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ABSTRACT 
WILLIAM WALKER APEDAILE 
TITLE 
The interface between the Planning System and private organisations in the case of 
large applications for Development: a theoretical and empirical study. 
This thesis focuses on the planning system as a complex and frequently difficult interface 
between the planning system and private organisations. The key questions asked in the thesis 
are first analytical, what are the relationships at the interface and secondly, managerial, can the 
interface be managed in a better way? 
The theoretical approach adopted is based on the Institutional Approach to planning and more 
particularly the communicative version of that approach. A particular analytical method has 
been developed based on project issues and the investigation of five dimensions of planning: 
Command, Challenge, Collaboration, Contract and Culture (the 5Cs). 
This research has a qualitative focus and is based on three case studies: a compulsory purchase 
by an Urban Development Corporation of a building owned by a major company whose 
challenge took the case to the Court of Appeal; a change of use of a site from bus depot to a 
supermarket raising highway, traffic, Conservation area, air pollution and cultural issues; a 
change of use from an industrial site to housing in which the Local Plan, employment and 
housing were key issues. 
The thesis finds a dominant power of command in planning governance, a crucial importance of 
the right to challenge, and an absence of real collaboration and contractual relationships. The 
lack of discussion in practice of the importance of cultural differences and the impact on 
resources are also evident. 
From these findings the thesis proposes a prescriptive model for the management of the public-
private interface. This is based on a modified collaborative model of the Institutional Approach 
but is equally influenced by the analytical model of the 5 Cs developed in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 1- THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE INTERFACE IN PLANNING: 
AN INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Planning - A Problem Interface 
In 1992, The Duke of Northumberland's Estate (the Estate) applied for Outline Planning 
Approval to develop some 16 acres of land at Willowburn on the outskirts of Alnwick, 
Northumberland, for a 50,000 sq.ft. scheme, including a 30,000 sq.ft. supermarket. The 
proposed site was designated for continuing agricultural use in the Structure Plan and 
furthermore, did not satisfy a specific government policy dealing with the impact of additional 
out of town retail development on existing town centre retailing. Despite an officer 
recommendation to approve, Alnwick District Council (the Council) rejected the application 
because it was inconsistent with the Structure Plan. This rejection resulted in a new application 
from the Estate for a much larger scheme, now including a 50,000 sq.ft. retail development. 
This scheme was approved late in 1993, despite objections from Alnwick Civic Society, the 
sole objector, on the grounds of the potential damage to retail trade in the town centre, a view 
supported by the Council's own expert consultants. 
In 1995, Safeway plc bought half of the site and lodged a planning application for a 50,000 
sq.ft. supermarket, a proposal supported by the Council leadership and the officers. Again the 
Objectors were the Civic Society but now supported by the Town Council and the Chamber of 
Trade. They objected to the scheme as being potentially damaging to town centre trade and the 
Council were ignoring their own consultants' advice. The Objectors also attempted, in vain, to 
persuade the Government Office in the North East (GONE), to call in the application. 
On the day the Council was to consider the application in 1996, GONE intervened, severely 
criticizing the Council for its December 1993 decision to approve the scheme. The Council 
was held to have acted "grossly wrongly" in approving when they had clear evidence that the 
retail element in the scheme would have a severe impact on the viability of trade in the town 
centre. The Secretary of State was also minded to revoke the retail element of the scheme as 
contravening national, county and local policies on retailing. In November 1996, the Secretary 
of State confirmed his intention to modify the 1993 approval excluding the retail element of the 
scheme. The Council, backed by the Estate and Safeway, appealed against this decision, 
resulting in a Public Inquiry in June 1997. 
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At the two week long Inquiry, the applicant's case was the clear need for extra retailing (not 
contested by the Objectors) and the only logical solution was the Willowburn site. The 
Objectors questioned the legitimacy of the Council's actions, the non-conformity ofthe scheme 
with planning policy, the impact on town centre retailing and the choice of the Willowburn site 
as the only possible location for extra retailing. 
The Inspector reported in three weeks but it was nine months before the Secretary of State's 
decision, accepting the report, was announced. The Inspector's report was a damning 
condemnation of the Council's actions. They were described as "grossly wrong" and "seriously 
perverse". They were also wrong in not accepting their own consultants' advice and also wrong 
in not implementing National & Structure Plan policies whereby the scheme ought to have been 
rejected. Following the decision, the Council and its insurers faced a £4 million compensation 
claim from Safeway who believed they had been mislead over the security of the planning 
approval. The insurers insisted that the Council must apply for judicial review, where the 
judgement of the High Court judge was a round condemnation of the Council's actions. 
1.2 The Significance of the Research Topic 
A short account of the Alnwick case has been presented here to illustrate why the interface that 
is the subject of this thesis is indeed worthy of research. The technicalities that arise in such 
cases as this are investigated and explained in later chapters but there are a number of points to 
be noted here. First, the dysfunctional delay - the case took six years for what ought to have 
been a straightforward determination. Secondly, there was the prolonged uncertainty of 
outcome arising from the delays. Thirdly, the actions of the people in the Council were found to 
be wrong and perverse in policy interpretation and implementation. Fourthly, there were the 
serious financial consequences for the Council after Safeway made their compensation claim 
for lost opportunity costs. Lastly, there is power in the system to get wrongs righted where the 
public in this case forced a wrong decision to be corrected and were supported by the Secretary 
of State. Moreover, the case raises issues about the impact of government policy and local 
plans, the role of the Regional Government Office, the Secretary of State, local politicians and 
officers, public sector procedures, appeals and Public Inquiries, the strategic inconsistencies, 
uncertainty, resource costs and ethical issues. 
The difficulties outlined here at Alnwick, together with the issues giving rise to them, are not 
unique in the author's experience. In a career lasting over thirty years with a major multi-
national corporation, difficulties in this conflict-laden interface have been a regular experience. 
I have obtained permits to build factories and offices in the UK, US, France, Germany, Italy 
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and Spain. In the non-UK projects, there were at times very difficult problems to be resolved 
but these were invariably technical issues as distinct from political issues. As it happened, we 
were not faced with technical officers' decisions being rejected by councillors, conflicting 
strategies or intra-organisational conflicts in the public sector. Nor were we faced with the long 
delays and uncertainty that bedevilled so many UK projects as illustrated by Alnwick. This 
personal experience was the original motivation for undertaking this research as a search for 
understanding and it raised the question: -
How can we explain and understand what is going on in the current relationships in the 
planning interface between public authorities and private organisations? 
There is however a second, wider point than this personal interest but arising from it. It is of 
little consequence to a business to know that of all the thousands of planning applications 
processed in a year, only a relatively small percentage fall into the types of cases exemplified 
by the Alnwick story. However, it is also the case that neither public nor private sector 
organisations can afford the time and resources to waste on this conflict-laden interface. At 
least the local authorities have specialist organisations devoted to planning matters whereas 
even very large private organisations rarely have such specialists. Even firms like Safeway 
depend on consultants and this is a firm that is constantly seeking planning consents for new 
sites. This then leads to the second question: -
In the interface between the planning system and private organisations, can a practical 
approach be developed that can improve the management of that interface to the benefit 
ofboth sides? 
This is the big question for the research and this thesis will be seeking to provide such an 
approach. 
1.3 The Focus of the Thesis 
The focus of the thesis is on the conflict issues arising in cases like Alnwick and the problems 
they cause. It must be emphasised at the outset, that this thesis is not focussed on the planning 
system in general but only on the problem interface between private organisations and the 
system. The problems may be common to both sides but the private organisation may suffer 
particularly in terms of unexpectedly high resource costs and lost business opportunities. 
Taking Alnwick as an example, from the point of view of the private sector applicant, the main 
difficulties are, first, the dysfunctional delay e.g. six years to achieve the final determination. 
Secondly, the uncertainty of outcome e.g. the initial rejection of one scheme at Alnwick, then 
approval of a much larger scheme followed by eventual rejection of all proposals after a public 
inquiry and judicial review. Lastly, the disproportionate costs e.g. a massive compensation 
claim against the Council, arising from the lost business opportunities for Safeway. 
13 
From the illustrative example of Alnwick and from the author's personal experience, we can 
note that from a private organisation's point of view, the organisation has a single-minded 
objective to get its project successfully achieved. A well-run business has no energy to waste 
as much as six years embroiled in the planning process in the confines of a single project. 
Secondly, the open- ended negotiations frequently experienced in the planning process are not 
conducive to an efficient and effective process and in any case, negotiation, as distinct from 
collaboration, can take place in a very hostile environment. It is difficult to see collaboration 
taking place amid such hostility. Thirdly, the lack of real contractual relationships does not lead 
to an effective process. Fourth, culture has a big influence on public and private organisation 
and people, informing their very actions, yet is never openly discussed as a problem in the 
process. 
Central and local government priorities may conflict, requiring clearer government guidance, 
more joined-up governance and better intelligence on central and local government priorities. 
There may be local political conflicts (e.g. legitimate objections) that may be capable of 
resolution with local interest groups. The private sector applicant may lack adequate knowledge 
and expertise to deal with the planning system. Here the solution could be improved 
collaboration and communication between the sectors, together with an adequate supply of 
good quality consultancy and advice. Public sector policy priorities may be competing or 
contradictory requiring more 'joined-up' government, but this may be a perfectly tenable 
position, say involving housing, transport and environmental policies. The planning process 
administration and management may be found wanting as it was at Alnwick. Solutions here 
may be improved standards of public administration, clearer and enforceable agreements 
between applicants and decision-makers. Lack of transparency may be a problem so that 
applicants are unable to minimise the risks of rejection, or assess opportunities and threats 
accurately and this may require greater efforts at transparency in the planning process. The 
Alnwick case provides a flavour of the complex nature of the planning process, as do the 
problems just outlined. It could be argued that the obvious solution to this complexity is major 
reform of the system. What I shall argue in this thesis is that such a level of reform is unrealistic 
in the context of a single project but nevertheless improvement to the process is still possible in 
that context. 
1.4 The Research Questions 
The difficulties we have encountered in the Alnwick case have already provided some support 
for the big question for this thesis. However, in order to answer that question, another series of 
questions arise, the research questions. These will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5, but they 
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are shown here in the context of the discussion in this chapter of the significance of the 
research, the research focus and the research objectives. The research questions are: -
1) Is there any theoretical basis for the way in which any or all of the participants in the system 
operate? 
2) Are there critical factors, perhaps structural that are built into the system and are then prime 
causes of the problems even between public sector organisations and if so, what are they? 
3) Why is so much uncertainty built into the process, could it be minimised and if so, how? 
4) Are there methodologies for managing the process that will avoid or minimise conflict and 
what are they? 
5) Are there policy and management implications, if so, what are they and how might they be 
implemented? 
6) Do the public and private sectors assess the conflict in the system differently and if so, why 
and how? 
7) Is it possible to develop an approach that will lead to improved working relationships in the 
planning process 
There are many ways the relevant issues could be categorised but in the context of this thesis, 
we are concerned with policy and management. Policy is critical because it is the bedrock of 
public sector activities in its generation, interpretation and implementation. On the other hand, 
the private organisation is the supplicant and has no choice in the matter of having to deal with 
a public authority. Management is a critical element on both sides and the interface is 
complicated by the dual nature of the hierarchy in the planning system with elected councillors 
and officers. 
1.5 Research Design & Methodology 
The starting point of this research is to establish a theoretical framework. As the planning 
system has essentially developed since the 1939-45 War, it seems appropriate initially to look at 
the political context in which the development has taken place. This leads to an investigation of 
the theoretical backgrounds of the state, local government and planning itself through an 
extensive search through the literature. An important question here is whether any planning 
theory is reflected in the actual implementation of the planning process. At the same time, my 
own experience of many projects has developed a comprehensive set of project issues that arose 
repeatedly on projects. These issues about the planning process require detailed analysis of 
appropriate empirical evidence. This is the starting point for the development of the analytical 
method and its framework (dealt with in detail in Chapter 5) and the investigation ofthree case 
studies to provide empirical evidence. 
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The development of the analytical method also saw the evolution of five dimensions of the 
interface relationship. Command, Challenge, Collaboration, Contract and Culture all developed 
out of consideration of the project issues mentioned above and the thrusts that lay behind them. 
These five dimensions (the '5 Cs' -- a shorthand term used later in the thesis) are used in the 
analysis of the narratives in the case studies. 
The thesis also develops a particular theoretical approach to the problems of the interface in 
planning. This approach starts from the basis of Institutional theory but is specifically an 
adaptation of the collaborative evolution of that theory as it applies to planning and developed 
in particular by Healey in her book 'Collaborative Planning' (Healey 1997). This theoretical 
approach is discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
1.6 Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis is presented in ten further chapters. 
Chapter 2 elaborates the framework, policy and process of the planning system in which the 
public -private interface is set. 
Chapter 3 sets out the development of planning over the last sixty years and discusses ideas 
about the relationship and roles of the state, local government and planning. 
Chapter 4 outlines the Institutional Approach to the design of governance and discusses the 
ideas that informed the evolution of Institutionalism into the current 'communicative approach' 
or 'collaborative approach'. This theoretical approach is discussed in some detail together with 
a short discussion of recent critiques of the approach. Finally, the adoption of a modified 
collaborative approach is elaborated for use in this thesis based on the work of Healey. 
Chapter 5 presents the empirical methodology adopted in this research, the research approaches 
and framework, the choice of case studies and the evolution of the analytical method. 
Chapter 6 provides a narrative account of the case and analysis of the first case study involving 
the regeneration of East Quayside at Newcastle. This case deals with the direct impact on a 
private organisation of a specific government policy, regeneration by an Urban Development 
Corporation and the use of a Compulsory Purchase Order. 
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Chapter 7 likewise provides a narrative account and analysis of the second case, a new Safeway 
supermarket at Bath that involved change of use of a site with highway and environmental 
problems arising from its location on the main London Road in Bath. 
Chapter 8 provides a narrative account and analysis of the third case study involving the 
proposed change of use for housing of a disused and semi derelict factory site at Francis 
Avenue, Bournemouth. This case raised issues of retention of employment land, need for more 
housing stock and changes to the Local Plan. 
Chapter 9 examines the empirical evidence of the three cases using the analytical method and 
reflecting the five dimensions of the planning interface (the 5 Cs). 
Chapter 10 examines the implications of the empirical evidence for planning theory. 
Chapter 11 moves from theory to practice. A perspective on the implications of the research for 
policy and management are followed by an outline of a prescriptive collaborative approach. 
1. 7 Conclusions 
This introductory chapter has illustrated some of the difficulties that arise in the planning 
interface. The illustrative Alnwick case has shown the conflicts, delays, uncertainties, impact 
on resources and costs that can occur. Furthermore, it has illustrated the role of objectors as 
stakeholders, the importance of the right to challenge through public inquiries and the roles 
played by all the actors. Here we have an example of conflict arising from implementation 
rather than policy. The crux of the case was the failure of the Council to comply with their own 
local policies as well as clear government policy guidance on out of town retail development. It 
has clearly shown up the impact of the role of the elected members and officers and the impact 
on the process in a case where they have acted perversely. This case illustrates a process that is 
unacceptable to all the participants and is consistent, in many of its aspects of difficulty, with 
many of my own experiences with the system. This is why I have undertaken this research. 
This thesis will seek to show that it is possible to develop a more project based and 
collaborative approach to management of the planning process that, with a more emphasis on 
explicitly contractual arrangements, will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the process 
and minimise if not avoid many of these difficulties. Such improvements are possible without 
obstructing the key purpose of the planning system, which is to protect the public interest. This 
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collaborative approach will be developed, drawing on empirical examples and an adapted 
version of Healey' s collaborative approach. 
This chapter has attempted to provide some understanding of why the big question was worth 
addressing and some indication of the path to answering the question. We now set out along 
that path. 
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CHAPTER 2 -THE PLANNING SYSTEM, FRAMEWORK, POLICY & 
PROCESS 
2.1 Introduction 
The planning system has gradually evolved from a focus on housing and public health issues 
into a regulatory system focussing on land use and spatial planning. In the context of 
government policy, this regulation is achieved through a legal framework empowering 
government ministers, civil servants and local authority councillors and officers to administer 
the system. In addition, the courts may become involved through the appeal system allowed 
under the law. 
This chapter provides an outline of this complex system because it is relevant to this thesis. 
Thus a short account of the crucial legal framework provides the background against which the 
organisation of the system, the component institutions and the individuals can be considered. 
The importance of central government Orders, policy guidance notes, and statutory instruments 
is outlined because of their critical influence reflecting changes in government policy in the 
planning process. 
The core elements of the planning process, Development Plans and Development Control 
including the appeal and decision systems are described in some detail as the guts of the 
process. A description of Urban Development Corporations is provided for two reasons. First 
one of my case studies concerns an extensive conflict with a UDC. Secondly, the UDCs were a 
crucial element in the Thatcher administration's policy commitment to achieving urban 
regeneration. This involved, among many other effects, the removal of planning powers from 
the relevant local authority for the specifically designated area. In achieving this property led 
regeneration, one of the vitally important powers given to the UDCs was that of compulsory 
purchase. A brief account of the compulsory purchase process and compensation is therefore 
provided at appropriate points, as this is a key factor in one of the case studies. As the 
administrative powers stem from a legal basis that is the starting point for this chapter. 
2.2 The Legal Framework 
The planning system in the UK is based on a legal structure that has evolved from the Housing, 
Town Planning etc. Act 1909 with its somewhat elementary provisions giving local authorities 
powers to prepare schemes 
. . with the general objective of securing proper sanitary conditions, amenity and 
convenience in connection with the laying out and use of the land. 
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Dissatisfaction with the provisions of this and later inter-war Planning Acts led to government 
commissioned investigations into various aspects of planning in the late 1930s. The resulting 
reports, the Bar low Report ( 1940) on Distribution of the Industrial Population, the Scott Report 
(1942) on Land Utilisation in Rural Areas and the Uthwatt Report ( 1942) on Compensation and 
Betterment all significantly influenced thinking on a new land use regulatory system. 
Eventually this led to the enactment of the Town and Country Planning Act 194 7 (the 194 7 
Act) and this has been the basis of planning over the past half century. 
The 194 7 Act not only created local planning authorities but also required them to prepare a 
development plan for their administrative area indicating the way land should be used and how 
such development should be carried out. In addition, all land was to be subject to development 
control to be guided by the development plan. Because of increasing complications and many 
decisions of the courts, further consolidation of planning legislation was necessary in Acts of 
1953, 1962, 1971 and 1990 (the 1990 Act) and three ancillary Acts. 
Because it is not possible to change legislation substantially in a consolidation Act, i.e. the 
1990 Act, separate legislation was necessary, consequently the Planning & Compensation Act 
1991 (the 1991 Act) was enacted. This Act made important changes to the law on planning 
relating to development plans, the definition of development, appeals, enforcement, 
compensation for compulsory acquisition of land and other matters. A crucial effect of this Act 
was to insert in the 1990 Act a provision which gave the development plan a prime place vis a 
vis other material considerations in the development control process. Section 26 of the 1991 
Act provided that the following provision should be added at the end of Part II of the 1990 Act: 
S.54 (a). Where, in making any determination under the planning Acts, regard is to be had to 
the development plan, the determination shall be made in accordance with the plan 
unless material considerations indicate otherwise. 
This new provision was crucial as it led to what is termed 'plan-led' decisions compared with 
earlier consideration of the development plan as merely one of the material considerations that 
was given no special weight. Moo re (2000 p.204) points out that the mandatory terms of this 
provision leave no room for discretion in its application. He suggests that only if there is no 
policy in the plan relevant to an application or if there is conflicting policy advice, may there be 
a case for disregarding S.54 (a). In addition, adherence or otherwise to the development plan 
carries considerable weight with the Secretary of State and Inspector in the call-in and appeal 
processes. This weight was evident at Alnwick and is a key factor in one of the case studies. In 
both cases, the issue was a practical one of implementation of policy in development plans. 
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2.3 The Organisation 
There are essentially two mam tiers of the organisation of the planning system, central 
government in the guise of the Secretary of State (together with the Regional Government 
Offices) and local government in the guise of the local planning authorities. A brief description 
of the responsibilities of the various participants is necessary before describing the actual 
process. 
The Secretary of State 
The planning system has from the outset been organised on the basis that day to day running of 
the system is the direct responsibility of local planning authorities. The law does not prescribe 
the responsibilities of the Secretary of State (the Minister) nevertheless he or she has wide 
powers to exercise overall supervision and co-ordination of the way in which the planning 
authorities operate to ensure they follow government policy. The Minister proposes legislation 
to Parliament, can issue regulations or orders fleshing out detail in the 1990 Act, issues 
important policy guidance notes, can call-in a draft development plan for his or her 
determination, although this is infrequent, likewise he or she can call-in a planning application 
for determination under Article 14 of the General Development Order 1988, orders public local 
inquiries, determines appeals under Section 78 of the 1990 Act against refusal of permission or 
conditions attached to an approval and confirms Compulsory Purchase Orders for authorities 
under his jurisdiction e.g. Urban Development Corporations. With this array of intervention 
available, he or she is, as noted by Moore (1997 pp. 12-13), at the apex of a pyramid of power. 
Moore goes on to point out that, in the end, the final say over determination of the use of the 
smallest parcel of land is given in law to the Minister. In all of these activities, the Minister is 
of course, acting with advice from civil service staff, both national and regional. Furthermore, 
the Minister is under no obligation to reveal information available to him or to his officials. 
It is important to put in context the Minister's role in the decision making over called-in 
applications, appeals, and confirmation of Compulsory Purchase Orders etc. The Courts have 
said that the role of the Minister is not simply to adjudicate between two parties. Lord Diplock 
made clear that the public interest must be treated as paramount and Lord Green in B. Johnson 
& Co (Builders) Ltd. v Minister of Health (1947),_made clear that:-
.. it is the function of the Minister to consider the rights and interests of the public. 
Lord Green has also enunciated principles known as the 'Wednesbury principles' laying down 
constraints about what the Minister must take into account in exercising a discretionary power. 
The decision must not be so unreasonable that no reasonable Minister would have made it. In 
another case, specifically about a CPO, Lord Denning said the Court can only interfere if the 
21 
minister has not complied with the powers available in the Act. The Minister must therefore 
consider all the evidence, treat the public interest as paramount, and be mindful of the 
Wednesbury principles. 
The Secretary of State can be seen as the apex of a power pyramid as suggested by Moore but 
he or she is subject to constraints in terms of legality, public interest, parliamentary support, 
media criticism and of course lobby groups. 
Regional Government Offices 
These are multi-Departmental offices located in the regions, e.g. m the North East. The 
Government Office for the North East (GONE) is staffed by civil servants under a Regional 
Director. The Department of Environment is represented in these offices by staff who can 
become actively involved in a planning application. This would occur in advising the Minister 
on a decision to call-in the application or when an appeal is made resulting in an Inquiry 
requiring Ministerial involvement e.g. at Alnwick. There is an element of networking between 
these civil servants and local authority officers from which applicants are excluded. Applicants 
have no negotiating access to the civil servants. 
Local Authorities 
In the planning system, the local authority has responsibility for development of planning 
policy through the Structure or Local Plans and for day-to-day processing of planning 
applications through Development Control. 
The local authority normally sets up a Planning Committee of elected councillors. This 
committee will consider and decide on formal recommendations made by the professional 
planning officers for determination of an application. In important cases, the full council may 
eventually take the final decision. In the democratic process, the elected members are finally 
responsible for the planning activities of the authority. This can be a conflict-laden 
responsibility when members may accept or reject recommendations of officers, must at times 
address conflicting government and local policies, have conflicting priorities vis-s-vis adjacent 
local authorities or even with their own electorate e.g. the first two points here were germane to 
the Alnwick case. Essex (1996 pp. 156-167) points to the difficulties members may have in 
getting involved in depth with Development Plan evolution also dealing with numerous and 
sometimes complex planning applications indeed members can reach overload. 
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Local authorities employ professionally qualified staff to advise members on planning matters, 
in policy areas, develop and obtain approval for the authority's policies through the statutory 
plans and other policy statements, through development control, examine and make 
recommendations for acceptance or otherwise of planning applications. Frequently, powers are 
delegated to officers to determine non-contentious planning application. The role of the officers 
is pivotal in the planning process. 
2.4 The Planning Process 
Having outlined the legal framework and the organisation of planning we now turn to the 
planning process. The core of the planning system in the UK is concerned with land use and 
spatial planning and consists of two key elements: -
1) Development plans that provide overall guidance; 
2) Development control that is the familiar planning process operated at local level on a 
case-by-case basis by the local authority. 
Development Plans 
In non-metropolitan areas, a two-tier system prevails involving a Structure Plan and a Local 
Plan and it is these two plans we will discuss here following the flow chart (Figure 2.1) 
The preparation of the structure plan is based on a survey of the relevant area by the local 
authority, usually the county council. This survey generates the data on which policies 
contained in the Structure plan will be based. Section 30 of the Town & Country Planning Act 
1990 (the 1990 Act), specifies a number of topics that are to be kept under review and 
examined. These are: -
The principal physical and economic characteristics of the area, including the principal 
uses to which the land is put; 
The size, composition and distribution of the population; 
Communications, transport and traffic characteristics; 
Such other matters as the Secretary of State may from time to time direct. 
Adequate publicity is to be given to this survey activity to allow due consideration of 
representations from interested persons. Thomas ( 1996 p.l71) notes the difficulties of involving 
public participation at this stage. 
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Figure 2.1 - Development Plan Process 
Based on a diagram in Rydin ( 1993 p. 89) revll/9/2003 
24 
A draft version of the plan is prepared, based on the survey and setting out policies in relation 
to development and land use covering amenity, areas of natural beauty, improvement of 
physical environment and traffic management. This is a 'broad brush' written statement 
although illustrative diagrams and the like are allowed. 
Key topics to be covered are new housing, green belts and conservation, rural economy, 
strategic transport and highway plans, major employment developments, minerals, waste 
disposal, land reclamation, tourism, leisure and recreation. Economic issues must be considered 
also social issues but only in terms of land use. 
This Draft Plan must enjoy wide publicity, consultation and public participation in its 
preparation and review. Government guidance in PPG 12 Development Plans and Regional 
Guidance points to the importance of such publicity and participation but Thomas (1996 pp. 
168-188) among others argues that this is not so easily achieved. In fact, government pressures 
on speed and efficiency in the preparation and adoption of these plans does not easily fit with 
the time needed to deal with objections which may be more numerous the more wide public 
participation is encouraged. The Draft Plan is placed on deposit for a stipulated period and 
again must enjoy adequate publicity. 
If there are no objections and the Secretary of State approves, the structure plan is adopted. 
Normally however and certainly if there are objections, the Secretary of State appoints a panel 
to conduct an Examination-in Public (EIP) to consider and report upon selected matters. The 
local authority that prepared the plan makes this selection of matters and the panel is not 
appointed to consider objections. There is no right of hearing at the EIP, invitations are 
essentially extended to those who are relevant to the discussions. Following the Report of the 
panel, modifications to the plan may be recommended and this may produce further objections 
and another EJP. Finally, agreed modifications may be made and the structure plan submitted to 
the Secretary of State for approval. If approved, the plan is then formally adopted. The life of 
the plan is expected to be ten to fifteen years. It must be noted that the process described here 
obtained until provisions of the Planning & Compensation Act 1991, amended the 1990 Act to 
allow county councils to approve their own plans. Nevertheless, the Secretary of State retains 
considerable powers of intervention in the process. 
The local plan follows much the same process as the Structure plan but does not start with the 
survey. In fact it sets out detailed policies and proposals for development and use of land in the 
area within the context of the relevant structure plan. The preparation of a district local plan is 
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mandatory and as we shall see, plays an important role in the use of a specific piece of land, 
unlike the structure plan. The content of the local plan is again a written statement and 
diagrams but must also include a map showing the existing and proposed land use in the area. 
The local plan will also normally include policies covering improvement of the physical 
environment and management of traffic. 
The local plan process allows for a public local inquiry to consider objections to the draft local 
plan rather than consideration of selected matters of the Examination-in-Public. This step is 
avoidable if after appropriate consultations and negotiations, objections are withdrawn. 
Following the inquiry and the Inspector's report, the local authority is required to give due 
consideration to the report and to give reasons for not following the Inspector's 
recommendations. Moore (2000 p. 71) emphasises the heavy responsibility laid on the local 
authority to discharge this duty with due care and diligence. Modifications to the draft plan may 
then be made with due publicity and the plan adopted. Adoption of the local plan is subject to 
its conformity to the structure plan and to that end a Certificate of Conformity has to be issued 
by the county council. The Secretary of State has powers to call-in a local plan for his or her 
approval but this likely to be only in exceptional circumstances. 
Development Control 
Permission to develop must be obtained prior to commencement of works, this being defined in 
Section 55 of the 1990 Act covering broadly all building, engineering, mining works and all 
material change of use of land and buildings. Again a flow chart is the best way of showing 
this process (Figure 2.2). 
In the majority of cases, the development control process is straightforward and leads to a 
permission to develop. Normally two types of planning application are available: -
1) Outline, which establishes in principle permission to develop but with reserved 
matters e.g. siting, design, landscaping, access, external appearance left until the 
required full application is submitted usually within three years; 
2) Full, which completes the outline process or an application where full details are 
submitted at the outset. 
Discussion and negotiation with the officers during scheme development is normal and is likely 
to lead to an application incorporating any specific requirements of the council. The elected 
councillors are not involved in negotiations and at best some local authorities permit a short 
presentation to the planning committee. Following the submission of the application, publicity 
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is mandatory, particularly among those immediately affected by the proposal as is statutory 
consultation with other authorities e.g. highway, utilities, the Environmental Agency, rail etc. 
Scheme Pre-application 
discussions 
Submission of application 
Possible Site visit b Committee & Officers 
Permission to 
develop 
Planning Decision 
Conditional 
permission 
Inspector's Report 
ea! decision 
Refusal of 
application 
Vary original 
conditions 
Figure 2.2 - Development Control Process 
Based on a Diagram in Rydin ( 1993 p. 97) 
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Normally the application is permitted and the scheme can be started. A time limit of eight 
weeks is laid down for the planning decision to be made but with the agreement of the applicant 
this can be extended, particularly with complex projects. As previously noted, the decision is 
made by elected councillors on the planning committee following formal recommendations by 
the planning officers. The committee does not necessarily accept these recommendations as we 
saw at Alnwick. 
Conditions are normally attached to an approval most being of a standard nature e.g. maximum 
size of development and approval of actual materials of construction. However, special 
conditions may be attached relating to specific circumstances e.g. flood protection, soil 
contamination clean up etc. Under Section 1 06 of the 1990 Act planning authorities were 
entitled to enter into agreements with applicants which, after the 1991 Act, were given the 
terminology of 'planning obligations'. Such Section 106 agreements were used particularly 
where the applicant would be obliged to carry out local road improvements. 
As we have seen from the description of the role of the Secretary of State, that Minister can 
prevent a decision being made and can call-in an application for his or her own determination. 
Such a call-in will normally lead to a public local inquiry being held where in most cases the 
appointed Inspector will enjoy delegated powers and make the decision. 
Provision exists for appeal to the Secretary of State for the Environment by the applicant 
against a refusal or against what he or she considers unduly onerous conditions. Rydin ( 1993) 
notes that in 1990-91, 26,000 appeals were decided in England & Wales. In a minor case, the 
appeal may be by written representations which an Inspector will consider and decide quite 
quickly. In more difficult situations, the appointed Inspector will hold a public local inquiry. 
The Inspector is normally a member of the Planning Inspectorate that was formerly a 
Directorate of the DoE. This lead to charges of potential lack of independence of Inspectors but 
in 1992 this organisation became an executive agency of the DoE. The Inspector will hear the 
evidence, take into account material considerations, report and if delegated powers are 
available, make the decision to approve or to vary the original conditions. 
It is in the Development Control area of the planning system where most of the conflicts occur. 
Alnwick illustrates this point where Safeway were caught between conflicting implementation 
of policy and determination over two applications, conflicts between members and officers and 
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the public eventually getting a wrong righted. However the causes of conflict may well lie in 
policy areas and the interpretation and-or the implementation of those policies at local level. 
The Public Local Inquiry 
As we have seen in the description of the planning process, Public Local Inquires are an 
important feature of the system so an attempt will be made here to highlight a few key features 
germane to this thesis. 
A public inquiry is set up to hear objections or an appeal against a decision and is normally 
conducted subject to two sets of rules, first, Statutory Rules of Procedure and secondly, the 
rules of natural justice, to ensure that the administrative process is carried out fairly. There are 
separate rules for normal planning matters and for compulsory purchase matters. The Statutory 
Rules are intended to ensure that the parties know that by following these rules the rules of 
natural justice are unlikely to be transgressed. Another benefit is that since 1988 and further 
revision in 1992, the procedure rules have imposed discipline on all participants in terms of the 
programme and timing of events up to, through and after the inquiry. The timing is based on 
the 'relevant date'. i.e. the date on which the Secretary of State formally notifies the appellant, 
the authority and statutory parties or objectors that an inquiry is to be held. Clearly, the 
common law rules of natural justice are a key feature of the inquiry. It is important to note 
here, that if there has been a breach of either of these rules, an order can be challenged in the 
Courts. Under Rule 6 of the Rules, the local authority must submit a 'statement of case' within 
six weeks of the relevant date to all the other parties, the Secretary of State, the appellant and 
any statutory party. The statement of case is a written statement giving full particulars of the 
case it is intended to submit at the inquiry together with a list of any supporting documents or 
evidence. Within a further three weeks, the appellant is likewise required to submit to all the 
other parties a statement of case. 
Except as otherwise required by the Rules, the conduct of the inquiry is at the discretion of the 
Inspector. The appellant, the authority and the statutory objectors are entitled to call evidence 
and to cross-examine witnesses. Specialist barristers normally represent the major participants 
as all the evidence is formally presented and is then subject to cross-examination. In complex 
cases the inquiry may last for some weeks. At any time, the Inspector may make a visit to the 
site, accompanied or otherwise as he or she sees fit. 
Following the inquiry, the inspector must write to the Secretary of State summarising the 
evidence, reporting his findings of fact and his recommendations. The Secretary of State then 
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makes the formal decision, notifying in writing all the participants at the inquiry and giving 
reasons for the decision. A copy of the Inspector's report or a summary is normally attached. 
The Secretary of State may allow the appeal, reject it, or vary the permission. The time taken 
for this decision can vary from weeks to many months and it is extremely difficult for the 
applicant to discover what is happening. The decision is normally final but provision is also 
made for challenge in the courts. Increasingly, the Inspector is taking the decision on the appeal 
on behalf of the Secretary of State and this does of course speed up the process. 
The importance of the Public Local Inquiry is exemplified by the Alnwick case where the 
Inspector roundly condemned the Council's actions and was supported by the Secretary of State 
and the Judge at judicial review. Here, the public view was heard by an independent official 
when the local authority did not appear to be listening. 
2.5 Planning Policy 
We have seen in Section 2.2 that the planning system is based on a legal framework. However, 
government policy is not static and in any case, the courts are constantly making decisions that 
can and do influence policy and the law. This section will discuss some of the instruments used 
by government in implementing these changes, Orders and Regulations made under the Acts, 
and provision of planning policy guidance. 
Orders 
Much of the 1990 Act lays down no more than general principles, thus the Secretary of State is 
given powers in the 1990 Act to make Regulations and Orders by the use of Statutory 
Instruments (Sis). These Sis are normally subject only to a negative resolution of either House 
of Parliament within a forty-day period otherwise the SI comes into force automatically. The 
Cabinet Office confirmed that the present government had issued 4,150 Statutory Instruments 
in 2001 (Sunday Telegraph Report of January 20, 2002). Until 1992, this figure had never 
exceeded 3,000. These figure do of course cover all areas of government. 
Orders enable the Secretary of State to vary many important provisions of the Planning Act. 
Two Orders of particular importance in the context ofthis thesis are:-
The Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987 (SI No. 764) 
This Order defines eleven 'use classes' and lays down that if a change of use in the same class 
is proposed, there is no material change of use and planning approval is not therefore required. 
The importance of this Order may be gauged by the comments of Grant (1989 pp. 2-3) who 
30 
notes that the courts have been closely guided by the use classes in their interpretation of what 
does and what does not constitute a material change of use. 
The Town & Country Planning (General Development) Order 1988. (SI No. 1813) 
Among other matters, this Order covers the procedures to be followed in processing planning 
applications. This includes powers for the Secretary of State to give direction to local 
authorities under Article 14 restricting their power to grant an approval, indefinitely or for a 
specified period. This may be done simply to allow the Secretary of State time to determine 
whether or not to call in the application for his or her own determination. Article 23 (2) (a) lays 
down that determination of an application must be within eight weeks from the date the 
application was received unless an extension of time is agreed with the applicant. Grant ( 1989 
p. 124-125) notes that this timing is a target rather than being realistic and goes on to quote 
Department of Environment statistics for April-June 1988 showing only 56% of all 
applications in that period having been determined within the eight weeks. The applicant's 
remedy for failure to determine within the statutory period is of course appeal to the Secretary 
of State. As we have seen at Alnwick and will see in all the case studies, this issue of delays, 
uncertainties and consequent costs is one of the key problem areas in the planning system. 
Planning Policy Guidance 
At present there are 25 PPGs and 13 RPGs in force in various editions, re-issues being made at 
times to reflect changes or new initiatives in government policy. It may be noted that there 
were 852 pages ofPPG's alone in late 2001 (Planning Green Paper 2001). 
These documents are of utmost importance to local authorities and others concerned with 
planning matters. For example PPG 1 General Policy & Principles provides strategic 
commentary on government's planning policies, PPG6 Town Centres & Retail Development on 
the other hand deals with policy on retail developments and tests for assessment of proposals, 
PPG 12 Development Plans deals with the role and importance of Development Plans. RPG 1 
Strategic Guidance for Tyne & Wear is an example of Regional Planning Guidance. A critically 
important issue with these policy documents is the weight attaching to them as material 
considerations which the planning authorities and indeed the Secretary of State must take into 
account in determining an application or an appeal e.g. Alnwick. Accusations are levelled at 
planning officers that they slavishly follow the policy guidance as a given. In a judgement on 
PPGs, Lord Justice Purchas said 
The only statutory obligation upon the local planning authority is 'to have regard to 
them'. They are in no way bound by them. (Carpets of Worth Ltd. v Wyre Forest District 
Council 1991) 
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However, LJ Purchas later pointed out the importance of planning authorities observing the 
guidance and departing from it only for clear reasons that should be stated. We can note here 
that PPG 6 dealing with out of town retail development and its effect on town centre retailing 
was ignored at Alnwick with serious consequences for the council. 
2.6 Urban Development Corporations 
A rather different manifestation of government policy but one of the utmost importance through 
the 1980s and 1990s was the institution of Urban Development Corporations. The first 
Thatcher administration quickly expressed dissatisfaction with the record and performance of 
the public sector in solving the urban regeneration problem. The Secretary of State, Hesletine, 
argued that: -
There is a need for a single minded determination not possible for the local authorities 
concerned with their much broader responsibilities (DoE 1979) 
Engagement of the private sector was seen to be an important element of the solution to this 
problem and action quickly followed. 
Government Policy 
In the light of the new policy, the Local Government, Planning and Land Act - 1980 (the 1980 
Act) was enacted empowering the Secretary of State to designate any area of land as a 
designated area provided he was of the opinion that it was expedient in the national interest to 
do so. Following such designation of an Urban Development Area (UDA), the Secretary of 
State could then set up an Urban Development Corporation (UDC). The objective of the UDCs 
was stated to be securing the regeneration of the UDAs that were generally areas of urban or 
industrial dereliction. No definition of urban generation was provided in the 1980 Act, although 
guidance was given on how it might be achieved. This was stated in Section 136 of the Act in 
these terms: -
To secure the regeneration of its area by bringing land and buildings into effective use, 
encouraging development of new and existing commerce/industry, creating an 
attractive environment and ensuring availability of housing and social facilities, thus 
encouraging people to live and work in the area. 
No subsequent definition of regeneration was offered by the DoE. However, this lack of 
definition caused problems that were widely recognised. The question was whether 
regeneration meant the physical improvement of sites, buildings, infrastructure etc. or that it 
included elements of welfare and community centred interest. This was addressed by the House 
of Commons Public Accounts Committee ( 1989), the Employment Committee ( 1989) and by 
many writers e.g. Colenutt (1988), Colenutt & Tansley (C.L.E.S. 1989) and Parkinson (1988). 
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Judge ( 1989) summed up these arguments when he commented on the differences between 
Parkinson (1988) and a response from Shields ( 1988). To quote Judge (1989): -
. . the lack of definition in the Act is key when Parkinson argues for a wider definition 
reflecting people's needs and Shields argues that such a definition would involve UDCs 
in a task they were never designed to fulfil. 
This was noted by Stoker ( 1988) when he said of physical regeneration that: -
. . the UDCs' single minded focus on this task is seen as one of their central 
characteristics. 
It must be noted that the designation of a UDA and setting up of UDCs was based on the 
opinion of the Secretary of State, the expediency of the national interest and that no prior 
consultation was required with the people, relevant Local Authorities, business or indeed 
anyone. Compared with the setting up of the post-war New Town Development Corporations, 
the UDCs were not subject to the consultation and possible public inquiry process of the New 
Towns. The potential delays caused by such processes were not acceptable to the government 
(Cullingworth 1994 p. 205). To achieve regeneration and to implement Hesletine's 'single 
minded determination' required avoidance of long planning delays and effective acquisition of 
UDA land, usually in multiple ownerships. Consequently, thirteen UDC's were eventually set 
up in five phases between 1981 and 1993 including the Tyne & Wear Development Corporation 
(TWDC) in 1987. The UDCs were to be non-elected agencies, set up and controlled by the DoE 
wherein rested the powers to designate the UDA, appoint its Board and Chief Executive, 
control its funding by grant-in-aid, agree its important annual corporate plan, give it statutory 
powers for development control and compulsory purchase and eventually decide its life span. 
In appointing the Board, the DoE had to have regard to the desirability of securing the services 
of people having special knowledge of the area (Colenutt & Tansley 1989). 
Powers 
The 1980 Act gave crucially important powers to UDCs, in relation to the UDA and adjacent 
lands. For example, Section 136 of the 1980 Act stated that UDCs may acquire, hold, manage, 
reclaim and dispose of land and other property, carry out building and other operations, seek to 
ensure the provision of water, electricity, gas, sewage and other services, carry on any business 
or undertaking for the purpose of the object and generally do anything necessary or expedient 
for the purposes of the object or for purposes incidental to that purpose. However, they must act 
within the general law. In addition, Section 149 of the Act allowed transfer of Development 
Control powers in the designated UDA from the relevant Local Authority to the UDC by an 
Order. The UDCs were to take note of and work within Local Plans while the local authority, 
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now with only a consulting-advisory role, had to recognize the impact of the plans developed 
by the UDCs. 
Generous funding by central government, together with the powers granted by the 1980 Act, 
would enable UDCs to lever in up to three times more private sector finance to effect 
regeneration of the relevant UDA. They were not expected to be developers in their own right. 
Imrie & Thomas ( 1993) noted that funding of the UDCs for 1989 - 92 ranged between £480- £500 
million each year. 
In practice then, the UDCs saw their task as physical regeneration of land involving land 
assembly, infrastructure improvements and the consequent attraction of private developers and 
their money. Conceptually, the thrust was "comprehensive regeneration" of a totally cleared site 
within the UDA by the removal or relocation of obstacles e.g. existing businesses of the wrong 
type. This meant businesses that could not be located on the new business parks as well as 
'non- conforming or bad neighbours' i.e. uses likely to cause environmental, aesthetic or similar 
problems (Colenutt C.L.E.S. Report No.2 1992), (Imrie & Thomas 1992). This strategy led to 
extensive use of Compulsory Purchase Orders (CPOs). 
2. 7 Compulsory Purchase by UDCs 
A Compulsory Purchase Order (CPO) is a legal device that allows Government, a Local 
Authority or any organisation possessing appropriate Statutory Powers to acquire land for 
stated purposes. Denyer- Green (1989) points out that since Parliament grants compulsory 
purchase powers on behalf of the community, it is unlikely that it would do so unless it was 
satisfied that, one, there is to be some public benefit and two, where private property is taken, 
compensation would be provided. Unlike a sale by a willing owner, compulsory purchase 
means the acquiring authority can unilaterally prepare the conveyances thus effectively passing 
title to itself. After serving the proper notice, the authority can then take possession of the land 
even against the owner's will. Statutory powers are crucial for three reasons (Denyer-Green 
1989), one, to authorise the compulsory purchase approach, two, to legalise an otherwise 
unlawful activity and three, to give powers to statutory authorities to carry out a particular 
activity. 
A Public General Act of Parliament is normally used to authorise the taking of unspecified land 
for a specific purpose by compulsory purchase followed by a CPO that specifies the land 
required. This procedure, allows the Secretary of State to confirm the CPO without further 
reference to Parliament. 
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The actual procedures for making and confirming a CPO are generally governed by the 
Acquisition of Land Act 1981. Matters common to every compulsory purchase e.g. conveyance 
of title, refusal of an owner to sell or give possession etc., are now covered by the Compulsory 
Purchase Act 1965, Section 7 of this Act providing the right of compensation when land is 
taken. Assessment of compensation is largely covered by the Land Compensation Act 1961 
together with many decisions of the Courts. 
Section 142 of the 1980 Act, empowered compulsory acquisition of land by UDCs, inside the 
designated UDA and even adjacent to it or elsewhere, if in these cases, acquisition was deemed 
necessary for proper discharge of the UDC's functions. Where a UDA comprised parcels of 
land in multiple ownerships, an owner or owners absolutely refusing to sell could clearly 
seriously compromise comprehensive site assembly. It is important to note here that there were 
special features and particular policies relevant to CPOs made by UDCs and these were set out 
in DoE Circular 23 I 88 - Compulsory Purchase by Urban Development Corporations. Before 
confirming a CPO, the Secretary of State would have in mind the statutory objectives of the 
UDC and would, inter alia, wish to consider the following points:-
!) Whether the UDC had demonstrated that the land was in need of regeneration. 
2) What alternative proposals (if any) had been put forward for regeneration by land 
owners (or others). 
3) Whether regeneration was, on balance, more likely to be achieved if the land was 
acquired by the UDC. 
4) The recent history of the land. 
5) Whether the land was in an area for which the UDC had proposals for a 
comprehensive regeneration scheme. 
6) The quality and timescale of both the UDC's regeneration proposals and any 
alternative proposals. 
Before submission of an Order to the Secretary of State for confirmation, the UDC had to notify 
every owner, lessee or occupier of affected land and publicise in newspapers the intention to 
make the order. This enabled any person to object to the Order within 21 days and these 
objections had to be considered by the Secretary of State. 
After confirmation of the Order and in order to acquire the land, the authority had to serve the 
affected persons with notice to treat. A number of consequences arose from receipt of this 
notice:-
I) The owner had 21 days in which to state his interest and his claim in respect of the 
land. 
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2) The owner was free to sell his interest in the land but must not create new interests 
with a view to obtaining increased compensation. 
3) The authority had the right to take possession upon giving notice of entry. 
Compensation for Compulsory Purchase 
As noted earlier, the acquiring authority must compensate the owner for loss of land taken by 
compulsory purchase. Once the owner's claim has been submitted, compensation has to be 
agreed and if disputed, referred to the Lands Tribunal. There are a number of very important 
points to be noted about compensation. First, under the Land Compensation Act 1961 (the 1961 
Act) purchase price is determined on open market value as if there was to be no scheme. 
Section 5 of this Act also states that no allowance shall be made because the acquisition is 
compulsory and assumes that the land is being sold by a willing seller. Second, the disturbance 
costs, i.e. the relocation and business interruption costs are all claimable by the affected owner. 
Third, the amount of compensation together with the disturbance costs, must be agreed and 
stamped by the District Valuer (DV) thus protecting the public from excessive expenditure. 
An important final point is that the compensation very often falls well short of the capital cost 
or ongoing new rental costs of replacing the owner's property in another location. This alone 
may offer sufficient cause for objection being made to a CPO. (Thomas, Imrie & Griffiths 
(1989) note such shortfalls and their effects in the Cardiff Bay UDC's CardiffDocklands UDA 
2.8 Challenges to a Compulsory Purchase Order 
Objections 
If any properly submitted objection is not subsequently withdrawn, the Minister must have the 
objection heard before an Inspector, normally at a Public Local Inquiry. Denyer-Green ( 1989) 
notes there are three groups of objectors. Firstly, 'statutory objectors', who are directly affected 
by the Order, owners, lessees or occupiers of affected land, but also neighbours, wishing to see 
the scheme modified in some way. Secondly, those accepting the proposed scheme but seeking 
a new site to which they can relocate. Finally are those objectors who seek to prevent the 
proposals being carried out at all. It will be seen that these disparate groups can constitute a 
formidable barrier to the CPO. The Public Local Inquiry is therefore the vehicle by which the 
objectors can hope to influence the Minister. Unless the Secretary of State has quashed the 
Order, the way is then open for the compulsory acquisition of the land. 
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Challenges in the Courts 
Section 23 of the 1981 Act permits any person with an interest in the land covered by the Order 
to challenge the validity of a CPO in the High Court on the grounds that, one, there are no 
powers in the enabling Act or in the 1981 Act authorising the Order, i.e. it is ultra vires and /or 
the essentially procedural requirements of the Acts and Regulations which apply to the CPO 
process have not been complied with, thus prejudicing the interests of the applicant. 
The ultra vires point can be sub-divided into three issues, one, the use of CPO powers outside 
the actual wording of the statutory legislation, two, misuse of the powers (note the Wednesbury 
principles), three, a breach of the rules of natural justice. The second of these grounds requires 
that to successfully challenge an Order on the grounds of procedural irregularity, the challenger 
must show substantial prejudice to himself. It is very important to understand the restrictions on 
the points which can be considered by the court because the merits, or otherwise of the Order, 
the reasons for it and Government Policy cannot be challenged. In addition to this procedure, a 
decision by the Secretary of State may be subject to judicial review under Order 53 of the Rules 
of the Supreme Court. 
Application must be made to a High Court judge for judicial review which may or may not be 
granted. The overriding rule is that of "sufficient interest" to the appellant. In civil cases, the 
case must be sufficiently arguable. A High Court judge will hear the appellant's case which 
may be rejected or one of three types of rei ief granted: -
1) Certiorari - a decision is brought to the High Court to be quashed; 
2) Prohibition - a restriction is made to prevent an action that is ultra vires; 
3) Mandamus -a requirement is made to carry out a duty. 
If the appellant's case is rejected leave may then be given to go to the Court of Appeal and 
ultimately even to the House ofLords, if the case is deemed to be of landmark importance. 
2.9 Conclusions 
This chapter has set out the context of the research by providing an outline of the planning 
system. The outline shows the importance of the legal framework in underpinning the 
administrative powers exercised by the Secretary of State, civil servants and local authorities. 
On the other hand, as we have seen in the Alnwick case, it also provides remedies for an 
aggrieved party for challenge through the appeal procedures, even as far as the courts. 
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The crucial role in the system of government in the guise of the Secretary of State can be seen 
all the way from the generation of policies, e.g. the conception and implementation ofUDCs, to 
the other end of the scale, e.g. detailed intervention in a particular planning application at 
Alnwick. 
Alnwick also enables us to see the roles of regional government offices i.e. GONE and the local 
authority, both members and officers, in their interpretation and implementation of policy. This 
is a particularly good example of the consequences of perverse actions by the local authority; 
delay, uncertainty and serious cost implications for all sides. The importance of development 
plans, specifically the Structure Plan, is highlighted at Alnwick, particularly the consequences 
of ignoring both that plan and relevant government policy on out of town retail development. 
The actual planning process appears to be covered concisely but considering the focus of the 
empirical evidence, this is sufficient for our purpose. As Alnwick illustrated and because of the 
importance ofthe objections and appeals in all three case studies, this area of planning has been 
covered in some detail. 
The subject of UDCs has also been covered at some length because one of the cases revolves 
around the activities of a specific UDC. This vehicle for urban regeneration, the brainchild of 
one particular Secretary of State, Michael Hesletine, brought its own problems, as we shall see 
in the first case study. Because it became the key issue in that case, the subject of compulsory 
purchase and compensation has also been covered at some length in this chapter. 
Overall, this chapter gives a picture of a complex system of government policies, legally 
underpinned and being interpreted and implemented by public sector actors, themselves 
empowered by that legal underpinning. These actors are attempting to deal with a very wide 
variety of planning applications, possibly from a house extension to a major facility, e.g. an 
office building, factory or supermarket bringing attendant infrastructure problems. What we 
have already seen at Alnwick and we shall see in investigating the empirical evidence, the legal 
framework may be in place; government guidance may be available, development plans and 
policies all clear but when the specific planning application is submitted, interpretation and 
implementation by people is the essence of the interface. As we have seen at Alnwick and we 
shall see more in the empirical evidence, even experienced private sector organisations can 
have considerable difficulty in coping with the system. 
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This chapter then, has already set the context in which the planning system exists and the 
influences, particularly from government that can complicate a particular application. The next 
chapter will examine the political and theoretical background to planning in the post-war years. 
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CHAPTER 3 - THE DEVELOPMENT OF PLANNING IN ITS POST WAR 
CONTEXT 
3.1 Introduction 
As we have seen in Chapter 2, the post war planning system is based on the 194 7 Act, passed by 
the immediate post war Labour Government. With its focus on the state ownership and 
management of many of the country's assets, this government also regarded public sector 
control of the development of land use as an important component of its strategy. The 
continuing development and implementation of the planning process in the post war period must 
therefore be considered in the context of the philosophies adopted by the unvarying actors in the 
process, namely the government, local government and the planners. Consequently, this chapter 
will review a number of theories that are chosen and discussed for two main reasons. First, 
because they appear to have informed the strands of political activity identifiable in each of the 
actors over the last fifteen years, the period covered by the research project. Secondly, it seemed 
necessary to provide at least an outline of the antecedents ofthese theories particularly as no one 
theory at any level of governance can be said to be totally representative of the particular 
climate at that time. For example, New Right thinking informed much of the Thatcher 
administration's activities whilst, at the same time, the New Urban Left clearly demonstrated a 
totally opposed ideological standpoint, for example in London. 
The chapter will start by attempting to understand what we mean by 'the state'. Each of the actors, 
government, local government and planners will then be considered in turn, in terms of the 
theoretical approaches that seem to have characterised their activities in the post war period. Also 
included here will be a review of sub-central government which covers agencies, networks and 
communities, at times including and overlapping the three sets of actors we have already 
mentioned. 
3.2 The State 
We have already seen in Chapter 2 that the planning system is a regulatory process instituted by 
the state, legalised by the state and managed by the state. It is important to gain at least some 
understanding of what we mean by the term 'state'. 
Hampton (1991 pp. 220-233) suggests that we need to consider two key questions; how is the 
state to be conceptualised and who controls the state? It is surprisingly difficult to define 'the 
state' but it must be said at the outset that we are assuming the state, in this case the UK, to be a 
liberal democracy with the following characteristics. There is representative government by 
majority rule with regular elections and choice among candidates. The representative body, i.e. 
40 
Parliament, has the right of legislation, taxation and an effective opposition. Some individual 
rights are protected from interference by the state, e.g. religious tolerance and free speech. 
Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987 pp. 2- 5) have suggested a useful definition in both organizational 
and functional terms. Organizationally, they define the state as a set of recognizably separate 
institutions or set of institutions so differentiated from the rest of its society as to create 
identifiable public and private spheres. The state is sovereign, or the supreme power, within its 
territory, and by definition the ultimate authority for all law, i.e. binding rules supported by 
coercive sanctions. Public law is made by state officials and backed by a formal monopoly of 
force. The state's sovereignty extends to all the individuals within a given territory and applies 
equally, even to those in formal positions of government or rule making. Thus sovereignty is 
distinct from the personnel who at any given time occupy a particular role within the state. The 
modem state's personnel are mostly recruited and trained for management in a bureaucratic 
manner. Finally, the state has the capacity to extract monetary revenues (taxation) to finance its 
activities from its subject population. Functionally, they define the state as a set of institutions 
that carries out particular goals, purposes or objectives. The state is also defined by its 
consequences i.e. maintenance of social order, which means the identification of the state with 
institutions or patterns of behaviour which are stabilizing in their effects. 
The Constitutional basis of the State 
In the UK political system, with its unwritten constitution, Parliament is sovereign. In practical 
terms this reduces to the House of Commons as the unelected House of Lords only has limited 
blocking and revising powers although, in the short term, the Lords can cause a lot of problems 
for the government within a specific Bill. However, although government may choose to take 
aboard amendments proposed by the Lords, in the end, by invoking the Parliament Act 1911, 
the will of the House of Commons must prevail. Unlike the United States, there are no really 
effective formal checks and balances on the powers of a determined government. With a good 
working majority legislation can be driven through Parliament although this is often at a 
political price. Dearlove & Saunders (1991 p. 215) note that from the point of view of the 
established theory, Parliament can make and unmake any law whatsoever; there is no higher 
legislative authority; and no Court is in a position to declare properly passed Acts of Parliament 
invalid or unconstitutional. Consequently the question of control of the state is particularly 
difficult in this country. The simple view is that democratic control is exercised by the citizen 
through regular elections but this view is contradicted two factors. First, once the election has 
taken place, the voter has no effective control over the activities of government until the next 
election. Secondly, the distortions produced by the normal results of the British first-past-the-
post electoral system. Oliver ( 1991 p. 130) notes that every government since the war has been 
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elected with less than 50% of the votes cast and this includes Labour majorities of 146 (1945), 
99 (1966), 179 ( 1997) and Conservative majorities of 59 ( 1955), 100 (1959), 43 ( 1979), 100 
( 1987). In addition, even these figures are supported by a turnout of voters of only around 75%. 
With overall majorities, the limited powers ofthe House of Lords and the discipline of the main 
parties in the party system in the UK, a government is clearly able to force its legislation 
through Parliament. 
In effect, each party claims a mandate based on its election manifesto and then claims 
legitimacy for its actions despite its minority of voter support in the election. In a similar vein 
Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987 p. 24) note what they describe as the constitutional fictions of 
Parliamentary sovereignty in the UK. Cerny ( 1990 p. 142) describes the Prime Minister as the 
"institutional fulcrum of power". Hutton (1999 p.259) argues that it is remarkable but in a 
democracy, profoundly dangerous, that Blair is now in more control of his government, party 
and country than even Thatcher at her zenith. Note that by 2003-2004 this degree of control 
over his party has been somewhat dented e.g. over University top up fees. 
Apart from the informal checks and balances constituted by pressure groups, public opinion and 
the media, there are two other extra-Parliamentary checks on government actions. These are 
judicial review and human rights legislation, both of which are of increasing concern to 
government. Nevertheless, as we have seen in Chapter 2, only a specific point of law will be 
considered at judicial review, not government policy itself. Recourse to the European Court on a 
matter of human rights is limited to very few cases although here, government policy may be 
discussed and may be the issue. 
3.3 Post war government in the UK 
Throughout the post war period, the political complexion of government has simply appeared to 
vary between Conservative and Labour. However, the theoretical context against which the 
parties have implemented their policies has been much more complex. Here we will consider 
three theoretical aspects of how these governments appear to have carried out their role. 
Post war Pluralism in the UK 
Despite the position outlined above in Section 3.2, the post-war period has been marked by the 
activities and influence of a plethora of interest groups. Dearlove & Saunders ( 1991 p.l32) note 
the difference between 'interest' and 'promotional' groups. Interest groups e.g. Trade Unions, 
the British Medical Association, the National Farmers' Union, Teachers' Unions and 
employers' organizations such as the CBI, advanced the sectional interests of their members. 
Promotional groups on the other hand e.g. Shelter, Greenpeace, advanced causes that were not 
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in the self-interest of only their own members. The activities of these groups led to explanatory 
theories offered by pluralist thinkers. These theories focused on the crucial importance of the 
process of policy making, interest groups as the all-powerful actors in that process rather than 
individuals and saw interest groups as enhancing democracy. Traditional liberal-democratic 
theories of the constitution and the ideal of participatory democracy are rejected because they 
are unrealistic in a highly complex age. Competitive interaction of interest groups and 
government are the answer to this problem and the resultant public policies are a reasonable 
approximation of society's preferences. The state is divorced from the interests of any one class 
or interest group and government exists to provide an arena for debate and resolution of issues. 
Government is seen as the referee. Interest groups rather than classes, individuals or parties are 
crucial elements of British polity and since anyone is free to join, leave or form groups; no 
interests are left outside the groups. Political power is fragmented because resources are widely 
dispersed and non-cumulative and no one interest group is dominant in the process. 
This approach has been heavily criticized from various perspectives, Marxist, Feminist and the 
New Right. While it can be seen to have some merit, there are clear weaknesses, not least the 
dominant position of trade unions with their industrial muscle and their financial and historical 
control on the Labour Party, hence on Labour administrations. Also, as Birch ( 1993 p. 168) 
points out, pressure groups in the UK, no matter their power and influence, can rarely prevent a 
government using its parliamentary majority to do as it wishes. Government is not neutral and is 
not just a referee. However, the UK does have a level of plurality given the number and effect of 
interest groups attempting to influence policy. There is little doubt that, at times, such groups 
have had an influential effect on government policies and actions, particularly the trade unions. 
Attempts at Corporatism and its failure 
The post-war period in the UK had been marked by what may be seen as a relative consensus 
irrespective of the Party in power. While the immediate post war Labour government was 
elected on a socialist programme of nationalisation of private property and industry, in fact this 
was carried out only to a limited extent in its first two or so years of office. With its acute 
economic difficulties, shortages of materials, food etc., the UK increasingly adopted a 
Keynesian approach to state intervention. This approach involved an economic consensus that 
largely obtained throughout the 1950's even with a Conservative government. Hutton (1996 
P.29) describes post - war Conservatism as settling for continuing with the Labour 1945 
settlement in a kind of 'grand bargain'. Cox ( 1988 pp. 198-207) argues that in this period, the 
UK had a form of the state that could be described as pluralist with a Keynesian policy bias. 
Cerny ( 1990 p.l48) identifies the period up to the late 1970's as characterized by a "partial 
corporatism" as by then he suggests there had been some vacillation between a corporate bias 
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and a pluralistic backlash. On the other hand, Cox (1988 pp. 207-211) argues that this was in 
fact failed-corporatism. This was because attempts by the Conservatives in 1962 and Labour in 
1974 to develop some degree of corporatist types of arrangements had failed. Tri-partite 
decision making institutions were set up e.g. the National Economic Development Council, 
involving government, trade unions and employers, with voluntary participation, no government 
controls or sanctions and unions and employers could not control their membership. Cox argues 
the reason for this was the strength of trade unions with their commitment to unfettered free 
collective bargaining, the City of London's role in the international financial system, the nature 
and organisation of industry and the critical attitude of the people to the interventions of the 
state. 
From the foregoing it appears that attempts at forging corporatist arrangements in the post war 
UK have eventually failed. At no time was the government, of whatever political persuasion, 
able to 'incorporate' capital and labour into the state. Government was not able to avail itself of 
powers that would compel labour, employers and the financial world to deliver on agreed 
strategies and promises. For example the trade union leaders were only able to carry their 
members on any agreement to wage restraints between 1975-1977. Thus one of the key tenets of 
a corporatist approach was never capable of implementation in the UK political climate. With 
Mrs. Thatcher came New Right thinking, which Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987 p.135) suggest 
has had the most recent and extensive impact on government decision making. 
The New Right and Mrs. Thatcher 
This normative approach is characterised by a conservative, scientific approach to orthodox 
economics, based on public choice theory, the importance of the individual in terms of self-help 
and as a consumer, pushing back on the state and trade unionism, commitment to free markets 
and perfect competition. A New Right perspective argued there was an overload of demands 
because, one, the public had unrealistic expectations about the services the state could 
'realistically' deliver. The causes were, the adversarial party system and the welfare state ethic 
of 'equality.' Secondly, the personal stake of the bureaucrats involved in public service 
provision as a powerful lobby for more services. Causes here were the public sector unions and 
the 'professional' public service ethic. Thirdly, local authorities in major urban areas were often 
Left-wing labour controlled with ever increasing demands from local interest groups - they then 
became such a group demanding more central government funds. Lastly, the trade unions were 
too powerful. They were dominant and uncontrolled in the pluralist world. 
However we can say that there are two fundamental concerns of the New Right theoretical 
approach. First was the central belief in individual freedom and minimal state interference with 
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that freedom. The state has, of course, a legitimate law and order function in protecting its 
citizens. Secondly was a firm belief in free markets. New Right thinking sees the citizens as 
individuals, consumers, competition as essentially beneficial and believes that such markets are 
the essential means of innovation, wealth creation and social co-ordination. These concerns lead 
of course to a profound rejection of state intervention, economically and in attempts to plan for 
and deliver 'social justice'. Many state institutions e.g. the civil service, local government are 
seen as self-serving, costly and far from solving problems are indeed part of the problem. 
Bureaucracy is seen as endemic in the public sector and in line with the need for individual 
freedom, has to be cut back. Thatcher saw the post -war performance (or lack of it) of the UK as 
stemming from failure to adhere to what she saw as fundamental principles. 
The title ofHugo Young's book 'One of Us' (1990) exemplifies the Thatcher administration's 
attitudes. Enemies were legion: socialists, trade unions (particularly the miners whom she 
memorably described on July 19, 1984 (Young 1990 p. 371) as 'the enemy within, which is 
more difficult to fight and more dangerous to liberty'), welfare 'scroungers', the professions, 
'wets' (fellow Conservatives who did not share her convictions), Left-wing run local authorities 
and many others. Consultation and planning were anathema to a government that believed that 
state intervention had been the cause of many of the problems besetting the UK and market 
forces were the answer. Monetary policy, privatisation of nationalised organizations, changes in 
the welfare-state e.g. the running of the Health Service, education policies, fiscal control over 
local government and emasculation of trade union rights, attempted reduction of planning 
powers of local authorities, the defeat of the miners, determination not to intervene in industry, 
the 'pole tax' are all examples of her government's approaches or 'Thatcherism' as it became 
known. There were many contradictions in this period of governance of the UK. Despite major 
increases in levels of unemployment to 6% rising at one stage to 14% in the I 980s, Thatcher 
was returned at three General Elections. 
There is much evidence that Thatcherism changed the political map of the UK and much of that 
change is continuing even under a Labour administration. On the other hand, despite the New 
Right push to 'get the state off peoples backs', Britain is still a highly centralised country. At the 
same time, as we will see later, reform of local government became a key feature of the 
government's activities. Thus it can be argued that, until the New Right adventures of the 
1980's and 1990's, apart from the statist activity by Labour in 1945-47, Cox's 'pluralism with 
Keynesian policy bias' has largely prevailed with some failed attempts at the introduction of 
corporatist institutions. 
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One common aspect of the UK state, irrespective of the political hue of the governing party has 
been the existence of an elite. Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987 p.179) note the role of Cabinet 
government masking an almost presidential rule by Prime Ministers. Further comment is made 
about how a 'politically neutered' Parliament dominated by the party leadership disguises the 
'constitutionally uncontrolled power' within the executive branch in the UK. It can be shown 
that throughout most of the post war period, Government (particularly the Cabinet), the top 
echelons of the Civil Service, the judiciary and the Bar, many of the major financial institutions 
and major industrial organisations were dominated by men who had been to public schools often 
followed by Oxford or Cambridge Universities. This indicates a significant potential for 
networking, at the very highest levels in the state. We must now turn to consideration of the 
second major element in the state namely local government. 
3.4 Theoretical aspects of Local Government 
In the planning process the local authority is the key interface in the decision making process. 
Furthermore, we have two key sets of actors, elected members and officers and as we have seen 
at Alnwick, important tensions can exist between them. It is therefore essential in this context 
to look at theories of local government that may underpin the process and practices of these 
authorities. First, we will consider local government from the point of view of its place 
constitutionally. 
The Classical Constitutional Model 
The foundation of this model is the legal framework (Hampton 1991 ). Local government in the 
UK exists only as far as Parliament provides powers to local authorities to carry out specific 
functions. Formation and subsequent abolition of the GLC is a good example of this legal basis. 
The concept of ultra vires is vital in the operation of local government where any actions taken 
outside the powers granted by Parliament can lead to swingeing penalties attaching to 
councillors. Nevertheless they enjoy considerable discretion in exercising their powers 
(Cochrane 1993 p 9, Stewart 1983 p.3 ). Within a specific Act of Parliament, Government does 
not necessarily wish to control the detailed decisions that are to be made, recognising that 
delivery of services locally reflects some degree of local choice. Authorities have no powers of 
general competence to act in the interests of their citizens as, say, in France. 
Within this model, Bulpitt (1983 pp. 52-66) argues that from the late 20s to early 60s the 
territorial politics of the UK were in the form of a 'dual polity' in which national and local 
polities were largely divorced from one another. Contacts were bureaucratic and depoliticised 
and the centre enjoyed its desired relative separation from peripheral issues in order to pursue 
46 
'high politics'. The general party politicisation of local government occurred post-war, as did 
the welfare state and its implications for the enhanced role of local government. 
Local government in the Pre- Thatcher Era 
Reference has been made earlier in this Chapter to the relative consensus obtaining in the early 
post-war decades. Cochrane (1993 p.7) suggests that the concept of these decades as the "golden 
age" of local government, with increasing budgets and responsibilities, is at the least 
misleading. He quotes Gyford (1985) as saying: -
Usually it did the right things for people; but sometimes it could do the wrong things to 
people; and only rarely had it previously discussed either of those things with people. 
(Cochrane 1993 p. 8) 
Cochrane goes on to suggest that, nevertheless, local government was a relatively unproblematic 
part of the political system. The post -war period saw local government gaining massively in 
resources and activity as a key part of the welfare state. Its task was professional delivery of 
fairly clearly defined services, council housing, social services, primary and secondary 
education, while having local democratic accountability. The budgets were large but actual 
support from the voters was (and still is) weak. Planning, through the Town & Country Planning 
Act 1947 became a critical activity in post-war development while council housing and 
education became the dominant areas of local authority expenditure. Cochrane ( 1993 p. 13) 
quotes increases of local authority spending between 1 9 50 and 1960 of 9 to 13% as a percentage 
of national income and 26 to 31% as a percentage of public expenditure. He goes on to quote a 
number of writers, Cockburn (1977), Dun leavy ( 1980), Saunders ( 1984) defining local 
government in terms of its role of collective or social consumption. Saunders ( 1981) had offered 
an empirical approach, his 'dual state' theory describing two distinct types of economic process, 
'social investment' e.g. physical infrastructure contributing largely to private sector well-being 
and 'social consumption' e.g. welfare, housing etc. contributing to support for the working 
population. These produced tensions between economic functions, which left only three 
decision-making strategies available to the state, bureaucratic intervention, pluralist 
competition, and corporatism. Rhodes (1988 pp. 37-38) criticised this theory particularly 
because of difficulties with classification, allocation of functions and the excessively narrow 
range of decision-making strategies considered. Rhodes ( 1985 p. 40) argued that sub-central 
government was the prime vehicle for building the welfare state up to the 1970s. This suggests 
to Cochrane (1993 p.l4) that: -
... this places local government at the heart of the post -war political compromise which 
has been called the Keynesian welfare state. 
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At the same time, the post war period has seen a shift to the total politicisation of local 
government in favour of the three main political parties. A consequence of this party 
politicisation has been the growth of what has been described as 'one party states'. For example, 
Brooke (1999 p. 55) quotes a recent 1997 survey in which one in five local authorities were 
found to have at least 80% of their councillors from one party. This situation appears to have 
been particularly prevalent in the m~or urban conurbations and cities under Labour control and 
Brooke goes on to question the 'representativeness' of the councils in such circumstances. 
The organisation and staffing of local government with their multiplicity and many of their 
responsibilities covering the same services was a major post-war government preoccupation. 
Seven committees or commissions reported between Maud 1967 and Paterson 1973 on the need 
to re-organise the local government structure, to reorganise the procedures, to improve the 
quality of the councillors and officers and to take aboard private sector methods of management. 
Eventually, these reports resulted in the Local Government Act 1972 and in 1974 the structure 
of local government was massively overhauled. Councils were amalgamated resulting in new 
district councils, the county councils and metropolitan counties. All this was occurring at 
roughly the same time as the welfare state itself was under serious pressure as the country's 
economic performance declined. 
In 1975, the Secretary of State for the Environment, Tony Crosland, announced cuts in public 
spending and declared: -
We have to come to terms with the harsh reality of the situation which we inherited. The 
party's over. 
The focus was largely to exert central control on councils by financial restrictions that capped 
their expenditure and their rate raising capacity. Cochrane (1993 p. 29) points out that by this 
period, the level of central grant aid to local authorities had reached 66.5% of revenue based 
local authority spending in England & Wales. By 1980, there had been a significant reduction of 
20% in local authority spending as a proportion of domestic spending. 
Mrs. Thatcher and the New Right Years 
With the arrival of the Thatcher administration in 1979, pressure on 'overspending and out of 
control' local councils increased massively. Stewart & Stoker ( 1995 p. 2) note there was no 
overall Tory strategy for their approach to local government, rather in fact a piecemeal approach 
evolving by gradual experience with occasional reverses e.g. the poll tax which proved 
calamitous and possibly the beginning of the end for Mrs. Thatcher. Local government was 
powerless to resist the New Right orthodoxy's which prevailed, tight financial constraints 
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market forces, public choice, focus on reduced public spending, less bureaucracy, enabling role, 
separation of responsibility for services from provision, more business-like management. 
A consequence of the government attitude was a veritable deluge of legislation being enacted 
dealing with local government matters, Stewart and Stoker ( 1995 p. 2) pointing to some forty 
Acts of Parliament being passed between 1979 and 1987. More was to come including of course 
the Town and Country Planning Act of 1990. Councils were forced into compulsory competitive 
tendering for projects including services like refuse collection. Services like design and 
construction were hived off into the private sector although this has not so far been the fate of 
the planning services. In fact, in terms of issues like urban regeneration, local government was 
eventually seen as a major part of the problem, rather than the solution. This of course was a key 
ideological consideration behind the concept of UDCs, which removed regeneration from local 
authority control in a number of areas. 
Harding & Garside (1995 pp. 167-168) argue that there was a clear inter-relationship between 
urban and economic development policies in this period and that in the 1980s the urban policy 
initiatives had some basic characteristics. These were, one, the vital importance of private sector 
involvement in achieving real lasting regeneration. Two, the role of government was to attract 
business to urban areas - benefits (Jobs) would trickle down automatically to local residents. 
Three, special urban programmes prioritised economic regeneration and employment 
particularly through physical environment adaptations by capital expenditure. Four, 
proliferation of independent initiatives each with its own limited financial resources, 
expenditure rules and delivery procedures. Five, initiatives were often short lived and responded 
to shocks e.g. the 1981 riots - money allocated to areas on perceived potential rather than actual 
need. Lastly, new implementation agencies e.g. UDCs, were dominated by business and 
regional figures not local authorities. 
Local government was ambivalent about many of the centrally initiated policies even when their 
own powers were downgraded or even removed and their influence diminished. This said, until 
1989 local authorities had no statutory powers in economic field, only creative use of statutory 
powers. One small resource was that under the Local Government Act 1972 - Section 13 7, the 
product of a 2p rate could be used in the interests of its area or people. Also, their local power 
as employers, contractors and purchasers was used to follow a people-based policy focused on 
local labour recruitment, equal opportunities, trade union organisation and anti-poverty 
campaigns. Key authorities were the GLC and six metropolitan councils in the use of these 
"alternative" economic strategies - antagonistic to central government that closed loopholes and 
eventually abolished these councils in 1986. 
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Harding & Garside (1995 pp. 170-172) argue that the Government's focus on single-purpose, 
unelected agencies and physical regeneration programmes appeared to provide limited benefits 
to local communities especially those disadvantaged and unemployed, there was little local 
residents' involvement in regeneration plans and complicated an already fragmented policy 
making environment and militated against a more holistic approach. Nevertheless, Local 
Authorities remain at the interface with the public and have general responsibilities for the 
social and economic well being of inhabitants in a complex system of local governance. Their 
leadership in such a system is critical despite lack of formal authority or sanctions against those 
agencies whose support is essential to promote change. 
The Post -Fordist Model of the Thatcher years 
A useful approach in looking at the Thatcher years is argued by Stoker and Mossberger in 
Stoker and Stewart (1995 pp. 21 0-225). This is derived from their analysis of the development 
of the post-Fordist local state where Fordism is the term used for the social arrangements 
obtaining in capitalist societies through the period of mass production and consumption until the 
early 1970's. These writers use regulation theory that argues the role of the state and local 
government as the product of social struggle in an unstable society. The role of the state and 
other economic and social institutions may reflect the strategic ambitions of key political forces 
but roles are also defined by the unintended and unanticipated outcomes of political conflict. 
Regulation theorists see the role of the state as intervening in the economy to manage and 
sustain demand for and provide the required infrastructure necessary for mass production. In 
addition the welfare state was an important adjunct. 
The authors argue that since 1979 there has been a centralised Conservative approach to the 
post-Fordist local state in which Tory governments attempted to impose a new role on local 
government to meet the demands of a changing political economy. They made two key points, 
first that it was a piecemeal process of change with no real strategic vision and secondly local 
authorities have not been passive recipients of change but have sought initiatives to respond to 
the changing environment. In order to achieve the required changes, the authors argue that the 
Tory government top-down approach required the following conditions, one, knowing what you 
want to do, secondly, availability of requisite resources, thirdly, ability to marshal & control 
these resources to achieve the desired results and finally communicating requirements to those 
required to carry out tasks and controlling their performance. Failure to achieve these conditions 
led to an "implementation gap". 
In examining the local government response to change, Stoker & Mossberger (1995 p 221) also 
note a useful typology of response by local authorities to change: -
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Early adherents: - display leadership & enthusiasm for implementing change; 
Pragmatic compliers:- second wave, seen to be up to date, avoid risks, seldom tmprove or 
expand; 
Critical compliers: -
Late adapters: 
late adapters, re-shape policies to suit needs, delay is strategic, could 
surpass early adherents; 
little enthusiasm, little need for innovation, comply with minimal 
requirements, delay. 
The authors also argue that there was an interconnected pattern of economic, social and political 
change:-
Economic:-
Social:-
Political: -
Managerial: -
supply-side intervention, competition & labour flexibility, local 
economic strategies and attraction of capital - Local Authorities' fight 
for investment, bids for the Olympics, etc. 
constraints on public spending, two tier service provision -
differentiated patterns of consumption-personal resources to use the 
private sector v reliance on no-frills provision. 
'Networking' & external focus, EEC and transnational focus, private 
sector involvement in policy making- QUANGOS 
'New management' thinking, dominance of pursuit of private sector 
methods - Compulsory Competitive Tendering. 
A reaction to the post war consensus -The New Urban Left 
One further important theoretical approach must be mentioned and that is the Urban Left. King 
(1995 pp. 228-248) discusses the political values of local government in the context of what he 
calls 'core liberal values'. These he defines first as, liberty - diffusing power in the political 
system providing a bulwark against the power of the state. Secondly, there is political 
participation, allowing citizens to participate in running their own local affairs. Lastly comes 
efficiency to ensure the most economically efficient way of allocating public goods and 
services. To these he adds social democratic values of redistribution and autonomy. 
Redistribution is of course the importance of concern for economic redistribution by means of 
progressive taxation but King points out the Jack of resources and powers of local government 
to implement these policies. Likewise in the British system, autonomy is hardly achievable in 
the context of fiscal restraints and the issue of ultra vires. 
An important development covering all of these points was the rise of the New Urban Left 
particularly in Inner London councils e.g. Islington, Lambeth and the Greater London Council. 
This political element has not been confined to these authorities but they have been key arenas 
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for action. The concept has been seen best in the form of potent actions by authorities over race 
relations, feminist and gender issues, the police and crucially, economic initiatives e.g. the 
GLC's Greater London Enterprise Board. Much Urban Left criticism of regeneration policies 
such as London Docklands (Colenutt & Tansley 1989) also arose. Essentially socialist, the 
approach has rejected the post-war statist brand of socialism with its emphasis on equality 
nationwide (King 1995 pp.238-241 ). Key elements in the theory are the rightful participation in 
decisions which effect them by local people, job creation by local authority intervention, active 
support, which is often financial, in new areas of conflict e.g. race, gender etc. An additional 
strand is the growth of communitarian arrangements, which focus directly on local citizen 
involvement, and even devolution of powers down to ward level i.e. housing. 
An important different approach to those outlined above has been offered by Rhodes 
(1981 ,1986,1988) with his concept of sub-central government which avoids focusing on central-
local relations and instead critically examines inter organizational communities and networks. 
This is the subject of the next section. 
Rhodes' and the Theory of Sub - Central Government 
The concept of Sub-Central Government (SCG) is important because it addresses the issues of 
networks and communities and their interactions, both public and private, rather than the models 
of local/central government we have discussed already. Rhodes (1988 p. 98) admits to a Neo-
Piuralist basis for his work albeit from a Weberian theory of bureaucracy. From the point of 
view of the examination of relations between public and private sectors, Rhodes provides some 
useful concepts that will now be outlined. 
Rhodes (1988) discusses the unit of analysis of governance as central/local activities but stresses 
the importance of inter-organizational relations in the public sector. He goes on to note three 
levels of analysis, first, the Micro-level, interactions within and between individual sub-central 
units of government, secondly, the Mesa-level - patterns of interaction between sub-central and 
central units of government and finally, the Macro-level - the national socio economic and 
political context ofthe meso and micro levels of interactions. 
Policy networks are a key element in the analysis of SCG (Rhodes 1988 pp. 77-78). Rhodes 
argues that they all have different characteristics of dependencies, constellations of interests, 
membership, vertical interdependence, horizontal interdependence and distribution of resources. 
He argues (Rhodes 1988 pp. 78-81) that there are different varieties of networks in SCG and 
distinguishes between highly integrated policy and territorial communities and less integrated 
professionalized, intergovernmental and producer networks. 
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Policy communities are those based on major functional interests e.g. fire, education and are 
networks characterized by stability of relationships, continuity of highly restricted membership, 
vertical interdependence based on shared service delivery responsibilities and insulation from 
other networks, invariably from the general public (including Parliament). 
Territorial communities are those based on territorial interests e.g. Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland. Issue networks, e.g. leisure and recreation, usually have a large number of 
participants; a limited degree of interdependence; stability and continuity are at a premium. No 
focal point for other actors to engage. 
Professionalized networks e.g. the NHS, water, are characterized by interests of a particular 
profession, a substantial degree of vertical independence and insulation from other networks. 
There is a national level ideological system. 
Intergovernmental networks are based on the representative organizations of local authorities 
where membership is topocratic, explicit exclusion of public sector unions, extensive constellation 
of interests (all services etc.) limited vertical interdependence (no service delivery responsibilities) 
but extensive horizontal ability to penetrate other networks. 
Producer networks covering both private and public economic interests. Fluctuating membership, 
centre's dependence on industry for delivering desired goods and expertise, limited 
interdependence amongst the economic interests. 
Accountability of policy networks (or the lack of it) is clearly an important issue. Marsh & 
Rhodes (1992 p. 265) point to the legitimacy of these networks from a point of superior 
expertise and improved effectiveness of service delivery rather than a political base. Access is 
very limited and certainly excludes the public. The coincidental growth of policy networks and 
the public sector professions is described as a true symbiosis. The implications for the planning 
profession are clear and will be discussed in the next section. 
Marsh & Rhodes ( 1992 pp. 266 - 268) also discuss the relationship between policy networks 
and various theories of the state, which have been reviewed already in this chapter. A neo-
pluralist account of policy networks sees their impact in terms of professional influence, the 
logic of technical rationality, the privileged position of select groups of interests and the 
complex interdependencies within decentralised government structures. Richardson & Marsh 
(1979) point to a 'vertically compartmentalised' policy making, virtually impenetrable by 
'unrecognised groups' or the general public. In their view, this is entirely consistent with 
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pluralism. New Right concerns with the corporate state are seen by Marsh & Rhodes (1992 p. 
267 - 268) as a clear part of the policy network concept. Professional monopolies, bureaucracy, 
limitations on competition, consumer choice were all New Right concerns. They raise a key 
point here in the importance of understanding the concepts of policy networks in examining 
resistance to change; the ways in which political institutions and practices adapt or not as the 
case may be. They go on to point out that the concept must be used in conjunction with one of 
the political theories of the state to provide a full explanation of the policy process and its 
outcomes. 
Although Rhodes' work on networks is valuable and can offer some useful pointers for analysis, 
it must be said that not all networks are obvious and the opportunity to join or influence policy 
through this means may simply not exist, particularly for private organisations. As we have seen 
above for policy communities, professional networks and intergovernmental networks, 
membership is restricted and does not allow inclusion of apparently powerful players e.g. large 
companies. Having looked at its local government context, we turn now to the planning system 
itself. 
3.5 Early Post War Planning- its underlying philosophy and purpose 
Eversley (1973 p. 5) defines the planner as an allocator of scarce resources. In the aftermath of 
war, resources were scarce and the welfare state was seen as the means of achieving a 'better 
life' for the people. This was in terms of health, education, housing, jobs, environment and 
social security. Planning was a key element in this strategy Eversley (1973 p. 160). Initially, 
he argues, (p. 4 7), that it was the nineteenth century Utilitarian social reformers who were the 
true begetters of modern planning. Furthermore, he suggests (p. 46) that Bentham 's belief in the 
power of a democratic state as the only means of providing the 'greatest happiness for the 
greatest number' led inexorably to the growth of central government power as we see it now. 
Eversley (1973 pp. 77-81) and Hall et al (1973 Volll pp. 59-62) elaborate on the influence of 
Ebenezer Howard on pre war thinking through his concept of garden cities forming stellar 
networks of settlements outside the great conurbations. As we saw in Chapter 2.2, in the 1930's 
government had commissioned Reports into various aspects of planning by Bar low ( 1940), 
Scott (1942), Uthwatt (1942) and later Reith in 1945. Hall et al (1973 Vol 1 pp. 91 & 92) argue 
that Barlow was the philosophical basis of post war planning - it was the logical distillation of 
all that had gone before. 
Barlow argued for the correction of regional employment imbalance and the containment of 
urban growth with these two strategies linked together as a single policy. A minority Report, 
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signed by Abercrombie among others argued for comprehensive control over the location of 
industry (Hall et al 1973 Vol lp.91). Scott reinforced Barlow's view on urban growth through 
his concept of the conservation of agricultural land as a priceless national asset and even 
suggested the 'onus of proof should be on the developer to show that the use of agricultural 
land would be in the public interest. Reith contributed the concept of the planning and 
organisation of new towns eventually coming to fruition via the New Towns Act 1945. Here 
planners were seen to have the right and responsibility to try to shape the life of the community 
through physical arrangements (Hall et al 1973 Vol I p.11 0). Abercrombie (Greater London 
Plan of 1944), among others, posited the development of a desirable end-state plan, a fixed 
master plan. Eversley (1973 p. 11) argues that, following Bar low, the timescale for identifying 
and substantial advances towards a solution, have shortened compared to earlier times. 
The original purposes of the planning system followed the philosophy outlined above. Urban 
areas were to be contained and the overspill housed in self contained and balanced communities 
e.g. new towns; thirty-five new towns were built. Regional balance was a key objective in 
terms of economic growth and population change but this relied heavily on the location of 
industry, which was controlled by the Board of Trade. This involved the use of Industrial 
Development Certificates without which, industrial development of a particular site was 
impossible. The importance of protection of the countryside was always a critical underlying 
objective e.g. through Green Belt policies. 
Uthwatt's Report led to the effective nationalisation of development rights to all land with all 
increased values resulting from development taken by the state. There were also objectives at 
the local level of segregation of land uses so that for instance, residential areas, schools, 
hospitals and recreational uses would not be subject to the environmental externalities of 
industrial pollution, heavy traffic impact on local road systems. Statutory Plan making and the 
rigorous development control system for individual areas of land were the key purposes of 
newly established local authority planning departments set up under the 1947 Act. These 
remain core activities ofthe planners. 
3.6 The Planning System and its theoretical basis 
Healey ( 1997 p. 9) argues that the massive industrial, commercial and urban expansions of the 
19th century with the economic consequences and their impact on the people, led to increasing 
interest in management of social and spatial relations. Key resources for managing the planning 
for the future, avoiding the volatility of markets and power of industrialists were seen to be 
improving scientific knowledge which could provide an objective basis for identifying present 
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problems and predicting future possibilities and 'instrumental rationality' -focusing on relating 
means to ends in logical and systematic ways. Impartial reason was seen as a key measure of 
such planning. 
The post war period has seen a burgeoning world of theoretical development. There is no 
'overarching' theory of planning and indeed there is considerable argument about 'what planning 
theory is.' Alexander (1997), Forester (1989), Taylor (1998), (Yftachel & Huxley 2000). 
Alexander (1997 p.3) discusses two aspects of planning theory, normative (what ought to be done) 
and positive (how to do it). 
Forester (1989 p. 137) offers a concept oftheory as:-
Planning theory is what planners need when they are stuck: another way of formulating a 
problem, a way to anticipate outcomes, a source of reminders about what is important, a 
way of paying attention that provides direction, strategy and coherence. 
Taylor (1998 pp. v-vi) argues that planning theory addresses the general understanding of the 
nature of town planning. This means that fundamental questions have to be asked- What sort of 
activity is it? What should planning be aiming to do? What are the effects of planning? 
(Yftachel & Huxley (2000 pp. 907- 912) quote the Oxford English Dictionary definition as:-
Explaining a phenomenon - a sphere of speculation and concepts as distinguished from 
practice .. 
Alexander (1997 pp. 3-6) posits a theory-practice gap and that the gap is likely to be unbridgeable 
because unlike say engineering, the facility to translate theories such as planning theory into 
application simply does not seem possible in the social sciences. Here, theory seems to be more 
assimilated through enlightenment. Harris ( 1997 pp. 799 - 80 I) argues that the gap may matter 
more to theoreticians than to practitioners but whether it can be bridged may depend on definitions 
of theory and practice and who is responsible for attempting to close the gap. Allmendinger and 
Tewdyr-Jones ( 1997 pp. 802- 806) agree with Alexander that the gap is likely to be unbridgeable 
but disagree with his reasons. They argue for a more 'political-realist' perspective and point to 
the discursive nature of theory as one of its greatest strengths. It is used as a tool in a continuous 
power game. They comment that nobody seems to have thought why there has been little interest 
in bridging the gap from practitioners. A planning theory which provided an absolute truth would 
be likely to reduce the discretion and power of the planners. Despite these arguments, there is no 
shortage of planning theories and the key ones impacting the British scene are now discussed. 
Rydin (1993 pp. 17-57) shows an evolution from environmental determinism of the 19th and 
early 20th Centuries through nai"ve public administration to procedural planning theory in the 
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1970's followed by the critiques ofthis theory in the 1980s (See Exhibit 3.1 for a summary of 
the theories and critiques). Environmental determinism, which lasted until post-war, is described 
by Rydin (1993 p. 22) as "the creation of an environment through careful, expert physical 
design, which not only improved the living standards but also improved the inhabitants 
physically, morally and socially". This was followed in the immediate post war years by what 
Rydin calls Nai've Public Administration and this we shall consider first. 
Na·ive Public Administration 
The economic, social and political problems of the 1930s led post war to the passing of the 
crucially important Town & Country Planning Act 194 7 which, for the first time compelled all 
local authorities to carry out planning activities. This required area based plans to be developed 
and development was to be controlled on a project-by-project basis. This immediate post war 
period was marked by policies of public sector direction of land use, including land taxation, 
policies predicated on the general acceptance of a socialist solution to problems. Rydin (1993 p. 
53) points out the there had been two major attempts in 1967 and in 1975-76 to direct 
development by nationalisation of land which had both proved abject failures. The apolitical, 
technical approach of planners assumed that given the political will of the politicians, 
appropriate powers and technical skills, planning was relatively problem free. 
Taylor (1998 pp. 3 - 28) shows immediate post war planning to be based on physical, design-
based strategies, planners very often coming from an architectural background. Critiques of the 
planning process of this period noted an absence of any real attempt by the planners to 
understand the social implications of the planning activity, e.g. of 'how a community actually 
operates'. The thinking appeared to be that a 'neighbourhood' could be designed physically. 
There was deemed to be a consensus as to what constituted the values and ideals of planning, 
nevertheless there was trenchant criticism of both layout and aesthetic design (Richards 1950), 
(Nairn 1955). There was no consultation with the people as to how they saw their needs (Gower 
1977). The theoretical explanation of this process from an academic standpoint was that of 
nai've public administration (Rydin I 993 p. 3 I). This view arose from what was perceived as a 
nai've view of success with little thought given to the impact of economic processes and thus 
possible failure to implement solutions and deliver successful outcomes. 
From naivety to rationality - Rational Planning 
With the economic growth in the post war period, need for jobs, housing, roads, leisure 
activities et al, planning was becoming much more a specialist profession and planners were 
claiming wider expertise, becoming more than purely technical, urban design officials. This 
was a period of Keynesian demand management, maintenance of full employment buttressed by 
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social welfare policies, really the last decades of Fordism. Increasingly planners attempted to 
gather all the necessary data in order to select between options and achieve optimal solutions to 
problems. Taylor (1998 pp. 61- 74) discusses this 'rational' approach as a theory ofthe process 
of planning, what Faludi (1973 Ch 1.) considered to be a 'procedural' theory. Thus, the 
prevailing orthodoxy in the immediate post war period was instrumental rationality or 
procedural theory, regarded widely as the dominant paradigm in planning theory. Alexander 
(1996 p. 46) argues that it filled the role of a 'general theory of planning' over a considerable 
period and goes on to suggest that despite all the criticism, rationality has not yet been 
adequately superseded as it has generated a significant body of concepts and useful applications. 
Low (1991 p. 259) also argues that:-
Contrary to the arguments of some planning theorists, the 'rational paradigm' cannot be 
superseded. The breakdown of rationality is simply an aspect ofthe dilemma generated by 
the professionalisation, hence the rationalisation, of decision-making about something, 
urban development, which is the subject of political struggle. 
The theoretical explanation of planning at this stage was of a rational process with the planners 
as rational decision makers. However as noted by Rydin (1993 p. 53), the changes to the 
procedures and reorganisation of planning had not led to improvements in efficiency or 
effectiveness (my italics). This rational approach suffered because of the difficulties with the 
quantity and quality of data to be collected and assessed, difficulties with the process and lack 
of consideration of economic impacts. Indeed the approach failed to cope with the eventual 
collapse in the 1970s of the growth of the previous decades. 
A scientific approach - Systems Theory 
A parallel approach was systems theory, which was developed from Operations Research and 
allied fields. It must be said here that this is not really a 'planning theory' as it was a tool much 
used across industly. Nevertheless, it provided planners with the tools for a much more 
sophisticated approach to the complexities of large scale urban planning. Furthermore, it had 
currency in the field of Organisation Development along with behavioural science techniques, 
where the organisation itself would be the subject of investigation. Systems theory is concerned 
with investigating understanding and control of systems using mathematical and similar 
techniques. A system here is a complex of interconnected parts, which are interdependent and 
therefore form a complex whole e.g. the human body, a city, a large organisation. It is important 
to recognise the fact that a system will exist in an environment e.g. a human being is dependent 
on air for survival. Taylor ( 1998 pp. 63-64) points out that the abstruse language, highly 
technical abstraction of systems theory was not a normal tool in the planning department 
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concerned with local plans and a myriad of planning applications to be handled. It did however 
have its uses in the development of structure plans at a more strategic level. 
Critiques of rational planning 
Taylor (1998 p. 95) points to rational planning and systems planning as being dominant into the 
1970s and by this time rational planning, commonly termed 'instrumental rationality' was 
generally considered to be procedural planning theory. In fact, Faludi ( 1973) was claiming that 
planning theory was synonymous with procedural theory. Rydin ( 1993 pp. 53-57) argues that, 
following the economic problems of the mid 1970's and the failure to solve many of the 
problems of society, planning became subject to much criticism. Planners had to rethink their 
activities while major academic critiques of the procedural approach were made using emerging 
social science disciplines. Healey (1997 pp. 10-27) points to criticisms of these planning 
activities being enunciated by many writers. They drew attention to the sheer quantity of 
empirical knowledge and data required to identifY and evaluate all the possible options as well 
as the unlikelihood of politicians being willing to comply with rational planning processes. 
Lindblom (Braybrook & Lindblom 1963) argued instead for "disjointed incrementalism". 
Davidoff & Rein er ( 1962) argued for "strict separation of fact from values". Gans (1969) argued 
for planners to have two clients, the customer for his or her services and the citizens affected by 
the customers' proposals. Barrett & Fudge ( 1981) suggested that policies were just as likely to 
be articulated through the ongoing flow of events as in formal policy making. Taylor separates 
critiques of rational planning into two strands, one the effects and two the implementation of 
planning. 
The effects of planning 
Taylor (1998 Chapter 6) cites Hall et al (1973) who published 'The Containment of Urban 
England' in which they investigated the actual effects of post war planning. Their conclusions 
were that three main effects were apparent, urban containment, suburbanisation and lastly 
inflationary effects on land and property prices. This last issue was consistent with a political 
economic critique where the influence of planning as compared to more potent influences of 
social and economic forces. Here Taylor ( 1998 pp. 102-103) cites the work of Pickvance in this 
area. Rydin (1993 p.82) argues that liberal political economy has seen something of a revival 
due to environmental economic arguments. 
A contrasting analysis was that from a Marxist political economy perspective. Whereas 
Pickvance saw planning and the market in opposition, this radical analysis saw the two in 
partnership. As Rydin ( 1993 p. 56) observes, this Marxist critique saw planning as supporting 
capital accumulation, a political process and the planners as agents of a capitalist state, deeply 
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involved in political activity. Outcomes were dependent on conflicts between capital and 
classes. 
The implementation of planning 
Taylor (1998 Chapter 7) suggests that rational planning was much about plan making and 
evaluation rather than a plan for rational action. He points out (p. 127 Note 1) that post war 
planning is replete with plans never implemented. He cites, in particular, Friedmann (1996) for 
his critique of rationalism for ignoring 'action'. Tay tor (1998 p. 117) suggests that if planners 
are to be successful implementers of plans and policies, they need three skills, one the ability to 
identify the other actors relevant to the implementation, two, they must establish contact and 
third, they need negotiating skills as the other actors may well have different objectives. 
Planning and the New Right 
The problems of the planners and the various attempts to provide theoretical underpinning and 
justification for their activities received further jolts by the arrival of the Thatcher government. 
The 1980s saw new developments under governments hostile to bureaucracy. New Right attitudes 
were exemplified by the concept of the 'enabling authority' proposed by Ridley (1988) as 
Secretary of State (Cochrane 1993 p. 52). At the same time, the New Urban Left developed as 
people wanted community involvement and a change in behaviour of what should be less-
professionalized planners to be supporters and advocates - the people wanted to decide. This was 
seen as a struggle for the allocation of resources between political groups by Rydin ( 1993 p. 72). 
The major thrust of the 1980s was New Right theory, which arose from the New Right 
economic theory adopted by the Thatcher government. The ideological importance of pushing 
back the state, public choice and market forces were key elements in this theory. This again 
was a critique of post war planning, focusing as it did on the rejection of local authorities and 
their bureaucrats as the best vehicles for the achievement of economic and spatial regeneration. 
Economic and social planning was seen as a burden and the public sector intervention seen as 
part of the problem. This approach led among other initiatives to the formation of UDCs to 
solve the urban regeneration problem. To resolve the perceived failure of the public sector in 
this area, planning powers in the designated areas were stripped away from the relevant local 
authorities and given to the UDC. A key role of the UDCs was to collaborate with the private 
sector in order to lever in private capital for the regeneration projects leading to bricks and 
mortar regeneration. On the other hand, UDCs were given wide powers of Compulsory 
Purchase to enable efficient acquisition of land where owners might strenuously resist sale of 
their property. Economic and social needs of local people were largely ignored, not being seen 
as part of the UDC remit. In new Right thinking, participants in the planning process are seen as 
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consumers and the planners as state bureaucrats. Planners were to become agents of economic 
development supporting private enterprise even where their powers were restricted or removed. 
This was essentially a prescriptive theory proposing new ways of achieving desirable outcomes. 
The New Left- a reaction to the New Right 
New Left approaches developed in reaction to the implementation of the New Right approaches 
of the government. Left wing local authorities supported a new agenda in which minority, 
feminist and other similar claims for resources had so far been largely disregarded. The Greater 
London Council under Livingston, Liverpool Council under Hatton were important examples. 
Community participation is a key component of this approach. This prescriptive theory looks for 
a distributive element in the sense of allocation of resources in ways in which disadvantaged 
people can gain an increased and better share in developments which effect housing, jobs, 
amenities etc. This approach has emphasised not only the plight of the poor and unemployed but 
has been heavily focused on race, gender and sexuality. Community participation is seen as a 
vital element in the process. Planners' relationships with capital and other economic interests 
are questioned as are their performance in achieving appropriate allocation of resources. De-
professionalisation of planning is urged whereby planners would become merely advocates in a 
local form of pluralism. 
3. 7 Conclusions 
In Section 3 .2, I have argued that, from a theoretical view, the prevailing post war approach of 
governments was Cox's 'pluralism with a Keynesian policy bias'. This was despite the 
immediate post war Labour government's socialist approach and later failed attempts at 
corporatism. Thatcher's arrival with the New Right approach ended this relative consensus. 
Thus, the post war period may be summed up as having three separate theoretical thrusts, initial 
socialism, modified pluralism and the New Right. 
In all three of these periods, local government has been shown to be essentially the handmaid of 
government given the overwhelming powers of the centre to dictate and control. However, it has 
also been recognised as being at the heart of the post war welfare state (Rhodes 1985) 
(Cochrane 1993). Thus the Classical Constitutional model would appear to be relevant to a 
consideration of local government theory. Apart from the massive structural overhaul in 197 4, 
the major post war impact on local government was the Thatcher administration's New Right 
approach. This resulted in the rise of a New Urban Left in some Labour led councils, 
particularly in London. Also, the Post- Fordist model argued by Stoker and Moss burger ( 1995) 
has some relevance to the reactions of local authorities of different political persuasions to the 
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government's approach. Rhodes' work on Sub-Central government also has relevance to 
theories of local government particularly in his consideration of communities and networks. 
In planning terms, we have seen how the underlying philosophy and purposes of planning in the 
early post war period were translated into a heavily design based physical process- regarded as 
based on procedural theory. From the standpoint of the planners, all the approaches outlined in 
Section 3.6 were critiques of or developments of the procedural theory, which had developed 
and were not theories promoted by planners themselves. A key question here is how the 
planners have seen these approaches. As we saw at the beginning of that Section, there was no 
disagreement with Alexander's identification of a gap between theory and practice. Indeed, it 
was suggested that the issue of whether the gap matters was probably only of concern to the 
theoreticians. Until the arrival of Thatcher's New Right approaches, planning theory had little or 
nothing to say about politics despite the day-to-day impact of the politicians, local and national, 
on the activities of the planners (Forrester 1989), (Hoch 1996), (Brooks 1996), (Alien 1996), 
Baum (1996) and Taylor (1999). Baum (1996 p. 366) makes the point that rationalist planning 
had little to say about politics and how to operate in the political world. He argues that more 
recent critiques have recognised the context of politics, otherwise they say no more than the 
rationalists. He suggests that: -
The key is to understand theorists as practitioners of theorizing. 
Reade ( 1987) argues that planning lacks any credible theoretical basis also arguing that planners 
take on board new ideas, theories etc. without due consideration or appropriate grounding in the 
knowledge. Planners had, since the advent of professional planning in the post war period, 
operated in a physical development tradition with little or no interest in economic influences of 
indeed the impact of social dynamics. The technical problems associated with developing 
spatial plans and subsequent controls of development were their key concerns, in other words, 
instrumental rationality. 
This chapter has been concerned with setting planning in its post war context. It is important to 
recognise the radically different state of governance today, nearly sixty years on from the 
passing of the Town and Country Planning Act 194 7. Government itself is more complex 
because of many different pressures it must sustain. There is the influence of Europe in terms of 
policy directives as well as the issues raised by human rights legislation. Global issues such as 
the environment. The global nature of business. The advent of more sophisticated lobby groups. 
Conflicts inside the arguments about the public interest e.g. in housing and transport terms. The 
interaction of policy initiatives where resolving one problem raises another e.g. the creation of 
centres in rural areas for proper processing of immigrants and the public reaction. 
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Planning itself is a good example of this more complex world as we saw in Chapter 2. 
Inspection of only the titles of the PPGs shows the Secretary of State offering guidance on 
Town Centres and Retail Developments (PPG6), Telecommunications (PPG8), Transport 
(PPG 13 ), Renewable Energy (PPG22), Planning and Pollution (PPG23 and so on. 
Supermarkets, mobile phone masts, modern levels of transport and pollution, renewable energy 
are just some examples of topics that were unheard of but are now subject to government and 
indeed often European policy. Moore (2000 p. 375) graphically illustrates the complexity of 
issues of policy and management in describing the Public Inquiry into the Heathrow Airport 
Terminal 5 project. This inquiry enjoyed 524 sitting days and together with linked and related 
proposals considered 21 planning applications. In addition it considered 6 highway orders, 5 
Acquisition of Land Act 1981 orders among others. The Inspector took evidence from 750 
witnesses, received 25,000 written representations and considered 5,400 inquiry documents. In 
the end, this has to result in a government policy decision for which the focal point is the 
Secretary of State. All this seems a far cry from Alnwick and the empirical evidence in this 
thesis, yet, as we saw in Chapter 1, we have delay, very high levels of uncertainty and very 
onerous potential costs and demands on resources for all sides. Terminal 5 projects and 
Inquiries may be very important but what might appear to be a little local difficulty at Alnwick 
turned into a £4 million problem for the District Council because of their perverse actions. 
Having set the context of the planning system, it is now against the background of the New 
Right approaches that we turn in the next chapter to a consideration of a radically different 
theoretical approach namely Institutional theory and its development, the communicative turn. 
The collaborative or communicative turn in urban planning theory has almost dominated the 
theoretical planning literature over the last two decades. Based on the work of Habermas and 
Giddens, it focuses on participation, possibilities of changing structures of governance etc., ideal 
means of communication, a different role for the planner and so on. It clearly turns its back on 
instrumental rationality as the dominant paradigm in planning theory and even if it is not itself 
the dominant paradigm it is certainly at the forefront of the debate. Because of its importance to 
this thesis, this approach to planning theory is discussed separately in the next Chapter. 
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THEORETICAL PLANNING APPROACHES EXHIBIT 3.1 
Na'ive Public Procedural Organisation Liberal Radical 
Admin Theory political political 
economy economy 
Definition Public sector Generic Policy Redressing Supporting 
of Planning direction of land decision implementation market failure capital 
use makers accumulation 
View of Public sector Rational Net workers Assessors of Agents of a 
Planners urban decision environmental capitalist state 
managers makers impact 
Process Policy Decision Negotiation Economic Influencing 
formulation & making assessment circuits of capital 
implementation 
Relation to External Nil Nil Intervention Responding 
the direction basis on quasi - to drive for 
of economy market profit 
economy valuations 
Relation to Implementation Goals set by Planners Nil Example of 
politics of socialist political bargain with functional 
plans process interested role of state 
parties 
Outcomes Naive view of Dependent on Dependent on Dependent on 
success handling of assumptions capital & class 
resource used in conflicts 
constraints assessments 
Research Particular Profession Local Social markets Production & 
focus policies planners Authorities collective & Quangos consumption 
JJfOCesses 
Theoretical Nil Generalisation Critique of Contextualsiing Radical critique 
antecedents of Naive Procedural development of ofNPA & 
Public Admin. theory Procedural Procedural 
theory theories 
Political New Right New Left Institutional 
sociolo2y 
Definition Local Economic Community Arena for mediation 
of Planning politics development participation 
View of Urban Stale Advocates One sectional interest among 
Planners gatekeepers bureaucrats many 
Process Allocation Potentially Struggle for local Mediation 
of scarce faci I itating power 
resources development 
Relation to Economics Intervention Economics Economics as one source of 
the a source in free markets constraining structuration 
economy 
of conflicts community goals 
Relation to Planning Potentially as if Local pluralism Planning involves 
politics is political an authoritarian conflict between sectional 
state interests 
Outcomes Inequality in Dependent on Dependent on ability Dependent on relations 
distribution planning goals to control public & between factors 
v market signals private 
sectors 
Research Political Markets Communities Local case studies 
focus groupings 
Theoretical Critique of Critique of Integrating Political Integrating development of 
antecedents Procedural Procedural & sociology & Radical Organisation theory, Liberal 
theory Liberal political political economy & Radical political economy 
economy & Political sociology 
Summansed from Rydm (1993) 
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CHAPTER 4 -TOWARDS A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH 
4.1 Introduction 
As we saw in the last Chapter, the prevailing orthodoxy in the immediate post war period was 
instrumental rationality or procedural theory, regarded widely as the dominant paradigm in 
planning theory. However, over more than two decades, this rational theoretical approach has 
been subjected to sustained critique Forrester (1989), Healey (1997), Hoch (1996), 
Mandelbaum ( 1996), and Sager (1994 ). It has been argued that if rationality was the dominant 
paradigm in planning theory, it is now being overtaken by an emerging paradigm namely 
'communicative action' (Innes 1995 p.I83). Allmendinger and Tewdyr-Jones (2002 p. 5) point 
out that the 'communicative turn' as they describe it has dominated theoretical discourse since 
the 1980's but it has gone through a number of mutations. They point to 'planning through 
debate' (Healey 1992), 'communicative planning' (Healey 1993), (Innes 1995), 'argumentative 
planning' (Fischer and Forester 1993), 'collaborative planning' (Healey 1997) and 'deliberative 
planning' (Forester 1999). Furthermore, they note that academic concern in relation to 
governance processes and institutional structures have, following Giddens, led to a focus on a 
'new institutionalism '. 
Healey ( 1997 p.5), defines institutional theory as an approach based on "new ways of thinking 
about the institutional design of governance". Two strands to this development are discussed: -
a) An institutionalist approach to urban and regional change focussing on the social relations 
involving the conduct of daily life and work and the way these relations interweave. The range 
of stakes which people have in the local environment, the different ways of asserting claims for 
policy attention, power relations and how these affect and inhibit the participants in the power 
game are all emphasised in this approach. 
b) A communicative approach to design of governance systems and practices - ways of 
fostering collaborative, consensus building practices. This approach looks for a shared power 
world, investigates the design of governance processes to achieve this and takes a normative 
position for an ethical commitment to enabling all stakeholders to have a voice. Transforming 
ways of thinking is a key element in this approach. Healey argues that such an approach could 
provide the means of realising real participatory democracy in pluralist societies. 
Healey considers both strands at some length in Part I of her book but importantly for this 
thesis moves on in Part Ill to consideration of design of processes for 'collaborative planning'. 
This collaborative approach uses both strands in supporting her stated purpose, which is to 
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provide a normative concept of collaborative planning as a style of governance and proposing 
some methods for achieving it (Healey 1997 p. 204). 
It must be made clear at this stage that Healey's standpoint on advocating collaborative 
planning is from consideration of a widely based spatial planning arena with all that entails. 
This thesis focuses on a much narrower arena where we shall be investigating the restricted 
context of the interface between the planning system and private sector organisations. 
An outline of the institutional and the communicative approaches will be followed by a short 
discussion of current critiques of the communicative approach. Given the claims made for the 
approach by a number of theorists, it is important to recognise that some of its precepts are 
under rigorous scrutiny by other theorists. An outline of my adaptation of Healey's 
collaborative approach and the resulting framework will end the chapter. 
4.2 The Institutional Approach 
This section will start with an account of the institutionalist perspective of the state followed by 
a similar account of local government. My purpose is to tie the institutional perspective in these 
areas into the background described in Chapter 3. The planning system is dealt with much more 
fully as it is the main thrust of this thesis. 
The State 
Writings on institutional theories of the state embrace the whole state and its institutions i.e. 
central and local government, business etc. Such approaches have economic as well as political 
theoretical foundations. Much of this can be found in neo-pluralist thinking described by 
Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987 Ch. 6). Here they point to the departure from conventional 
pluralist analysis by thinkers such as Dahl, Lindblom and Galbraith as they responded to social 
crises in Western nations caused by economic failures and civil unrest in the 1960s and 1970s. 
This was the basis of neo-pluralism, an approach that attempted to critique the differences 
between modem advanced industrial societies and previous eras. Neo-pluralism started with 
rejection of out-dated methodologies in economics and political science, e.g. in New Right 
thinking. The protagonists embraced unorthodox economic ideas, realizing the limitations on 
democratic choices caused by the activities of business corporations, argued the development of 
a professionalized state, the influence of systems theory, use of policy analysis incorporating 
organizational theory and overall a thrust for empirical realism. Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987 
pp. 273 - 274) suggest that unorthodox economics has a heavily institutionalist bias, trying to 
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show how social values and organisational arrangements exert an important influence upon 
supposedly separate economic operations. 
Galbraith's normative approach in "The Good Society" (1996 pp. 1-2) attempts to explore and 
define what an achievable 'good society' would be. He asks, among other questions, how 
economic policy could contribute to closing the gap between 'haves' and 'have nots'. How can 
public services be made more equitably and efficiently available? He is concerned with the 
'achievable' not the 'perfect' society. These are clearly the types of questions raised by 
institutionalist thinking particularly when he goes on to discuss (pp. 17-18) the power and 
influence of business and its bureaucratic nature. He argues (pp. 19 -20) that as comprehensive 
socialism has all but disappeared, an opposing ideology, privatisation has emerged and that 
broadly, they rank with each other in irrelevance. He goes on to suggest that while there is a 
significant area where the market should be unchallenged, there is a large range of activities 
that increases with increasing economic well being where the services and functions of the state 
are either necessary or socially superior. In the good and intelligent society there is one 
dominant rule: decision must be made on the social and economic merits of the particular case 
and not subordinate to ideology and to doctrine. Action must be based on the ruling facts of the 
specific case. This point raises interesting questions for the planning system. How does a 
private organisation cope when a local authority acts perversely in the face of the facts e.g. 
Alnwick Council disregarding the Structure Plan and government retail policy? 
Acknowledging his debt to Galbraith, among others, Hutton in 'The Stakeholding Society' 
(1999) champions the 'stakeholder society' as a normative approach to the state. He addresses a 
number of issues, which can be seen as institutionalist. Like Galbraith, he notes the 'ideological 
injunction' informing New Right thinking- private is good- public is bad. He argues (p.4) that 
the Conservatives have succeeded in creating a new public language in which choice and 
individual rights are seen as the overwhelmingly dominant values rather than responsibility, 
mutualisation of obligation and social duty. Opposed to this is how he describes (p. 74) the 
unifying idea of stakeholding, which is inclusion - the individual is a member, a citizen and a 
potential partner. Inclusion is not a one way street, there are reciprocal obligations on the 
individual as well as rights - in every domain and in every social class - could be a voluntary 
code or be codified into law. The institutions that grow out of these relationships foster 
relations of trust and commitment; they tend to be high investing, attentive to human capital and 
highly creative. He argues further (p.SO) that stakeholding has profound implications for 
economic, social and political organisation. Workers are seen as members of firms rather than 
locked into employer/labour antagonisms. Firms become social organizations embedded in a 
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complex skein of rights and moral obligations. There is a different vocabulary - social 
inclusion, membership, trust, co-operation, long-term ism, equality of opportunity, participation, 
active citizenship, rights and obligations versus the New Right vocabulary - opting out, 
privatisation, individual choice, maximisation of shareholder value, the 'burden' of welfare and 
the public sector. 
In discussing business Hutton (pp. 81-84) describes the firm as a network of reciprocal claims 
between shareholders, employees, bankers, suppliers, managers and consumers. (Many firms 
would regard the consumer as the prime claimant, including this author's former employer). A 
business is doing something unique. It holds a franchise, in the widest sense of that word, 
through a network of co-operative working relationships cemented by trust and a desire to 
sustain a good reputation. At the same time controls of various kinds govern how people build 
these relationships, legal, financial. He suggests that the right to be a member of a functioning 
economic community is among the most important of individual rights. The key stakeholder 
value is inclusion rather than the 'equality' sought by the old left or the 'individual autonomy' 
of the New Right. All markets are social and political as well as economic. They are made to 
work by real people embedded in a real culture, interacting in real institutions. 
Finally, Hutton offers some prescriptive approaches (pp. 90-95) where he argues the necessity 
to rebuild the intermediate institutions between the individual and the state so that they 
incorporate stakeholder values while simultaneously reforming state structures so that they are 
more open, accountable and responsive to the balance of public opinion. The task is to reinvent 
a value system in which obligations are stressed along with rights, so underpinning democracy 
and the wider society. This stakeholder economy and society needs to be buttressed by a 
revived democracy that offers the capacity for local elites to engage in debate and public 
service is worthwhile; nobody from whatever level in society wants to become a cipher of ideas 
decided at the centre - the condition of local democracy in contemporary Britain. We have 
already seen at Alnwick that consideration of stakeholder or public pinion played little part in 
the process until it came to challenge. A more collaborative approach between council and 
people may have avoided the conflict. 
Rydin (1993 pp. 276- 281) argues that institutionalists have a normative analysis of the state, 
which promotes a role for public policy in redressing economic and social inequalities. This 
contrasts with much of the New Right approach of the Thatcher government. 
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Healey ( 1997 p. 207) argues that institutionalism is a normative theory which emphasises the 
complex interactions between the activities of formal government bodies, economic activity and 
social life, inter-linked through social networks and cultural assumptions and practices which 
cut across formal organizations. It has a thrust of policy development and strategy making 
which is inclusive, collaborative and communicative. Strategies must be seen to be effective 
and legitimate in terms of being clearly understood. It seeks to involve and hear all 
stakeholders. This compares with a corporatist approach, which concentrates, on a small 
number of powerful interest groups or a pluralist approach attempting to involve a plurality of 
interest groups (Healey 1997 p. 24 7). It again contrasts with a New Right approach, which for 
example deliberately shunned organised labour. It questions governance duties, competences 
and the division of tasks. Subsidiarity is a key question as opposed to the increasing centralising 
tendencies of the governments of recent times. The erosion of local government powers over 
the last three decades under governments of all persuasions is a direct contrast here. Finally, it 
stresses that those in governance must be able to justifY their actions and be subject to 
challenge. This point is one, which is not generally comfortable for any British government. 
Critically, resources to effect challenges must be made available. 
Rydin ( 1993 pp. 183-189) argues that this institutional approach is not seen to be useful to the 
executive as its normative view on the mediating role that the state can play is minimised by 
lack of consultation and negotiation over many areas of policy and by inequitable structuring of 
any mediation, which does occur. 
Local Government 
This level of governance is covered by much the same philosophy and process as outlined 
above for central government. Clearly, as we have seen in Chapter 2, central government is the 
key policy generator and source of powers for local and sub-central government. These latter 
on the other hand would be much more affected by the key stakeholder issues of inclusion, 
participation, trust, communication and challenge. Rydin ( 1993 pp. 189-198) and Rhodes 
(1988) discuss a complicated pattern or mesh of communications, intra-organisational and inter-
organisational, involving the functions and organisation of local government. Rydin suggests 
that the institutional approach is particularly useful at identifYing and analysing these forms of 
local governance activity. In the context of resolution of actual and potential conflicts between 
tiers of governance and departments of governance, these communications networks are seen as 
vital. These interactions and conflicts were clearly illustrated at Alnwick. Such conflicts are 
clearly likely to occur when she shows for example, that in 1993 (Rydin 1993 p. 186), in 
England alone, fourteen Whitehall Departmental organisations were relevant to the planning 
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system. Furthermore, the continuing erosion of local government powers has provided a fertile 
ground for conflicts between the two tiers of governance. 
The Planning System 
As we have seen in Chapter 3, the post war period saw planning as a rational, bureaucratic, 
physical design based process with the planners seen as apparently apolitical experts attempting 
to meet utopian objectives. Significant critique of this prevailing orthodoxy started in the US 
with critical assessments of political and business influences on development. Healey suggests 
this led to a policy analysis basis of planning. This itself came under serious critique led by 
Lindblom (Lindblom and Braybrooke 1963) where Lindblom attacked the possibility of 
comprehensive 'rational decision making', evaluating all the available options and then 
choosing the best (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987 pp. 54-55). Lindblom instead argued for 
'disjointed incremental ism'. Other writers raised the issue of values i.e. the planners were 
people and could not be value free. Hitherto this had not been seen as problematic in the 
prevailing consensus. Davidoff (1965) argued that it was impossible for planners to be value 
free in their decision making. Gans (1969) was arguing for planners to be aware of a wider 
interest than the direct client i.e. the citizens affected by the proposal. 
Healey (1997 pp. 31-43) discusses the issue of resolution of conflict over spatial plans and 
frameworks and argues that in Britain, conflicts have been managed by a kind of pluralist 
interest group politics, which has simply meant that conflicts were repeated on a project-by-
project basis. Participants became skilled in adversarial conflict. Mutual suspicion and lack of 
trust became entrenched and the nature of the power relations causing the conflict did not 
become transparent. A key issue in this thesis is the resolution of conflicts within the 
framework discussed by Healey. Dispute resolution mechanisms work eventually e.g. at 
Alnwick and as we shall see in the case studies. However, the delays, uncertainties, demands on 
resources and costs may be exacerbated by the process. 
As we saw in Chapter 3, the New Right approach was market focused using performance 
criteria to measure results. This of course still allows conflict over what criteria are relevant 
and how they should be used. Again, as we shall see later, such criteria can easily prove to be 
contestable. Healey goes on to point out other issues such as institutional constraints. She talks 
of deeply embedded institutional constraints against collaboration in the British state with 
hyper-centralisation, the "pillar" type of organisation of government departments and the 
resulting complexities in local conflicts. 
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A crucially important background development in the rise of the 'new institutionalism' was the 
'modernist v post modernist' debate. Taylor (1998 p. 164) suggests that in terms of planning, 
'modernism' was an intellectual position based on reason and science. This fostered an 
optimistic belief that, through rationality and science, human beings could develop a better 
world. This thesis was seriously undermined by the post war utopian attempts at planning 
producing for example the despised tower blocks. Healey (1997 pp. 38-43) argues that 
modernism has been subject to much critique, where the belief in the "objectivity of science" 
was rejected by critics suggesting that science was actually socially produced and framed by 
constructs which held together only because groups of scientists believed in them. This critique 
it is argued has led to increasing distrust of what Habbermas ( 1984) calls 'abstract systems' of 
social, political and economic organisation. The rejection of the modernist intellectual position 
has led to post modernism where at the extreme, even rational discourse itself is impossible 
(Taylor 1998 p. 165). As far as planning is concerned, Taylor goes on to argue that what post-
modernism is really criticising is comprehensive, 'clean sweep' planning not planning per se. 
Reason in planning, he points out, is as relevant as ever (Taylor 1998 p. 165). 
Post-modernism nevertheless provides a focus on the way we live our lives. Healey (1997 p. 
39) uses the word 'betrayal' in suggesting that this is our sense today of the modernist world 
that has been our experience. This is primarily because the governance institutions set up to 
improve everyone's material circumstances through science and technology has created new 
ways of making people unequal. She goes on to say this has led to increasing awareness of the 
cultural embeddedness of much of our life and its organisation. Culture is defined here as 
systems of meaning and frames of reference through which people socially shape their 
institutional practices, where values are seen not as individual preferences but to derive from 
modes of thought. This leads to identifying change away from homogenous cultural 
communities to encounters between people of different cultural communities. Each person may 
live in a number of different cultural communities involving many networks, family, work, 
social, sport etc. Healey poses a crucial question - 'is it possible to reconstruct a public realm 
within which we can debate and manage our collective concerns in as inclusive a way as 
possible'? 
This is essentially where 'institutional ism' starts, largely, as Healey argues, underpinned by 
Giddens with his work on 'structuration' and Habbermas with his work on 'theory of 
communicative action'. Healey ( 1997 pp. 45 -49) describes Giddens' theory of structuration as 
follows:-
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a) Our working out of our individual identities and social relations are "structured" by 
what has gone before and we are embedded in these structures by all types of rules 
and systems of which planning of land use is one. These rules and systems may seem 
to have the quality of engineering and managerial techniques but all have been 
"made" at some time and are continually being remade. Modes of thought are very 
powerful e.g. in planning, assumptions of regulatory permits or plan making. 
b) We are all active agents and we make these structures ourselves i.e. structures shape 
agents just as agents shape structures. Planners make daily choices such as "whether 
to follow the rules or change them". In other words, change the structure. 
c) Individuals are neither fully autonomous nor automatons. 
d) We have power to change if we recognise the situation (Transformative Power) by 
changing the rules, changing the flow of resources and most significantly, change the 
way we think about things. 
Ball (1998 p. 1512) notes that in what he calls the Agency-Structure-Healey model of 
institutional ism, no precise definition is given of what constitutes a 'structure', an 'agency' or 
an 'institution'. 
Structure seems to be aspects of the broad context in which agents operate. Agents 
seem to be key people working in the institutions, in which case institutions become 
wrongly personified as people. 
However, Rydin (1993 pp. 73-75) notes that 'structure' is defined by the way actors operate 
with and against rules, resources and ideas as they pursue their specific strategies. Key 
definitions in the context of development are one, rules are political and judicial rules that 
define the limits of development, two, resources are channelled through financial systems and 
the interplay of supply and demand and lastly, the ideas and values that inform what should be 
built, what environment is desirable. The state is seen as a mediating agent in the conflicts 
between different interests. 
McDougall (1996 pp. 189-200) notes that Giddens defines 'structures' as organised sets of 
rules and resources that are produced and reproduced through human action. Continuity is 
dependent on the knowledge of the human actors who concretise and reproduce through 
thought and action, the routinised patterns of social life. Giddens' definition of 'agency' is in 
terms of the ability of individuals to intervene in social life through their action. Action is an 
issue of choice, to act or not to act, to act differently and whatever the choice, if they wish 
exercise control. This issue of choice and how it is exercised implies power, which Giddens 
sees as lubricating the relationship between structure and agency. McDougall suggests that this 
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possibility of choice of actions and the extent to which planners exercise these choices is a 
central issue in planning. 
Bolan ( 1996 p. 505) defines resources in two ways; command over allocative resources and 
command over authoritative resources. While the first involves control over material goods and 
natural resources, the second is the control over human beings. He cites Giddens saying, 
Power may be at its most alarming and quite often its most horrifying when applied as a 
sanction of force. But it is typically at its most intense and durable when running 
through the repetition of institutionalised practices (Giddens 1995 p.9). 
This concept of authoritative power is important in the context of planning because of the role 
of the actors in the planning system from Secretary of State down to elected council members 
and officers. We saw examples of this at Alnwick but more will be seen in the case studies. 
All of this rejects the notion that we are autonomous individuals merely pursuing our own 
preferences in order to obtain material satisfaction - the utilities of neo-classical economic 
theory. Instead, it argues for 'socially constructed' individual identities. All of our daily actions 
seeing, knowing and behaving take place in kinds of social relations with others and are 
therefore embedded in particular social contexts. The particular geographies and histories of 
these contexts are crucial in framing attitudes and values. Systems of meaning and frames of 
reference arise from these contexts. Crucially important are differences in systems of meaning, 
in cultures. Social life is therefore actively made and socially constructed as we live our lives. 
All these constructs are acted on by powerful structures which impact on our daily activities. 
Nevertheless, the institutionalist approach argues that we are not merely passive cogs in 
someone else's machine - i.e. we have choices. We continually make relationships; we have 
shared understandings, mutual trust, we belong to many networks, all resources, which can be 
called upon in future. This is the creation of intellectual and social capital. 
Vigar et a! (2000 pp. 49-51) provide the following summary ofthe 'new institutional' approach 
to the analysis of policy practices. First, the approach is founded on a dynamic and relational 
view of the world, which focuses on the processes through which living and acting are 
accomplished and how patterns or continuities are established, maintained and changed, rather 
than seeking to analyses the particular patterns, which arise per se. Secondly, the approach 
gives people, as active agents, a key role in shaping and inventing processes of change. 
Recognises the power of agency along with that of driving forces. Emphasises the importance 
of the network of relations with others that all actors carry with them. These networks are not 
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just support mechanisms or means of access to resources. They focus on nodal points in 
networks. Thirdly, the approach takes for granted that the social worlds of people in formal 
agencies of government are intertwined with wider social forces, embedding governance 
processes in the wider relations of economic activity and civil society. Fourth, the approach 
puts a major emphasis on the analysis of policy ideas and the often taken for granted frames of 
reference used by members of 'cultural communities'. Lastly, the approach provides an 
empirical way of seeing how the power of external forces is made manifest in specific 
instances, and the extent to which these influences are accepted, reinterpreted, and struggled 
over. 
Writing on property development and the institutions involved, Ball ( 1998 pp. 1511-1512) 
discusses Healey's approach to institutional analysis in the context of Giddens' structure and 
agency. Ball suggests the objective of this type of analysis is to relate the agency's roles, 
strategies and interests to the underlying structural resources, rules and ideas. He goes on to 
show a four-step framework based on Healey's work. 
A mapping exercise has to be undertaken describing what happens in the development 
process. 
A relational analysis is made; who does what and to whom? 
The strategies and interests of significant actors are analysed and related to the structural 
rules, resources and ideas. 
This goes beyond empirical work and connects back to underlying social theories, 
Giddens, Habbermas et al. 
Ball goes on to say that several attempts have been made to use this particular model but 
difficulties experienced may have been due to what was attempted with the model. 
All this suggests the institutional approach is concerned with policy analysis of spatial planning 
at an urban, regional level and new ways of thinking in attempting to influence change in the 
processes of such planning. We can now turn to the communicative approach dealing with 
human interaction at a more detailed level. 
4.3 The Communicative Approach 
This approach is based on the work of Jurgen Habermas who has had major influence on 
thinking among planning theorists through his work on the theory of communicative action 
(Healey 1997 pp. 49-54) (Taylor 1998 pp. 123-124). Habbermas talks of the constraints on 
daily life as 'abstract systems', which are, economic (the market place) and political 
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(bureaucracy) and are opposed to our lifeworld of personal experience. He is concerned with 
distortions of communication, hence his theory of communicative action. 
Normatively, Habermas ( 1984 pp.307-308) argues that there are four critical conditions for an 
effective communication between two or more people:-
1) What is being communicated is comprehensible; 
2) Something must be communicated which is factually true; 
3) The communicator must be sincere; 
4) An understanding is being sought so the communication must be legitimate within 
certain moral norms and conventions shared by all parties to the communication. 
Practical reasoning frequently does not separate facts from values or emotions from our 
deployment of material resources, as there is often a total mix up of data, issues and priorities. 
Habermas argues there are three forms of reasoning and "validity" claims which each 
demands:-
1) Instrumental -technical reasoning (ends to means, evidence to conclusions); 
2) Moral reasoning (focused around values and ethics); 
3) Emotive -aesthetic reasoning (derived from emotive experiences). 
Habermas argues that the second and the third forms have been crowded out by the first, the 
scientific, rational type of reasoning because it is more associated with economic and political 
life, treated as outside reason. All three should be given equal weight and the language of all 
three types of reasoning must be included in discourse. The theory of communicative action 
with communicative ethics can be summed up as - 'dialogue and conversation'. Critically 
important is the avoidance of one-sided conversations where the hearer is marginalised. Healey 
(1999 p. 1131) sees this work of Habbermas' as being normative criteria for critiquing 
governance practices, used as an evaluative ideal practice against which to evaluate actual 
governance practices. She sees Habbermas' criteria as being tools for continual critique of the 
flow of governance processes, as argumentative tools for 'excavating' embedded power 
relations for wide scrutiny. These perspectives on effective communication and types of 
reasoning resonate with the difficulties experienced in the interface we are considering. Both 
public and private sector actors can be faulted for communication problems that arise as we saw 
at Alnwick and will be only too evident in the case studies. 
Forester ( 1989 p. 224 Note 14) sees the difference between the work of Giddens and 
Habbermas as the attention each gives to the question, 'How does the reproduction of social 
relations reproduce or subvert illegitimate' authority'. He suggests that Giddens assesses the 
reproduction of social action but ignores the question. By contrast, the issue of legitimate 
75 
authority and its reproduction lies at the heart of Habbermas' entire perspective on assessing 
'systematically distorted communication'. 
Healey ( 1997 pp. 28-29) suggests that while numerous theories have evolved to some extent to 
take into account social processes and diversity in the ways people have of thinking and 
valuing, a communicative planning theory has also evolved in the last three decades. She 
suggests the key elements are: -
I) Recognition that all forms of knowledge are socially constructed, scientific and expert 
knowledge and techniques are not so different from practical reasoning. 
2) Development and communication of knowledge and reasoning can take many forms. 
3) Individuals do not decide on their preferences independently but develop them in 
social contexts and interaction. 
4) People have different interests and expectations. Power relations can be dominant 
through taken for granted assumptions and practices, not only through distribution of 
material resources. 
5) Ownership and knowledge of public policies concerned with planning and which are 
efficient, effective and accountable need to be shared and involve the stakeholders. 
6) All of this leads to collaborative consensus building, transform ways of organising and 
discussing and in the end build cultures. 
7) Planning has the capacity to challenge and change relationships through its approach 
to planning practices. 
It is clear that many elements of this normative theory are consistent with the institutional 
approach already described. 
4.4 Critiques of Communicative Planning 
Innes (1995) wrote of communicative action as 'Planning Theory's emerging paradigm' and in 
succeeding years, an increasing level of critique of the approach has been evident. This section 
will attempt to illustrate some of the key points in this critique. Although other critiques will be 
mentioned, the paper by Tewdyr-Jones and Allmendinger (1998) will be the main focus as it 
deals with many points that are of specific interest in this thesis. 
First with Innes's proposition of the 'emerging paradigm', Huxley and Yiftachel (1998) argue 
that this claim goes too far and indeed, if we consider paradigms in the Khunian sense, the 
dominant paradigm would still be instrumental rationality as it pervades practice. Taylor (1998 
pp. 157-159) helpfully enunciates Khun's view that a paradigm is a given theoretical 
perspective that is dominant in the scientific community for long periods until some other 
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empirical evidence arises which does not fit prevailing theories. Eventually, a new theoretical 
framework is developed that accounts not only for the new evidence but also the old evidence. 
A new paradigm then replaces the old paradigm. This is revolutionary not evolutionary and 
such 'paradigm shifts' occur infrequently e.g. the shift from Newton to Einstein. Taylor 
counsels against regarding the communicative approach as necessarily being a paradigm shift, 
for example, the view of planners as having specialist knowledge and planners as 
'communicators' and 'mediators' could be merged. 
Allmendinger and Tewdyr-Jones (2002 pp. 11-13) follow similar lines of thought. They note 
that communicative action may be the dominant theoretical paradigm but there are healthy 
arguments for other parallel theories. They point to Feyarabend criticising Khun for 
concentrating on dominant and emerging paradigms when there may well be a host of other 
theories competing and overlapping. These theories may not emerge from a paradigmatic crisis 
but may well emerge for many other reasons. Their overall concern over treating the approach 
as a dominant paradigm is what they see as the attempt to force the shape of urban planning 
into the particular perspectives of a small number of prominent urban planning theorists. 
One of the issues with institutional ism has already been mentioned with Ball (1998) and his 
criticism of the ambiguities involved with structure, agency and institutions. Allmendinger and 
Tewdyr-Jones (2002 p. 18) pick up this point and suggest that a number of key aspects are 
downplayed including intra and inter agency/institutional conflict, strategies that may be the 
product of other external forces, overestimating the impact of agency upon structural change 
and under-theorising the dynamics of change (Ball 1998). 
In general terms of critique, Tewdyr-Jones and Allmendinger (1998 pp. 1975-1989), in a paper 
entitled "Deconstructing communicative rationality: a critique of Habermasian collaborative 
planning" offered a critique suggesting it fails to deal adequately with the peculiar political and 
professional nuances existing in planning practice. They go on to argue that communicative 
planning has reached a defining moment for three reasons. First is a questioning of its 
theoretical foundations. This has to do with its seeming lack of concern with outcomes, its 
seeming neutrality of process emphasising uncoerced and undistorted communication hiding 
some important assumptions regarding participatory democracy v representative democracy and 
the theorists' distaste for free market economies. This lack of concern with outcomes is a key 
problem for private organisations. The difficulties in reaching honest, lasting consensus and 
how failure to do so will be mediated are seen as important issues. Recourse to the courts 
hardly seems consistent with the approach. Second are practical problems with implementation 
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of the communicative approach into realistic projects where the focus has been on process as 
opposed to outcome. The roles, strategies, agendas, aims and values of all the stakeholders 
present difficulties for Tewdyr-Jones and Allmendinger. Also, if the expert role of the planner 
is questioned, the need for professional planners at all comes under question, as does the issue 
of who takes a lead in getting the stakeholders together. They question Healey's notion that the 
power dimension can be transformed through a restructuring of power relations and social 
contexts, as a process to be recognised by stakeholders, where an alternative to existing power 
structures is to be sought (Healey 1997 p. 86). 
Tewdyr-Jones and Allmendinger question Habermas's notion of four social concepts of action 
with communicative action being an alternative to teleological action, normatively regulated 
action or dramaturgical action. They argue that these three are inherent within communicative 
action. They note first that an actor may act teleologically using strategies in the discourse to 
achieve his or her desired ends. Secondly, even within collaborative planning, members of 
groups may have shared agendas and values supporting their intention to succeed in the debate 
even if they have agreed open and honest rules of discourse. There is thus a possibility of 
normatively regulated action. Third, stakeholders may present a particular image in the 
discourse in order to present an acceptable image to the audience or to present a false 
impression in order to avoid argument. Healey is noted as not covering this point in her work 
although Forester does, using the concept of dramaturgical action. The conclusion from this is 
that a truly collaborative action is not feasible because individuals will not wish to build trust 
and new relations of power or to 
. . generate social, intellectual and political capital which can endure beyond the 
particular collaborative effort Healey ( 1997 p. 264 ). 
Tewdyr-Jones and Allmendinger (1998) argue that in such a heavily politicised arena as 
planning, consensus is a utopian dream; there will always be winners and losers. Furthermore, 
they are critical of the lack of focus on outcomes at the expense of diligent analysis of process. 
They point to failures in practice where the approach has been attempted and the resulting 
dissatisfaction felt by stakeholders and planners (Phelps and Tewdyr-Jones 1998). Here, despite 
real attempts at collaboration, the expectations of the stakeholders could not be met because 
some issues were not allowed to be included in the development plan for statutory reasons and 
the format and language of the plan as laid down by statute militated against the needs of the 
stakeholders. Needless to say, the stakeholders' heightened expectations were not met and this 
outcome was not well received. 
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The issue of values raises four questions for Tewdyr-Jones and Allmendinger (1998 pp. 1984-
1987). First, the position of the professional planner and whether such an individual is even 
needed under this approach. Secondly, the point that actors adopt more open style and 
practices, although why they cannot already do this is open to question. They point out that 
planners have never been encouraged to act democratically by the state, their professional body, 
or education. They forcibly argue that in the UK, the planner is not under any obligation to 
facilitate the process of learning, nor is the planner grounded in an ethic of inclusion. Planners 
may not believe the system should address these matters and may indeed fear participation and 
inclusion as potential threats to their autonomy and expert professional position. Third is the 
issue of stakeholders' knowledge about the issues to be discussed and the supposition that they 
possess the same knowledge or even perfect knowledge to enable an honest debate to occur 
with integrity. Fourth, the theorists state that they are not offering a prescription for planning 
practice, although they argue that Healey in various writings e.g. Healey ( 1997 pp. 288-289) 
discusses pointers to good practice which lead to the conclusion that a programme for 
collaborative planning practice is being developed. Lastly, is the question of how decisions 
taken by stakeholders in the collaborative approach would be challenged? Clearly, allowing for 
this means the view developed in the arena of discourse could be challenged and overturned. 
What then? Healey ( 1997 p. 31 0) even recognises the need for an appeals arbitration process as 
a "backstop formal arrangement" in the event of a breakdown in agreement. This seems at odds 
with the Habermas ideal of communicative rationality. 
Tewdyr-Jones and Allmendinger believe there to be a growing dissatisfaction with the 
unfulfilled promises of the approach as well as their belief that the proponents of 
communicative action seek to speak on behalf of those who do not hold similar views. They 
state that collaborative planning has caused a sea change in the parameters of how theorists 
consider planning but do not agree that a shift is occurring in planning practice. Any attempts at 
this approach are being undertaken in a 'top down' institutional, political and legal framework. 
They argue that when planners try to transpose stakeholders' desires into practical policy 
outcomes, the 'hierarchical regulatory and institutionalised planning context' wins the day. 
They go on to note that a bottom-up democratic process will only be effective when the 
political culture and institutional design of the planning system are transformed. This critique 
constitutes, in their view, a serious undennining of 'high' Habermasian communicative 
rationality. They believe this has caused some of the main proponents of the approach to 
redefine and reposition their interpretation into a pale imitation termed 'collaborative planning', 
which is close to enhanced participation. Nevertheless, the authors conclude that the theorists 
of communicative and collaborative action have made a major contribution, in line with critical 
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theory, to reveal and question. Furthermore, they argue that such critique is not attempting to 
demolish the communicative approach but to open up the debate and indeed help to strengthen 
its appeal. The questions they finally raise are: what holds current planning practices in place, 
how far are these factors likely to change, how could the critique of communicative practices 
help to open up the possibilities of change and how far could the design of different 
communicative practices help to develop alternative pathways for planning practices, both in 
individual instances and in the design of the system as a whole? 
In a response to this critique, Healey ( 1999) argues that Tewdyr-Jones and Allmendinger are 
arguing from a utilitarian perspective because they suggest that collaboration would only be 
natural if it was in the interests of the parties concerned. An institutional approach, on the other 
hand, would question ways of thinking and acting being taken as natural. Healey also argues 
that the communicative approach is not in any way 'power blind' and indeed seeks to determine 
how to achieve 'power to' enable change in contradistinction to a command position of 'power 
over'. Healey's response to the question of whether it works in practice goes back to 
Habermas's critical theory approach, where the analysis is an argumentative tool to critically 
scrutinise governance processes, a process for 'excavating' embedded power relations for wider 
scrutiny. Finally, she comments on the British system and suggests that land-use planning 
practices in Britain have become deeply embedded in routines of state procedure and allowed to 
privilege certain interests over others. There are some peculiar characteristics of the way the 
system has evolved over the last two decades, which have constrained the trajectory of 
communicative action. 
In their later paper, Allmendinger and Tewdyr-Jones (2002 pp. 13-16) argue that the 
argumentative or deliberative approach proposed by the communicative action view are not the 
only valid methods of collective decision making. Bargaining and voting are normal methods 
and all four modes of decision making are valid and of proper use under different 
circumstances. They go on to discuss the contention that open discussion will expose 
multifarious interests in the force of better argument. They point out that actors may act 
'strategically' but under a veneer of public interest or seemingly for the public good and in 
other words powerful interests may not be transformed. They make a crucial point about the 
communicative approach when they say on page 14:-
We await a reasoned justification from the proponents of the communicative turn in 
urban planning to demonstrate why and in what circumstances the communicative 
approach is superior to others. 
This point is addressed in the next section. 
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4.5 An Adaptation of Institutional-Collaborative Approach. 
Why adopt this Approach? 
This thesis is restricted in its scope and does not attempt to deal with the broad sweep of urban 
planning. It cannot therefore embrace all the elements of communicative action described and 
critiqued in this chapter. Therefore, despite the critiques of 'communicative action' discussed 
above, it seems that at least in a modified form, it is a theoretical approach that has something 
to offer in the context of this thesis. The methodology used in the thesis will be described more 
fully in Chapter 5 but this section will simply explain which elements of communicative or 
collaborative theory have been used to form a potential theoretical approach for use in this 
thesis. 
As a result of the literature search, initial acquaintance was made with institutional theory and 
then with Healey's work, particularly her book "Collaborative Planning" (Healey 1997). At 
the same time a framework of project issues surfaced during the selection of the cases and it 
became apparent that some form ofHealey's collaborative approach might well have something 
useful to say about these project issues. Consequently, a selective approach has been taken to 
Healey's work where aspects of her collaborative approach appear to be of significant 
analytical use in this thesis. My work is based essentially on Chapter 9 of her book (Healey 
1997). This chapter entitled ' Systemic Institutional Design for Collaborative Planning' offers a 
normative theoretical approach to planning. 
My adaptation of Healey's collaborative approach arises from specific issues of conflicts that 
are shown up in the empirical evidence and have already been seen at Alnwick. The attraction 
of this collaborative approach (adapted) is that it can be used analytically to address a number 
of issues, which are germane to the empirical evidence. In the context of this thesis, these 
issues are: -
Governance strategies, duties, responsibilities, competences and accountability. 
Challenges to decisions and the criteria for those challenges. 
Stake holders 
Resources and their use. 
Different cultures and their impact on each other. 
The transformative issue of 'how things could be made different'. 
The approach addresses aspects of the process of governance, the issues of challenge, 
comprehensively addresses the issues of collaboration, resources and not least culture. One of 
the causes of problems in the planning system is that people often confront each other from 
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very different positions, with no past history of encounters. These are meetings of strangers. 
Healey suggests that the planning systems aim to provide a framework for dealing with such 
encounters, which can be seen as conflicts between cultural communities. Problems can arise 
therefore not just about the proposals but also about the concepts behind the proposal, 
organisation forms, power relations, types of discussion and language. These will all need to be 
addressed. The institutionalist approach suggests that transformation is possible through 
discussion, collaboration etc. which through building up relations between networks can build 
institutional capacity - social qualities which appear to make a difference to local economic 
performance. It is important to recognise that in attempting to solve problems of collaboration 
across cultural differences, first, cultural dimensions must be recognised i.e. "where they are 
coming from" and second, participants must make shared systems of meaning and ways of 
acting into a new layer of cultural formation. Healey (1997 p.64) very carefully defines culture 
as: -
The continuously re-shaped product of the processes through which systems of meaning 
and modes of thought are generated. 
Planners are seen as mediating professionals in a system where planning itself provides the 
arena for mediation to take place. Rydin (1993 p. 83) notes that this approach concerns the way 
in which planners perceive the social and economic stakes involved and how they negotiate 
with individuals representing social and economic interests in society. How and whether the 
planners can influence these actors is a key question. 
The Modified Collaborative Approach 
The approach taken here has been to attempt an adaptation of Healey's work to suit the needs 
of my narrower focus. For use in analysis, a Framework summary document has been 
assembled (Exhibit 4.1) that is entitled, 'A Modified Institutional-Collaborative Framework'. 
This Framework acknowledges the foundations of Institutionalism but then picks out the 
elements of Healey's Collaborative Approach deemed relevant to this thesis. Here, we are 
concentrating only on the issues arising in the adaptation of Healey's approach, hence the use 
of her headings of Governance, Challenge, Collaboration, Resource, costs and uncertainty and 
lastly Culture 
Governance 
The first area of concern is governance itself. Healey addresses three key elements, the 
strategies that are selected, the duties of those in governance and governance competences. The 
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impact of these three elements has already been noted at Alnwick where all three were key 
factors in the conflict. As we shall see, they play a similarly important role in the case studies. 
The duties of those in governance to be democratic, effective and accountable seem to be 
unarguable. However, Healey throughout her discussions argues for promotion of participative 
governance, which is contested by some critics as we have seen earlier in this chapter. 
Nevertheless, Alnwick highlights the importance of the possible impact of more public 
participation where it was public input that eventually prevailed. 
Governance competences, who does what, where, at what level, with whom, the use of 
expertise, interaction with wider society, roles and interactions inside governance are all 
important issues in the cases and are necessary items for analysis. These issues were nicely 
illustrated by Alnwick and their importance in the case studies will be seen in later chapters. 
Challenge 
The importance of the right to challenge is born out in the cases and is of incontestable 
importance as a major element in the planning process. The process and arenas of dispute 
resolution and the type and quality of information available are all key issues for any appellant, 
as the case studies will demonstrate. The criteria for challenge again may vary for different 
appellants but the ones selected here all have particular resonance in the cases. The issue of the 
process acknowledging diverse ways of thinking of the whole community may seem an odd 
choice but again there were issues of mutual misunderstanding of views, language and 
arguments involved in all the cases. 
Collaboration 
The involvement of all the stakeholders, inclusion v exclusion, who is included, when, how and 
the arenas for discussion are all relevant issues if a collaborative v adversarial and non-
participatory process is to be followed. This is equally true of the routines, rituals, language 
and even the choice of topics for discussion. Again, the cases will illustrate the importance of 
all these points. Habermasian communicative ethics could be a useful analytical tool as Taylor 
(1998 p.l24) points out in citing Kemp's analysis of the Public Inquiry held into the Windscale 
nuclear reprocessing plant in 1997 (Kemp 1980). As we shall see, in all the case studies in this 
thesis, there were clear issues of distorted communication and Habermas may offer some 
assistance in examining these issues. 
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Resource, cost and uncertainty issues 
In all the case studies, we shall see that these were major issues for all sides, public sector as 
well as the private organisations. It does not seem that the planning system is intended to 
minimise resource costs and uncertainty, so questions need to be asked about why and how this 
happens. 
Culture 
This topic is never discussed in planning negotiations in my experience and yet is a pervading 
influence on all the participants. If this is the case, as we shall see in the case studies, it seems 
important to address the cultural issue, the differences in cultures, how they can be taken into 
account and whether ethical and moral issues arise and need to be considered. 
As stated earlier in this section, the detail of the choice of issues, choice of cases, the 
development of this collaborative approach and the initial model (Exhibit 4.1 ), will be set out in 
Chapter 5 on Methodology. 
4.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has set out to provide an Institutional background to the development of an 
adapted collaborative approach to planning for use in this thesis and to give an indication of 
what this adapted approach will be. It is my proposition that conflicts could be minimised at the 
very least by open discussion of the themes identified by Healey and outlined here. 
We have briefly examined an Institutional perspective on the state, which, from all the points of 
view represented, is a normative analysis of the state, as Healey concedes (Healey 1997 p. 207). 
In particular, it is hardly a description of Mrs. Thatcher's New Right approach that is the 
background to the cases we will investigate in the empirical evidence. Collaboration, except in 
terms of collaborating with the market, was not on the New Right agenda. 
In terms of local government, as centralisation has tightened its grip, the potential for conflict 
in the relationship with government has heightened. Much of the tension arises from the fiscal 
control exerted from the centre but as we have seen at Alnwick, the council was at odds not 
only with GONE and the Secretary of State but also with the electors. As we saw in Chapter 2, 
the Thatcherite New Right attitude to local government, exemplified by the very concept of 
UDCs, was designed by government to get the public sector out of the equation. This picture of 
local government relationships hardly accords with an Institutional approach. Rydin ( 1993 pp. 
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289-298) rightly speaks of the usefulness of the Institutional approach as a tool of analysis of 
the complexity of local government activity. 
The planning system appears to be a fertile field for theorising not least in the claims and 
counter claims made about the communicative turn or Healey's collaborative approach. 
However, as we have seen in these arguments, instrumental rationality or procedural theory is 
still likely to be the prevailing orthodoxy in the planning office. Despite the arguments about 
whether the 'communicative turn' represents a paradigm shift, the relationship between 
institutional, collaborative and communicative approaches, and the critiques of these 
approaches, there are resonances here with many of the issues raised in the case studies. Issues 
of governance strategies, challenge, collaboration or the lack of it, uncertainty, resource costs 
and culture are all issues raised by the cases. The issues and ensuing conflicts that arise in the 
planning interface we are considering in this thesis are eventually resolved, even if not to the 
satisfaction of all the parties. The significance of all these issues for the case studies will be 
demonstrated in later chapters. 
Another point to be made briefly about the adapted collaborative approach is its relevance to 
the research questions stated in Chapter I. All the themes outlined in Section 4.5 of this chapter 
speak to one or more of these questions. It offers a framework for analysis of governance; it 
addresses structural issues in the system as it does uncertainty. It clearly addresses policy and 
management implications and offers normative perspectives on managing the process. Lastly, 
the adapted collaborative approach may also provide some prescriptive help but this will be 
determined in later chapters. The limited area of Habermasian communicative ethics may prove 
particularly useful but this will be explored further in the next chapter. 
The next step is to review the development of the empirical methodology and show how the 
adapted collaborative approach will be made ready for use in analysis and so we move to the 
next chapter. 
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lEXHIJB][T 4.1 
A MOD:U:JFli:ED IN§TD:TUTJIONAL/COLLAJBORA Tli:VE FRAMEWORK 
ISSUES 
1) GOVERNANCE a) Strategies are selected that are 
(i) EFFECTIVE - with regard to resource allocation and regulatory power. 
(ii) LEGITIMATE - In terms of general understanding.-
b) Duties of those in governance roles to be 
i) Democratic - promote participative governance - respect for concerns 
ii) Effective - to deliver (performance criteria?) 
iii) Accountable - operating and reporting within openly agreed principles 
c) Governance competences 
i) Who performs governance tasks and where? Subsidiarity - regional & local levels 
ii) Each level of governance can be a stakeholder at another level 
iii) Interaction between formal government and wider society 
iv) Use of administrative and technical expertise 
2) CHALLENGE a) Right to Challenge- to allow formal challenge to governance decisions 
b) Dispute resolution- Appeals, ITI_quiries, Courts, Mediation 
c) Information of high quality to be available to all parties at accessible cost. 
d) Criteria for challenges 
i) Those in governance required to give good reasons for decisions 
ii) Decisions should be justified in terms of impacts on the whole community 
iii) Decisions should be justified by reference to agreed strategies and argumentation 
iv) Process to acknowledge the diverse ways of thinking of the whole community, 
the diversity of ways in which views and claims and forms of argument (technical, 
moral etc.) may be expressed, the agreed strategies of other areas of governance 
3) COLLABORATION a) Stakeholders- Who, where, why are they involved- involvement of majority- new 
membership? 
b) Collaborative process to be inclusionary v corporatist 
c) What and where are the arenas of discussion? Different arenas at different times? 
d) Ethical considerations? Who is included, when and how? 
e) Routines, rituals and styles of discussion- topics, language, how and by whom? 
f) Rights -voices must be heard and taken into account and given adequate information 
to allow knowledgeable participation 
g) Use ofHabermasian communicative ethics in which the following three forms of 
reasoning are to be included in the discourse and given equal weight:-
i) Instrumental -technical reasoning (ends to means, evidence to conclusions) 
ii) Moral reasoning (focused around values and ethics) 
iii) Emotive -aesthetic reasoning (derived from emotive experiences) 
Important to avoid one-sided discussions where the hearer is marginalised. 
4) RESOURCES , a) Decision making process to avoid undue delays and uncertainties 
COSTS& b) Undue costs and diversion of resources to be avoided on all sides 
UNCERTAINTY c) Impact of the project to be minimised e.g. traffic, environmental issues 
d) Applicant must deliver the agreed project 
5) CULTURE Cultural issues? Are they addressed? Differences identified? How? Moral duties? 
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CHAPTER 5 -EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1, the research problem posed the question - In the interface between public sector 
and private organisations in the planning system, can a practical approach be developed that can 
improve the management of the interface to the benefit of both sides? 
The first part of this thesis has set the context in which this question will be addressed. Chapter 
2 has provided an outline of the planning process in order to define the context of the research. 
Following an extensive literature search, Chapter 3 reviewed theories of the state, central and 
local government and planning in the context of the post 1939-45 war period. This set the 
governance context in which planning evolved after the war. Chapter 4 continued with a review 
of the Institutional Approach and paid particular attention to the theoretical theme of Healey in 
terms of her 'collaborative approach', this in turn leading to an adapted collaborative approach. 
This chapter will explain the methodology adopted in this research, the research approaches 
and framework, the choice of case studies and the rationale for those choices. The evolution of 
the analytical method and its use in analysis of the empirical evidence is then discussed. 
Finally, the Research Questions, the sources of evidence and some comment on validation are 
covered. The research questions are the subject of the empirical investigations to be carried out 
in subsequent chapters. 
5.2 Approaches to the research 
As set out in Chapter 1, the first task was to carry out a literature review with the intention of 
establishing a theoretical foundation for the research. It seemed at that stage that such a 
foundation was necessary for analysis of the activities of the variety of actors in the system, 
from state to planners. To that end, considerable effort was expended on investigation of 
theories of the state, local government, sub-central government and planning. Further work, 
including ongoing literature review, led to Chapter 3 in its current form. 
The second aspect of the research was the kind of research it would be. Phillips and Pugh 
(1994) suggest there are three basic types of research:-
Exploration: - tackling a new problem about which little is known. 
Testing-out: - defining the limits of previously proposed generalisations. 
Problem solving:- start with a 'real world' problem needing definition and a solution. 
87 
This research project started out from my own experiences in the planning process with the 
background of some success, some major failure, some collaboration, quite a lot of conflict and 
a lot of apparent dysfunction. From this standpoint it seemed very much a 'real world' problem, 
as the interface with planners is constantly occurring, day-by-day, up and down the country. 
There could also be an element of testing-out however, because of the specific project focus of 
the cases. This remains to be seen. 
There was clearly much empirical evidence on which I could draw from my own experiences. It 
was not obvious to me that it would be possible to share these experiences and benefit from 
them if I had attempted a quantitative research study. In my view the empirical evidence could 
only be treated appropriately via a qualitative approach through a mix of case studies which 
would be likely to provide rich, deep, 'thick' description (Stake 1995 pp. 39-42). He quotes von 
Wright (1971) in his book Explanation & Understanding talking of empathy, creating in the 
mind the mental atmosphere, thoughts, feelings, motivation and intentionality of the actors. My 
intention was to attempt to get inside the cases to understand who was doing what to whom, 
how and why. 
The third aspect was the aim of the research. At this stage, conflict was very much in mind as a 
recurring feature of planning in the author's experience with the system. The research 
consequently had an initial aim of investigating the sources and nature of this conflict in the 
planning system and to understand the impact of the various factors involved. Questions of how 
the participants assess these factors, how they manage the process, do they attempt to avoid 
conflict? These were all questions that led to the development of a number of Research 
Questions and these are discussed in Section 5.7 of this chapter. 
5.3 The choice of Case Studies 
The point has been made earlier in this chapter about the writer's desire to use project 
experiences that involved planning issues. At the same time, it was important that case studies 
be selected that could provide breadth as well as depth. The point has already been made about 
rich depth but cases are also needed that provide exposure to a wide spectrum of issues as well 
as issues unique to a particular case. Stake ( 1995 p. 4) argues that selection of cases should 
involve maximisation of what we can learn, be easy to access and are "hospitable to our 
inquiry" i.e. informants and actors are willing to be involved. He also emphasises the 
importance of consideration of the uniqueness and context of alternative choices. Another point 
is the need for at least three cases. Fewer than three and there is less variety in the type of case 
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available and no possibility of triangulation. Fewer cases are also unable to provide the 
experience of a variety of councils, planning authorities and other public sector bodies. 
Initially, it was decided to use two cases with which the author was very familiar but with very 
different levels of involvement. They would also be cases of very different character. Ideally, 
the third case would be of a totally different character to the other two, in an unfamiliar location 
and completely outside the experience of the author. Thus, three primary cases with different 
characteristics would be available for empirical investigation. 
The first case from the author's experience was at East Quayside in Newcastle upon Tyne. The 
case was selected because it is a direct policy driven case arising from the Conservative 
Government's use of Urban Development Corporations to achieve urban regeneration. This 
policy resulted in the formation of a UDC, the Tyne & Wear Development Corporation. There 
was a consequent loss of local democratic accountability, the emasculation of the local 
authority from a planning point of view and the loss of an important office facility to Procter & 
Gamble (P&G). P&G are a multi national company, which at that time had its UK headquarters 
in Newcastle. P&G took this case to the Court of Appeal. Here, the author was project manager 
for the P&G attempt to save its offices. 
The second case from the author's experience was at Francis Avenue, Bournemouth. This case 
was selected because it involved proposals to use a disused former P&G cosmetics factory site 
for housing development including a large element of social housing. This meant amendment of 
the recently adopted Local Plan and the interaction of three local authorities with conflicts 
arising between Bournemouth Borough Council and its neighbouring Councils, Dorset County 
and Poole Borough. The key council, Bournemouth was intransigent in pursuing its policy of 
continued employment use for the site. Here the author was the P&G interface with the 
potential purchaser and developer of the site. 
A third case was sought which would ideally be market driven in the sense of a firm's need to 
build a completely new facility on an existing urban site in order to meet an identified business 
need. I was fortunate because a former P&G colleague became a non-executive Director of 
Safeway Stores plc. He introduced me to the Property Director of Safeway who offered me a 
choice of cases. Among these was a case at Bath. This case was selected because it involved the 
change of use of a site on the main London Road into Bath. The site housed a working bus 
depot and change of use was to be sought for use as a new supermarket location. This case 
involved issues of World Heritage status, Conservation Area status, traffic density, highway 
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access, air pollution as well as the interactions of two local authorities. Safeway plc very kindly 
agreed to provide total access to all documents and all their consultants in the case. 
An illustrative case was also selected for use in Chapter 1, namely Alnwick, although this case 
has not been used as part of the empirical evidence. It involved a successful attempt by local 
people to stop the council acting ultra vires, over the development of an out of town Safeway 
supermarket. The author had no personal connection with this case and the involvement of 
Safeway plc was coincidental. 
5.4 The Research Framework 
1) ISSUE 
Significance & 
Methodology 
2) CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Planning Projects 
Literature/Theory 
Analytical Framework 
,, 
3) EMPIRICAL MATERIAL 
Empirical 
Material - Cases 
4) ANALYSIS OF (3) IN TERMS OF (2) 
• 5) 
/ 
---., 
Analytical 
Conclusions 
PROPOSED 
MODEL APPROACH 
Policy & Management 
Implications 
Figure 5.1 Research Framework 
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The decision to use a qualitative methodology based on case studies had also been made. The 
model for the research had already been partially developed in terms of the literature review, 
establishing the planning context for projects, investigating the theoretical approaches 
addressed in Chapter 3 and selecting the cases. This evolving model was formally developed 
into a Research Framework showing how the elements already in place would be 
complemented by the development of an Analytical Framework. 
The three case studies would constitute the empirical material that would subsequently be 
analysed in terms of the Conceptual Framework using the Analytical Framework. The 
expectation was that analytical conclusions could than be drawn, whilst both policy and 
management implications of the research would be assessed. Finally, it was hoped that a 
prescriptive model would be produced for use in practice. 
The Research Framework was finally developed into that shown in Figure 5.1 above. 
5.5 The Analytical Method 
The initial development 
In parallel with a continuing literature search, an attempt was made to identifY the planning 
issues that had arisen on projects in my own experience. These are shown in Exhibit 5.1 where 
potential issues were identified and then grouped in seven categories. These categories were 
selected because they appeared to be descriptive of the issues included within them. At this 
point, the East Quayside and Francis Avenue cases were already in mind so an attempt was 
made to see what these and other projects might say about these conflict issues. Three more 
P&G projects and even a local housing project were checked out. Exhibit 5.2 shows there was 
reasonable correlation given the totally different nature of all the projects. This exercise 
suggested that this project issue listing might form the basis of an effective analytical tool. 
Further review of the categorization titles used in Exhibit 5 .I suggested that the terminology 
added nothing to the usefulness of these documents. A review of the project issues also 
suggested that some refinement could be effected in this area. These considerations gave rise to 
a further question, namely, whether there were themes or patterns, which might unite some of 
the issues. It was at this time that four themes emerged from a connection back to the result of 
theoretical exploration (Chapters 3 and 4). These themes were initially identified as Command, 
Contract, Collaboration and Culture, which are referred to by the shorthand term 'the 4Cs'. 
Command covered government policy, law, objections, inquiries, strategies and public interest. 
These issues arise where, within a single project, the applicant has little or mostly no ability to 
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influence the issue e.g. the planning legal framework, Government officers, the Secretary of 
State, local politicians and public sector procedures. Contract covered a number of issues that 
are frequently the subject of some form of contractual relationship between the public and 
private organizations even if only implicitly so. In this context, Contract addresses uncertainty, 
resources, agreements, job issues, and the performance of private organizations. Collaboration 
addressed what appeared to be so many features where collaboration might have been expected 
but if anything offered so many negative aspects of planning. It addresses those issues to do 
with informing, participating, negotiating, communicating, interaction, conflict and suspicion 
and inclusion. Finally, Culture, as well as addressing cultural and ethical issues, also covered 
those issues that appeared to have cultural overtones, such as differences in thinking, 
procedures and operations. It attempts to address the conflict of cultures between public and 
private sectors. All of this was pulled together in an 'Analytical Framework' and used as an 
initial check on the East Quayside case (Exhibit 5.3). 
At this stage, there were still only the 4Cs because there was no separate identification of 
Challenge, then included under Command. This had seemed reasonable as a first cut because 
the Challenge process is legally defined by government (See Chapter 2). Continuing work on 
the thesis with continuing literature review also involved review of the emerging analytical 
tools. The inclusion of objections, appeals, inquiries, and courts inside Command seemed to be 
denying the importance of Challenge and the crucial role it can play as a weapon in the armoury 
of the applicant and objectors. This was particularly relevant to the three chosen case studies 
that were to be included in the Analytical Framework. All this argued for a separation of these 
Challenge issues from Command. Accordingly, a new version of the Analytical Framework was 
produced but now having 5 Cs including Challenge (Exhibit 5.4). This has led to the use of 'the 
5 Cs' as a generic term throughout the thesis. 
As the Framework was developing, there was also some addition, deletion, revision and 
relocation of the project issues. Two new ones were included, the role of the Secretary of State 
in Challenge and Networks in Collaboration. Some issues were deleted because they were not 
relevant to any of the cases e.g. from Command, the Universal Business rate, time limits on 
Approvals. Green Belt and Conservation Areas were relocated into Government Policies, 
involvement of private organisations from Culture to Collaboration. Finally, suspicion and lack 
oftrust was moved from Collaboration to Culture because it appeared to fit in with the cultural 
and ethical considerations of that aspect of planning. There were also a few re-descriptions of 
issues e.g. Parochiality was added to Local v Regional thinking. This latter issue was also 
wrongly noted as a Culture issue in Exhibit 5.4. 
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Analysis- final developments 
The first draft narrative of the East Quayside case had been written by this time and an analysis 
of the case was to be attempted using the new Analytical Framework (Exhibit 5.4 ). The 
question was- how to use the Analytical Framework. One way would be to identify the project 
issues from the Framework each time they occurred in the text by annotation of the text 
margins. Notes were then made at intervals throughout the narrative text, collecting the 
annotations of project issues that had been identified and commenting upon them as in this 
example. 
Note 11 (3a, b) 
The attempt at informing and enabling 
deep participation with the public, owners 
& occupiers hardly fitted into an 
Institutional process of collaboration. 
Note the selection basis did not consider 
public needs or desires but did consider 
the Market 
These comments were made to emphasise the relevance and importance of the particular project 
issue at that point in the narrative. The comments were also though to have potential use in the 
eventual review of the empirical evidence. This exercise was useful as a first step as the Notes 
had certainly helped to highlight the occurrences of the various project issues. 
Before making a start on the Bath case, the work already carried out on the East Quayside case 
was critically reviewed. The allocation of each project issue within the 5 Cs was reviewed and 
changes made e.g. the role of the Secretary of State reverted to Command. Allocation to 
Challenge, because of his role in that process, had not reflected his total role in governance. At 
this stage it was also decided to record each project issue in the Analytical Framework each 
time it occurred to give a more accurate picture of the impact of the project issues, thus of the 5 
Cs. In the earlier stages of analysis, even if an issue occurred twice or three times in the 
envelope of one Note, it had only been recorded once in the Analytical Framework. A further 
analysis of the East Quayside narrative was duly carried out using this revised framework but 
again it became apparent that more refinement of allocation of project issues was necessary. 
This resulted in the final version of the Analytical Framework that became generally applicable 
across the cases as Exhibit 5.5. 
With this Framework in hand, the narratives of all three cases were analysed using the Note 
system and thus producing a completed Analytical Framework for each case. The data available 
by now in the Analytical Frameworks could be summarized for each case to provide a picture 
of the overall impact of the project issues but also an impression of the relative impact of the 5 
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Cs. This became an Analysis Summary (Exhibit 5.6). It must be emphasized here that this is not 
a quantitative research project and no attempt has been made to weight the project issues for 
their relative importance. They are not even of the same relative importance to both sides. The 
public inquiry was a real nuisance to the public authority in each case whereas it was of crucial 
importance to each private organisation. This analytical exercise was carried out to attempt to 
provide at least an impression of the overall impact of the 5 Cs in each ofthe cases. 
At this point, a major review of the thesis led to a revision of the presentation of the case 
studies arriving at what we have now in Chapters 6, 7 & 8. Here the Notes are presented 
alongside the narrative as a Commentary, with the annotations of the project issues in their 
appropriate place in the text. This Commentary is meant to 'flesh out' the specific annotation of 
a project issue and provides a source of data for use in Chapter 9. The Analytical framework 
has also been revised to include the Summary of the project issues in each of the cases, thus 
combining what had existed previously in the form of Exhibits 5.5 and 5.6. These changes 
allow a much clearer and more convenient way of presenting the analytical data (Exhibits 6.1, 
7.1 & 8.1). These Exhibits are subsequently summarised in Exhibit 9.1 for use in Chapter 9, 
which provides a review of the empirical evidence. 
5.6 The 5 Cs - Dimensions of planning 
Having given an account of the development of the Analytical methodology in this thesis, 
something needs to be said in detail about the dimensions of planning that have been termed the 
5 Cs. This section will provide a description of the project issues finally incorporated in each 
ofthe dimensions as used in the rest of the thesis. 
Command 
Chapter 2 provided some indications of the central government's legal and political powers to 
control the planning process. Likewise, in Chapter 3, we saw the 1947 Town & Country 
Planning Act was intended to exercise strict controls on why, where and how land was to be 
developed. Moore (2000 p.l3) points out that, in the end, the final say over determination of the 
use of the smallest parcel of land is given in law to the Secretary of State. Command shows 
fourteen project issues where some common features appear to be shared. 
First, the Secretary of State influences all of them to a greater or lesser extent. He or she can 
bring in new legislation, change the existing law, announce new policies and guidelines, 
enlarge or remove powers from Regional Government Offices and Local Authorities, call in 
individual applications for determination and indeed decide the extent of his or her own role. 
As we saw in Chapter 2, whilst the law and powers exercised there under are determined by 
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Parliament, large government majorities mean that a determined Secretary of State will achieve 
policy objectives. Secondly, the private organisation has little or mostly no ability to influence 
these issues. Indeed, with an individual planning application, the applicant largely has to work 
with the grain of the issues rather than against them. Thirdly, even Local Authorities can be 
powerless in the face of government i.e. the implementation of UDCs by Hesletine (when 
Secretary of State), which stripped powers away from Local Authorities despite their objections 
and the abolition of the Greater London Council. Another point needs to be made, namely that 
even the 'public interest' issue is not decided by the public but eventually by the Secretary of 
State. This is of course normally done through the law, regulations, guidelines etc. 
promulgated through Parliament. However, in the last resort, the Secretary of State can so 
determine by calling in the application and the applicant cannot prevent this action, nor indeed 
can the public. 
All of this indicates Secretary of State very much in command of the system but in fact much of 
the detailed, day-to-day control is normally delegated to the Local Authority. Nevertheless, in 
the context of this thesis, when the private sector organisation starts to deal with a planning 
authority, the organisation may not even recognise it is actually playing in a game where many 
of the critical project issues it will face, are so heavily Command influenced. In the light of the 
argument advanced so far, it could be argued that this particular theme in the process may well 
have been called Control rather than Command. However, this situation seems more like that of 
the military position, where the Commander may well have many tanks, aircraft, ships etc. 
under that specific command, without knowing day-by-day what an individual unit is doing, 
that particular control being exercised by a local commander. This analogy rings true in the 
sense that by far the largest proportion of planning applications go through without the 
Secretary of State being aware of them. 
Challenge 
This simply means what it says. The four project issues all represent different aspects of this 
theme and as we have seen in Chapter 2, the right to object and or appeal is laid down by law 
and can clearly be of critical importance to an aggrieved private organisation. In one sense it is 
the reactive power that can be exercised against Command and constitutes a reciprocal, 
adversarial, vertical interaction with it. It must be recognised however, that there is nothing 
equal about the actors in this interactive power struggle. The private organisation may have the 
right to challenge a decision but even the process of Challenge is Command influenced because 
there are strictly laid down rules governing the process. There is a positive side to this situation 
of course, because the existence of such rules enables all the participants to know exactly how 
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to proceed. All this would suggest a strictly controlled process, however the appellant does 
possess one crucially important power, namely the ability to decide not to proceed with the 
Challenge at any stage. This may be a negative power but only the appellant can exercise it. 
Collaboration 
A key feature ofthe planning process is seen by all participants to be the process of negotiation. 
The applicant frequently turns up out of the blue, with project plans, in order to start 
negotiations with the planners. As we have seen in Chapter 2, this process will normally 
continue until an approval is obtained or a rejection which probably results in an appeal. If an 
approval is then achieved, further negotiations will take place until a final detailed planning 
approval is obtained. These negotiations are not necessarily Collaboration so what is the 
difference? 
One key difference is that negotiations can be and are carried out in an atmosphere of mutual 
hostility. Planners and or elected members may not even wish to entertain the application whilst 
the applicant only wishes to get over this hurdle and get on with development. On the other 
hand, it is difficult to see Collaboration taking place in such an atmosphere, when the very 
concept of collaboration is one of support, striving towards a specific objective and how best to 
achieve it. Ten project issues are identified as having a collaborative bias. 
First, public consultation can appear to be a problem to both applicant and planner but it has to 
be done by law. The planner may simply regard this as a procedural task and this is how it is 
normally done, the applicant being a bystander. This may not be a smart decision by the 
applicant because objections may be made and if regarded as significant could lead to a public 
inquiry. This is equally true of public participation, particularly where there is a possible public 
good involved. There is a crucial difference between the two however because of the right to be 
consulted where no such right necessarily exists for participation. 
The issue of working with non-elected agencies, e.g. UDCs, is the subject of one of the case 
studies, but there is already much literature on this issue. See Colenutt (1988), Colenutt & 
Tansley (C.L.E.S. 1989) and Parkinson (1988), Judge (1989), Thomas & Imrie (1993), Byme 
(1993). As we have seen in Chapter 2, planning powers were taken from local authorities and 
given to UDCs frequently causing much hostility as in the early UDCs, London Docklands and 
Merseyside. More will be said about this in Chapter 6 but Collaboration was not seen to be part 
of the UDCs' game plan by those involved in negotiating with them. 
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Networks are clearly in existence but usually inaccessible to the applicant. There is inter-local 
authority networking, networking with Regional Government Office and Whitehall officials but 
not the applicant, yet these officials can be critical actors in decision-making. Collaboration 
without involvement is somewhat difficult. 
It is obvious that there will be frequent clashes between various levels of governance and 
business strategies. This again presents a significant problem because both sides may be 
intransigent for what they believe to be very good reasons. When a planning application is 
submitted which cuts across the council's strategy, hostility is an almost certain consequence 
and is thus inimical to collaboration. 
The next two issues can be looked at as being similar in the sense that Collaboration can only 
be possible if both sides believe in it. How much a private sector organisation is allowed to 
collaborate is very much at the discretion of the officers. On the other hand, the involvement of 
the private sector may significantly affect the actions of the public sector, as we shall see in 
Chapter 6 with the influence of the chosen developers on TWDC. 
Lack of contact between Members and the applicant is the norm and the lack of an interface 
clearly rules out real collaboration 
Conflict between local authority departments and between local authorities is hardly conducive 
to a collaborative process. More will be said on this in Chapters 7 and 8 but suffice it to say 
here such conflicts do not involve Collaboration. 
Unlike Command and Challenge, this theme in the planning process is essentially a horizontal 
interaction. After all, even the existence of a Command based system does not, of itself, rule 
out Collaboration. What it does do is to suggest that unless the public sector actors, at whatever 
level, wish to collaborate, it will not happen. Although it does not impact Challenge because of 
the adversarial nature of that particular theme, it clearly impacts on Contract because of the 
heavy potential influence of Collaboration. 
Contract 
This term has been used to describe that part of the process where the parties to an application 
have clear needs of the other side. We have six issues we can examine. 
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First is uncertainty. This may not bother the planners much but can be a nightmare for the 
applicant, as we shall see in later Chapters. Theoretically, the application should be determined 
in eight weeks, but this is impracticable with a difficult or large project. The question then 
arises, how long? There is no specific Contract between the parties on the issue of timing, 
which therefore turns out to be an imponderable. 
The performance of the private organisation (the applicant) is crucial, not only in delivering an 
application in form and content to meet the requirements of the planners but also in eventually 
delivering the agreed project. Again, we shall see more of this in Chapters 7 and 8, but the 
Contract to deliver is clear. 
The issue of resources and costs is clearly of great importance to all the participants. However 
there is never a Contract between them on this critical problem and as we shall see in the next 
three Chapters, all parties can be led almost unwittingly into expenditure of very large resource 
costs. 
The next three issues have a common thread in the sense that apart from the actual subject 
facilities covered by the application, there may well be other issues to be formally agreed. 
Employment can be a two edged sword. The local authority may be desperately keen to get it 
or, because of its impact on infrastructure, schools, housing, roads etc. may be equally 
desperate to stop it. In the latter case, if the application is successful, conditions are often 
negotiated resulting in what is called 'planning gain' where the applicant agrees to provide 
some facility outside the actual scope of the project. This could be road works, an extension to 
a school etc. but is then almost always the subject of a legally binding Contract. This usually 
takes the form of a Section 106 Agreement named after the Section of the Act covering its use. 
These project issues all have a Contract theme even if the contract is not recognised as, for 
example in uncertainty and use of resources. This theme in the planning process can again be 
seen to be a horizontal interaction because it can be involved in both Command and Challenge. 
In terms of Command, it is certainly involved in environmental, highway and aesthetic issues 
and a successful Challenge often results in conditions that must be met as a Contract. 
Culture 
This may be an obvious name for a theme in the process that is there but mostly hidden from 
view. An organisation existing to provide a service to the public like planning, starts from a 
different place than one set up to make a profit. Both organisations will have values, standards 
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and practices which are very often unspoken and maybe not even written down but nevertheless 
inform their activities, 'how they do business'. This provides'glue' that binds together the 
members of that organisation in a particular way. 
In the UK, the public sector service ethos has been well recognised as one of its great strengths. 
When we turn up at the planning office with an application and throughout its processing, we 
expect the officers to deal with us courteously, honourably, professionally, truthfully, 
efficiently and effectively. That these expectations are normally met is a credit to the public 
sector people involved and reflects an organisational culture that underpins these norms. There 
is of course another cultural determinant in local authorities and that is the culture of the 
elected members. This may be determined by place e.g. a city like Bath as a World Heritage 
City, by political party, by history, by long serving members. What is clear is that it will impact 
on the officers, the public and indeed on the planning applicant. 
The private sector is often dismissed as only being interested in making profit and not worrying 
how this is done. Unfortunately, there has been much publicity that would support this view. 
However private organisations do have a culture and very often, as in the case of my own 
former company, P&G, a very strong one. The company took a strong position on ethical 
trading, on how business be conducted in every particular. Such a culture pervaded every action 
and the thinking behind it. One important feature of this culture was secrecy and by definition 
what could be said to the outside world about the business. As will be seen in Chapter 6, this 
tendency was not always beneficial to the company. Another issue regularly promoted by the 
top management of the company was that of 'being a good corporate citizen' wherever the 
company does business. As we will again see in Chapter 6, this is not as easy as it sounds 
because different people take different views on the meaning of corporate citizenship. 
If the attitudes, behaviour and actions of participants in the planning process are so culturally 
influenced, the impact on the actual process might be considerable. From the point of view of a 
planner who moved to the private sector, Pell ( 1991 p. 99) makes a telling point: -
As a general comment on the relationship which we see between the private and public 
sectors, it is evident that despite the many attempts to bring public and private sectors 
together to carry out development there is still a very high degree of mistrust between the 
sectors which must be partly contributed to by personal misunderstandings of the roles, 
ethics and values of the other parties. 
Nicholson (1991 pp. 53-62) on the other hand, talks of his difficulties in moving the other way 
and having to cope with the planning office culture. 
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What this implies is that this theme pervades all aspects of the planning process because of the 
cultural impact of their own organisations on the thinking and activities of all the actors 
involved. If this is so, it is at least surprising that this cultural issue is never specifically 
discussed during the planning process. 
5. 7 The Research Questions 
In Chapter 1, the big question for the research and this thesis will be seeking to provide an 
approach in answer to the question:-
In the interface between the planning system and private organisations, can a practical approach 
be developed that can improve the management of the interface to the benefit of both sides? 
This question leads to a number of ancillary questions leading back to the main question: -
1) Is there any theoretical basis for the way in which any or all of the participants in the system 
operate? 
2) Are there critical factors, perhaps structural that are built into the system and are then prime 
causes ofthe problems even between public sector organisations and if so, what are they? 
3) Why is so much uncertainty built into the process, could it be minimised and if so, how? 
4) Are there methodologies for managing the process that will avoid or minimise conflict and 
what are they? 
5) Are there policy and management implications, if so, what are they and how might they be 
implemented? 
6) Do the public and private sectors assess the conflict in the system differently and if so, why 
and how? 
7) Is it possible to develop an approach that will lead to improvement in working relationships 
in the planning process? 
Question 1 has already been the subject of the work in Chapters 3 and 4 and the answer is 
already yes, there are theoretical bases for the operation of the participants in the system. 
These chapters have also partially at least, addressed Question 2, although this issue will also 
be addressed in the analysis of the empirical evidence as will Questions 3 and 6. Questions 4, 5 
and 7 are the subject of the last three chapters in the thesis. 
5.8 Sources for the Empirical Research 
The first source for the three cases is access to the relevant papers. These comprise reports, 
correspondence, chronologies, legal papers i.e. submissions for appeals, judicial review and 
Planning Inspector's Reports for the cases. All the relevant documents for the East Quayside 
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case are in my possession whilst the developer, Primetower, has kindly made available the 
documents needed for the Francis Avenue case that were not in my possession. Safeway very 
kindly allowed me to have access to any and all the papers relating to the Bath case that were 
still in their possession and copied all the papers I requested. They also allowed me to have 
access to all their consultants who in turn gave me unfettered access to all the papers still 
available. Copies were made freely available to me. Finally press reports have been consulted. 
In addition to the papers, other important sources are Acts of Parliament e.g. Town & Country 
Planning Act 1990, Planning and Regional Policy Guidance Notes, House of Commons Select 
Committee Reports e.g. Public Accounts Committee Report on UDC's in 1989 and National 
Audit Commission Reports and DoE Reports. Structure and Local Plans are also available for 
consultation as required. Books, specialist periodicals and other academic papers have also 
been consulted as shown in the Bibliography. 
5.9 Triangulation and Validation 
In carrying out research we are striving for accuracy and validity of observations and 
interpretation whether the research is quantitative or qualitative. Protocols are needed that are 
independent of the researcher's own good intentions to do it the right way, to get it right and to 
be 'objective'. Triangulation encompasses these protocols Stake (1995 p. 1 07). One problem 
in this thesis is the issue of my own objectivity, given my background in this interface and my 
participation in two of the cases. This was one of the reasons the third case was selected 
because it was completely outside my own experience. 
Stake ( 1995 p. 112 goes on) to quote Denzin ( 1989) on the subject of triangulation in which 
Denzin sets out the following protocols:-
a) Data source triangulation - Does the phenomenon or case remains the same at other times, in 
other spaces or with different interpersonal interactions? 
b) Investigator triangulation - Other researchers look at the same scene or phenomenon. 
c) Theory triangulation - To the extent that eo-observers etc. describe the data with some 
similar detail the description is at least partially triangulated. 
d) Methodological triangulation - Multiple approaches to a study increase the likelihood of 
illuminating or nullifying extraneous influences. 
Validation is another key issue and is no less applicable to qualitative as to quantitative 
research. Stake ( 1995) quotes Messick (1989) pressuring researchers to assure consequential 
validity for their measurements meaning the use of such measurements should be considered 
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part of the researcher's responsibility. He argues that qualitative researchers should not settle 
for less. Descriptions resulting in the case being held wrongfully in low esteem mean that such 
descriptions are not fully valid. He also argues that ethical obligations to minimise 
misunderstandings and misinterpretations are critical. Only important data and claims would be 
deliberately triangulated. A useful table is provided by Stake (1995 p.ll2) summarising the 
need for triangulation in our quest for validation. 
Data situation 
Uncontestable description 
Dubious and contested description 
Data critical to an assertion 
Key interpretation 
Author's persuasions, so identified 
Need for triangulation 
Needs little effort toward confirmation 
Needs confirmation 
Need extra effort toward confirmation 
Need extra effort toward confirmation 
Need little effort toward confirmation 
For data source triangulation, the question is whether the phenomena being described remain 
the same at different times and in different places. The aim in this thesis has been to deal with 
these questions through two main channels, first the choice of cases and secondly the analytical 
methodology. 
The cases were chosen on the following basis: -
1) Three cases were chosen to allow triangulation to be used. 
2) Different policy issues were involved in each of the cases. 
3) Different public sector bodies were involved in each of the cases. 
4) Three different locations were involved. 
5) The cases were different in timing. 
As we have already seen in Section 5.5, the Analytical Method that has been used aimed to deal 
with the analysis, interpretation and the impact of the 5 Cs and the project issues across the 
cases. This analysis has been summarised in Exhibit 9.1. This would indicate common ground 
across the cases except in the situations where there was a specific issue in one particular case 
e.g. non-elected agencies and compulsory purchase at East Quayside. This suggests that in 
terms of data source triangulation, there is good correlation between the cases across location, 
time, authority, private organisation and policy issue. 
In terms of methodological triangulation, the decision was taken to carry out some fieldwork in 
the form of interviews. There seemed little to be gained from pursuing this course of action for 
the East Quayside case given my personal knowledge of all the key actors and all the relevant 
documents and a detailed diary of events are in my possession. At Francis Avenue, there might 
be something to be gained, because of my peripheral involvement in the negotiations. The Bath 
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case seemed to have most to offer, as it was all completely new, even the Safeway people were 
unknown to me. It must be stressed that the interviews were not the fundamental part of the data 
gathering methodology in this thesis. They were very much used to allow clearer understanding 
of the story that was otherwise accessible only through the available papers. 
Questions were generated for each of the participants that might have something to offer at 
interview. These were specific questions although of course, there were common questions too. 
Each request for an interview was granted and the interviews were carried out in the arena 
chosen by the interviewee. It was not possible to obtain interviews with politicians. The 
responses provided mostly corroborative data about the cases but also provided useful insights, 
particularly from Mrs. Maxwell at Bath. 
A final word on fieldwork is to point out that early fieldwork was carried out in the visits to 
Bath, Bristol and Birmingham to access the papers for Bath. Likewise visits to Bournemouth in 
connection with Franc is A venue. 
Neither investigator nor theory triangulation were attempted in this thesis. The reasons were 
firstly, data source triangulation appeared to be particularly strong given the quality and nature 
of the cases. Secondly, the use of methodological triangulation at Bath and Francis Avenue 
was an effective check on the validity of the descriptions in those cases. Lastly, was the 
difficulty in getting other researchers sufficiently deeply involved in investigation of the cases. 
5.10 The Institutional position 
In Chapter 4, an Institutional -Collaborative approach was developed and was summarised in a 
Framework document (Exhibit 4.1 ). This provides the analytical framework for use in Chapter 
10 where the implications of the research for planning theory are discussed. For convenience in 
that use in Chapter 10, Exhibit 4.1 has been renumbered Exhibit 10.1 and placed at the end of 
that chapter. 
5.11 Conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide an account of the approach to the research, the 
framework and the methodology used. The main aim of this research project is to investigate 
the nature of the relationship between public and private sectors in their interface in the 
planning process and to attempt to develop a model approach as to how this interface can be 
improved. 
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The previous chapters have already provided some indication ofthe complex world of planning. 
Chapter 1 has indicated some of the practical problems in planning through the Alnwick case. 
Chapter 2 gave some insight into the complexities of the planning system through a description 
of the process. The extensive literature search enabled a theoretical foundation to be established 
for consideration of the state, government, local government and planning in Chapter 3 and this 
went on to show up the complexities of the state, local government and planning itself from a 
theoretical perspective. This led in turn to investigation of Institutional theory and eventually to 
Healey's work and in Chapter 4 this theoretical complexity, particularly in the discussion of the 
debate around the communicative turn, was confirmed. In this chapter, the approach to the 
research has been outlined from a starting point of my own experiences in what I saw as a 
conflict laden planning interface. This experience, together with all the discussion of 
complexity suggests that the research is investigating a real world problem and, after proper 
definition of that problem, the search for solutions. This position pointed towards in-depth, 
analytical investigation of a small number of different types of case. Consequently, this 
research is a qualitative research project. This qualitative approach has resulted in the use of a 
widely differing range of cases to provide the necessary depth, breadth and quality of empirical 
data. 
As we have seen, the analytical method has evolved over an extended period of time starting 
with my own original project issues and the analysis of the cases against these project issues 
leading to the identification of the five themes - the 5 Cs. The product of this work was the 
Analytical Framework as an analytical tool to be used in analysis of the empirical evidence. In 
addition, the Commentary on the narrative of the case studies developed out of a perceived 
need to flesh out the particular annotations with a potential for use in the later chapters of the 
thesis. 
The research questions will mostly be dealt with in the later chapters of the thesis but the first 
question on a theoretical basis for participants' actions has already been the subject of Chapters 
3 and 4. 
Lastly, the choice of the three cases has allowed data source triangulation in all of the cases. 
It is now time to turn to the cases themselves and the use of the analytical methodology in 
analysis of the evidence. In the next chapter we will consider the first case study, a study on 
the direct impact of government policy and the ensuing problems of implementation. This is the 
East Quayside project. 
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l)LAW 
EXIUBI1' 5.1 
PLANNING & CONFLICT 
POTEN'fliAL SOURCES OlF CONJFLKCT 
a) Planning Law- the foundation of the whole process 
b) Compulsory Purchase Law - Reasons for CPO - Powers to resist - Valuation of 
property - Compensation for loss 
c) Courts- Processes (adversarial-paperwork- not all facts made available)- Appeals 
d) Judicial Review- Limited scope for review - point of law only 
e) Public Inquiries- Process (use of barristers- adversarial process)- Inspector's 
reporting line (Secretary of State for the Environment) - decision making process -
Appeals 
f) Objectors- Impact on applications- Strength of case (frivolous objections) 
2) POLITICAL PROCESSES 
a) Theoretical conflicts - Central, sub-central, local government and planning theories 
b) Public Interest What is it? Who defines it? Does the public agree? 
c) Role and influence of Government Ministers- Environment I DTI I Transport 
d) Role and influence of Local Politicians - decision makers 
e) Attitudes of politicians - Political Ideology - Anti business - understanding of the law 
and/or the system 
f) Council Procedures - use of sub-committees, committees and full council 
g) Role of non-elected agencies - difficulties in negotiating, lack of openness 
h) Inter-Departmental issues e.g. Planning I Housing I DTI I Education I Transport 
i) Effects of Govt. Policies - UDCs, Enterprise Zones, Regional Economic Policies 
j) Local versus Regional thinking -lack of understanding of business needs 
k) Intra Local Authority disputes - e.g. site located across LA boundaries together with 
County Council influence 
I) Uncertainty of decision-making process 
m) No interaction with elected members of Planning Committee- developer unable to 
provide all of the data they require for an informed decision- Committee sees only 
what officers write 
3) PLANNING ISSUES 
a) Green Belt- New development- Development of existing facilities 
b) Ratios of Building I Land- no definite position laid down in the UK 
c) Conservation Areas - how effective and can they prevent development 
d) Screening -Trees I Hedges etc.- the real impact of development on the locality 
e) Aesthetic Issues - who decides, how? 
f) Planning Gain - road improvements 
g) Section I 06 Agreements - use and importance of legally binding agreements 
h) Car parking - Different councils have different ratio of spaces to staffing levels 
i) Strategic I Unitary I Local Plans - influence, timing, knowledge of plans 
j) Traffic - access, road systems 
k) Restrictions on use of facilities- Use classes 
1) Effects of Time Limits on Planning Approvals 
4) STRATEGIC ISSUES 
a) Strategic Planning - absence of it and conflicts when it does exist 
b) Inconsistency between Central Govt., Local Government, non-elected agencies and 
Private Sector 
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EXHIBIT 5.1 (ctd.) 
5) TIME I RESOURCES PROBLEMS 
a) Business/Planning Authority time conflicts 
b) Diversion of resources I impact on business - effects on management time 
c) Delay of projects 
6) OTHER ISSUES 
a) Employment issues - few local people being employed from immediate locality -
travel in from outside district 
b) Universal Business Rate- impact of local employer not perceived 
c) Commitment to deliver against the agreed plan by the developer 
d) Consultation process - by Local Authority - by developer 
e) Economic issues - business logic not understood or valued - costs of process and 
decisions 
f) Suspicion- lack of trust on both sides 
g) Ethical considerations- behaviour and attitude of developer and LA's (politicians 
and officers) 
7) ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 
a) Already contaminated sites - lack of properly defined limits on ground water 
contamination in the UK - Agency unwilling to make long term, binding decision 
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EXHIBIT 5.2 
SPECIFIC CASES 
Conflict East Francis Egham Brooklands Stamfordham 
Sources Quayside Avenue Phase 2 Housing 
Rusham Rusham 
Park Road 
la X X X X X X 
b X 
c X 
d X 
e X X 
f X X X X X X 
2a X X X X X X 
b X X 
c X X X 
d X X X X X X 
e X X X X X X 
f X X 
2 X 
h X X X X 
i X X 
.i X 
k X X X 
I X X X X X X 
m X X X X X 
3a X X 
b X X 
c X 
d X X X 
e X X 
f X 
2 X X 
h X X X X 
i X X X X 
.i X X X X X X 
k X X X X 
I X X 
4a X X X X 
b X X X 
Sa X X X X 
b X X X X 
c X X X 
6a X X X X X 
b X X X X X 
c X X X X X 
d X X X X X 
e X X X 
f X X X X 
g X X X X 
7 X X 
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EXJHI:IIUT 5.3 
AN AIL YTllCAIL lFRAMEWORlK- ][ 
CASE - EAST QllJA YSIDE 
A) COMMAND J[ssue in 
case? 
a) Planning Law- the foundation of the process X 
b) Compulsory Purchase Law - reasons for CPO - powers to resist - valuation of property X 
- adequacy of compensation for loss 
c) Courts - adversarial process - amount of paperwork - all facts & data not always made X 
available to the Court - appeals process 
d) Judicial Review- permission required- limited scope for review X 
e) Public Inquiries - adversarial process - Inspectors not independent of Dept. of the X 
Environment - decision making process - appeals 
f) Objectors - quality of objections - impact on applications - strength of case X 
g) Impact of time limits on planning a~ovals 
h) Govt. Policies - UDCs, Enterprise Zones, Regional, economic policies X 
i) Green Belt- New development- development of existing facilities 
j) Conservation Areas - how effective and can they prevent development? 
k) Restrictions on use of facilities- Use Classes -change of use 
1) Universal Business Rate - financial impact of local employer not locally seen 
m) Strategic I Unitary I Local Plans - influence, timing, knowledge of plans 
n) Public Interest- What is it? Who defines it? Does the public agree? X 
B) CONTRACT 
a) Aesthetic Issues- who decides? how? Real impact on the area? X 
b) Private organisation's commitment to deliver against the agreed plan X 
c) Costs of process and decisions in resource and financial terms to all sides X 
d) Employment issues- local or external to area? Impact on schools etc.? X 
e) Contaminated sites - impact of potential future contamination and costs 
f) Section 106 Agreements - importance of legally binding agreements X 
g) Planning Gain - road improvements etc. X 
h) Traffic impact and its impact on the community X 
C) CULTURE 
a) Cultural situation - Public Sector- Private organisations X 
b) Local politics- role, attitudes and influence of decision makers X 
c) Public Sector Procedures- procedures- closed meetings X 
d) Ethical considerations - Public Sector and Private organisations X 
e) Local versus Regional thinking and understanding of business needs 
f) Private organisations' lack of knowledge and understanding of public sector X 
D) COLLABORATION 
a) Public information process - by Planning Authority - by Private organisations X 
b) Public participation X 
c) Lack of contact between councillors & developer - data not made available X 
d) Suspicion- lack of trust on both sides X 
e) Non-elected agencies- their processes and difficulties in negotiating with them X 
f) Uncertainty of decision making process - officers unable to predict outcomes X 
g) Intra Local Authority disputes - e.g. site located across LA boundaries 
h) Inter-D~_artmental conflicts in Local Authority e.g. Planning, Housing etc. 
i) Inconsistencies of strategies of Central Government, Local Government, non-elected X 
agencies and the Private organisation 
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EXHIBIT 5.4 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK- 11 
East Francis Bath 
Quayside Avenue 
I) COMMAND 
a) Planning Law- the foundation of the process X 
b) Compulsory Purchase Law - reasons for CPO - powers to resist X 
c) Compensation - valuation of property - limitations of compensation X 
d) Govt. Policies- UDC's, Enterprise Zones, Regional, economic X 
Policies, Green Belt, Conservation Areas 
e) Strategic I Unitary I Local Plans- influence, timing, knowledge of plans 
f) Public Interest- what is it? Who defines it? Does the public agree? X 
2) CHALLENGE 
a) Objections - quality of objections - strengt_h of case - impact X 
b) Public Inquiries - adversarial process - Inspectors not independent of the X 
Dept. of the Environment - process - appeals 
c) Courts - adversarial process - amount of paperwork - all facts & data X 
not always made available to the Court - appeals process 
d) Judicial Review -permission required - limited scope for review X 
e) Role of Secretary of State for Environment X 
3) COLLABORATION 
a) Public information process - how and by whom? X 
b) Public participation - stakeholders X 
c}_ Lack of contact between councillors & developer - inadequate data X 
d) Non-elected agencies - difficulties in negotiating with them X 
e) Uncertainty of process- officers unable to predict outcomes X 
_!)_ Intra Local Authority disputes - e.g. site straddling LA boundaries 
g) Conflicts in Local Authority e.g. between Planning, Housing etc. 
i) Inconsistencies of strategies of all levels of governance and private sector X 
j) Involvement of private developers X 
k) Networks - which ones & how is influence felt X 
4)CONTRACT 
a) Aesthetic Issues- who decides? how? Real impact on the area? X 
b) Private organisation's commitment to deliver against the agreed plan X 
c) Resource costs of process and decisions to all sides X 
d) Employment issues- local or external to area? Impact on schools etc.? X 
e) Contaminated sites - impact of potential future contamination and costs 
f) Importance of legally binding agreements (Section I 06) X 
g) Planning Gain - road improvements etc. 
h) Traffic impact and its impact on the community X 
S)CULTURE 
a) Cultural differences between Public Sector & Private organisations X 
b) Local politics - role, attitudes and influence of decision makers X 
c) Public Sector Procedures - procedures - closed meetings X 
d) Ethical considerations - Public Sector and Private organisations X 
e) Parochiality -local versus Regional thinking versus needs of business X 
_!)_ Suspicion - lack of trust on both sides X 
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ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK- Ill 
NEWCASTLE EAST QUAYSIDE 
EXHIBIT 5.5 
CATEGORY ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
PROJECT ISSUES NOTES 
1) Command a) Planning & associated Law- foundation of the 4 (2), 18, 19, 22 
process 
b) Compulsory Purchase Law - resistance to Orders 11,12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22,24 
c) Compensation- Limits- value of property 24 
d) Govt. Policies - Planning, Regeneration, 1(2), 2, 4, 5, 7, 19,25 
Environmental 
e) Local Plans & Policies- land use, influence, timing 5 
f) Public Interest - what is it? who defines it? 8 
g) Regional Government Office role 
h) Role of the Secretary of State for the Environment 1, 2, 5, 18, 22,23 
j) Environmental issues e.g. Air Pollution 
k) Aesthetic Issues - who decides? how? Real impact? 14, 16, 17, 19 (2) 
I) Highway & Traffic issues - impact on the community 3, 16, 17 (2),19 (2), 21,22 (2), 23 (2) 
m) Local politicians- role, attitudes and influence 2, 3, 5, 9, 13, 15, 19, 21,25 
n) Officers - role, attitudes and influence 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15 (2), 16, 17, 19,21 
o) Public Sector Procedures & processes 8, 9(2), 10(2), 11(2), 12, 14, 15, 
16(2), 17(2), 18,20,21,23,25 
2) Challenge a) Appeals -rights -process- resources 23 
b) Objections- rights -quality of objections- strength of 14,17,24 
case - impact 
c) Public Inquiries- the adversarial process- 18, 19 (2), 20, 22, 23(2) 
Inspectorate - appeals - decisions 
d) Judicial Review (permission required & limited 23 (3) 
scope 
for review ) & adversarial process of the Courts 
3) Collaboration a) Public information process - how and by whom? I, 8 
b) Public participation - stakeholders 2,3, 8 
c) Non-elected agencies- difficulties in negotiations 2, 10(2), 11, 12, 13, 14(2), 15, 17(2) 
d) Networks - which ones, who is involved, how & 2,8,9(2), 15,19,21 
why? 
e) Strategic inconsistencies between governance and the 3,4,6, 11 (2), 12, 14, 16(3), 17(2), 19, 
private sector 20,21 
f) Officer I private organisation interaction 10(2), 12, 16,17 
g) Private organisation involvement 3, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16,25 
h) Lack of contact between Members & applicant 13 
i) Conflict between LA Depts and Intra LA disputes 5 
j) Suspicion- lack of trust on both sides 11, 12,13 (2), 14(2) 
4) Contract a) Uncertainty of process- outcomes & timing 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16,17,23,25 
b) Private organisation performance 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 19, 21,25 
c) Resource costs of process and decisions to all sides 16, 19, 20, 24, 25(2) 
d) Employment issues - local or external to area? 6 
e) Planning Gain- new community facilities, road 
improvements etc. 
f) Legal agreements - Section I 06 Agreements 23 
5) Culture a) Cultural differences between Public & Private 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16(2), 17,21 
organisations 
b) Ethical issues- Public and Private sectors 9, 12, 13, 15(3), 16,17,21 
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lEXIIIliHT 5.6 
ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
NEWCASTLE EAST QUA Y§IDE 
No. of %of MAIN PROJECT ISSUES No. 
Issues Total 
Raised 
COMMAND 86 41.3 Public sector procedures & processes 19 
Officers - roles, attitudes, influence 11 
Highways & traffic 11 
Local politicians 9 
Colll}J_ulso_I}'_Qurchase 9 
Government policies 8 
Secretary of State role 6 
73 
CHALLENGE 15 7.2 Public Inquiries 8 
Objections & obj_ectors 3 
Judicial review 2 
13 
COLLABORATION 61 29.3 Strat~ic inconsistencies 15 
Non elected agencies 11 
Property developers 10 
Networks 7 
Suspicion 6 
Officer I private organisation interaction 5 
54 
CONTRACT 27 13.0 Private OI];anisation performance 10 
Uncertainty of process 9 
Resource costs on all sides 6 
25 
CULTURE 19 9.2 Differences in culture 10 
Ethical issues 9 
19 
TOTAL 208 
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CHAPTER 6- CASE STUDY 1- EAST QUAYSIDE AT NEWCASTLE 
6.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2, we saw how a new Conservative government policy was developed to effect 
comprehensive regeneration of designated areas of urban dereliction through the use of Urban 
Development Corporations (UDCs). This case study demonstrates the direct impact on a large 
private organisation, Procter & Gamble (P&G), of implementation of this policy through the 
activities of one UDC, the Tyne and Wear Development Corporation (TWDC) in Newcastle. 
Technically, the case eventually hinged on five issues. One, the need for comprehensive 
regeneration of East Quayside at Newcastle, two, the architectural impact on the TWDC 
scheme of retaining an existing office building belonging to P&G, three, the need for road 
alterations, four, the extensive car parking requirements and finally, the economic impact of 
retaining the P&G office on the TWDC scheme. An important feature of the case is that the 
normal planning process was effectively neutralised because the City's planning functions for 
East Quayside were assumed by TWDC. The failure ofthe parties to agree the retention of the 
P&G office building led to the use of wide ranging compulsory purchase powers by TWDC and 
resulted in a conflict which P&G took to the Court of Appeal. The resulting delays, resource 
costs and diversion of people from their core tasks caused all the parties major problems. 
In this case, the author was project manager for what was effectively a project to prevent 
TWDC acquiring and then demolishing a useful and much needed office building. The 
narrative attempts to provide a factual account of the key events in the project relying on 
reports, minutes of meetings, letters, press reports and diaries. 
My thesis is that in the context of the planning system there is a dysfunctional interface 
between the planning system and private organizations. This case demonstrates a particularly 
difficult interface when the normal planning processes were set aside by government policy and 
the interpretation and implementation ofthat policy by a non-elected agency of government. 
The narrative has been analysed usmg the methodology discussed in Chapter 5. The 
Commentary is based on annotations in the narrative related to the impact of the 5 Cs and the 
occurrence of project issues defined in the Analytical Log. (Exhibit 6.1 ). This document then 
records their frequency of occurrence in the text and also summarises the relative impact of 
these project issues and the relative influence of the 5 Cs, Command, Challenge, Collaboration, 
Contract and Culture in this case .. 
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6.2 Participants 
First we need to say something of the participants in the case. 
There were two main protagonists, the Tyne & Wear 
Development Corporation (TWDC) and Procter and Gamble 
(P&G). Playing less important roles but nevertheless having 
significant impact on the case was the Newcastle City 
Council and a private developer, Mr. Landau. 
The Tyne & Wear Development Corporation was formally 
designated as one of the second generation UDCs in May 
1987. (ld) Typical of the UDC's, TWDC had a Board and 
Chief Executive appointed by the Secretary of State (lh), 
together with a relatively small staff of professional and 
support people under the Chief Executive. Sixty per cent of 
the ten member Board, including the Chairman were from 
business and the private sector emphasising the policy thrust 
towards private sector involvement.(3g). There was no 
representation of the current Labour dominated Newcastle 
City Council despite the importance of East Quayside to 
regeneratiOn needs in the city. (lm; 3b) 
Procter & Gamble (P&G) had been located in Newcastle 
since 1837 and was one of the few major companies to have 
its UK corporate headquarters in the city. Apart from this 
headquarters, located in residential suburbs, the company also 
owned an important research facility located on a separate 
site, together with a disused factory and an occupied office 
building, New Sandgate House located on East Quayside. 
The long-term viability of this office facility was the key 
point of dispute with TWDC as the company supported the 
regeneration of East Quayside in principle. (3g) 
The critical role of Newcastle City Council in this case was 
its status as Highway Authority. In this capacity, it was 
consulted by TWDC and was the final arbiter as to the 
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COMMENTARY 
Command 
The direct result of government 
regeneration policy 
Command 
These were crucial appointments 
by the Secretary of State. 
Collaboration. 
The private sector drawn into 
collaboration in government 
policy 
Command 
South Tyneside & Sunderland 
Councils were both represented. 
Collaboration 
No public participation. 
Collaboration 
P&G drawn into this interface 
created by this government 
policy. 
acceptability of the changes to road layouts caused by the 
TWDC's regeneration proposals. A secondary role was to be 
consulted on the planning of East Quayside. (1 t; lm) Despite 
the long establishment of P&G in the city, the company had 
no relationship, formal or informal, with the City Council. 
(3g) 
Mr. Landau was a Swiss private developer who bought up 
available properties on East Quayside aiming to develop these 
sites in partnership with TWDC. Unfortunately TWDC did 
not agree with this aim. (3e; 3g) As will be seen, one ofthe 
properties bought by Landau was the disused P&G factory. 
6.3 The Site 
East Quayside, in Newcastle upon Tyne, was part of the Tyne 
& Wear Urban Designated Area, designated by the Secretary 
of State in 1987. (lh) This comprised some 2375 Hectares of 
derelict industrial land mostly along the banks of the lower 
reaches of the Rivers Tyne and Wear. The East Quayside 
portion of the designated area, some 11.75 Ha in extent, lay 
along the north bank of the River Tyne as indicated on the 
Plan (See Plan 6.1 ). East Quayside comprised some 67 plots 
owned by a multitude of owners, some unidentifiable. By 
late 1989, about one third of the land had been acquired by 
the TWDC and its preferred developer. (ld) (See Plan 6.2). 
The P&G owned factory and the associated New Sandgate 
House offices together standing in about 1.4 Ha, were located 
along the north boundary of East Quayside (See Plan 6.3). 
P&G had been making soap related products on this specific 
East Quayside site for around 120 years but because of 
operational difficulties, the factory closed down in 1987. The 
adjacent building, New Sandgate House was still in use as 
office accommodation. With growing staff accommodation 
problems in Newcastle, the Company had decided in 1984 
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Command 
The City thus had a Command 
role for highways but only a 
Collaboration role for planning. 
Collaboration 
Despite its stakeholder status in 
the City, P&G had no relationship 
with governance. 
Collaboration 
There was a strategic conflict 
here because Landau wished to 
collaborate with TWDC. 
Command 
The Command role of the 
Secretary of State. 
Command 
The government's regeneration 
policy already having an impact 
that New Sandgate House could provide office space for 
around two hundred people, thus alleviating its space 
problems. The cost of providing the same amount of space 
(c. 42, 000 sq.ft. net useable) on another local company site 
was estimated to be around £7 million. Strategically, the 
facility was seen as an essential long- term component of the 
company's corporate accommodation on Tyneside. Following 
the 1984 decision, initial expenditure of £600,000 had been 
made on partial refurbishment of the building that by 1987 
housed around 1 00 people. The company had no plans for the 
disused factory that was fast becoming vandalised with no 
apparent market value for its original manufacturing use. 
6.4 The Regeneration Proposals 
The Consultants' Report in 1987 had recommended that 
'Flagship' sites should be designated and that East Quayside 
should be one of them. Thus a scheme was proposed, 
estimated to cost £35.4m, of which the public sector (TWDC) 
would need to finance £8.7m. (3g) 
Three developers had prepared schemes in response to the 
TWDC's request for proposals for East Quayside and these 
schemes were exhibited in public in July 1988. (3a; 3b; 3g) 
The schemes were very different in size and complexity as 
can be deduced from their estimated costs of £48m, £78m and 
£1 08m ( 4b ). It was clear at this stage that only the £48m 
scheme would retain New Sandgate House. Without having 
seen the brief given to the developers, it was inconceivable to 
P&G that given the same brief, three schemes so widely 
different in scope and cost could have been produced. (lo) In 
September 1988, Newcastle Quayside Developments (NQD) 
was chosen by the TWDC as its preferred developer. The 
cost of this NQD scheme was £108m of which the TWDC 
would contribute £21 m. Note that these figures compare 
with£35m & £8.7m respectively in the original Consultants' 
Report. 
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Collaboration 
Private sector collaboration in 
developing government policy. 
Collaboration 
Public participation only 
occurring after the developers' 
proposals were already drawn up. 
Contract 
Note the widely different private 
organisations' performance on 
the basis of the same brief. 
Command 
This selection process ignored a 
basic rule of project management 
that proposals must be directly 
comparable. 
Quoting from "Forward to 1991" (TWDC 1988), the TWDC 
Chief Executive, Alistair Balls was impressed by the sheer 
scale of the NQD scheme and said:-
lt requires boldness, flair and excitement to bring it 
(Newcastle Quayside) back to life and we believe this 
development will do just that. (1 o) 
Balls went on to express his delight at the public preference 
for the NQD scheme, pointing out that almost 5,000 people 
visited the exhibition of which 46% preferred the NQD 
scheme. Note that this level of public interest compares with 
the population of Newcastle of some 200,000. (lf;ln;3a; 3b) 
At a meeting of the Regional Capital Urban Development 
Sub-Committee of the Newcastle City Council, Balls said 
that: -
. the UDC were picking a partner rather than a 
scheme, someone who could work successfully with 
them on the site, It was clear that any scheme would 
not be entirely dissimilar to that suggested by the 
developer actually chosen although there would be 
scope for considerable negotiation. The 1WDC Board 
would be considering selection on the basis that what 
was offered by the developer would be acceptable to 
the Market, the design satisfactory, the track records of 
the prospective partners were suitable and value for 
money was being achieved. (lo; 3g; 4b) 
In February 1989, the Regional Capital & Urban 
Development Sub- Committee of the City Council considered 
and supported the NQD planning application. P&G later 
found out, via leaked documents, that the officers' 
recommendations which were highly critical of the scheme 
had been seriously amended between January 24 and the 
meeting on February 15, changing the thrust of the report to a 
supporting position. (lo) 
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Command 
It is difficult to conceive a P&G 
executive taking this view over 
such a huge discrepancy between 
the original idea and the final 
proposal. 
Command 
The level of public interest hardly 
seemed to justifY Balls' delight. 
Collaboration 
This hardly demonstrated 
enthusiastic public participation 
Command 
If the process was not about 
picking a scheme, the design of 
the process has to be questioned. 
Collaboration 
An insight into TWDC's 
understanding of collaboration 
with private organisations. 
Contract 
Potential performance of the 
developer was the real issue here. 
Command 
P&G understood that any report 
is subject to last minute changes 
but here they were absolutely 
fundamental. 
The changes are too numerous to detail here but two 
examples may suffice. Under Recommendations: -
1) The Sub-Committee is recommended to inform the 
Urban Development Corporation that due to major 
unresolved issues surrounding this proposal and the 
unacceptability of many aspects of the scheme, it 
would be quite unrealistic and quite wrong to grant 
planning permission for the application as submitted. 
became 
The Sub-Committee IS recommended to inform the 
Urban Development Corporation that it welcomes the 
principle of a major redevelopment of this important 
riverside location and considers that many elements of 
the scheme will assist in the regeneration ofthis area. 
2)Whilst many desirable uses have been incorporated into 
the scheme the impression of the design and layout is 
for the most part a tightly packed jumble of buildings 
many of which are entirely inappropriate in design to 
this area or site. There are too many buildings, which 
are too fussy and too flimsy with too little useable open 
space. The character of the scheme is not appropriate 
for this location adjoining the well preserved buildings 
in the Quayside Conservation Area to the west of the 
development site. (lk; lm; ln; 3d; 4b; 5b) 
These latter points were simply deleted and in March 1989, 
TWDC itself gave Outline Planning consent to its own 
developer's scheme. New Sandgate House was unaffected by 
these approved plans. (ld) 
6.5 The Interface 
The initial contact between TWDC and P&G occurred when 
Balls wrote to the company in May 1987 to explore the 
possibility of purchasing spare company land on East 
Quayside that might be made available to enable TWDC to 
begin the assembly process. (3t) 
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Command 
The roles of members and 
officers appeared to be in conflict 
over layout and aesthetics. 
Collaboration. 
Perhaps the City was already 
committed to the TWDC scheme 
through networking 
Contract 
NQD had not got the City's 
officers on board. 
Culture 
An interesting ethical situation. 
Command 
The first example ofTWDC's 
exercise of its planning powers. 
Collaboration 
A positive first attempt at 
Collaboration by Balls. 
At a cordial meeting in July, P&G emphasised the crucial 
importance of New Sandgate House to its corporate plan but 
also the company's willingness to sell the factory subject to 
TWDC paying the costs of relocating into New Sandgate 
House some facilities still in use but then located in the 
factory buildings. Balls said that he could see New Sandgate 
House continuing in operation: -
.partly because of relocation costs but also by 
virtue of the value of over 100 people working in the 
area. (Cole 1989) (ln) 
It was agreed to start immediate negotiations for the sale of 
the factory. 
Nine months later, P&G wrote to Balls appraising him of a 
potential £6m investment in New Sandgate House and 
pointing out that P&G understood that our site was being 
included in NQD's plans despite Balls' assurances at the July 
1987 meeting. P&G requested an early assurance that New 
Sandgate House was not to be acquired by TWDC. (3f) No 
negotiations for the sale of the factory had been started. (1 o). 
Balls responded immediately saying: -
We have explained to them (the developers) that our 
preference would be that your office facility should 
remain; and we have no plans to include it in the 
compulsory purchase order which we shortly intend to 
promote in the East Quayside. (lb) Nevertheless, we 
cannot prevent developers from coming forward with 
their own ideas, nor would we wish to. (lo) Our aim is 
to bring life into an area, which at present, particularly 
abutting on the Quayside, is largely dormant. You 
understand, therefore, that the last thing we would 
want to do is to discourage business, which is already 
active in the area; indeed we would want to see your 
employees remain as a source of custom for our 
developments in due course. (3g) 
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Command 
This positive attitude of Balls was 
welcomed by P&G 
Collaboration 
Balls' behaviour was now causing 
some concern to P&G. 
Command 
Public sector processes very slow 
by P&G standards. 
Command 
The first mention of a CPO by 
TWDC. 
Command 
This ambiguous process was 
inconceivable to P&G in that 
TWDC did not 'instruct' the 
developer on the essential 
parameters ofthe scheme 
regarding New Sandgate House. 
Collaboration 
This seemed a positive invitation 
for P&G involvement 
The second aspect of your letter refers to the possibility 
of using the site for a significant investment in a new 
facility by Procter and Gamble. If there is anyway we 
could assist you in this, either through our 
environmental or other powers, we would be happy to 
discuss it with you (Cole 1989). (ln; 3c; 3f; 4a) 
Following the exhibition of the schemes in July 1988, P&G 
again registered concern at the proposed demolition of New 
Sandgate House in two of the schemes. Balls' short response 
again spoke of the freedom given to the developers saying 
that: -
. the future of New Sandgate House had not been 
specifically mentioned although the importance of 
P. &G as a major employer in the area was made clear 
to them (Cole 1989). (lo; 3c; 3e) 
Command 
A positive attitude from Balls 
Collaboration 
P&G were beginning to sense 
difficulties in dealing with Balls 
and TWDC. 
Contract 
Time was passing and no 
negotiations for the factory. 
Command 
The process was becoming ever 
more confusing. 
Collaboration 
P&G were increasingly 
concerned about the conflict of 
In October 1988 the TWDC resolved to make a Compulsory strategies. 
Purchase Order (CPO) on East Quayside and at a subsequent 
meeting between P&G, the TWDC and NQD in November 
1988, the need for the demolition of New Sand gate House to 
aid comprehensive regeneration of East Quayside was 
discussed at length. (lb; 3f; 3g). NQD agreed to investigate 
the impact of all aspects of their scheme on New Sandgate 
House, at the same time opening negotiations on buying the 
factory. Note that this was sixteen months after the proposed 
start of 'immediate' negotiations. P&G emphasised that any 
attempt at compulsory purchase would be vigorously 
opposed. (Cole 1989). There was no follow up to this 
meeting despite repeated requests from the company and its 
advisors. 
All this uncertainty was causing critical problems for the 
company as the Newcastle staffing numbers were increasing 
rapidly. (3c; 42; 4b) 
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Command 
The CPO was now becoming a 
reality. 
Collaboration 
Perhaps negotiating with TWDC 
was a waste of time. 
Collaboration 
A low level of trust prevailed 
because of the difficulties in 
negotiating. 
Contract 
No clear schedule and growing 
wtcertainty were by now major 
problems for P&G 
Suddenly, in late January 1989 the TWDC's property advisor 
told the company, without giving reasons, that: -
We have had a great deal of discussion on planning 
and highways and it is now clear that it would be 
impossible to retain New Sandgate House if the East 
Quayside site is to be dealt with in a comprehensive 
manner (Cole 1989). (ld; 1 {; 3e; 3g) 
Nothing more was heard of the possible purchase of the 
factory until March 1989 when an offer was made by the 
TWDC, too late as it happened, because P&G had by then 
agreed to sell the facility to Mr. Landau. (lo; 3c; 4b) As the 
owner of adjacent property, Mr. Landau had suddenly 
approached the company with an offer that proved very 
acceptable, subject only to two conditions, that complete 
secrecy be maintained and that TWDC had not served a CPO 
Notice on New Sandgate House. (lb) When TWDC were 
informed of the factory sale, they and NQD were very upset. 
NQD demanded to know of P&G why they had not been 
given a chance? Balls called P&G to say they were 
disappointed, the effect on their scheme was to reduce it to 
dust, and asked was the sale irrevocable? (3f; 3g) Balls and 
his Chairman met with the Managing Director of P&G and at 
that meeting questioned the irrevocability of the sale of the 
factory, made clear their need to get us out of New Sandgate 
House but keep us on the Quayside, they said the CPO 
notices would be issued in a couple of weeks and that Balls 
Command 
The first mention of highways as 
a regeneration issue on East 
Quayside 
Collaboration 
The conflict between strategies 
continued to worsen. 
Command 
This offer not based on 
negotiation. 
Collaboration. 
The interface was in a poor state 
Contract. 
In the absence of an offer from 
TWDC, P&G had no difficulty in 
doing this commercial deal 
Command. 
Landau already perceived the 
CPO as a threat even though he 
wished to collaborate with the 
TWO C. 
Collaboration. 
Whilst understandable, these 
reactions underlined the poor 
quality of interface and 
relationships that existed by this 
stage. 
would call a meeting in two weeks to discuss the future of Command 
New Sandgate House. Now twenty-one months had elapsed 
from the proposed start of the 'immediate' negotiations for 
the sale of the factory. (ln; lo; 3e; 3f; 4a; 5a; 5b) 
Following a request from NQD for a specification of the 
company's space needs to keep P&G on East Quayside, 
TWDC's property advisor submitted three offers to P&G in 
120 
Public sector attitudes and 
processes very different from 
those ofP&G and Landau. 
Collaboration 
P&G became even more confused 
by Balls' strategy 
Contract 
Time seemed not to be an issue. 
Culture 
P&G's culture and ethics 
prevented any disclosure of the 
sale until Landau approved 
May, one, for the freehold of the whole P&G site including 
the factory, another for the factory only and a third for New 
Sandgate House only. The factory now belonged to Landau. 
There was no proposal for alternative accommodation on the 
Quayside but there was an offer to sell back to the company a 
piece of its own land. Many of the 'facts' stated in these 
proposals about the existing New Sandgate House facilities 
were completely inaccurate. (lo; 3c; 4b) 
Unlike TWDC with its regular media coverage, P&G had not 
sought any publicity for its position, believing that sense 
might prevail. Attempting to gain some support, the company 
invited Nick Brown, the local MP, local ward councillors and 
two members of the TWDC Board to tour NSH. The TWDC 
people did not attend because Balls had rung P&G objecting 
to the invitations to his members. Brown and the councillors 
gave unqualified support and much advice. Subsequently a 
Board member of TWDC was allowed to visit New Sandgate 
House (lm; ln; lo; 3f; 5a; 5b) 
TWDC gave formal notification ofthe making of the CPO for 
East Quayside in June 1989 with a preliminary Statement of 
Reasons that did not comply with the Statutory Rules of 
Procedure and not mentioning P&G or New Sandgate House. 
P&G formally objected and in August, Official Notice was 
given of a Public Local Inquiry to be held in Newcastle in 
November 1989. (lb; lo; 3c; 2b; 2c) 
At that time, a new offer was made for New Sandgate House 
by NQD. The offer was rejected by P&G because the NQD 
proposal took the whole New Sandgate House site, provided a 
new office building nearby on the East Quayside at what 
NQD estimated to be a gain in asset value of £2.5million to 
P&G. It seemed to completely escape TWDC and NQD that 
any such gain could only be realised by selling the asset, 
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Command 
P&G were totally confused by 
this process 
Collaboration. 
P&G despaired over the quality 
of the interface at this time. 
Contract. 
A clear gulf in understanding 
over P&G's actual needs and 
TWDC/NQD's efforts to help. 
Command 
Balls' seemed to wish to avoid 
exposure of his members to the 
facts ofthe P&G case. 
Collaboration 
Balls' response to the P&G 
invitation indicates the quality of 
the interface. 
Command. 
A helpful result of direct access 
to councillors. 
Culture. 
Culturally, P&G, TWDC and 
NQD were a long way apart. 
Command 
A public sector body not 
following the statutory rules. 
Collaboration 
A further highlight of dealing 
with TWDC. 
Challenge 
The Challenge process worked 
very smoothly. 
leaving the company short of accommodation for 150 -200 
people. (3e; 3g; 4a; 4b; Sa) 
In August, TWDC attempted through their solicitors to make 
a direct approach to the company's top management in 
Cincinnati in the US. The following day, Balls called the 
P&G Managing Director saying that they had made an offer 
to P&G for the 'surplus land' and also that they wanted to 
make a direct approach to Cincinnati because of the 'pressure 
they were under to resolve the New Sandgate House issue'. 
Later in the week, TWDC confirmed that their direct 
approach to Cincinnati had indeed been made without the 
knowledge of P&G in Newcastle.(1n; 1o) The parent 
company, through its Cincinnati lawyers made very clear to 
the TWDC solicitors that their only point of contact with the 
company under any circumstances was through the local 
management in Newcastle. (3c; 3e; 5a; Sb) 
At this time, P&G sought a meeting with Beecham (the 
Leader of the City Council) to inform him of the company's 
position. Beecham mentioned the road issue as a key problem 
and while there was some sympathy for the company's 
position, it was obvious that he was very keen to see the 
TWDC's regeneration project succeed. (11; 1m) 
The following day, the company was given a copy of a 
'briefing note' written by Balls to the Council Leader on the 
morning of the meeting with P&G. (1n; 3d). In this leaked 
briefing note, Balls summarised the three reasons for 
acquisition of P&G property as being: -
I) Aesthetics (i.e. Urban design, Architecture, 
Environmental-Economic impact) (1j; 1k) 
2) Highways (1 t) 
3) Essential car parking faci I ities (1 t) 
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Collaboration 
Different strategies and no 
collaboration 
Contract. 
Difficulties for P&G in coping 
with the unpredictability ofNQD 
Culture. 
TWDC and NQD were operating 
in a wholly different culture from 
P&G. 
Command 
Balls' action may have been an 
act of desperation but it angered 
P&G in Newcastle and Cincinnati 
and this was not helpful to the 
interface. 
Collaboration 
Balls' action made P&G wonder 
whether he and TWDC could 
ever be trusted. 
Culture 
To P&G this was a most 
unethical action. 
Command 
Beecham was very clear about his 
position and though disappointing 
to P&G, his clarity was to be 
commended. 
Command; Collaboration 
Balls' actions gave the first clear 
insight of networking between 
TWDC and the City 
Command 
For P&G, all these issues were 
now clearly enunciated for the 
first time 
He said that: -
.... highways are a matter for the Council but the TWDC 
being aware of the sensitivity of the Council to the 
disturbance of such an important company, have 
consciously played down this important aspect. 
He went on to say they would continue up to the Public 
Inquiry with this strategy, instead emphasising the 
comprehensive regeneration argument but the note stressed 
the pivotal importance of the highway matter. For this Command 
strategy in underplaying the highway issue, 
.. as a quid pro quo we would expect the Council's 
continued quiet support until the Inquiry at which time 
the facts will speak for themselves. 
. (lt; ln; 3c; 5a; 5b) 
This episode, together with the direct approach to P&G m 
Cincinnati, totally confounded P&G management. They 
regarded the approach to Cincinnati as nai"ve, stupid and 
unforgivable. (3c; 3f; 5b) As for the City, the presence of the 
UK headquarters of a major multi- national company " such 
an important company" in Balls' words and which had been 
in the city for around 160 years counted for nothing. The 
interface between P&G and TWDC had reached a new low at 
this time. (lm; 3c; 3e; 5a; 5b) 
At a meeting on August 18, Balls told the company for the 
first time that there were four issues related to the future of 
New Sandgate House. At P&G's mention of the briefing 
note, Balls' responded that there were numerous leaks from 
his organisation and that in any case he would not know how 
to play dirty tricks. (lo; 3f; 5b) Maybe he did not always 
come across as having a professional approach. As far as the 
factory was concerned, P&G had not been clever to sell to 
Landau and the company could not walk away from its 
responsibilities with the consequence that we had blocked the 
scheme. (ln; 4b) 
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This approach was in 
contradistinction to that of 
Beecham's own openness . 
Collaboration 
Typical public sector behaviour 
or simply a non-elected agency in 
league with a developer? 
Culture 
Balls' action did not imply a 
sound ethical or cultural situation 
in his organisation. 
Collaboration 
Collaborative hardly seemed an 
appropriate description of the 
interface. 
Culture 
A total conflict of cultures here 
Command; Collaboration; 
Culture. 
Behaviour, strategies and cultures 
were in conflict P&G and their 
advisors no longer understand the 
rules of the game. 
Command 
A contrast with the 'need to 
know' secrecy ofP&G. 
Collaboration 
Balls appeared contrite at this 
stage. 
Culture 
Balls' concept of ethical 
behaviour was interesting. 
Command 
Balls was quite emotional here. 
Contract 
P&G was not aware it had any 
responsibilities for the scheme. 
P&G suggested the scheme was not blocked and in any case 
TWDC could use Compulsory Purchase. Balls said the CPO 
process was not all-powerful and the more land on East 
Quayside owned by Landau, the weaker the TWDC case. (lb) 
He then addressed the four issues related to the future ofNew 
Sandgate House. 
First, m terms of comprehensive regeneration P&G 
involvement arose because the factory space was the most 
attractive commercial area and its acquisition was key. (3g) 
Secondly, studies showed the architectural integrity of their 
scheme was spoiled by retention of New Sandgate House. 
Asked if he had seen the studies, he said no. (lk; ln) It being 
pointed out that aesthetics depends on one's starting point 
Balls said that retaining New Sandgate House would devalue 
the most commercially attractive part of the site namely, 
office development. New Sandgate House with a potential 
rental value of £5/sq.ft would have a serious impact on 
NQD's new properties, aiming at a rental of £12-14/sq.ft. 
Balls said the company's demand for 50,000 sq.ft. of space 
when it was only using 20,000sq.ft. of New Sandgate House 
was a key issue and that TWDC was bound by the 
Compensation Code but NQD was not. In fact, in his recent 
proposal to P&G, the developer was taking a reduction of £2 
million in his anticipated yield, based on a predicted value of 
a new building of £7.43 million with a net cost to P&G of 
£4.92 million). P&G pointed out that TWDC's logic was that 
the company spent £5 million to protect the developer's 
profits. (3c; 3e; 3f; 4c) 
The third point was that car parking had to be built 
economically in one place against City Road and this was 
under the site of New Sandgate House, which would 
therefore have to be demolished. 
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Command 
An interesting public sector 
perspective on the power of 
compulsory purchase. 
Collaboration 
No option for P&G about 
involvement 
Command 
Balls' mixing of aesthetics with 
economics was an interesting 
insight into his appreciation of 
the project. This was the first 
time economics had been 
mentioned. 
Collaboration 
P&G and TWDC were diverging 
even further on strategy. 
Contract 
To P&G, this looked like 
protection of the developer's 
profit at P&G's expense. 
Lastly, there was the issue of highways that were the City's 
responsibility and although it was obvious that the scheme 
would increase traffic, the effect on New Sandgate House 
was not clear. (1 t) 
Balls said that with those four arguments the company must 
think of its position but of course P&G were entitled to say to 
hell with the scheme.(1n) Instead, P&G emphasised its 
support for comprehensive regeneration and that City Road 
appeared to be a rational boundary. However, it was also 
made clear that if forced out of New Sandgate House it was 
highly unlikely that the company would stay on East 
Quayside. Balls was reminded that the attractions of New 
Sandgate House were, it was there, it was large, flexible, 
good quality accommodation, accessible and could easily 
house more people. Balls said that they would bend over 
backwards to keep P&G on East Quayside but other sites 
could be made available. (3e) He also agreed that unless there 
was an acceptable road proposal, New Sandgate House was at 
risk. Asked whether P&G could enjoy equal disclosure of the 
City's road proposals, he thought yes. (14 1o; 3d; 3f) 
It is worth noting that this discussion took place against the 
background of Balls' briefing note to Beecham only four days 
earlier confirming to the Leader of the City Council that the 
road issue was critical. Now, he was saying that the road 
issue was not clear, architecture and letting values were, 
together with parking, the critical issues. (lk; 14 1n; 3c; 3f; 
4a; 5a; 5b) 
Some days later, the City Traffic Engineer handed over to 
P&G data showing that the retention of New Sandgate House 
was not inimical to the NQD scheme. (14 1m; 3e) TWDC 
issued the statutory Statement of Reasons in October 1989. 
but this time New Sandgate House was actually mentioned. 
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Command 
Balls was dodging the real 
highway issue that he had so 
clearly stated to Beecham. 
Command 
Balls' mixture of rational and 
emotive argument was not a 
helpful contribution. 
Collaboration 
The strategies of TWDC and 
P&G were totally divergent at 
this stage 
Command 
The TWDC processes over the 
highway issue still mystified 
P&G. 
Collaboration 
P&G did not believe that the 
networking between TWDC and 
the City would allow such 
disclosure. 
Command; Collaboration 
The meeting resolved nothing but 
increased P&G's confusion. 
Contract 
Timing not even discussed. 
Culture 
If Culture informs behaviour and 
attitudes, TWDC and P&G were 
worlds apart. 
Command 
A different view of the highway 
issue 
Collaboration 
Another strategic difference and 
yet more uncertainty 
The relocation section was significantly amended, saying 
that: -
. . the Corporation is mindful of the contribution 
made by the Company as a major employer to the 
economy of Newcastle and is endeavouring to agree a 
suitable site for relocation of this part of the company's 
activities. The Company is understood to own another 
site in the Newcastle area, which might be suitable for 
Command 
relocation. The Corporation is ready and willing to This document was less than 
assist the Company to relocate in accordance with its 
relocation policy. (1 b; 3c; 3e; 3g) 
The section relating to proposals for closure of public 
highways still made no mention of the effect of such closures 
or any consequent new road works on New Sandgate House. 
(1 t) The Statement of Reasons contained nothing about the 
other points raised verbally by Balls in the August 18 meeting 
i.e. architecture, highways or car parking. It will be noted that 
even at this stage, all P&G knew formally was that New 
Sandgate House must go in order to achieve comprehensive 
regeneration. (14 1o; 3c; 3f; Sa) 
6.6 The Public Local Inquiry and Inspector's Report 
The Inquiry was set up to consider the TWDC's application 
for confirmation of the East Quayside Compulsory Purchase 
Order and associated proposals to make an Order for 
Stopping-up various highways on the East Quayside. The first 
Order was for the purpose of securing regeneration of East 
Quayside and the second Order was to enable development to 
be carried out in accordance with the outline planning 
permission already granted. (1b; 1t) The 17 day long Inquiry 
started with the TWDC case followed by the two major 
objectors, P&G and Landau and then a few minor objectors. 
TWDC, with NQD support, advanced a largely property 
based case for comprehensive regeneration stressing the 
critical importance of removal of New Sandgate House as 
outlined by Balls on August 18. (1d; 2a; 2c) 
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comprehensive in relation to New 
Sandgate House . 
Collaboration 
Balls now introducing another 
strategy for P&G- relocation 
from East Quayside 
Command 
The highway issue was still an 
enigma to P&G 
Command; Collaboration 
This discrepancy was cmcial in a 
supposed statutory document. 
This hardly represented any kind 
of collaboration and heightened 
uncertainty 
Culture. 
A cultural gulf in the approaches 
of the parties. 
Command 
Clarity was now emerging about 
the highway proposals 
Command 
An argument fully in line with 
government policy 
Challenge 
A courteous but adversarial 
process, the objectors on the 
defensive, perhaps because no 
attack was mounted on the merits 
and viability of the NQD scheme. 
P&G rejected these arguments proposing instead three 
alternative highway solutions, proposals to minimise the 
effects on the parking scheme and proposals for spending 
£650,000 on aesthetic upgrading of New Sandgate House. 
(lk; 1 t; 3g) Interestingly, a computerised model of the NQD 
scheme indicated that the impact of New Sandgate House on 
the architectural aspects of the NQD scheme was minimal. 
The Inspector had announced at the start of the Inquiry that 
the criteria contained in paragraph 6 of DoE Circular 23/88 
would be central to the Secretary of State's decision on 
whether or not to confirm the CPO. (lb; ld; lh; 2c) These 
criteria were: -
a) Need for regeneration 
b) Alternative proposals 
c) Balance of advantage 
d) History of the land 
e) Comprehensive proposals 
f) Quality & programming of proposals 
As far as the P&G case was concerned, the Inspector said: -
The submissions made on behalf of Procter and Gamble 
relate to the use of powers under Section 142 of the 1980 Act 
by the acquiring authority. My conclusions are that these 
powers appear to have been properly used in relation to the 
acquisition of the land, which is needed for incidental 
highway improvements. In addition, the point is made that 
the essential legal test is the end to which the land so 
acquired is to be put. In this case I am left in no doubt that the 
road improvements required by the local highway authority 
are reasonably necessary to secure the regeneration of East 
Quayside in that appear to have been properly used in relation 
to the they are the subject of detailed negotiations and 
agreement between the TWDC and Newcastle City Council. 
(la; Jlb; lt; ln; 3d) 
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Command 
P&G believed these were very 
good solutions to the problems as 
stated by Balls. 
Collaboration 
P&G had expended considerable 
expertise and resources on the 
development ofthese proposals. 
Command 
These appeared to be eminently 
sound criteria 
Challenge 
P&G had no issue with points a) 
and d) 
Command 
The wide interpretation of the law 
was difficult to counter. The 
other argument barely stood up to 
scrutiny. If the highway 
improvements were only 
"reasonably necessary" because 
ofthe collaboration between 
TWDC, NQD and the City, why 
should P&G be forced to pay to 
replace its own building? 
Collaboration 
Reference to the networking 
between TWDC and the City. 
On the agreed assumption that most of the P&G site would be 
incorporated in the Order lands, the exclusion of a small part 
of the plot containing the 1936-49 building (0.14 Ha out of 
11.75Ha) would result in New Sandgate House forming the 
sole fragment of the western ensemble fronting City Road. 
An odd circulation pattern would be established such that the 
main pedestrian entrance would remain at the upper street 
level and the ancillary parking provision would be made 
within the multi-level decks at some considerable vertical 
distance below. Such a prominent oddity would do little to 
enhance the attractiveness of the regeneration scheme as a 
whole. (lb; lk; lt; 2c) From the Balance of Advantage 
standpoint, the retention of New Sandgate House may to an 
extent be separately assessed in relation to the NQD scheme. 
It is virtually common ground that only the building itself 
need be retained. Even neglecting the cumulative effect of 
excluding the Landau land, the result of amending the NQD 
layout to accommodate both the building and necessary 
ancillary parking for the P&G building would be financially 
onerous. Not only would a loss of profitability ensue from the 
reduced office content but there would also be, as yet wholly 
unquantified, cost penalties associated with probably 
expensive and certainly inconvenient engineering works 
Command 
Pedestrian and car access was 
surely a matter of normal logistics 
not aesthetics it did not seem to 
be an unusual solution. 
Challenge 
This seemed to P&G to be a very 
subjective view. 
needed to underpin the structure. (lo) There is very little Command 
doubt that the existing building might well be improved to 
provide future office accommodation for the parent company 
but the utility of such floor space must be in some doubt 
considering the company's present pattern of dispersal within 
the city and surrounding area. (2c; 3e; 4c) 
The decisive objection to retaining New Sandgate House is 
probably that of the pattern of traffic management, which it 
would impose upon the area, which surrounds East Quayside. 
Any solution of the problem of absorbing more traffic along 
the restricted width of City Road would seem to require area 
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It was difficult to understand 
these conclusions in the absence 
of relevant cost data. 
Challenge 
The Inspector's opinion on the 
dispersal ofP&G staffwas 
irrelevant. 
Collaboration 
P&G's space strategy was totally 
inconsistent with this view. 
Contract 
The Inspector did not weigh the 
relocation resource costs to P&G. 
traffic management involving some degree of one-way 
working within residential areas. Such proposals are 
seemingly not acceptable to the City Council and are in 
marked contrast to those comprehensively agreed between the 
latter and the Development Corporation. (1 (; 3d; 3e) 
Command 
The highway issue appeared to be 
the demolition tool for New 
Sandgate House. 
Collaboration 
In the normal planning process, 
P&G would have been able to 
work with the officers ofTWDC 
and the City to arrive at 
The history of the land is one of virtually total inaction within acceptable solutions. 
the East Quayside area during the decade of the 1980's argues 
powerfully for immediate action now. Such action is doubly 
urgent in the light of the centrality, visibility and potential for 
regeneration of this part of the quayside area. The bulk of the 
land has been acquired relatively recently by the TWDC and 
by the NQD consortium. In contrast to this orderly sequence 
of land assembly, it may be felt that the piecemeal acquisition 
and disposal of land and property by Herr Landau and by 
P&G respectively has been less than forthright and far less 
conducive to the proper planning and ultimate successful 
regeneration of the area. 
My overall conclusion is that a choice must be made between 
the high probability of securing regeneration by compulsory 
acquisition and the very distinct possibility of confounding 
such a worthy aim by leaving the land in divided ownerships 
as a result of failure to confirm the order substantially as 
made.(ld; lo; 2c; 4b; Sa; 5b) 
The Inspector firmly recommended to the Minister the 
confirmation ofthe order. 
6. 7 The Decision 
The Secretary of State's formal decision was given on 3 July 
1990. The decision read: -
After careful consideration of all the material before him, the 
Secretary of State wholly agrees with the Inspector's 
conclusions and accepts his recommendations. 
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Command 
This orderly acquisition of land 
allowed such delays as to allow 
Landau to buy the P&G factory-
" the most attractive commercial 
area" (Balls August 1998). 
Challenge. 
The Inspector's views were not 
appreciated by the objectors. 
Contract 
Landau's business like approach 
to acquisition compared to 
TWDC may have arisen from 
different cultural perspectives or 
possibly more complex 
procedures between public and 
private sectors. 
Culture 
Accusations of' lack of 
forthrightness' against the 
objectors seemed one sided in the 
context of the activities of 
TWDC, NQD and the City. 
He is satisfied that the Order must be confirmed so that the 
regeneration of the Order land may be secured. The Secretary 
of State has accordingly decided to confirm the Order with 
the modifications shown on it and this letter conveys his 
decision to that effect. As regards the legal submissions made 
at the inquiry about the power of the Corporation to 
compulsorily purchase land which will become highway, the 
Secretary of State is satisfied that the Corporation does have 
the power to compulsorily purchase such land as part of its 
regeneration of the area. Indeed the provisions of Section 157 
of the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980 
indicate that it was contemplated that an Urban Development 
Corporation might have to carry out private street works and 
then compel the highway authority to take them over as 
highway.(la; lb; lh; lt; lo; 2c; 3e) 
Thus almost three years after the first meeting with the Chief 
Executive of the TWDC, the company had lost the first battle 
for New Sandgate House and decided to appeal. (2a; 3f; 4a) 
6.8 The Appeals 
As we saw in Chapter 2, it must be remembered that there 
was no possibility of questioning the advice or opinions given 
by the Inspector in his report to the Minister. At most, the 
company could seek to apply for a judicial review of its case. 
(lb; lo; 2c; 2d) 
The case for judicial review rested on the following points: -
First, the CPO was made for the securing of regeneration of 
East Quayside. It was confirmed (by the Secretary of State) 
primarily for collateral purposes of enabling the City highway 
authority to widen City Road to facilitate development of 
other projects. This was unlawful and ultra vires. 
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Command 
The wide interpretation of the 
powers ofthe TWDC was a 
hammer blow to the objectors. 
Challenge 
A question arose as to the extent 
of the 'material before him' 
considered by the Secretary of 
State. Was it only the Inspector's 
report? 
Collaboration 
TWDC's strategy appeared to be 
totally vindicated compared with 
that ofP&G. 
Command; Collaboration; 
Contract 
If Balls had been clear at the 
outset about his intention to 
remove New Sandgate House, all 
this trouble might well have been 
avoided. 
Command 
It would be an interesting 
development if the objectors 
could review and comment on the 
Inspector's report before 
submission. 
Challenge 
Judicial review is a crucial 
safeguard for objectors 
Secondly, there was no evidence that the P & G land (plot 11) 
was required for highway widening for East Quayside. The 
evidence was that East Quayside could be regenerated 
without impinging on Plot 11 and that the highway authority 
wished to carry out general highway improvements. This was 
unlawful. 
Finally, P&G's objection should have been considered 
separately from Landau's. However the Inspector and the 
Minister linked the objections and thus took account of 
irrelevant considerations. Attention was drawn to the use of 
the word "decisive" by the Inspector in Paragraph 13 of his 
Conclusions when he said that: -
The decisive objection to the retention of New 
Sandgate House is probably that of the pattern of 
traffic management it would impose on the area 
surrounding East Quayside 
(la; lb; 1d; lh; lt; 2c; 2d) 
Awaiting the judicial review and with the possibility of a 
successful appeal, formal legal agreements were reached 
between P&G and TWDC over the aesthetic upgrade of New 
Sandgate House, car parking arrangements and the minimum 
amount of land required to operate New Sandgate House. 
(lk; 1 t; 3f; 4a; 4t) 
The three-day appeal was heard in February 1991. The 
judgement was delivered in June 1991 comprehensively 
rejecting the company's arguments. However, leave was given 
to appeal to the Court of Appeal. This appeal was heard in 
October 1991 and again the company's case was emphatically 
rejected. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused. 
(2a) 
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Command 
The appeal was firmly based on 
Command issues. 
Challenge 
Note the very limited scope for 
Challenge trying to prove actions 
as ultra vires and unlawful. 
Command. Collaboration; 
Contract. 
Whilst TWDC were very 
confident that they would 'win' 
they were prepared to negotiate 
Legal Agreements for New 
Sandgate House in the event they 
lost, thus saving time. 
Challenge 
P&G at least had the satisfaction 
that they had gone as far as they 
could to have their case heard by 
objective judges. 
6.9 The Cmrnsequences 
The company's failure to save New Sandgate House left only 
basic negotiations between TWDC and P&G on 
compensation and the timing of the formal acquisition by 
TWDC consistent with the company's need to acquire, lease 
or construct a replacement facility. As noted in Chapter 2, 
TWDC had to compensate P&G for the compulsory purchase 
of New Sandgate House in accordance with a strictly laid 
down set of rules. However, this compensation fell well short 
of the cost of replacing the accommodation. Thomas, Imrie 
& Griffiths ( 1989) point out very forcibly that in the Cardiff 
Docklands, the value which owners placed on their property 
often fell far short of the figures offered by the acquiring 
authority. (lb; le; 3f) 
The company eventually decided to replace New Sandgate 
House with an extension to its headquarters. Even this was 
not straightforward since Newcastle City Council gave 
planning approval for the building by only one vote and the 
Leader of the Conservatives vociferously opposed the 
Command 
As Balls had said earlier, room 
for negotiation on compensation 
is very limited. 
Collaboration 
TWDC officers were very helpful 
now the battle had been won and 
lost. 
application. He did this despite his initial opposition to Command 
compulsory purchase of New Sandgate House resulting from 
his own government's policies. The new building was 
completed and occupied in October 1993. Thus some six and 
a half years after the formation of the TWDC, the company 
finally vacated New Sandgate House. This is in the context 
of an original presumed life of the TWDC itself of some 
seven years. (lm; lo; 3e; 4a; 4b) 
In terms of resource impact, P&G was forced to spend c. £3 
million of its own money on a new building to replace only 
50% of the New Sandgate House space. This was in addition 
to costs incurred of c. £400,000 to fight the CPO and pay 
TWDC's costs for the appeals in both Courts. It is estimated 
that about four years of management time was diverted from 
P&G's core business activities because of an external 
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The performance of the City 
councillors did not impress P&G 
who had just lost New Sandgate 
House as result of public policy. 
Collaboration 
City and P&G strategies now 
seemed divergent. 
Contract 
The uncertainty that had 
prevailed over nearly four years 
had impacted on the P&G 
business in terms of the efficiency 
of its operations. 
intervention, which the company did not want, and was none 
of the company's own making. (lb; 4a; 4b; 4c)Resource 
figures for TWDC are not available but TWDC was estimated 
to spend c. £300,000 to win the East Quayside CPO (Fazey -
Financial Times 1992). One crucial impact of the case was 
the collapse of the TWDC's preferred developer, NQD and 
the subsequent appointment of their successors, AMEC. 
Thus the scheme shown originally to the public by NQD in 
1988 was by now, five years later, a different scheme with a 
different developer and substantially increased public 
investment. (3a; 3b; 3e; 4a; 4b; 4c) The 1992 Report of 
TWDC showed that at that time, the actual cost of the East 
Quayside scheme was £183 million of which TWDC had 
contributed £64 million. This compares with figures of 
£35.4 million and £8.7 million respectively proposed in the 
original Price Waterhouse Report to the Department of the 
Environment. (ld; lo; 4b) 
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Command 
This gives some indication ofthe 
impact of a CPO on a private 
organisation. 
Contract 
The resource impact on P&G 
was seriously resented by 
management 
Collaboration 
Not a successful outcome for the 
TWDC strategy of picking a 
partner or for public information 
and involvement 
Contract 
The uncertainty, the performance 
of all the parties involved and the 
resource impact of the delays 
could not be foreseen and were 
unacceptable to them all. 
Command 
Hardly what Hesletine envisaged 
when he conceived UDC's. 
Contract 
Cost and schedule overruns of 
this magnitude would be totally 
unacceptable in P&G. 
6.10 Conclusions 
This case is a clear demonstration of Command, demonstrating the powerful impact of a 
specific government policy on a very large private organisation and the conflicts that ensued. 
As a measure of this impact, nearly half of the project issues raised by the case were Command 
influenced (Exhibit 6.1 ). This is hardly surprising given the nature of the case and the 
directness of its relation to a government policy that granted such wide planning and 
compulsory purchase powers to a willing user. The practical problems caused by this Command 
situation were really implementation problems. TWDC may have always intended to use 
compulsory purchase powers but it took them a long time to get there and at great cost. It has to 
be said that the government policy was successful in that a regenerated semi derelict East 
Quayside area is now a thriving centre of both business and leisure activity. 
Although Challenge only accounted for a small number of the occurrences of the issues raised 
by the case (Exhibit 6.1 ), the case demonstrated the vigour of the Challenge process. P&G was 
able to exercise its right of Challenge as far as the Court of Appeal and therefore could not 
complain that its case had not been heard. There was anecdotal evidence that other UDCs were 
watching this case with some concern because of the precedence it could set if TWDC lost. It 
became increasingly clear towards the end, that there was no chance of the company wining and 
in hindsight, the case was probably not worth fighting. 
Collaboration may have the second highest incidence of occurrences of the issues in the 
narrative (Exhibit 6.1) but in a sense Collaboration in this case is a negative reflection of 
events. Collaboration never really happened. Here we had a major divergence of business 
strategies between TWDC and their developers versus P&G. There was also the difficulty for 
P&G of dealing with a non-elected agency. Balls in particular saw P&G as having a 
contributory role to the success of his scheme whereas P&G took no such view. P&G played a 
game of business logic as they saw it, far away from the somewhat emotional position taken at 
times by TWDC and their developers. What had started as a cordial interface gradually 
evolved into one of suspicion and mistrust. P&G also regretted a lack of any sort of 
relationship with the City Council because there was no support available to the company from 
that quarter, despite the company's 'importance' as a corporate citizen of nearly 160 years 
standing. 
Contract only accounted for a small number of the issues (Exhibit 6.1 ), but these issues were a 
major problem for all the participants; long delay, uncertainty, rising costs, diversion of 
resources etc. One point that is worth raising here is that it is virtually impossible to forecast the 
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resource costs of a case like this. Even expert advisors, counsel, surveyors, traffic experts, all 
with plenty of experience of compulsory purchase cases could not make realistic predictions of 
the resource impact. From comments made by senior managers in the company after the events, 
it is unlikely they would have been willing to commit to this fight if there had been any early 
indication of the eventual drain on the company's resources. 
Although Culture again represented a small number of occurrences (Exhibit 6.1 ), it was clearly 
a significant influence between all the participants but was never discussed. There was clear 
evidence of behaviour that was held by the other side as unethical but this only raised the 
question- whose definition of ethical behaviour is to be used to judge that behaviour? 
A final point to make is that for the first time since 1832, there is no longer any P&G presence 
in the City of Newcastle. The new building that replaced New Sandgate House at the Gosforth 
headquarters site has just been demolished along with the 1950s and 1960s buildings. It is not 
possible to conclude that the experience of East Quayside was a major factor in the demise of 
the company's presence in the city, but it could not have been helpful experience. 
This chapter has dealt with a problem of a very large company's inability to cope with a local 
arm of government and thus government itself. The next chapter deals with a different type of 
case that was more 'normal' in the sense that the planning and appeals process followed the 
normal development control process. Nevertheless it is a miserable story of frustration, 
confusion, delay, cost and uncertainty for all parties. 
135 
CASE STUDY 1 -EAST QUAYSIDE, NEWCA§l'JLE EXJEHJ!Uf 6.1 
ANALYTXCAJL lLOG 
This Log records the number of times a specific project issue is noted in the narrative. 
5Cs PROJECT ISSUE§ LOG %of 
TOTAL 
1) Command a) Planning & associated Law- foundation of the process 3 
b) Compulsory Purchase Law- resistance to Orders 15 
c) Compensation- Limits- value of property 1 
d) Govt. Policies - Planning, Regeneration, Environment 9 
e) Local Plans & Policies- land use, influence, timing 
f) Public Interest - what is it? Who defines it? 1 
g) Regional Government Office role 
h) Role of the Secretary of State for the Environment 5 
j) Environmental issues e.g. Air Pollution 1 
k) Aesthetic Issues - who decides? how? Real impact? 7 
{) Highway & Traffic issues - impact on the community 20 
m) Local politicians - role, attitudes and influence 8 
n) Officers - role, attitudes and influence 13 
o) Public Sector Procedures & processes 22 
TOTAL of Command 105 43.7 
2) Challenge a) Appeals- rights -process- resources 3 
b) Oblections- rights -quality & strength of case- impact 1 
c) Public Inquiries- the adversarial process- 9 
Inspectorate - appeals - decisions 
d) Judicial Review (permission required & limited scope 2 
for review) & adversarial process of the Courts 
TOTAL of Challenge 15 6.3 
3) Collaboration a) Public information process - how and by whom? 3 
b) Public participation- stakeholders 4 
c) Non-elected agencies- difficulties in negotiations 14 
d) Networks- which ones, who is involved, how & why? 5 
e) Strategic differences between public & private sectors 16 
f) Officer I private organisation interaction 16 
g) Private organisation involvement 15 
h) Lack of contact between Members & applicant 
j) Conflict between LA depts and Intra LA disputes 
TOTAL of Collaboration 73 30.4 
4) Contract a) Schedule - delays and uncertainties 10 
b) Private organisation performance 13 
c) Resource costs of process and decisions to all sides 4 
d) Employment issues - local or external to area? 
e) Planning Gain --community facilities, roads, etc. 
f) Legal agreements - Section 106 Agreements 1 
TOTAL of Contract 28 11.7 
5) Culture a) Cultural differences between Public & Private sectors 9 
b) Ethical issues - Public and Private sectors 10 
TOTAL of Culture 19 7.9 
TOTAL NUMBER OF ISSUE§ 240 
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CHAPTER 7- CASE STUDY 2 - SAFEW AY STORE AT BATH 
7.1 Introduction 
Unlike the first case study, this case focuses on the operation of the Development Control 
process within the planning system and challenges to the decisions made under that process. 
The major interface was that between the applicant, Safeway plc, and Bath City Council 
engaging in a dispute over the change of use of an operating bus depot into a supermarket site. 
Technically, the case eventually hinged on five issues. One, the use of the site for retail 
purposes, two, the local highway and traffic conditions, three, the visual impact of a 
supermarket in a Conservation Area of a World Heritage City, four, air quality and lastly, 
whether demonstrable harm would outweigh likely benefits. 
The consistent failure of the parties to resolve these five issues and the late appearance of the 
air quality issue, led to three Public Inquiries. Apparently, this was the first planning 
application to hinge on this air quality issue. The extended timescale of the project and its 
consequent effect on strategies and resources for all the parties involved was a particular 
feature ofthis case. 
In this case, the author had no connection with the project at all. The attempt to provide a 
factual narrative account of the key events in the project therefore relies on reports, minutes of 
meetings, letters, press reports, diaries and interviews with key participants on all sides. 
My thesis is that there is potentially a dysfunctional interface between the planning system and 
private organisations. This case demonstrates a process of confusion, frustration, government 
intervention, unacceptable delay and finally, the crucial importance of the right to Challenge. 
The narrative has been analysed usmg the methodology discussed in Chapter 5. The 
Commentary is based on annotations in the narrative related to the impact of the 5 Cs and the 
occurrence of project issues defined in the Analytical Log (Exhibit 7 .I). This document then 
records their frequency of occurrence in the text and also summarises the relative impact of 
these project issues and the relative influence of the 5 Cs, Command, Challenge, Collaboration, 
Contract and Culture in this case. 
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7.2 The Participants 
The participants in this case included two local authorities, 
the site owner and the potential developer, Safeway plc. 
Avon County Council was the strategic planning and highway 
authority for the area. Bath City Council, later the Bath & 
North East Somerset District Council, was responsible for 
Planning, Environmental and local traffic management. 
Safeway plc was the third largest supermarket chain in the 
UK and were seeking a site in Bath to meet a perceived 
market need. Dolsett Estates Ltd. owned the Kensington bus 
depot site as the property arm of bus operators, Badgerline. 
7.3 The Site 
The 1.8 Ha Kensington site is located in the North East area 
of Bath, lying to the south of the very busy London Road, the 
main traffic route into Bath from the east but largely screened 
from the road by domestic and minor retail properties (See 
Plan 7.1 ). The other site boundaries are on the east, some 
playing fields, to the south the River Avon and on the west a 
mixture of warehousing etc. Almost all the buildings on both 
sides of London Road adjacent to the site are Listed at least 
Grade 11. 
Safeway's choice of the site was based on the substantial 
population living within the walk - in catchment area and the 
number of bus services passing the site and serving a large 
area of Bath. Having found an agreed alternative site for the 
bus depot elsewhere in Bath, Safeway agreed to the purchase 
ofthe Kensington site in March 1990. 
Bath is almost a museum of fine Georgian buildings and in 
1987 was designated by UNESCO as a World Heritage Site, 
the only complete city to be so designated in the UK. Not 
surprisingly, around two thirds of the city is included in the 
1,915 Ha Bath Conservation Area and this includes the 
Kensington site (lk) (See Plan 7.2). 
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COMMENTARY 
Command 
This status dominates the 
planning philosophy of Bath 
according to a Planner at 
interview 
7.4 The Planning Context 
Two Development Plans, the Avon Structure Plan and the 
Bath City Plan covered the site. 
The Second Alteration of Avon Structure Plan was approved 
in October 1989. Avon County Council approved a proposed 
Third Alteration to this plan in September 1991, effectively 
rolling forward policies covering the period 1989 to 2001. 
This alteration was subject to public consultation between 
October and December 1991 Policies RT1, RT2 & RT3 
related to shopping issues, notably the protection of the city 
centre and other major centres, the provision of convenience 
stores and the criteria governing approval of such stores. 
These included lack of adequate sites adjacent to the existing 
centres, accessibility by public transport, cars and traffic 
issues (le; 1 ~ 3a). 
The Bath City Plan was adopted in June 1990. Because of 
later legislation, this plan had the status of a 'saved non-
compliant plan' because it was non- conforming to the 
Structure Plan. A replacement City Plan was then being 
pursued. (le) Three principal issues were the focus of these 
plans. One, the underlying philosophy of conservation, two, 
growing concern for the effects of new development with 
increasing traffic congestion and consequent restraint policies 
and lastly, the inability of the city to grow in physical terms. 
(lk; 1 t} The council accepted that Bath is not and must not 
become a museum and the needs and aspirations of its 
citizens could not be satisfied without change. Shopping 
strategies were addressed in policies R1, R2, R9 and R13. 
As in the Structure Plan, these policies sought to protect 
existing shopping in the city centre and major district centres. 
The Kensington site was close to one of these centres and 
Policy R13 stated that substantial convenience stores would 
not normally be permitted outside the defined central or 
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Command 
Traffic and shopping were key 
issues in this strategic plan. 
Collaboration 
Public consultation was in line 
with planning law. 
Command 
Potential conflict here with the 
two Plans out of step and the 
time needed to replace an 
existing Plan. 
Command 
This traffic situation was and is a 
constant issue in Bath. 
suburban centres if it caused potential harm to the existing 
retail structure ofthe city, was in the green belt, was allocated 
for other uses or had traffic and transportation problems. 
Interestingly, Policy R 16 in the draft replacement city plan 
proposed that up to 30,000 sq. ft. net of convenience store 
space would be permitted, provided it would not contravene 
the conditions set out in the existing Policy R 13 (le; ll) 
In a 'Bath Shopping Needs' study commissioned by the Bath 
City Council in 1989, Nathaniel Lichfield & Partners, argued 
there was a quantitative and qualitative need for additional 
supermarket capacity in the city, best met by a store of 25,000 
to 30,000 sq.ft. net to be located in the North East of the city. 
It must be noted here that all the Safeway Planning 
Applications proposed a supermarket of around 40,000 sq.ft. 
gross (25,000 sq.ft. net) (lf; 3b). 
7.§ The Interface 
An initial meeting with the Chief Planning Officer was held 
in November 1989 proposing a plan for a store of 42,000 sq. 
ft. gross with 334 car parking spaces (3f). Subsequently on 
January 12, 1990, Safeway made their first formal application 
for Outline Planning Consent for a supermarket on the 
Kensington site conforming to the recommendations of the 
Lichfield Study (Application No. 451911 0). 
Following negotiation, the size of the store was reduced to 
39,000 sq. ft. and the number of parking spaces increased to 
347. The Chief Planning Officer reported to Committee in 
May 1990 that the site was the preferred site for bulk food 
retailing on the East side of Bath but determination should be 
withheld until after an ad hoc meeting with Avon County 
Councillors (ln). 
At this stage the Avon position was that, pending completion 
of the Batheaston to Swainswick by-pass and parking and 
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Command 
Conservation, shopping and 
traffic philosophies were all in 
potential conflict here. 
Command 
This marked a serious attempt by 
the Council to determine the 
public interest. 
Collaboration 
Involving the stakeholders 
Collaboration 
This was felt by Safeway to be an 
effective, collaborative start to 
negotiations. 
Command 
This appeared to Safeway to be a 
positive and sensible position for 
the Planning Officer to take. 
highway works the application was premature and must be 
subject to a binding legal agreement (1 t; 4f). In January 
1991, Avon County Council officers advised that on both 
traffic flows and parking matters no further highway 
objections could be sustained and their objections should be 
withdrawn (lnn). The members rejected this advice and 
resolved to advise Bath councillors that the application 
should be rejected on highway safety and environmental 
grounds (].j; lm). Anticipating rejection of this application, 
Safeway submitted a second parallel duplicate application on 
February 6, 1991(Application No. 4519/12). (la) 
On March 13, 1991 Bath City Council Planning Committee, 
rejected the first application against officers' advice, on the 
grounds that: -
01 the proposals would be likely to cause an excessive 
increase of traffic on this public highway (A4 London 
Road) and thus be detrimental to highway safety and 
the local environment. 
02 the proposal would involve over-development of the 
site, resulting in inadequate on-site parking provision 
leading to a detrimental effect on the amenities of 
surrounding residents by reason of congestion likely 
to result at the entrance to the site and the adjacent 
road systems. 
The principle of retail use of the site and all other aspects of 
the amended application were accepted (1 t; 1m; 1n; 4a). 
Following further amendments to the second application, 
Bath City Council's traffic consultants, Travers Morgan, 
advised that there were no sustainable traffic grounds for 
rejection of this application (11}. 
Consequently in September 1991 Bath Planning Committee 
referred the second application for acceptance by the full City 
Council. on September 24 (Jf; ~lb). 
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Command; Contract 
This attitude of Avon highlights 
the importance of the highway 
issues 
Command 
Note that this was a technical 
assessment based on the data 
currently available. 
Command 
Members' rejection of technical 
advice and introduction of a new 
issue of environment. 
Command 
A normal action for an applicant 
to take in these circumstances 
Command 
Bath Councillors had acted on 
Avon's advice to the letter. 
Contract 
Uncertainty was already an issue 
after fifteen months of 
negotiation with two councils 
Command. 
Again a technically based 
argument from traffic experts. 
Collaboration; Contract 
It had taken twenty-two months 
to get to this stage. Safeway's 
performance could be questioned 
in not getting the technical issues 
resolved more quickly. 
On the morning of the meeting, the Government Office for 
the South West (GOSW) faxed instructions to the Council 
under Article 14 of the Town & Country Planning General 
Development Order 1988, not to approve the application on 
the grounds that the Secretary of State wished to consider 
whether he should call in the application for his own 
determination (lg; llh). The Council nevertheless resolved by 
a majority of 30 to 9 to delegate authority to determine the 
application to the City Planning Officer and for him to 
recognise the Council's wish to approve subject only to the 
Secretary of State not calling in the application, which he 
dulydidonNovember21, 1991 (lh; lm; ln; lo). 
A three-day Public Inquiry was held in December 1991 to 
hear Safeway's appeal against rejection of the first 
application. Immediately prior to this Inquiry, the Department 
of the Environment issued instructions that the first and 
second Safeway applications be considered together with 
another scheme for a site elsewhere in Bath proposed jointly 
by Tesco and Bath Rugby Football Club. This resulted in a 
three week long Public Inquiry into Safeway's first 
application and the Tesco/Bath RFC scheme in October 1992 
and a five-day Inquiry by the same Inspector into Safeway's 
second application in January 1993 (lh; 1 o; 2c). 
In March 1994, the Secretary of State confirmed the 
Inspector's rejection of all the schemes, Safeway's second 
application proposals being rejected for a number of reasons. 
(lh) He was not satisfied with the site access design, had 
concerns about possible archaeological finds and the issue of 
continuing permanent access to adjacent private properties in 
Command 
A critical intervention by the 
Secretary of State. 
Command 
A process and policy mess with 
councillors ignoring instructions 
of the Secretary of State, which 
they had no power to do. 
Command 
The Secretary of State again 
overriding local decision making. 
Challenge 
The intervention caused a messy 
Public Inquiry process through 
no fault of either Bath Council or 
Safeway. 
Command 
The Command power of the 
Secretary of State well illustrated 
by now. 
Lower East Hayes and Kensington Place (ll ~ 3f) He stated Command; Collaboration 
There was no excuse for this 
that on balance, the development would enhance the character access being an issue at this stage 
and appearance of this part of the conservation area. The 
location met the advice in the Bath Shopping Needs Study; it 
was accessible by different modes of transport and that it 
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could revitalise the run-down London Road shopping area 
(lk; ll). He concluded that the proposal was acceptable on 
retail impact grounds and was broadly consistent with the 
PPG 6- Town Centres and Retail Developments and the then 
Command 
This was an important 
declaration and might be thought 
to end any further arguments in 
these areas. 
Command 
draft PPG 13 -Transport (ld; 2c). An important policy statement. 
Challenge 
The Public Inquiry process had at 
After further discussion, Bath Planning Committee least produced some positive 
results. 
announced that access proposals for Lower East Hayes must 
be subject to a Section 106 Agreement (1 t; lm; 4f). 
By the end of September 1994 it seemed that all the concerns 
expressed by the Secretary of State had been resolved, subject 
only to formalising the Section 1 06 agreement. It may be 
noted here that almost five years and two public inquiries had 
passed since the first meeting with the Bath Planning Officer 
in November 1989 (lh; lo; 2c). 
7.6 The Final Application 
On October 5, 1994 Safeway submitted a third planning 
application, (Application No. 4519/13). In November, the 
site owners, Dolsett were informed that two local residents 
claimed ownership interests in the access road to Lower East 
Hayes. (lt; 2b) As any planning approval was crucially 
dependent on resolution of this issue, Dolsett notified the 
Council that they intended to give formal notification to local 
residents stating the intention of entering into Section 1 06 
Agreement in an attempt to clarify access road ownership 
claims. (3g; 4f) 
A month later Dolsett wrote to the Council complaining that 
the Bath Legal Department was refusing to provide sight of a 
deed purporting to support the claims of one of the residents. 
Furthermore, the Legal Department had suggested they would 
adjudicate between the local residents' claims and Dolsett's 
submission that the access was a public right of way (lo). 
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Command Contract 
This was seen as a sound 
precaution that would 
ensure that no one could claim 
ownership of the access road or 
prevent use by others. 
Command; Contract 
Not what any of the parties had 
in mind initially. 
Command; Challenge 
Sudden objections to the very 
issue raised by the Inspector. 
Collaboration; Contract 
This action should have occurred 
as soon as the Inspector raised 
the issue. 
Command 
A potential conflict of interests 
More problems arose in December when the Avon County 
engineers wrote informing Safeway's traffic consultants, 
Arup, of their dissatisfaction with traffic data and access 
junction layout design (1 t; ln). They suggested it might be 
premature to report to Committee on December 22 as 
intended and called for further discussions to avoid a negative 
recommendation. Arup responded, accepting some of the 
engineers' input but pressing them to advise their Committee 
to consider the application on December 22 as originally 
planned (1n; 1o). 
At this time, Bath planners were informed that no 
archaeological remains had been found by the expert survey 
but there would be a watching brief throughout construction. 
The need for consideration of the Planning Application on 
January 18, 1995 was emphasised. Bath had employed new 
traffic consultants, Halcrow Fox who, in a report to the 
council requested a full traffic impact assessment but also 
raising a number of technical issues already resolved (1 t; 1 o). 
Arup responded immediately rejecting this input and pointing 
out that only issues raised by the Inspector should be under 
consideration. 
On December 16 Avon Council engineers wrote to Arup with 
a new request that Safeway agree to pay £120000 towards a 
new traffic signalling system at the site entrance (ln; 4e). 
This would be the first phase of the Avon Council's desired 
long-term SCOOT project, that is, a computerised urban 
traffic control system. After minor amendments, Safeway 
agreed to pay £I 08,500 towards the scheme so the Avon 
Engineering Director could make a positive recommendation 
on technical matters to the December 22 meeting of his 
Committee subject only to a Section I 06 Agreement ( 4b; 4f). 
At the December 22 meeting of the Avon Planning Sub-
Committee, they resolved to hold an ad hoc meeting with the 
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Command 
This new input was almost three 
years after the same people said 
they could not sustain a rejection 
on these grounds. 
Command 
This highlights the key role of 
officers in the public sector 
process 
Command 
Bath's new consultants were 
effectively trying to start from 
square one. 
Command 
Both councils had now raised 
new issues after four years of 
'negotiations'. 
Contract 
This planning gain was a new but 
not unreasonable demand. 
Contract 
Safeway tried to support this 
demand and it was appropriate to 
require a legal agreement. 
Bath Planning Committee to discuss the highway issues, 
hopefully at the meeting already scheduled for January 1 0, 
1995. Despite the fact that these ad hoc meetings were 
forums for discussion, members could nevertheless decide on 
a joint recommendation (1[; lm; lo; 3d). Hopefully if this 
happened the recommendation would be reported to the 
January 18 meeting of BCC Planning Committee. 
On January 5, 1995, Safeway was informed that Bath 
Planning Dept had said they would be unable to take the 
application to committee on January 18 because: -
1) Bath Legal Dept had not yet confirmed that the 
Lower East Hayes access road issue had been 
satisfactorily resolved. 
2) The Planning Dept. had not forwarded Amp's 
drawings as agreed by the highway authority's 
officers on December 21, 1994. 
3) The Planning Dept. had not been informed abut the 
proposed ad hoc meeting (ln; 1o; 4a; 5a) 
The next meeting of Bath Planning Committee would be on 
February 15 and if the items outlined above were resolved it 
would be possible to make a recommendation to the meeting. 
A couple of weeks after this new date was offered, 
confirmation was received that the ad hoc meeting would 
take place on January 31 and that Avon intended to convene 
an extraordinary meeting of their Planning Committee to 
ratify any decisions of the ad hoc meeting and then formally 
respond to Bath Planning Committee. (lm; 1 o; 3d) 
Four days before the ad hoc meeting, Safeway was informed 
that the Bath Planning Dept. now required an Air Quality 
Assessment report prior to the February 15 meeting of the 
Planning Committee. This issue had arisen at this particular 
time because of some recent comments on air quality issues 
by the Secretary of State, John Gummer. The officers 
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Command 
Safeway felt the process to be in 
some disarray at this stage. 
Collaboration 
Safeway had no access to this 
network of members and officers 
Command 
The internal processes inside 
Bath Council were now of 
serious concern to Safeway. 
Contract 
Each new turn of events 
increased the levels of 
uncertainty. 
Culture 
An unbusiness-like culture 
seemed to prevail at Bath 
Council. 
Command 
No one and everyone seemed to 
have responsibility. 
Collaboration 
The project appeared to be 
bogged down in the network 
between the two councils. 
anticipated that members of the Council would have 
questions on the issue. (lh; lj; lm) The report was to be put 
in hand immediately but the scope of the work was only 
agreed on February 13. (lo) Following the ad hoc meeting, 
Command 
This demand only had a 
precautionary rationale as 
Gummer was not stating current 
policy. 
Command 
consideration of the application by Bath Planning Committee Again a poor process. 
was delayed until March 15. Bath also appeared hesitant 
about a clear title to the access road to Lower East Hayes. 
(ln; 4a) The Avon Officers' Report for the Planning, 
Highways & Transport Committee meeting on March 7 
recommended that Bath be asked not to approve unless they 
were satisfied that the scheme would not result in increased 
air pollution in the vicinity.(lj; ln) Furthermore, without a 
Section 106 Agreement covering the design of the access 
junction and contribution to the traffic control system, 
approval not be given.(! t; 4f) 
On the morning of the meeting the Avon engmeers were 
informed by Bath that their traffic consultants were still not 
satisfied with the site traffic access scheme and even though 
Avon as highway authority were satisfied by the Safeway 
scheme, Bath wanted full agreement between all the traffic 
experts. (lt; ln) In addition, the Air Quality Report had not 
been received and this would prevent Bath Planning 
Committee determining the application on March 15. (lj; lo) 
Bath requested that all these matters be brought before the 
A van Planning Committee at the afternoon meeting. (3d) 
Notes taken of that meeting showed that a motion to defer the 
matter to an Urgency Sub-Committee was carried by a two-
thirds majority. (lm) The Planning Officer argued that he 
was concerned that a rejection on the grounds of pollution 
would not stand up to an appeal and he considered there were 
no strategic or highway grounds on which to defend an 
appeal. (lj; ln; 2a) The members did not accept this position 
and one councillor argued that the officers should seek ways 
to frustrate Safeway's ambitions for this site. She was 
concerned about traffic increases and while agreeing that 
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Command; Contract 
This issue continued to be a sore 
to Safeway and fuelled 
uncertainty. 
Command 
Avon appearing to leap on the 
new environmental bandwagon. 
Command; Contract 
This was an issue that could have 
been resolved in 1990 
Command 
An understandable desire but 
these technical matters appeared 
to be matters of opinion 
Command 
Bath making unrealistic schedule 
demands for such a major report. 
Collaboration 
Close networking between the 
Councils. 
Command 
This seemed ironic to Safeway as 
urgency had hardly figured in 
this project. 
Command; Challenge 
A professional, technical 
appreciation of the situation at 
last, but going unheeded. 
they did not have a strong case she suggested that officers 
should find means to frustrate the scheme. (lm; 3e; 5b) 
On March 13, Safeway's' advisors complained to Bath 
Council that after seven months the Council were still holding 
up the process of establishing title on the Lower East Hayes 
access road. (ln; lo; 4a) At the same time, Bath denied that 
they had obstructed Safeway's efforts to get together the 
traffic consultants on both sides to discuss outstanding issues. 
The letter expressed the Council's resentment that Safeway's 
traffic consultants, Arups, were focussing on the highway 
authorities' officers without reference to the concerns of 
Bath's own consultants, Halcrow Fox. Bath made very clear 
that as Planning Authority, they would make the final 
decision and would not do so until they were satisfied with 
conclusions on traffic and other related issues. In doing so, 
they would consider the views of BOTH (their capitals) the 
County Council and Halcrow Fox. To do otherwise would be 
irresponsible. (lt; ln; lo; 4b) 
Safeway had written to Avon Council m mid-March 
complaining about the councillor's remarks in the March 7 
Command 
An interesting member's attitude. 
Collaboration 
A strategic gulf between 
strategies of Safeway and the 
councils. 
Culture. 
An interesting ethical and moral 
position for a councillor. 
Command 
Serious concerns arose from this 
extended public sector process. 
Contract 
This crucial contractual issue was 
becoming a nightmare for 
Safeway. 
Command 
This was not an unreasonable 
position for Bath to take. 
Contract 
Safeway's consultants were not 
performing effective 
coordination. 
Planning Committee meeting proposing frustration of Collaboration 
Safeway's scheme. (3g; 5b) The County Solicitor rejected the 
complaints saying he did not recollect the remarks of the 
Councillor that in any case, would not have been minuted in 
detail. He went on to suggest that the remarks may have been 
taken out of context.(lm; ln) Safeway could, if they wished, 
convey their further views or even address the Committee at 
the next meeting on April 12. (lo) The councillor concerned 
then wrote to Safeway defending her position but not 
addressing the key issue of her argument that the officers go 
and find ways of frustrating Safeway's plans. (lm; 5a) 
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Safeway saw this attitude as a 
barrier to effective negotiation 
Culture 
Safeway saw this proposal as 
unethical. 
Command 
Not a convincing argument when 
the remarks had been recorded 
verbatim. 
Command 
Safeway did not regard this as 
any sort of compensatory device. 
Command; Culture 
Her attitude showed up the 
cultural divide between the 
sectors. 
The Bath Planning Dept wrote on March 27 setting out the 
reasons for deferral of the application at their meeting on 
March 15 as follows: -
1) Unresolved traffic issues, mostly basic assumptions. 
(14 4b) 
2) Members' concerns covering "rat running", 
pedestrian movements at the junction, air pollution, 
how the computerised traffic signalling would work 
and suggesting deferral until the Batheaston by-pass 
was completed and its effects could be measured. (lj; 
it} 
3) More "user friendly" data presentation material required 
for any subsequent presentation to the Committee. (3f; 4b) 
Following a meeting of Bath planners, Halcrow Fox and 
Arups on April 3, it was agreed that all outstanding material 
would be made ready for the Planning Committee meeting on 
May I 7 but on May 4, Bath Planning Dept requested an 
extension until June 30. After some argument about 
responsibility for delays, a delay to June 14 was agreed. (1 o; 
4a; 5a) 
An informal approach to the site owners by a supportive Bath 
Councillor suggested that much 'briefing' of councillors was 
taking place and a petition supporting the Safeway scheme of 
at least 500 signatures was needed - without it success was 
likely to be very difficult. (lm; 3b) This helpful suggestion 
was followed up with local residents groups such as the Bath 
West Indian Society and the Bath Multi Racial Club. 
Around the end of May, Bath Legal Dept agreed that the 
Lower East Hayes access road issue was settled in principle 
and then Halcrow Fox agreed the Arup design of the site 
access junction with the London Road and also confirmed 
they had no further issues. (lit; lllll) 
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Command; Contract 
For basic assumptions to be 
under question at this stage 
bordered on the farcical. 
Command 
Apart from air pollution, these 
issues were stiJI being re-run 
after five and a half years. 
Collaboration; Contract 
This indicated poor 
communication between officers 
and Safeway's consultants which 
the latter ought to have resolved. 
Command 
The public sector processes were 
becoming an ongoing nightmare 
to Safeway at his stage. 
Contract. 
Uncertainty seemed to be the 
only certainty. 
Culture. 
Business culture and the public 
sector could hardly be farther 
apart. 
Command. 
At last some help and advice 
from a counciJlor. 
Collaboration. 
An interesting point that the 
public must be engaged. 
Command. 
The Lower East Hayes issue 
settled after fourteen months. 
At their meeting on June 7, Bath Planning Committee 
deferred consideration of the application pending further 
consideration of the Air Quality Assessment and the views of 
Avon as highway authority. (lj; lt; lo) In any case, the DoE 
had written to Bath the day before directing that approval be 
not given except under special authority. The Secretary of 
State felt a need to take an interest considering the 
'unprecedented' number of letters of objection thus, to decide 
on whether to call in the application. (la; lh; 2b) 
Safeway's advisors responded arguing against call-in because 
the application did not raise issues of national or regional 
importance and had been thoroughly aired already at two 
Public Inquiries.(ld; 2c) The outstanding issues had been 
resolved and there was no case for a call in simply because of 
a 'substantial' amount of local objection. The costs involved 
in having a third Inquiry could not be justified. (2b; 4c) 
By this time, Avon had granted highways consent subject to 
Safeway entering into the Section 1 06 Agreement on the 
agreed traffic engineering works. (la; 1 t; 4f) Conservative 
and Labour councillors had effectively forced the issue on the 
Lib Dem majority by insisting that a decision be made. 
(lm) 
In order to protect their rights, Safeway submitted a second 
parallel planning application on June 9, 1995 on the grounds 
of non-determination of the current application that had 
already been running for twelve months. (la; 4b) Bath 
Planning Dept. refused to accept and register this second 
application as they were entitled to do if, within the previous 
two years, either they or the Secretary of State had refused a 
similar application and there had subsequently been no 
change in the development plan or in other material 
considerations. (la; 1 o) 
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Command. 
If Avon's views were not 
available, this meeting seemed an 
irrelevance. 
Command; Challenge 
Again the powers of the 
Secretary of State made apparent. 
Nothing seems to have been 
known about the levels of 
support for the scheme. 
Command; Challenge 
This seemed a valid argument as 
the outstanding issues were being 
resolved albeit slowly. 
Challenge; Contract 
Resource costs falling on 
Safeway and Bath, not the 
objectors. 
Command; Contract 
After five years a sensible 
agreement was achieved. 
Command 
This action had taken a long time 
to happen. 
Command; Contract 
This was a precautionary action 
often taken in these 
circumstances 
Command 
This is designed to prevent an 
aggrieved applicant trying to 
'wear down' the planners with 
repeated applications. 
Nevertheless this was a strict 
interpretation of the law by Bath. 
The Bath Planning Dept had agreed by now that the current 
application would be submitted to the Planning Committee on 
July 5 and possibly to the full council on July 17. (io) 
However, on June 27 the Planning Dept sent Arups a copy of 
a letter they had received on June 19, from a Councillor 
Forrester. This appended two pages of detailed highly 
technical questions on traffic levels, traffic modelling, traffic 
patterns and air quality. The planners requested that 
Safeway's response to these questions be verified by Halcrow 
Fox and received in ample time for the July 5 committee 
meeting. (1j; 1~ 1m; 1n; 4a) 
On June 28, Safeway discovered that Bath Planning Dept had 
still not forwarded the copies of the Safeway application 
documents requested on June 6 by the DoE, thus 'the clock 
had not started ticking'. The next day Safeway sent a 
complete file direct to the DOE covering the application. (1n; 
1o) 
On June 30, the Section 106 Agreement covering Lower East 
Hayes access road was finally resolved and the agreement 
signed. It had taken fifteen months to get this relatively small 
but crucially important piece of legal work executed! Note 
this agreement was a key requirement of the Secretary of 
State. (1n; 1 o; 4a; 4f) 
Despite support from the Transport Research Laboratory for 
Safeway's Air Quality Assessment, Councillor Forrester 
produced a paper "SAFEWA Y - The Case for Refusal" for 
the Planning meeting on July 5. (1m) This paper implored his 
colleagues not to vote in favour of the application unless they 
were satisfied that all the key points had been addressed. 
They should reject on the 'precautionary principle'. The key 
points raised in the paper were, first, that air quality was 
already within less than 2% of the EC limit (]j). Secondly, 
the SCOOT computerised traffic control system would not 
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Command 
Everything now appeared to be in 
place for a determination. 
Command 
This appeared to be a remarkably 
sophisticated input at this late 
stage. 
Contract 
Suspicion and uncertainty were 
now key ingredients of Safeway's 
attitude to this project 
Command 
Safeway were unimpressed by 
the failure of the officers to 
comply with this request. 
Command 
Safeway felt this to be a sad 
indightment of public sector 
processes. 
Contract 
The officer's attitudes to this 
crucial matter had 
been a continuing cause of 
uncertainty 
Command 
Another late input from this 
Councillor who was leading the 
fight against the project. 
Command 
This point should already be part 
of the technical assessment. 
work. This was the system to which Safeway had contributed 
£108,000 through a Section 106 Agreement. (1 ~ 4e; 4f). 
Thirdly, Arup's Air Quality model was flawed because of the 
timing of the data collection, assumed traffic levels were too 
low, among other issues. Fourthly, Safeway's claimed 
savings of 780,000 miles in cross-city journeys was 
unfounded and in any case only represented 0.5% of the total 
mileage in Bath. (lj; 1 () Lastly, "Rat running" in local areas 
north of London Road would be exacerbated. (lt} 
On July 5, Bath duly refused the application on the single 
issue of adverse effect on air quality. lj; lo) The Officers' 
Report said that the highway authority, Avon CC, had no 
objections to the highway aspects of the scheme and that 
clearly represented a significant material consideration. This 
Command; Contract 
Remarkably, Safeway, had 
contributed to an 'unworkable' 
scheme at the behest of Avon's 
highway engineers whose studies 
indicated it would help relieve 
the traffic problems. 
Command 
All the engineers had already 
agreed these data. 
Command 
This was at best a subjective 
assessment. 
Command 
This now appeared to Safeway to 
be the 'peg' on which refusal 
depended. 
reinforced the Bath officers' conclusion that refusal on Command 
At last all the original issues 
highway grounds was not reasonably sustainable. (1 ~ ln) An seem to have been resolved with 
independent verification of the Air Quality Assessment 
should be a pre-requisite of approval and in any case the 
direction from the Secretary of State prevented approval at 
this time. (1h; 1j) Councillor Forrester's resolution to adopt 
the precautionary principle in refusing the application was 
accepted with a majority of 10 to 5.(1m; ln) Notes of the 
meeting indicated that: -
the officers. 
Command 
This was a non-negotiable 
position. 
Command 
This stance did not seem to 
accord with the declared need in 
the Local Plan to meet the needs 
First, the Air Quality Assessment did not convmce the of its citizens 
Command 
Councillors. (lj; lm). Councillors might have been 
Secondly, Halcrow Fox' engineer in his presentation to the 
Committee on traffic had discredited the Air Quality 
Assessment by rubbishing the traffic figures used. (lj; 1 ~ Sb) 
Thirdly, Bath's Environmental Health Officer did not clarify 
his own involvement in agreeing the parameters for the Air 
Quality Assessment. (lij; 3f) 
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convinced by a report from a pre-
agreed independent consultant. 
Command; Culture. 
Halcrow Fox had offered no 
further objections to the traffic 
aspects of the scheme in early 
June. 
Command; Collaboration 
This officer's input had been key 
to the basic assumptions used. 
Fourthly, several councillors, led by Councillor Forrester had 
been strongly against the application and the Chairman 
expressed a personal view against approval. (lm) 
Lastly, the Planning Officer said he felt the issue should be 
decided on whether the disbenefits of increased pollution 
caused by the new junction would be outweighed by the 
reduction in pollutants throughout Bath. (lj; ln) 
A piece in the "Daily Telegraph" of July 7, 1995 reported that 
this was probably the first rejection of a planning application 
on the grounds of traffic air pollution. (la; lj) A letter 
received from Bath Planning Dept on July 11 confirmed their 
continued refusal to accept the parallel application first 
submitted on June 9, 1995. (la; lo) 
7.7. The Final Appeal 
Safeway lodged an appeal against the determination on July 
20, 1995 on the grounds that there was no sound basis for 
refusal on the basis of air pollution. (lj; 2a) Safeway were 
highly concerned whether the impending Public Inquiry could 
be contained to the single issue of this refusal or if all the 
issues could be opened up once again. Advice was that it 
depended on the level of objections, the view the Inspector 
would take and how much all other issue could be agreed as 
not in dispute. (2c; 3t) 
Some six weeks later on September 5, the Planning 
Inspectorate wrote offering May 22, 1996 as the earliest date 
They could offer nothing earlier because of a shortage of 
Inspectors and a management instruction they had received 
that they should concentrate their resources on Local Plan 
Inquiries. (2a; 2c) On the 26th of September, it was found 
that Bath had rejected May 22nd on the grounds of the impact 
of Local Authority reorganisation. Two weeks later, the 
Planning Inspectorate offered a cancellation date of 
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Command 
Interesting that one councillor's 
views could outweigh the officers 
of two councils and all the 
technical experts. 
Command 
How this might be determined 
was an interesting technical 
problem. 
Command 
This was an interesting point 
because there was as yet no 
Government policy extant on this 
issue. 
Command 
This was hardly unexpected 
given the initial refusal. 
Command; Challenge 
An appropriate Challenge against 
a determination on unique 
grounds. 
Challenge; Collaboration 
Safeway were highly concerned 
because of the potential 
subjective nature of the 
Inspector's view. 
Challenge 
Given that Safeway had started 
out on this venture over five and 
a half years earlier this further 
delay was a blow. 
February 13, 1996 February 13, 1996 and confirmed that they 
would impose this date on Bath. Later Bath tried to get a 
further delay but this was refused. (ld; lo; 4a) 
In an attempt to constrain the Inquiry to consideration of air 
pollution only, a joint paper was in production to demonstrate 
all areas of agreement. (3f) This was against a background of 
pressures from some councillors and local residents that 
traffic and retail impact issue should be re-opened. (1 t; lm; 
3b) The consultants would jointly confirm there were no 
outstanding traffic issues that could justify refusal. A joint 
attempt would also be made to seek a pre-inquiry meeting to 
constrain the Inquiry to air pollution issues thus avoiding a 
wide ranging re-opening of other issues. As a consequence of 
this meeting, Halcrow Fox requested further traffic and air 
quality data from Arup. (lj; lt; 2c; 4a) 
The Public Inquiry duly started on February 13 with an 
Inspector assisted by a specialist Assessor to advise on air 
quality issues. The Planning Inspectorate, in pre-inquiry 
discussions had said they were confident the Inquiry could be 
completed in four days as the Inspector had all the evidence 
from the previous Inquiries and he would be unlikely to re-
hear matters previously heard. However, the London Road 
Residents Association (LORARA), had been granted 
principal party status by the Inspectorate on January 17 and 
this status enabled them to be treated on a par with the 
Council and Safeway and to cross-examine witnesses. (2b; 
2c). After four days spent largely on air quality, the Inquiry 
was adjourned until April 16. (lj). This second phase was 
largely given over to a re-run of all the new, or old objections, 
depending on the viewpoint. LORARA had submitted proofs 
of evidence on retail impact, location, design and landscaping 
all subjects of the previous Inquiries and now agreed between 
Bath Council and Safl!way. Their submissions were in a sense 
illegal, as they had not been shared with the other parties in 
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Command; Contract 
To Safeway this process 
represented a shambles with 
uncertainty the consistent norm. 
Collaboration 
The first real attempt at 
Collaboration. 
Command; Collaboration 
A combined attempt to constrain 
the scope of the Inquiry despite 
the wishes of the public. By 
now, the Avon councillor's wish 
to 'frustrate the scheme' seemed 
to permeate the whole process. 
Command; Challenge 
Arup could hardly believe this 
request. 
Contract. 
Already the attempt to 
Collaborate was looking 
uncertain before it started. 
Challenge 
LORARA's status appeared to 
nullify any attempt to constrain 
the scope of the Inquiry. 
Command 
This was the estimated four days 
on what had been thought to be 
the single issue. 
advance and had had not complied with the Rules for 
Inquiries. Nevertheless the submissions were accepted (la; 
2b; 2c) 
At the end of the first part of the Inquiry the Inspector had 
asked for a letter from Safeway confirming the situation on 
the Section 106 Agreement covering the traffic signalling 
system (SCOOT). On May 3, the Inspector was informed that 
a draft was under discussion but local government 
reorganisation had delayed securing final agreement. This 
would be achieved in the next week or so.(1d; 1 t:, lo; 4f) 
On July 9 the GOSW confirmed they had received the 
Inspector's report on July 4 but, due to the complexities of 
the case, it was likely to be at least eight weeks before a 
decision was made. (1g; 1o; 2c) 
Proposals by the successors to Bath City Council, the Bath & 
North East Somerset Council to refer the draft Section 1 06 
Agreement on SCOOT back to their Engineers were dropped 
when it was agreed that only the Inspector needed to see the 
document with confirmatory letters from each party agreeing 
the draft. (1 t:, 4f) 
Shortly afterwards it was discovered that the draft Section 
106 Agreement had been circulated to third parties for 
comment along with further letters received from protesters 
since the Inquiry. The Secretary of State had decided that 
such documents should be circulated prior to a decision being 
reached. Among the letters were further objections from a 
local MP and MEP. (1h; 1o; 2b; 4a) This saga continued 
when it was apparent that every time some one wrote in to 
GOSW or to the Council, the letter was circulated giving two 
weeks for comment. One of these was from Councillor 
Forrester with further adverse comment on traffic and air 
pollution matters raised by the letters he had received from 
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Command; Challenge 
In the experience of this writer, 
LORARA appeared to be treated 
very leniently by the Inspector. 
Command; Contract 
This ought to have been capable 
of a simple response but in the 
context of this case even this was 
not so. 
Command; Challenge 
This was not an abnormal 
position. 
Command; Contract 
The draft ought to have been 
agreed by the engineers long 
before this point. 
Command 
Another example of Command 
powers exerted by the Secretary 
of State. 
Challenge 
The objectors were certainly 
being given every opportunity for 
input. 
Contract 
Further delays and uncertainty 
arising constantly. 
the DoE. (ig; lj; u; lm; 1o; 31b) 
GOSW wrote to all parties on December 16, 1996 offering an 
opportunity to comment on all the material submitted 
following the close of the Inquiry. On December 18, GSOW 
issued a Draft Local Authority Circular on Air Quality and 
Land Use Planning to all the parties to the Appeal, requesting 
comments by February 14, 1997. This Consultation draft was 
important because the Secretary of State would regard it as a 
material consideration in reaching his decision. Comments 
were indeed submitted by all the parties raising all the issues 
that had been fought out in the Inquiries.(lg; lh; lj; 2b; 2c) 
On February 27, 1997, GOSW wrote saying that the Secretary 
of State had carefully considered all the material and now had 
sufficient evidence to proceed to a determination of the 
Appeal. He wished to close out written representations and in 
accordance with natural justice, offered Safeway, as 
appellant, ten days to make final comments on the material. 
(lg; lh; 2b) One key issue raised by LORARA and 
Councillor Forrester was that government would not fund the 
proposed SCOOT system and the whole Safeway pollution 
case relied on this system to cancel out increases in pollution. 
Safeway refuted this point in their final comments. (1 t; lm; 
2b) 
7.8 The Decision 
On March 21, Safeway were told that no decision would be 
made until after the May 1 General Election when the new 
government would decide. The decision was duly issued on 
November 19, 1997 and Safeway's Appeal was upheld. (lo; 
2c) 
The Secretary of State declared that despite Bath and 
Safeway agreeing that all matters apart from air pollution had 
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Command; Collaboration. 
The barriers to progress seemed 
at this point to be almost 
insuperable as far as Safeway 
was concerned. 
Command 
A draft circulated by GOSW five 
months after the Inspector's 
report was submitted. 
Challenge 
If the Public Inquiry process is 
considered a vehicle to give the 
public its say, this appears a very 
good example, albeit only the 
dissenters seem to be having a 
hearing. 
Command; Challenge 
This looked to be at least the 
beginning of the end of the 
process. 
Command; Challenge 
Again, this issue of SCOOT and 
its benefits for the Safeway 
scheme were part of the 
Inspector's Report. 
Command; Challenge 
After seven and a half years 
another public sector barrier to 
progress but the process had 
eventually worked for Safeway. 
been resolved, the Inspector had decided this was a new 
application and therefore had to be considered de novo.(lh; 
lj; le; 3t) The Secretary of State shared this view and 
considered that the main issues were therefore: -
One, whether, having regard to the earlier conclusions of 
March 11, 1994, retail use of the site remained acceptable in 
terms of PPG6 (Retail Policy) and the recently adopted Bath 
Local Plan. (ld; le). 
Two, the impact of the scheme upon local highway 
conditions. (1/). 
Three, the visual impact on the surrounding Conservation 
Area having regard to Bath's designation as a World Heritage 
Site. (lk). 
Four, the air quality impact. (lj) 
Lastly, whether any demonstrable harm is sufficient to 
outweigh the need for any benefits arising from the proposed 
development. (lt) 
Command; Challenge; 
Collaboration 
The first real piece of 
Collaboration overturned by the 
Inspector, supported by the 
Secretary of State 
Command 
This was a reasonable re-
appraisal ofthe situation after 
five years. 
Command 
A key issue in the previous 
Inquiries 
Command 
This was not surprising given 
Bath's Status. 
Command 
This was seen as the issue for this 
Inquiry. 
Command 
A public interest, therefore a 
All these issues were carefully considered and the Secretary political decision. 
of State supported the Inspector's views that all of them had 
been satisfactorily addressed. He therefore allowed the 
Appeal and an Outline Approval was granted. (lh; 2c) 
7.9 Final Detailed Approval 
This Outline Approval left a number of 'reserved matters' to 
be determined to achieve a final Detailed Approval, namely 
landscaping, site layout (but not the building itself), materials 
of construction and minor elevational treatment. (la) This 
process lasted another thirteen months during which time, 
eight attempts had to be made to achieve a review of the 
documentation before submission of the application in June 
1998. Furthermore, there were continuing difficulties in 
dealing with the officers. 
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Command; Challenge 
It seems astonishing that it had 
taken seventeen months to reach 
this agreement with the 
Inspector's conclusions. 
Command 
This is normally expected to be a 
restricted area of negotiation 
On one occasion, they attempted to reopen fundamental 
matters such as the location of the building on site, the 
number of parking spots, the amount of landscaping. At a 
later meeting, officers were critical of the detailed design of 
the road junction, provision for public transport access, 
cycles and pedestrian access, excessive car parking at the 
expense of landscaping and safety considerations and minor 
concerns with the elevational treatment. They went on to 
request a more detailed response on the issue of sustainability 
i.e. recycled energy (heat and grey water), use of the site and 
future re-use of the building. These matters had been subject 
to three public inquiries and final decision by the Secretary of 
State. (lh; lj; lt; ln; lo; 3f; 4a; 5a) 
It has to be understood that the Council possessed the 
'weapon' of delay to seek to persuade Safeway to meet any of 
their requirements. (1 o) Apart from persuasion, the only 
alternative open to Safeway was a second parallel application 
and an appeal on the existing one. This could mean a delay of 
a further nine to twelve months! (lo; 2a; 3f; 4a; 5a; 5b) 
Despite an officer recommendation to approve the application 
at the November 11 meeting of the Development Control 
Sub- Committee, the application was deferred 'pending 
further information and consultation'. Following this 
meeting, Safeway's architect wrote to the Chairman of the 
Planning Committee heavily criticising the quality of the 
presentation to the Committee, after ten months had been 
spent working with the officers on developing the scheme and 
aids to presentation. He could only sympathise with 
councillors who complained they did not comprehend what 
they were being asked to approve. (lm; ln; lo; 3f; 3g) 
Detailed consent was finally granted on December 9, 1998 
after three Public Inquiries and in just a month over nine 
years since Safeway submitted the original application to 
Bath City Council. Even the Third Application, including 
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Command 
Normally these ultra vires 
activities of the officers are 
quickly corrected by senior 
officers. 
Collaboration 
The continuing obstruction of 
officers was straining the 
interface to the limit. 
Contract 
Uncertainty prevailed and no 
contract even seemed implicit in 
achieving an outcome. 
Culture 
A clash of cultures as 
officers seemed oblivious to the 
needs of Safeway to get a store 
built. 
Command 
A real Command issue. 
Command 
Persuasion not an easy option in 
a Command process 
Challenge 
Probably a reckless strategy. 
Collaboration 
Suspicion of officers' motives 
was a clear issue. 
Contract 
Yet another major dose of 
uncertainty. 
Culture 
The cultures were worlds apart. 
Command; Collaboration 
This was probably a fault of both 
sides if the presentation materials 
did not meet the needs of the 
officers and members 
the Inquiry, had taken just over two years.(lo; 2c; 4a). The Command 
store was eventually opened to the public in March 2000. 
The resource impact on the parties does not appear to have 
been quantified according to interviews with participants on 
all sides. The inefficiency of the process might be summed up 
by Safeway's architect who pointed out the wearisome task of 
picking up a project anew, many months after the last round 
of interactions. (4c) It was a very difficult process given that 
in the intervening period, the Safeway project had been 
completely out of his mind as he worked on other client's 
projects. (1 o) 
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Not an advertisement for the 
Command processes of the 
public sector .. 
Challenge 
The importance of Challenge to 
the private sector is clear. 
Contract 
The uncertainty of every part of 
the process is clear. 
Contract 
This protracted process over nine 
years caused all the participants 
very large costs in terms of 
resource expenditure. 
Command 
It is difficult to comprehend that 
this is how the planning process 
is meant to work. 
7.10 Co1111dusiolllls 
This case has illustrated the misery that can be generated for all sides out of what ought to be a 
straightforward change of use of site from a decrepit bus depot into a store, a use acknowledged 
early in the proceedings by the Secretary of State. Blame could be levelled in all directions but 
this has been a useful case study in terms of its insights into the interface between the planning 
system and private organisations. Command based issues came to the fore with two thirds of 
the occurrences noted in the narrative (Exhibit 7.1 ). This of course reflected the interventions of 
the Secretary of State and GOSW, the involvement of two separate Councils, the elected 
members and the officers. Until the advent of the air pollution issue, this was always a problem 
of implementation as distinct from policy. In principle, the siting of a supermarket on the 
Kensington site was established after the second Inquiry. Thereafter, the issues were technical 
and had all the hallmarks of a system based on instrumental rationality. 
Challenge was a crucial dimension of this case although recording only a small fraction of the 
issues raised in the narratives. It must be noted of course that this case study has only dealt with 
the events leading up to the Final Public Inquiry in detail. It is unlikely that the planning 
system was designed to put an applicant through such a vexatious process, even if Safeway 
were eventually vindicated. Safeway's willingness to fight on seems to an outside observer 
almost suicidal yet, through the availability of the Challenge process, they succeeded in the end. 
Collaboration shows a lower rate of occurrences of issues in the narrative than East Quayside, 
(Exhibit 7 .I) but this reflects the existence of major strategic inconsistencies and non-elected 
agencies at East Quayside. Mrs. Maxwell's comment at interview that collaboration was not on 
the agenda at Bath was a telling insight from the inside. On her admission they fired their own 
traffic consultants because they were not trusted. 
Contract, again showed a low number of occurrences (Exhibit 7.1) but was, nevertheless a 
reflection of the uncertainties, delays and resource costs expended on all sides in this case. East 
Quayside may have reflected serious delays and costs but at least the focus was clearly on the 
compulsory purchase issue. At Bath, the situation was much more complex with the wide range 
of actors, not least two local authorities and the interventions of the Secretary of State playing a 
critical part in the complexity of the Contract issues. 
Culture accounted for only a tiny proportion of the issues in the narrative (Exhibit 7 .I) but at 
times provided a revealing insight e.g. the Avon councillor's wish to find means sabotage the 
scheme even if the council did not have a case. At Bath, Culture seemed less an issue between 
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organisations as much as to do with the place. There is little doubt that the very culture of Bath 
as a World Heritage city plays a key part in the difficulties suffered by private organisations 
trying to develop in Bath. This point was noted by Mr. Webster, the architect, at interview and 
acknowledged by Mrs. Maxwell. 
This case has demonstrated the unsatisfactory face of planning. It is difficult to comprehend 
that the planning system is inherently designed to cause the frustrations, delays, uncertainties 
and costs sustained by Safeway. If the company's lost opportunity costs were worth £4 million 
at Alnwick, it is hard to imagine what they might be at Bath. We can now move on to the third 
case, Francis Avenue, on the face of it, a simpler case than the others but we shall see whether 
the patterns identified in the first two cases will continue. 
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CA§E §1!'1U][)Y 2 -SAJFEW AY §TORE AT BATH EXHKBKT7.1 
ANALYTIICAL LOG 
This Log records the number oftimes a specific project issue is noted in the narrative. 
5Cs PROJECT K§§UE§ LOG %of 
TOTAL 
1) Command a) Planning & associated Law- foundation of the process 9 
b) Compulsory Purchase Law - resistance to Orders 
c) Compensation- Limits- value of property 
d) Govt. Policies - Planning, Regeneration, Environment 5 
e) Local Plans & Policies- land use, influence, timing 4 
f) Public Interest - what is it? Who defines it? 2 
g) Regional Government Office role 5 
h) Role of the Secretary of State for the Environment 14 
j) Environmental issues e.g. Air Pollution 25 
k) Aesthetic Issues - who decides? how? Real impact? 4 
I) Highway & Traffic issues - impact on the community 35 
m) Local politicians - role, attitudes and influence 22 
n) Officers - role, attitudes and influence 24 
o) Public Sector Procedures & processes 34 
TOTAL of Command 183 66.3 
2) Challenge a) Appeals- rights- process- resources 4 
b) Objections - rights -quality & streng_th of case - im_l}act 9 
c) Public Inquiries- the adversarial process- 15 
Inspectorate - appeals - decisions 
d) Judicial Review (permission required & limited scope 
for review ) & adversarial process of the Courts 
TOTAL of Challenge 28 10.1 
3) Collaboration a) Public information process- how and by whom? 1 
b) Public participation- stakeholders 4 
c) Non-elected agencies- difficulties in negotiations 
d) Networks - which ones, who is involved, how & why? 3 
e) Strategic differences between public & private sectors 1 
f) Officer I private organisation interaction 11 
g) Private organisation involvement 3 
h) Lack of contact between Members & applicant 
j) Conflict between LA depts and Intra LA disputes 
TOTAL of Collaboration 23 8.3 
4) Contract a) Schedule - delays and uncertainties 13 
b) Private organisation performance 6 
c) Resource costs of process and decisions to all sides 2 
d) Employment issues - local or external to area? 
e) Planning Gain -community facilities, roads, etc. 2 
f) Legal agreements - Section 1 06 Agreements 10 
TOTAL of Contract 33 12.0 
5) Culture a) Cultural differences between Public & Private sectors 5 
b) Ethical issues- Public and Private sectors 4 
TOTAL of Culture 9 3.3 
TOTAL NUMBER OF ISSUES 276 
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CHAPTER 8 - CASE STUDY 3 
FRANCIS AVENUE FACTORY, BOURNEMOUTH 
8.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2, we saw the importance of the two core elements of the planning process in the 
determination of a planning application namely development plans and the development control 
process. This case illustrates the critical role development plans may play in the eventual 
determination of an application. 
When this case arose, government policy had determined that the planning process must become 
more 'plan-led' as development plans were to have a more important role than hitherto. The 
Francis Avenue site was subject to three existing development plans. These were the Dorset 
County Council Structure Plan and then two Local Plans prepared by Bournemouth and Poole 
Borough Councils respectively, both having jurisdiction over parts of the site. 
Technically, the case hinged on three issues. First, the determination of Bournemouth Council to 
resist the loss of employment land within the borough boundaries, second, whether more 
affordable housing was needed and lastly whether approval of the scheme would be premature 
given the potential future changes to the Structure and Local Plans. The dispute primarily 
involved the applicant and Bournemouth Borough Council as the key planning authority. 
Neither Dorset nor Poole Councils was able to support Bournemouth Council. 
In this case, the author as representative of the site owners was largely a frustrated onlooker in 
the planning process. The narrative is therefore an attempt to provide a factual account of the 
key project events relying on reports, minutes of meetings, letters, press reports and diaries. 
My thesis is that in the context of the planning system, there is a dysfunctional interface 
between the planning system and private organisations. This case shows a picture of Council 
determined to stick to the Local Plan, confused strategies between the three local authorities and 
a developer who persisted because of his conviction of the strength of his case. 
The narrative has been analysed using the methodology discussed in Chapter 5. The 
Commentary is based on annotations in the narrative related to the impact of the 5 Cs and the 
occurrence of project issues defined in the Analytical Log. (Exhibit 8.1 ). This document then 
records their frequency of occurrence in the text and also summarises the relative impact of 
these project issues and the relative influence of the 5 Cs, Command, Challenge, Collaboration, 
Contract and Culture in this case. 
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8.2 The Participants 
The participants in this case included three Local Authorities, 
the developer and the owners of the industrial site. 
Dorset County Council was the strategic planning and 
highway authority for the County of Dorset. Bournemouth 
Borough Council was the most influential local authority 
involved as this Council was responsible for Planning, 
Environmental, Highways and Housing matters and 77% of 
the site, including all the buildings, lay within its jurisdiction. 
Poole Borough Council had similar responsibilities for the 
remainder of the site, although this area was largely taken up 
with truck and car parking space. (3j) 
The Procter & Gamble Company (P&G) had acquired the 
factory and its site as part of the purchase of the Revlon 
cosmetics group of which the Max Factor cosmetics operation 
was a constituent company. Max Factor had manufactured a 
range of cosmetics on site since 1946. 
The developer, originally trading under the name UDE, was a 
local firm with a good track record of successfully negotiating 
planning approvals for this type of residential development 
and apparently well known to these Local Authorities. In 
August 1994, due to internal difficulties and financial 
restructuring, the firm became Primetower Properties. 
8.3 The Site 
The application site is located on the northwest edge of the 
South East Dorset conurbation (See Plan 8.1 ). The major part 
of the site, some 3.4 Ha, belonged to P&G and was largely 
occupied by a disused factory with ancillary offices, car and 
truck parking. This site was bounded on the south by detached 
1930's bungalows (Francis Avenue), high- density housing to 
the north, the Northbourne golf course to the west and an old, 
rundown light industrial estate to the east (See Plan 8.2). 
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COMMENTARY 
Collaboration 
Potential for conflict with and 
between adjacent Local 
Authorities already existing. 
The P&G owned site straddled the Administrative boundary 
between Bournemouth and Poole Borough Councils. The 
developer also acquired of a strip of about 0.6 Ha by 
purchasing pieces of the adjacent gardens from the 
householders in Franc is A venue. 
The site had originally been earmarked in the 1930's for 
housing development commencing with Francis Avenue. 
Following use in wartime to produce radar components, Max 
Factor acquired the site in 1946 and began the manufacture of 
a range of cosmetics in the existing buildings. A Planning 
Approval dated April 1949 gave permission for continued use 
of the buildings for these purposes and a number of further 
additions were made to the facilities into the 1960's. (la) At 
its peak employment level, about 750 people worked on the 
site. (4d). Procter & Gamble's development of its beauty care 
business through company acquisitions in Europe in the 
1980's led to the need to rationalise production and 
distribution in the 1990's. Because of its age, layout and 
location, closure of the Francis A venue factory was 
announced in June 1992. By this time, 450 people were 
employed on the site, around 70% of them female staff. Over 
45% of the staff were relocated to other company locations 
including the nearby Wallisdown Road warehouse. (3g; 4d) 
Closure was completed by June 1993 and following 
professional advice, the site was placed on the market as it 
stood. 
8.4 The Planning Context 
Because of its location across an administrative boundary, the 
site was affected by three Development Plans produced by the 
three Local Authorities havingjurisdiction.(le) 
Dorset County Council had produced the extant South East 
Dorset Structure Plan (First Alteration) approved in 1990 by 
164 
Command 
This Approval provided early 
confirmation of existing use 
under the 194 7 Act. 
Contract 
In those days the process was 
very labour intensive with much 
hand-packing. 
Collaboration; Contract 
There was no legal requirement 
to work collaboratively with the 
Local Authority over the plans 
for physical closure or the 
employment effects of these 
plans. 
Command 
An unfortunate geographical 
accident of boundary delineation. 
the Secretary of State for the Environment. (le; lh) The plan 
called for provision of around 9100 new dwellings and about 
24Ha of employment land in the Bournemouth area between 
1986 and 2001. Following publication and consultation on a 
Draft Structure Plan for the whole of Dorset in 1994 a Deposit 
Structure Plan was published in 1996 for further consultation. 
(lo; 3b) This plan allocated to Bournemouth Borough, 
construction of 12,400 new dwellings between 1994 and 
2011, this despite Bournemouth arguing for a reduced figure 
of 11,400. (3j) Economic Policy A of the Plan showed 
provision for 293 Ha of land for employment use in the same 
period and that Local Plans should ensure that an adequate 
mix of sites would be maintained. Bournemouth was to 
provide 14 Ha of this employment land. 
The Bournemouth Borough Local Plan, adopted in 1995, 
showed industrial/office use of the site although the planning 
officer conceded that this use was a carry-over from that use 
existing' when the Local Plan was being prepared in around 
1990. (le; 1 o; 3b) 
Policy 3.25- 3.29 addressed affordable housing and although 
the allocation in the Structure Plan had already been met, the 
Local Plan acknowledged the problem of lack of availability 
of a range of quality accommodation to buy or rent for those 
on lower incomes. (3j) 
Policy 5.1 of the Local Plan focused on industrial land use 
and stated: -
Development likely to result in the loss of existing 
and proposed industrial sites will normally be refused 
planning permission except in the case of existing 
isolated industrial sites located in primarily residential 
areas that cause environmental problems. (la; lj) 
The proposed change of use from industrial to residential was 
likely then to be a major issue for Bournemouth Council. (4d) 
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Command 
Central approval of this plan by 
law. 
Command; Collaboration 
A complex, time consuming 
process but often failing to 
achieve the desired level of 
stakeholder involvement. 
Collaboration 
Already inter local authority 
conflict. 
Command 
A logical view on the evidence in 
his possession. 
Collaboration 
P&G's fault that it had no input 
to this plan. 
Collaboration 
An unresolved conflict between 
the Plans of the two Local 
Authorities. 
Command 
With its location and the poor 
aesthetics of the buildings, this 
almost described the P&G site. 
Contract 
The fundamental issue in the end 
The Poole Borough Council Deposit Canford Heath Local 
Plan (le) showed the area of the site inside the Poole 
boundary as existing parking but the adjacent Northbourne 
golf course was allocated for about 750 housing units. 15 Ha 
of land adjacent to the proposed relief road was designated for 
industrial use with excellent access to the local and national 
highway system. The use of the P&G site for housing would 
be entirely consistent with this Plan. (14 4d) 
8.5 The Proposals 
Procter & Gamble gave formal instructions to a London based 
firm of property consultants to sell Francis Avenue site in July 
1992. The brief was to complete a sale for continuing 
industrial use by the final closure date of June 1993. This 
strategy would clearly avoid potential planning problems 
involving a change of use of the site. (la; le; 3g) 
Command 
Ifthe site had been wholly in 
Poole, this case is unlikely to 
have arisen. 
Command 
Unlike Francis Avenue, excellent 
road access. 
Contract 
Also much better potential 
employment land 
Command 
A wise if eventually forlorn 
strategy 
Collaboration 
It never occurred to P&G to ask 
Bournemouth the 'what if 
Through a major international, national and local marketing question about change of use. 
campaign some 2,967 companies were eventually reached out 
of which 128 responded. Only two eventually pursued their 
interest in purchasing the site, Sapcote and Cornwall Parker 
plc. Sapcote quickly withdrew because their business plan 
was not economically viable given the costs of adaptation of 
the premises. Cornwall Parker planned to relocate a local 
subsidiary company on half the site, and to use the rest for a 
group warehousing operation. The sale of the premises was 
duly agreed in June, 1993 which was of course exactly in line 
with P&G's closure and sale strategy. Ten days later, 
Cornwall Parker withdrew for four reasons, one, projected 
savings from consolidation of operations could not justify the 
capital expenditure or the commercial risks of disruption of 
operations, two, the site layout proved operationally difficult 
particularly for warehousing activities, three, trading. 
conditions were becoming more difficult and 
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four, the cost of adaptation and refurbishment of the facilities 
was prohibitive.(4b) 
Interest from residential developers had already been 
expressed during the earlier marketing activities so it was 
decided to advertise the site for residential use subject to the 
successful buyer obtaining planning consent for change of use 
to residential and completion of the sale by April 1994. (3g) 
P&G accepted the offer of a local developer, UDE, in 
September 1993, the sale to be completed by April 7, 1994. 
UDE planned a mix of social and private housing as a co-
operative venture with Sovereign Housing Association and 
aimed at providing low cost affordable housing for rent and 
for sale. This plan was consistent with other similar 
developments the firm had executed in the south and south 
west of England on similar post-industrial sites. The scheme 
as originally envisaged called for around 130 dwellings.(4b) 
8.6 The Interface 
P&G was only peripherally involved in the planning process 
because UDE was obliged by the sale contract to obtain 
planning consent for change of use. (4b) Consequently, the 
interface was between UDE and Bournemouth Borough 
Council. (3f) The contract target dates were for a planning 
application to be submitted in November 1993, planning 
approval in March 1994 leading to final purchase in April 
1994. 
UDE missed the November date for three reasons. One, 
because they were not ready (4b). Two, because there were 
problems with changes in Government funding of Housing 
Associations (ld) and lastly, the need to acquire land from the 
occupants of Franc is A venue. This latter problem arose 
because of Bournemouth Council's requirements for a 
specific amount of open space in the development. (lo). The 
revised date for the application thus became February 1994. 
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Contract 
Neither firm appeared to have 
done its homework 
Collaboration 
Even at this stage, P&G did not 
check with Bournemouth on this 
strategy. 
Contract 
A private sector plan without any 
local authority input. 
Contract 
P&G expected a timely delivery 
of the planning approval through 
UDE 
Collaboration 
UDE were understood to have 
good relations with Bournemouth 
Contract 
Partly due to input from 
Bournemouth officers 
Command 
Government policy changes were 
clearly not foreseeable 
Command 
Not an unreasonable requirement 
However, in January 1994, the Director of Community 
Services of Bournemouth Council wrote to Sovereign 
Housing Association supporting the use of the site for low 
cost affordable housing. The letter stressed the success of 
similar schemes in the past and alluded to the need for a 
'slightly higher number of properties for ownership in the 
programme'. (ln; 3t) 
From August through December 1994, the mam pre-
occupation was the change of ownership of UDE to 
Primetower and consequent contractual issues with P&G. 
However in September 1994, Dorset County Council had 
clarified their position as Strategic Planning Authority saying 
they had no objection to the use of the site for 13 3 dwellings. 
Likewise, Poole Council had no basic objection to the change 
of use. (3j) Bournemouth at this time had indicated a number 
of technical issues requiring resolution but said that their 
Head of Policy would need to support the change of use. (ln; 
3t) Primetower submitted a formal planning application to 
Bournemouth Council on December 14, 1994 forecasting an 
approval by mid to late 1995 (Optimistic) to mid - 1996 
(Pessimistic) plus the possibility of judicial review. (lo; 4a) 
Five key issues were raised by the Bournemouth officers in 
the ensuing negotiations. First, the members were unhappy 
about possible revision of the Local Plan particularly as they 
were reportedly reluctant to see an 'industrial site' disappear. 
(le; 4d) Secondly, Bournemouth's Head of Policy and the 
Planning Director were opposed to the scheme. Third, the 
members and the officers (apart from the Housing Director) 
rejected the need for such a mix of residential development. 
(lm; ln) Fourth, there were constant changes to the numbers 
and mix of social-private units that the officers felt they could 
recommend for approval. (3t) Lastly, the Transport Director 
rejected the use of the design parameters laid down in the 
locally accepted County Surveyor's guidelines for road design 
in housing. These standards were consistently applied in most 
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Command 
A welcome initiative from an 
officer 
Collaboration 
Good collaboration between 
private and public sectors 
Collaboration 
These inputs highlighted 
Bournemouth's parochial 
position on employment land. 
Command 
This officer was known to be 
antagonistic towards the scheme. 
Collaboration 
Officers were constantly 
changing their requirements 
Command 
A poor reflection on 
implementation of the planning 
process 
Contract 
The aim is a determination in 
eight weeks 
Command 
Understandable as the Local Plan 
had only recently been approved. 
Contract 
Employment land a key point 
Command 
A united front based primarily on 
the employment land issue 
Collaboration 
A very poor interface and 
worsening relations. 
local housing developments. (t ~ 1 n) 
By June 1995 Primetower had support in writing for the 
application from Dorset County and Poole Councils, likewise, 
there was written support from the Housing Director of 
Bournemouth Council. (ln; 3j) However, the Planning 
Director of Bournemouth was opposed to the application and 
the road design was not accepted. In addition, Bournemouth 
also required a topographical survey, noise survey and 
contamination report for the site. (t ~ 1 n; to) 
A revised planning application was made on June 30, 1995 
and considered by the Development & Planning Services Sub 
- Committee two weeks later. At this meeting, the data on 
land available for housing in the Borough was deemed to be 
inadequate, consequently the Chairman requested that the 
Director of Development Services submit a report to their 
next meeting on the land bank available for housing purposes 
within the Borough. (to) (Sa) Despite this apparent lack of 
crucial data, the Committee recommended rejection; firstly, 
because of the loss of employment land, secondly, that the site 
had not been allocated for housing use and lastly, it was 
contrary to Policies 3.2 and 5.1 of the Local Plan.(te; tm; 3e; 
4d) 
The application was to be considered by the full Council a 
week later and permission was granted for a ten-minute 
presentation to be made to the Council Meeting on behalf of 
Primetower. (to) Primetower's project team accompanied by 
the author of this narrative attended the meeting as spectators. 
The presentation was duly made, it was received in silence 
and there were no questions. It was expected that the project 
would then be discussed when the report of the Planning Sub-
Committee was reached on the agenda. This report was 
accepted without discussion, thus after some three and a half 
hours, the meeting finished without any mention of the 
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Command 
This officer was particularly 
difficult and his attitude had a 
major impact on the scheme. 
Command 
Interesting that the specialist 
officer supported housing. 
Collaboration 
Totally conflicting views of the 
neighbouring councils 
Command 
Officer opposition was one thing 
but the technical issues should 
have been resolved by this time. 
Command 
This situation did not reflect well 
on the Council's processes 
Culture 
Command 
The Local Plan a major 
stumbling block to approval 
Collaboration 
Totally divergent strategies 
Contract 
Employment land at the heart of 
the members' concerns 
Command 
This appeared a promising 
concession 
Francis Avenue site, nevertheless, the Primetower application 
had been rejected by virtue of the full Council's approval of 
the Sub-Committee Report. (lm; lo; 4a) 
This performance by the Council and its officers was greeted 
with incredulity and considerable anger by the Primetower 
team and P&G, particularly as some people had travelled 
considerable distances to hear the discussion. Very strong 
letters of complaint were addressed to the Mayor and Chief 
Planning Officer but apart from apologies for the wasted 
journeys, it was made clear that nothing unusual had occurred 
because, unless a Member wished to raise an issue, Council 
Standing Orders allowed acceptance of a Sub-Committee 
Report without discussion. (lm; ln; lo; 3f; Sa) Grounds for 
rejection were stated to be the loss of employment land, no 
overriding need for housing, a precedent could be set for 
similar sites and the scheme was premature given the current 
state of the Draft Local Plan. (le; lo; 3e; 3f; 4d) 
Later, in August, Poole Council signified intention to reject 
the application covering their part of the site because of the 
Bournemouth decision. (1 o; 3j) 
Command 
This process and the apparent 
lack of interest of the members 
astonished the applicants. 
Contract 
Another major delay in prospect. 
Command 
The epitome of a Command 
situation 
Collaboration 
No prior discussion of the 
process with the officers. 
Culture 
P&G could not understand a 
culture that allowed this to 
happen. 
Command; Collaboration; 
Contract 
The failure to convince the 
officers had led to a clear 
enunciation of the issues 
Command 
Not surprising as they only had 
jurisdiction over the smaller part 
ofthe site. 
Collaboration 
Poole were known to disagree 
On September 25, Notice of Appeal was given and with the Bournemouth position 
negotiations with Poole continued around the use of a 
'Grampian' condition. This simply meant that Poole's 
approval of residential use of the area of the site under its 
jurisdiction could be implemented only if Bournemouth 
approved such use for the remainder of the site. Poole 
Council's formal approval for residential development of their 
part of the site was given in early January 1996. (la; 2a; 3j) 
Official notice was received in November that a Public Local 
Inquiry would be held lasting four days and starting on June 
18, 1996. (2c) 
170 
Command 
A proper planning position for 
Poole to take 
Challenge 
The only resort left to 
Primetower 
Collaboration 
Poole had been a good example 
of collaboration 
Challenge 
A timely response to the appeal 
by the Inspectorate 
Later in November, Bournemouth Planning Department wrote 
to the Dorset County Planning Officer seeking the County 
Council's support for Bournemouth's position at this Public 
Inquiry. The letter set out four issues as the thrust of 
Bournemouth's case. First, the loss of industrial land allocated 
in the Borough Local Plan. Secondly, a precedent would be 
set for potential loss of other industrial land in the Borough. 
Third, there was no need for additional residential land 
according to the Dorset County Structure Plan (First 
Alteration) or the Bournemouth Borough Local Plan. Last, 
approval would be premature pending the publication of the 
Dorset Structure Plan and Borough Local Plan which would 
roll forward the planning process in the Borough to 2011.(le; 
4d) 
In reply, the County Planning Officer addressed housing 
allocations in the Borough and pointed out that the review of 
the existing Structure Plan envisaged 12,400 dwellings in 
Bournemouth in the period up to 20 I 1 and the Deposit Plan, 
which represented County Council policy, would be issued in 
January 1996. As far as industrial land was concerned, the 
County Council took the view that employment land should 
be assessed on wider than district level. He went on to point 
out that sites were available in this area, one of the main 
industrial locations of Bournemouth and Poole, both in the 
short and long term. He concluded by saying-
My conclusion therefore is that it is unlikely that this 
proposal can be successfully resisted on appeal. (le; 
ln;3e;3j) 
At this time, Primetower had instructed Consultants to carry 
out rigorous investigations and prepare reports on the housing 
situation in Bournemouth and the industrial land situation in 
Bournemouth and the surrounding area. (3g; 4b) 
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Command 
This dependence on the Plans 
was noteworthy given Dorset's 
views already expressed. 
Contract 
Employment land the key factor 
Command 
Very clear position from this 
officer 
Collaboration 
Different strategies between the 
councils and support for 
Primetower 
Collaboration 
Primetower trying to help with 
Bournemouth's lack of data. 
Contract 
An important private initiative 
Following discussions with the planning officers, 
Bournemouth's Head of Planning Services, Mr. Duckworth, 
wrote to Primetower on April 2, 1996. (3t) In his letter he 
discussed changes to the planning situation in Bournemouth 
since the rejection in July 1995 of Primetower's application. 
(3e) He conceded that these changes could be relevant to and 
supportive of Primetower's proposals and would no doubt be 
raised at the Public Inquiry in June. He said that 
... It could be argued however that this Inquiry is the 
proper forum in which these changes, together with the 
substance of our respective proofs of evidence, should 
be assessed by an independent Inspector. (ln; 2c) 
He goes on to say that he is mindful of the expense and delays 
in ongoing Inquiries and that material changes in the planning 
situation could be sufficient to cause the Council to reconsider 
its position. (lo; 4c) Accordingly he considers that this could 
be a case for reconsideration because of these changes and 
because of the evidence produced by Primetower. (4b) He 
goes on to suggest that if Primetower agree to submit a new 
application (without fee), he will present all the relevant fresh 
evidence at the May meeting of the Sub-Committee and the 
full Council meeting on June 4, 1996. (ln) If approval were to 
be forthcoming, Primetower would with draw their appeal and 
not seek an award of costs against the Council. (5a; 5b) 
He concludes 
As indicated to you at our recent meeting, it is only 
very recently (and some three months later than had 
been anticipated) that we have had the chance to see 
and study your case, and furthermore, some of the 
relevant changes which have led me to suggest it might 
be in your interest to resubmit your proposals have 
only come to light recently. (1 o) 
This somewhat unexpected but nevertheless encouraging turn 
of events bought a positive response from Primetower. 
Revised plans were quickly prepared and submitted for a 
detailed planning application (7/95/16/BL). 
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Collaboration 
The first sign of officer 
collaboration 
Collaboration 
Perhaps the strategies of the 
parties were coming together 
Command; Challenge 
An interesting view on Inquiries 
suggesting 'let the Inspector 
decide'. 
Command 
These material changes were not 
clear to Primetower 
Contract 
At last a consideration of costs 
and time 
Contract 
Primetower's evidence may have 
been part of the material changes 
Command 
An important change of heart by 
this officer 
Culture 
The council's culture was very 
confusing in the way they 
handled applicants 
Command 
The process had been going on 
for two years and only now had 
the case been studied 
This revised scheme was believed to be fully in accordance 
with all the relevant standards and requirements of the 
Borough and County. Further, they had designed the mix of 
housing in accordance with the urgent needs identified in their 
Consultant's Housing Study. (4b; 4c) A highly detailed 
Officer's Report was submitted to the Planning Sub-
Committee Meeting on May 20, focusing on the changes in 
circumstances that had led to the Officer's recommendation to 
approve. 
The Officer's Report concluded-
Whilst I consider the reasons given for the refusal of 
the previous outline application were justifiable at the 
time, and that your officers will endeavour to continue 
to justify them should the current appeal proceed, (2a) I 
would concede that there have been changes in the 
planning policy situation since July 1995, which it 
could be argued, weaken those grounds for refusal and 
give more support to the applicant's present proposals. 
Weighing up all the points for and against the 
proposals, I am of the opinion that planning permission 
should now be granted. (ln; lo; 5b) 
Despite this recommendation, the Sub-Committee rejected the 
application by 12-2 with one abstention. (lm; ln) The local 
ward Councillor said that housing was not a concern in his 
ward but he wanted to see comprehensive re-development 
with the adjacent half-vacated Webster site. Various non-
planning issues were raised by the councillors, education 
facilities, infrastructure, park and ride. One member observed 
that the Local Plan was a bible and they should remain 
committed to maintaining employment. (le; 4d) Another said 
he had heard too many can 'ts -
Can 't allow applications for anything apart from 
housing. Can't sell offices. Can't find land for schools. 
The officers have got it wrong and we should defend 
the refusal. 
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Contract 
Primetower's initiative had 
proved useful albeit at 
considerable cost to the company 
Challenge 
The appeal appeared to be a 
useful tool for Bournemouth 
Command 
Hardly a ringing endorsement of 
the scheme 
Culture 
Different cultural standards 
seemed to obtain over 
Duckworth's attitude to defence 
of the Bournemouth position 
Command 
Little influence by officers over 
members here 
Command 
This view of the Local Plan is 
understandable from a member's 
standpoint 
Contract 
Employment re-emphasised as 
the key issue 
Another asked -
How can we be weak on appeal if we are conforming 
with the plan? We seem to be driven by the Dorset 
Structure Plan demanding these wretched houses. 
Who runs this town? (le; lm; 2a) 
The Chairman had constantly reminded councillors that they 
could not win on appeal but on a motion from the local ward 
councillor demanding comprehensive re-development, the 
application was rejected. The application would still go to full 
Council on June 4 and the officers would still recommend to 
approve. Mr. Duckworth said that the grounds for refusal 
would remain as before. Given this refusal, confirmed by full 
Council, Primetower proceeded with their appeal.(lm; ln; 
2a; 4a) 
8. 7 The Public Local Inquiry 
The Inspector held the three day Inquiry in June, 1996 when 
the only principal parties were Bournemouth Borough 
Council and Primetower.(2c). 
Bournemouth Council's case was based on the four key points 
that they had stated so often and had been the reasons for 
refusal. First, the loss of industrial land allocated in the 
Borough Local Plan would be contrary to Policy 5.1 of that 
Plan. Second, a precedent would be set for potential loss of 
other industrial land in the Borough.(le) Third, residential 
targets for the Borough were likely to be exceeded up to 200 1 
so there was no need for additional residential land according 
to the Dorset County Structure Plan (First Alteration) or the 
Bournemouth Borough Local Plan. Last, approval would be 
premature pending the publication of the Dorset Structure 
Plan and Borough Local Plan that would roll forward the 
planning process in the Borough to 2011. (le) (3j) 
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Command 
Who indeed ifthere was conflict 
over a basic issue like housing? 
Challenge 
A poor understanding of the 
reasons and process for appeals 
Command 
This process totally confused the 
applicant 
Challenge 
At least this route provided a 
rational process 
Contract 
Further delays and uncertainty 
Challenge 
An important challenge because 
Primetower believed the 
Council's case was absolutely 
flawed and the officers almost 
agreed 
Command 
The rigidity of Bournemouth's 
adherence to the Local Plan now 
to be tested. 
Command 
The importance of the Plans 
continued to be emphasised 
Collaboration 
These pending Plans were known 
to be in conflict 
Primetower's case was a comprehensive document given the 
relatively straightforward issues at stake. This was because 
the applicant believed the Bournemouth Council case 
concerning availability of industrial land and affordable 
housing needs was flawed. (3g) As we have already seen, 
Primetower had commissioned significant studies in these 
areas proving the availability of sufficient employment land 
around Bournemouth and the needs for affordable housing in 
the Borough. (4b; 4d) In Primetower's view, the fact that 
Dorset and Poole Councils supported the application as well 
as the Bournemouth officers left the councillors at 
Bournemouth isolated and effectively without a case. (lm; 
ln; 3j) 
8.8 The Decision 
The Inspector reported on the Inquiry very quickly on July 26 
1996 (Taylor 1996). (2c) He regarded the relevant statutory 
Development Plans as being the South East Dorset Structure 
Plan First Alteration approved in 1990 and the Bournemouth 
Borough Local Plan adopted in 1995. He then suggested the 
most relevant policies from these plans were: -
1) The Structure Plan 
In Policy 1.4A, Bournemouth had to provide for about 
9100 new dwellings between 1986 and 2001. 
In Policy 3 .I, in the same period about 24 Ha of 
employment land (sites of 10 Ha and over), should be 
provided in the Bournemouth area .. 
2) The Local Plan 
In Policy 5.1, The Council will seek to retain existing 
or allocated sites for industrial or major office use 
except in the case of existing isolated industrial or 
office uses located in residential areas that cause 
environmental problems. 
He would focus only on these statutory Development Plans as 
they still had five years to run, thus were not out of date and 
he considered the figures projected in the 1996 Deposit 
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Collaboration 
Primetower had involved 
themselves in this process far 
beyond P&G's expectations 
Contract 
The studies were comprehensive 
and convincing 
Command; Collaboration 
The members seemed to be in 
conflict with everyone 
Challenge 
This was a very professional 
performance by the Inspector 
Structure Plan a long way from being finalised. There were 
the figures calling for Bournemouth to provide about 12,400 
new dwellings and ensuring provision of about 14 Ha of land 
developed for employment uses in the period up to 2011. 
(le). He would also take into consideration the relevant 
government planning policies namely (ld): -
PPG1 
PPG3 
PPG4 
PPG12 
PPG13 
General Policy and Principles 
Housing 
Industrial and Commercial Developments and 
Small Firms 
Development Plans 
Transport 
The draft Circular on Planning and Affordable Housing would 
also be a consideration.(ld) The Inspector argued that there 
were three main issues. First, whether the scheme would lead, 
on its own or cumulatively, to a shortage of employment land 
in the area. Second, how much harm or benefit the proposed 
housing scheme would bring to the area. Third, whether the 
scheme was premature pending the review of the structure 
plan and the local plan. 
The Employment Land issue 
Unemployment in Bournemouth was the highest in Dorset 
and there was a clear need for new jobs. There was no direct 
relationship between the amount of available employment 
land in the area and the number of new jobs being created. 
The main issue was employment land rather than jobs - too 
much land could be a wasting resource - too little could result 
in lost job opportunities. To decide on whether the site needed 
to be retained for possible future employment use, he would 
consider four points. One, how the site related to Policy 5.1 of 
the adopted Local Plan .. Two, the site's inherent potential for 
future employment use. Three, precedent, particularly in 
relation to the adjacent Webster site. Four, the employment 
land supply and demand situation. (le; 4d) As the site was 
clearly an existing industrial site and was allocated for such 
use on the Proposals Map of the Local Plan, it was clear that 
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Command 
This was a robust stance by the 
Inspector 
Command 
The PPG's seen here as important 
material considerations at an 
Inquiry 
Command 
Even a draft Circular was taken 
into account 
Command; Contract 
A rational approach to the 
employment issue 
Policy 5.1 applied. Despite the general restrictions of Policy 
3.2 preventing residential development of sites allocated for 
other purposes, Policy 5.1 makes an exception for existing 
industrial uses that are isolated in a residential area and that 
cause environmental problems. It was clear to the Inspector 
that the site was to be regarded as isolated. Similarly, he 
regarded the buildings on the site as an environmental 
nuisance for local residents. The Inspector concluded that the 
site fell within the exceptions category of Policy 5.1 and said 
this clearly points in the favour of the proposed 
development. (le) 
The Inspector argued that the marketing of the site had come 
to a premature end and had been over too short a period in a 
recession for him to conclude that it had no further future 
employment use. (4b) He pointed out there were nevertheless 
significant inherent problems with future use for employment 
purposes i.e. the planning status - what kind of industrial use, 
the unlikelihood of the existing premises being attractive for 
re-use either one major user or multiple users, difficulties with 
total demolition and redevelopment of the site having regard 
to potential cost and the proximity of existing and proposed 
residential areas. (4a) The trend in fact, locally and nationally 
seemed to be for firms to re-locate from older premises to 
new sites as both Max Factor and Webster actually did. The 
conclusion was that the site had only limited inherent 
potential for satisfactory future employment uses. (3e) 
If the appeal was allowed on Francis A venue the parties were 
in agreement that this could set a precedent for the future of 
the recently vacated Webster site. The Inspector disagreed 
saying that the two sites were not comparable. The Webster 
site had two possible access points straight onto the A348 
compared to Max Factor having one onto a quiet cui-de-sac. 
The Webster site was less developed than the appeal site, had 
better circulation space, buildings of a different character and 
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Command 
A widely different interpretation 
of Bournemouth's own policy 
Contract 
P&G was surprised by this view 
given the effort made to sell the 
site 
Contract 
This view itself implied a long 
timescale for potential further 
employment use 
Collaboration 
A strategic support for the P&G 
position. 
the buildings that had no comparable visual impact on 
dwellings. Heavy goods traffic would present no problem on 
the Webster site and advertising its presence on a major road 
would not be a problem. Thus, the Inspector concluded that 
no such precedent would be set.(lk; 1 ~ le; 3e) 
The Council's case on the supply and demand situation for 
employment land rested on five fundamental assumptions. 
One, the appropriate area of analysis was the administrative 
area of Bournemouth. Two, the analysis should appropriately 
be based on traditional industry i.e. Use Classes Bl(c)- any 
industrial use and B8 - storage or distribution. Three, the 
current situation should be related to the time horizon of the 
deposit Structure Plan - 2011. Four, the future take up of all 
employment land by traditional industry would be the same in 
future as in the past 12 years, i.e. 37%. Lastly, having 
calculated the amount of land to be developed for traditional 
industry up to 2011, it would be reasonable to identify all east 
as much land again to allow for some of the land not being 
made available for development. 
The Inspector rejected all these assumptions. (le; 4d) He 
pointed out that industrialists and workers were not 
constrained by administrative boundaries and this view had 
been confirmed at previous Inquiries in the area in 1989 and 
1990. (2c; 3e) He considered the identification of land for 
traditional use as misleading and unrealistic. He dismissed the 
other three points and concluded that little weight should be 
attached to the Council's analysis of supply and demand and 
the need to retain the site had not been demonstrated by the 
Council. (lo) He accepted Primetower's analysis that in his 
view confirmed that land was available if a wider-than-
district view was taken, as he believed it should. (4b) 
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Command; Challenge; 
Collaboration 
The value of an independent 
Inspector's view of all the 
comparative issues on the two 
sites 
Command; Contract 
Bournemouth's strategic thinking 
totally undermined 
Contract; Collaboration 
A reminder of Bournemouth's 
previous failures 
Command 
A poor reflection on the 
Bournemouth procedures 
Contract 
Despite the success of this 
analysis, Primetower ought not to 
have needed to carry it out. 
The Housing bsue 
The Primetower case showing the need for low cost housing 
was proved. (4b) Provided that the mix of two and three 
bedroom dwellings was controlled by a planning condition, 
the Inspector saw a housing benefit as well as an 
environmental benefit arising from residential development of 
the site. (la; lj) It would be beneficial overall in augmenting 
the Borough's stock of lower-priced family dwellings and this 
had been accepted by the Bournemouth Director of Planning 
Services. (ln) 
The Prematurity Issue 
The Inspector rejected this point for three reasons. One, the 
site must be considered on its own merits and not in 
conjunction with the Webster site. Two, PPG 1 indicates that 
where a development plan has been issued for consultation, a 
prematurity issue may arise. No such document had been 
issued here. Three, PPG 1 suggested that only substantial or 
very significant proposals would be likely to prejudice the 
development plan process. This was not the case here. (ld; 
le) 
His conclusions on these issues were: -
a) The scheme would not lead to a shortage of employment 
land as it was isolated from any other industrial activity 
and the local plan allowed change of use in such 
circumstances, the land had limited inherent potential 
employment use, there would be no precedent set for a 
nearby small industrial site and there was no under supply 
of employment land in the conurbation. The Inspector 
rejected as an issue lack of employment land actually 
located in the Borough. (le; 3e; 4d) 
b) The scheme, with a properly controlled mix of housing, 
would be beneficial in terms of the Borough's supply of 
lower priced housing, would make good use of a vacant 
urban site, would environmentally improve the situation 
for existing residents and would do no harm. (lj) 
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Contract 
Again, not Primetower's 
responsibility 
Command 
A normal requirement and an 
endorsement of the Primetower 
proposals 
Command 
Support for one of the 
Bournemouth officers 
Command 
The importance of PPG's in 
interpreting Local Plans 
Command; Collaboration; 
Contract 
A complete rejection of 
Bournemouth's employment land 
strategy 
Command 
A vindication of the scheme from 
an environmental standpoint 
c) The scheme was not premature as the impact was 
small, there was no extant consultation document on 
the Local Plan and the County supported the 
development in relation to the structure plan. (le; 3b; 
3j) 
d) The concerns expressed by the Environmental Agency 
about possible contamination were an expression of 
well-founded caution and a standard condition relating 
to such contamination would be imposed. (la; lj) 
Accordingly, the Inspector granted Outline Consent. (la; 2c) 
8.9 The Consequences 
Following the Inspector's decision, the sale of the site to 
Primetower was completed in August 1996. Thus three years 
had elapsed between the first approach of Primetower's 
original company and the grant of an Outline planning 
Command; Collaboration 
The Local Plan proved not to be a 
'bible' and the strategic authority's view 
vindicated 
Command 
A sensible precaution 
Command; Challenge 
The challenge process had proved its 
worth from Primetower's standpoint 
Command 
consent. (lo) The drain on Primetower's resources had been Not a process t be recommended 
such that eventually they had to join another company with 
greater resources to jointly develop the site. In around a year 
they decided to pull out of Francis Avenue completely. (4b; 
4c) In a recent interview with the Managing Director, of 
Primetower, he said that his relations with the planners and 
other officers at Bournemouth Council are now very good and 
he is treated with much respect. He puts this down to the fact 
that he fought them through an Inquiry and won. (2a; 3f) 
This whole process, the uncertainty and the time it all took 
had bemused P&G management.(4a) Having made a business 
decision to sell the site they found it difficult to understand 
why Bournemouth Council's parochial attitude to the 
provision of employment land could delay the sale of the 
Francis Avenue site for so long. (lm; ln; 3e) It remained a 
point of conjecture whether it would have been better for 
P&G to get a planning consent for change of use of the site 
and then sell to Primetower. (4b) 
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Contract 
Success was gained but at what price for 
a small developer? 
Challenge Collaboration 
This does not appear to be the purpose 
for which Inquiries were designed 
Contract 
It was difficult to gain continuing P&G 
management support over this period 
Command; Collaboration 
The fierce adherence to the Local Plan 
of members and officers 
bedevilled the process 
Contract 
There is no doubt that P&G would have 
handled the process differently. 
8.10 Conclusions 
Lacking the complications of Bath's World Heritage status, this ought to have been a relatively 
straightforward case of change of use of a semi derelict industrial site. Again we had Command 
in the ascendant with almost half of the occurrences of the issues in the narrative (Exhibit 8.1 ). 
The major issue here was the Local Plan although public sector procedures caused Primetower 
and P&G some problems. There was also the complexity of dealing with three councils 
although, unlike Bath, Primetower was only in conflict with one of them. Another important 
factor was the roles, attitudes and behaviour of the members and the officers. Mr. Garrett was 
clearly surprised by this situation at Bournemouth as he noted during interview. 
Challenge accounted for a very small number of the occurrences of project issues (Exhibit 8.1) 
but, unlike Bath, this was, a straightforward, quick public inquiry. This does not detract from 
the importance of Challenge in this case as Primetower was absolutely vindicated at the inquiry, 
just as Safeway succeeded eventually at Bath. 
Collaboration accounted for about one fifth of the issues raised in the narrative, less than the 
other cases (Exhibit 8.1 ). What we saw here were prolonged negotiations but no collaboration 
focussed on a mutually acceptable solution. However there were critical issues here. The 
interaction between the officers and the private organisations was difficult as the officers' 
demands changed and timing slipped. The conflicts between the planners and housing 
department at Bournemouth Council and the intra council conflicts were unhelpful to say the 
least. Then there was the head on confrontation over strategies between the protagonists. 
Contract amounted to a fifth of the issues in the narrative (Exhibit 8.1) and here the key issues 
were employment land and private organisation performance. Employment land was the crux of 
the strategic differences between the parties and the short shrift given to the Council's case by 
the Inspector was to say the least illuminating. One has to question how this case was so 
prolonged when his objective insights so devastatingly demolished the Council's case. 
Culture was a tiny figure (Exhibit 8.1) but there were the classical differences between the 
developer and the council. Interestingly, Mr. Yoeman of Primetower said at interview how 
much the interface had improved following the confrontation over Francis Avenue. 
The three case studies have demonstrated a degree of similarity in their patterns but this will 
now be investigated in detail in the next chapter provides and overview of the evidence. 
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EXHIBIT 8.1 
CASESTUDY3-FRANCISAVENUEFACTORY-BOURNEMOUTH 
ANALYTICAL LOG 
This Log records the number of times a specific project issue is noted in the narrative. 
5 Cs PROJECT ISSUES LOG %of 
TOTAL 
1) Command a) Planning & associated Law - foundation of the process 7 
b) Compulsory Purchase Law - resistance to Orders 
c) Compensation- Limits- value of property 
d) Govt. Policies - Planning, Regeneration, Environment 4 
e) Local Plans & Policies- land use, influence, timing 21 
f) Public Interest - what is it? Who defines it? 
g) Regional Government Office role 
h) Role of the Secretary of State for the Environment I 
j) Environmental issues e.g. Air Pollution 4 
k) Aesthetic Issues - who decides? how? Real impact? I 
0 Highway & Traffic issues - impact on the community 4 
m) Local politicians -role, attitudes and influence 8 
n) Officers- role, attitudes and influence 16 
o) Public Sector Procedures & processes 17 
TOTAL of Command 83 48.8 
2) Challenge a) Appeals- rights- process - resources 5 
b) Objections- rights -quality & strength of case- impact 
c) Public Inquiries- the adversarial process- 7 
Inspectorate - appeals - decisions 
d) Judicial Review (permission required & limited scope 
for review ) & adversarial process of the Courts 
TOTAL of Challen2e 12 7.0 
3) Collaboration a) Public information process - how and by whom? 
b) Public participation - stakeholders 3 
c) Non-elected agencies- difficulties in negotiations 
d) Networks -which ones, who is involved, how & why? 
e) Strategic differences between public & private sectors 9 
f) Officer I private organisation interaction 8 
g) Private organisation involvement 5 
h) Lack of contact between Members & applicant 
j) Conflict between LA depts and Intra LA disputes 11 
TOTAL of Collaboration 36 21.2 
4) Contract a) Schedule -delays and uncertainties 5 
b) Private organisation performance 13 
c) Resource costs of process and decisions to all sides 3 
d) Employment issues - local or external to area? 13 
e) Planning Gain -community facilities, roads, etc. 
f) Legal agreements - Section 1 06 Agreements 
TOTAL of Contract 34 20.0 
5) Culture a) Cultural differences between Public & Private sectors 3 
b) Ethical issues- Public and Private sectors 2 
TOTAL of Culture 5 3.0 
TOTAL NUMBER OF ISSUES 170 
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CHAPTER 9- AN OVERVIEW OF THE EMPIIRICAJL EVIDENCE 
9.1 Introduction 
In this thesis the planning system has been examined from a number of standpoints. Chapter 2 
outlined the elements and organisation of the planning process, the process of challenge and the 
legal and policy frameworks. Chapter 3 provided post war background to the planning system 
showing the varying political, policy and theoretical approaches underpinning the planning 
system during that period. Chapter 4 dealt with the development of the modified collaborative 
theoretical approach to planning applied in this thesis. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 constitute the body 
of empirical evidence in the form of narrative accounts of three cases, each subject to a form of 
analysis and commentary discussed in Chapter 5. Against this background, the question can 
now be posed in this chapter - what have we learnt empirically about the interface between 
local authorities, non-elected agencies and private organisations in the context of the planning 
system? This chapter will deal with that question in two ways. First, by reviewing the empirical 
evidence against the same analytical framework as was used in the case studies. Secondly, by 
focusing on the motives of the actors and the interfaces and relationships that developed in the 
cases. 
As we saw in the case studies, the narratives were analysed by annotating the text for each 
occurrence of a specific project issue and summarising these occurrences in a framework 
document (Exhibits 6.1, 7.1, & 8.1). To gain an overall view for this chapter, these data for each 
of the case studies have been summarised by project issue and by each of the 5 Cs in Exhibit 
9.1, PART I. This summary has then been further simplified in Exhibit 9.1, PART 11 which is a 
summary of the impact of the 5 Cs. 
9.2 Command 
Inspection of Exhibit 9.1, PART 11 shows Command representing comfortably the greatest 
number of occurrences in the narratives in each of the cases. This is not surprising because of 
the statutory basis of planning. In turn, this aspect of planning practice covers those project 
issues where the applicant has little or mostly no ability to exert real influence e.g. on 
government policy, the legal framework of planning, the Secretary of State, civil servants, local 
politicians and public sector procedures. The East Quayside case shows that very often a private 
organisation does not even understand that it is unable to exert influence in these areas e.g. P&G 
and many other companies who unwittingly became involved with UDCs. Likewise, the Bath 
case shows that even Safeway, who were constantly involved in the planning system, found 
their inability to exert influence was a major problem. What can we say then about the planning 
system in terms of Command? 
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The first thing we can see from the evidence is the influence and power of the government in the 
guise of the Secretary of State. This was clearly illustrated by the East Quayside and Bath cases. 
Despite the resources P&G could command, the company could not retain its own property in 
the face of the wide powers given to TWDC as a local agency of government. Through 
legislation government had removed from the City Council the normal planning mechanisms for 
considering the TWDC's scheme and TWDC was actually its own planning authority. An 
insight into his motivation and the powers he used to develop new regeneration policy through 
UDCs is given in his autobiography by Michael Hesletine, Secretary of State for Environment 
in Thatcher's government in 1979 (Hesletine 2000, pp. 211-214 ). 1 He describes the strategies 
he developed over a period of time, which would avoid what he considered ineffective 
piecemeal attempts at regeneration by local government. Instead, he would bring in central 
government and the private sector. He describes at length, the opposition from the civil service 
and senior colleagues, which he was able to overcome once he had the backing of the Prime 
Minister. He also concedes that he had significant opposition from relevant local authorities. 
In a different context we have seen in Bath how Safeway was bemused by the interventions of 
the Secretary of State and the multiplicity of Inquiries. The powers available to the Secretary of 
State were clearly illustrated when he instructed Bath City Council not to approve the 
application on the morning they were intending to do so. This instruction came via the GOSW 
and must have arisen from advice tendered by these local civil servants who had the requisite 
knowledge of the case and the facility for advising the Secretary of State. Again this represents 
a Command situation because the applicant has no access to these people. Apart from 
government policy and the law, the advice tendered by the civil servants to the Secretary of 
State is based only on the formal application submitted by the applicant together with any 
additional data supplied by the local authority. There is no provision for working discussions, 
explanation and argument involving the private organisation i.e. there is no interface. 
Furthermore, the advice is secret and the Secretary of State is not under any obligation to reveal 
it at any time. 
At Bath we also had the situation where simply on the basis of a speech on air pollution by the 
Secretary of State, John Gummer, this issue eventually became the fundamental issue in the 
case, even though at that time there was no government policy guidance. Even at Francis 
Avenue, the case was only resolved at Public Inquiry by the agent of the Secretary of State, 
namely the Planning Inspector, deciding in favour of one side. 
I have dwelt upon this issue at some length because the powers available to the Secretary of 
State, normally acting on civil service advice, have such impact in the area of planning we are 
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considering. He or she can have an idea for policy e.g. UDCs, persuade parliament to provide 
the necessary powers, provide non-elected agencies with sweeping powers including 
compulsory purchase, take powers away from local authorities. All of this without consultation 
with local politicians or local people and indeed through the use of Statutory Instruments, 
normally little challenge in Parliament. In other words it is a Command position without the 
possibility of effective Challenge to the policy, no Collaboration or Contract with the local 
people and no consideration of Cultural issues. There can be influences brought to bear on the 
Secretary of State and government by public opinion, the media, pressure groups such as 
Friends of the Earth, the CBI and of course European Directives. In the context of a single 
project, it is difficult to see any of these influences apart from Europe having any effect. As 
Moore (2000 p. 13) points out, in the end, the final say over determination of the use of the 
smallest parcel of land is given in law to the Secretary of State. 
In Chapters 2 and 3, we saw how governments arrived at the need to control development 
particularly in the aftermath of war. Both East Quayside and Bath cases show that this policy of 
centralised desire to control, Command, still exists and that the influence of the Secretary of 
State is crucial in the development of government policy initiatives and guidance. This results of 
course in changes to the legal framework, initiated by the Secretary of State, i.e. Command. In 
most planning applications the law is seen as the essential underpinning of the system and not as 
a problem but it can become the problem when the parties come into conflict. The East 
Quayside case study well illustrates this where the use of wide Compulsory Purchase powers by 
TWDC caused problems for all the parties. Compulsory purchase is an excellent example of 
Command because the site owner is powerless to stop the site being taken. As in this case, a 
CPO is normally used 'in the public interest' but the question arises- who decides what is the 
public interest? It is the Secretary of State acting on behalf of the public. 
Another element of the planning framework is the Development Plans and as we have seen in 
Chapter 2, the preparation of these plans is laid down by statute and is therefore a Command 
issue. However, there are also elements of Challenge, Collaboration and Contract. Following 
the statutory consultation process, which is of course a form of Collaboration, if there are 
objections, the Plan is subject to Challenge through an Inquiry procedure. The Francis Avenue 
case showed how P&G's failure to participate in these Collaboration and Challenge procedures 
was a cause of the eventual conflict with Bournemouth Council. The finally approved Plan is 
essentially a form of Contract with the public and government as to the development of the 
subject area. Francis Avenue provides a good example of how firmly the Council viewed this 
contract. This is an area of planning that is amenable to the influence of Collaboration and 
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Contract, provided the private sector organisation takes the trouble to know what is happening 
with the development of the Development Plans. 
Environmental issues represent Command because the local authority is required to solicit the 
views of the environmental agencies on all planning applications and these views will constitute 
a material consideration. The conditions normally attached to any planning approval almost 
always include one or more environmental conditions, which are then mandatory. A condition 
of the planning approval is effectively a form of Contract, normally the subject of a Section I 06 
Agreement. It must be noted that if, after all the arguments, an environmental condition is 
attached which the applicant finds unduly onerous, the only recourse is an appeal or Challenge. 
This was the case for Safeway at Bath where air pollution suddenly became an issue because of 
a speech by the Secretary of State and despite all efforts at resolution it was finally the key issue 
at the Inquiry. 2 An important factor here is the potential for disagreement about measurement of 
pollution and the standards to be used and this again was a critical issue in Bath. This area is 
again amenable to Collaboration and Contract influences if the parties are determined to find 
mutually acceptable technical solutions. 
Highway issues are very much a Command issue because the local authorities are essentially 
judge and jury in assessing highway proposals. Both at East Quayside and in Bath, highway and 
traffic were key problems and the highway authority was a crucial influence on the decision. 
There is also a significant element of subjectivity involved because what appears to one of the 
parties be objective data is often an area of dispute as it was at Bath. As the City Engineer 
memorably stated in a meeting on East Quayside, he wanted a perfect highway solution. Despite 
three workable options being submitted by P&G he wanted only his own solution, which meant 
the demolition of New Sandgate House. As we also saw in Bath, two councils, three different 
consultants and the applicant took nearly ten years to resolve the issue. The narrative account 
describes how the Councils and their consultants disagreed, agreed and eventually disagreed 
with the work of Safeway's consultants and even eventually criticised the Road Transport 
Research Laboratories' work. The London Road Area Residents' Association (LORARA) and 
Forrester criticised everyone. Mrs. Maxwell (at interview) said Bath Council had even changed 
traffic Consultants because they believed their original Consultants were too close to Safeway's 
Consultants. Like environmental issues, this is a Command area amenable to Collaboration and 
Contract influences 
Local politicians, as members of the Planning Committee, are the critical players in the initial 
determination of a planning application. as described in Chapter 2. They are in a Command 
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position as the decision makers. As Mr. Yeoman, Managing Director of Primetower said in 
interview on the Francis Avenue case:-
The situation is a monopoly- the applicant has no option but to go to the local authority 
for a planning consent. 
A key question for the private organisation is just how the members will react to the application. 
The Third Nolan Report (1997) specifically addresses planning as 'probably the most 
contentious matter with which local government deals'. The empirical evidence in this thesis 
would seem to support this view. The motives, attitudes and influence of the elected members 
are all issues of considerable interest to the private organisation. Clearly, members are under a 
variety of pressures in making their decisions. Personal views, party political or ideological 
positions, the interests of the specific ward represented, the interests of the wider community, 
government pressures and potential conflicts of interest are all possible influences on decisions. 
As we saw at East Quayside, P&G could not ascertain the views of the elected members on the 
TWDC Board because the Chief Executive, Balls, prevented a visit to the disputed site by these 
members. At Bath and Francis Avenue, members appeared to take a community wide view 
although Councillor Forrester at Bath appeared to represent a somewhat ideological 
environmental position. A key question for the private organisation here is the objectivity or 
otherwise of the members in determining an application. Nolan (1997) speaks to this need for 
objectivity. Clearly, members must take very seriously issues like local employment and 
environmental externalities such as the project's impact on air pollution, traffic, aesthetic impact 
and the needs of the people. However, at both Bath and Francis Avenue, the applicants were 
not persuaded of the objectivity of the members. In both cases, the applicants believed that a 
rejection leading to an appeal and eventual decision by the Secretary of State was a way of 
getting the members 'off the hook'. A dilemma here is the perceived need to avoid contact 
between members and applicant to avoid any possible charges of corruption (Nolan 1997). 
The three cases indicate that the role of the officers is not readily amenable to influence by the 
private organisation and is essentially a Command position. This is equally true of their 
influence, because the extent of both their role and influence is internal to the authority and 
governed by the relationship of the members to the officers. These issues are again of 
considerable interest to the applicant as the officers are the interface and form the conduits to 
the members for the applicant's case. At both Bath and Francis Avenue, the roles and influence 
of the officers appeared to be such that they were unable to dislodge members from entrenched 
positions. At East Quayside, Balls appeared to have a good degree of control over his members, 
at least over their ability to have contact with P&G. What may be possible is that the attitudes of 
the officers may be amenable to some external influence but even that depends upon the quality 
of the interface and their relationships with the applicant. As we see from the evidence in all 
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three cases, the quality of the interfaces and relationships with the applicants would not have 
supported such influence. 
It is also clear from the evidence that in each case there was another interface, namely that of 
the public sector body with the public. TWDC successfully presented itself as the bringer of 
salvation to East Quayside. Bath Council was the protector of the traffic and environmental 
problems of the City, although Dunlop of LORARA ridiculed their weak stance at interview. 
Bournemouth on the other hand, was the protector of employment; at least of employment land 
even when it was proved that they could not substantiate their position. 
The procedures of the public sector bodies, be they local authorities, government offices, non-
governmental agencies frequently present problems for private organisations. This point has 
been shown up in all the narrative accounts but in these and other cases, in the author's 
experience, the decision-making processes in the public sector consistently bemuse private 
organisations. This is not only over issues such as Bournemouth council's treatment of the 
applicant at the full council meeting, but more generally over just how the public sector does its 
business. In Bath, the Council departments' processes were subject to much criticism in 
interviews with Safeway and their consultants but also by LORARA (Mr. Dunlop) and even by 
Mrs. Maxwell, formerly Principal Planning Officer at Bath. The private organisation is likely to 
see these processes as a Command situation. At Francis Avenue, the Housing, Highway and 
Planning Departments were at odds with each other with what were later proven at the Inquiry 
to be inadequate positions in their respective areas of competence. 
The foregoing paints a picture of the powerful influence of the Secretary of State, representing 
government, in ultimate control of the whole process. How true a picture is it? 
The first point to make is that if it is not true, the Secretary of State, his Department and the 
process must be capable of being influenced if not controlled. Parliament is the fountain of the 
law but the relevant Secretary of State is the initiator of new law and of changes to existing law. 
With the support of a working majority in the House of Commons and of the Prime Minister, 
the Secretary of State will legislate successfully. In addition we have already seen the 
burgeoning use of Statutory Instruments, which are rarely if ever debated despite the impact 
they have in the system. In the case of a major project, say to do with manufacturing, it is just 
possible some attempt at influence may be brought to bear by the Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry. From personal experience, the author never found any assistance coming from that 
quarter. The Department's civil servants are clearly influential both in terms of the detail of 
legislation and advice on specific planning applications e.g. Bath. However, as we have seen in 
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the case of Hesletine and UDCs, civil servants are unlikely to overcome the wishes of a 
determined Secretary of State. The next influence might well be the Courts but as we have 
already seen, unless an action has been taken which is ultra vires, the Courts cannot intervene. 
Finally there is the public. The planning process does require public consultation but the 
effectiveness of this activity may be questioned. Despite information being published in 
newspapers etc. the response of the public tends to be apathetic, apart that is from people 
directly involved e.g. the neighbours. This was shown up on East Quayside where the 
involvement of the public was minimal. In Bath, the planners and main objectors admitted they 
did not know what the local people thought about the need for a new supermarket in 
Kensington. At Francis Avenue, the public appeared not to be involved at all and P&G did not 
even know the Local Plan was being revised. 
All this suggests a process where, even if not under day-to-day command of the Secretary of 
State, the Command influence pervades the system. There is of course no possibility of an 
interface or relationship with the Secretary of State and the applicant. However the applicant is 
not altogether without hope as the law also admits the possibility of Challenge to planning 
decisions. This we will now consider. 
9.3 Challenge 
All three cases demonstrate the importance of this aspect of planning practice and the various 
degrees of complexity arising from it. The Challenge process has already been described in 
Chapter 2. The right to Challenge cannot be over-emphasised because as we have seen, in two 
of the three case studies, Bath and Francis Avenue, the appellant was successful. Exhibit 9. I 
PART 11 shows Challenge with the lowest number of occurrences in the narratives. This is not 
an indication of unimportance because Challenge, unlike Command, is not a constantly 
recurring aspect of planning in the narratives. Objectors were a significant proportion of the 
Challenge category for Bath primarily because of the activities of LORARA. 
The three cases provide a widely differing perspective on appeals, all the way from a simple 
short Inquiry at Bournemouth via multiple Public Inquiries at Bath through to the Court of 
Appeal at East Quayside. The law provides the right of appeal to the Secretary of State and this 
is therefore a clear and very important Challenge issue. After all, both Safeway and Primetower 
used this right with great success. However, there is even a Command element here as the right 
to Challenge and the process is carefully laid down by law. A key issue is that government 
policy cannot be questioned. This seems clear except for the fact that there can be confusion 
over the interpretation and implementation of Planning Policy Guidance notes by local 
authorities. As already explained in Chapter 2, the courts have rejected their use as having 
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statutory force- the planners should only 'have regard to them'. However, their very existence 
is to reflect current government planning policy and the Inspectors at Bath and Francis Avenue 
placed great importance on the relevant PPG's as material considerations. 
Bath is a very good example of the availability and use of objectors' rights although it seemed 
to Safeway that in this case, the Inspector had taken an unusually lenient approach to LORARA 
at the Final Public Inquiry. East Quayside also provides a good example of the rights to object, 
as P&G and Landau were both able to exercise these rights to the fullest extent. An Inspector 
will always have regard to the objections made although the objections may well be rejected as 
they were at East Quayside and Bath. This is primarily a Challenge issue. 
Public Inquiries have both Challenge and Command aspects. Challenge because the Public 
Inquiry is the tribunal where the appeal process normally ends as the Franc is A venue case 
demonstrates. Bath, on the other hand demonstrated a different version of this point as it took 
three Inquiries to get there. However, there is a strong Command aspect of Inquiries for a 
number of reasons. 
First, the applicant has no influence over the choice of the Inspector who will hear the appeal. 
Secondly, the law strictly lays down the Inquiry procedures. This has merit in that everyone 
involved should know what is to happen and how. Third, the Inspector can determine the scope 
of the Inquiry. At Bath, even though the parties agreed there was only one outstanding issue, air 
pollution, the Inspector allowed a complete re-run of issues already decided. Fourth, the 
inspector will subsequently report his decision only to the Secretary of State and not to the 
applicant or the wider community. Lastly, the Secretary of State need not disclose the advice on 
which the final decision on an appeal is made. Reasons for the decision are always given but the 
appellant may well see the decision as based on poor or wrong advice. 
The Secretary of State, acting on advice, is essentially the final decision maker on an appeal. 
Increasingly, the Inspector takes that decision on behalf of the Secretary of State. This is clearly 
a problem from the appellant's point of view as the only appeal against the decision is then in 
the courts and only on a point of law. Permission to proceed to judicial review must be given by 
a High Court judge. The point(s) of law will normally be quite narrow and will depend of 
course on proving unlawful action or inaction by the Secretary of State, or advisors. On East 
Quayside, Counsel for P&G sought to prove proposed actions by TWDC as ultra vires e.g. 
using CPO powers for collateral purposes, which were illegal. Again, this whole process is out-
with the influence of the appellant and appears to have a significant Command element. 
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There is little more to be said about this aspect except to note the continuing influences of 
Command. In fact, Challenge might well be seen as a reciprocal and therefore democratic 
dimension of Command and so part of it. This was my initial view and as indicated earlier in 
Chapter 5, Challenge was only separated out because of its crucial importance to an aggrieved 
applicant. It could be argued that resort to Challenge indicates a breakdown in negotiations 
between the local authority and the applicant. It may well be, as in all three case studies that 
both parties are intransigent. It certainly is not normally the vehicle for resolution, which would 
ideally be chosen by either party. This is for the reasons we have seen in the empirical evidence, 
use of resources, cost, delay and the possibility of much further dispute until it results in a final 
approval or rejection. A Public Inquiry can present a daunting prospect for participants unused 
to such arenas and the language of discourse is legalistic and/or technical, certainly not tending 
to be inclusive. The process is also adversarial as it is in the Courts, although it must be said 
usually conducted with courtesy. Collaboration between the parties could well be an answer and 
this aspect of planning will now be examined. 
9.4 Collaboration 
Collaboration covers those issues to do with interfaces, relationships, informing, participating, 
negotiating, communicating, interaction, inclusion and conflict. Collaboration could be argued 
to be an element in each of the other aspects of planning. However, it can also be argued that the 
parties may think they are collaborating when they are simply negotiating. For this reason, 
various project issues have been separated out to examine what is really happening. As we have 
seen in the three case studies there was only a minor attempt at true collaboration at Bath and at 
Francis Avenue, neither of which was successful. In Habermasian terms of communicative 
ethics, the three cases showed strong instrumental reasoning, almost no moral reasoning and 
some one-sided emotive-aesthetic reasoning. 
Inspection of Exhibit 9.1 PART II shows Collaboration as second in terms of occurrences in the 
narratives. This is hardly surprising as many of the issues included here recurred throughout the 
narratives. 
The Public information process is Command in one sense because it is one of the essential 
procedures laid down in the planning process. It is included here under Collaboration because 
the reason for informing the public by newspaper, local notices, letters etc. is to allow any 
interested party i.e. stakeholder, to pmticipate in the process. This may be by objection, support 
or observation. None of the cases demonstrated a successful public information process and at 
Francis Avenue, P&G was not even aware of the publicity about the Local Plan revision. 
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Public participation is included in Collaboration because, theoretically, stakeholders can become 
involved and collaborate. None of the case studies showed any significant level of public 
participation despite the public information process. This might have been expected at Francis 
Avenue where the grounds for the Council's case proved to be so flimsy. At East Quayside and 
Bath, it might have been expected to be the other way round. After all, ifHesletine's strategy for 
the use of UDCs was soundly based on a public interest in regeneration, where and how did the 
public demonstrate that interest? The answer to both questions is that they did not. In Bath, no 
one knew what the public thought because they were just not involved. This is particularly 
surprising because additional supermarket facilities may well have been thought to excite the 
public interest. There is a Command aspect here too because the degree of public participation is 
largely determined by the efforts of the relevant authority. 
To the private organisation, influence on the non-elected agency can only be through 
Collaboration which is why the issue of non-elected agencies is included here. However, by the 
standards set on East Quayside, where P&G were completely unable to influence TWDC, 
Collaboration did not work and was therefore a negative issue in that case. The poor quality of 
the 'collaboration' can be put down to the development of a poor interface between the 
organisations and increasingly suspicious relationships on all sides. 
In the narratives, the issue of networks arose primarily in the interactions between councils or 
on East Quayside, between TWDC and the City Council. Clearly there was collaboration here 
albeit without the applicant. However, the real issue is the invisible networking which impacts 
on the case, maybe crucially so. This is the sort of networking between planners and regional 
government offices and on to Whitehall e.g. Bath, between UDCs, regional government offices 
and again on to Whitehall as at East Quayside. In none of this can the private organisation be a 
participant. This again shows a Command thread but is in effect a negative Collaboration issue. 
Strategic inconsistencies would appear to be a negative Collaboration issue. Clearly, 
organisations of all persuasions develop strategies to suit their core activities. We have seen in 
each of the case studies how public and private sector strategies came into conflict. If P&G had 
not needed New Sandgate House, there would probably have been only some haggling over the 
value of the building. As it was, the strategies were poles apart. Likewise, if P&G had 
participated in the Local Plan consultation process, alternative uses for the Francis Avenue site 
may have been agreed up front. On the other hand, in Bath, the Council had shown, through the 
shopping study, that a supermarket was needed. In this respect only, Bath City Council and 
Safeway strategies actually coincided. If these inconsistencies are to be avoided, mechanisms 
for Collaboration appear to be the only way to reach some accommodation. 
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Officer- private organisation interaction is a true Collaboration issue because it is the fulcrum 
for negotiation of the application and the officers form the conduit to the elected members who 
make the final decision. All three cases would indicate that this interaction was of poor quality 
and ineffective, leading to poor quality interfaces and relationships. After all, at Bath and 
Francis A venue, the highly focused strategies of the officers were overturned and the applicant 
won. At East Quayside, the poor quality of interaction led to long delays, uncertainty and high 
expenditure of resources on all sides. There is also a Command thread, as the officers will 
determine the degree of actual collaboration as happened in all three cases. 
Private organisation involvement is really the opposite side of the coin to the previous issue and 
is a true Collaboration point. The private organisation can hardly complain about the officers or 
the elected members if they are not themselves willing or able to collaborate effectively. I 
believe the narratives show each of the private organisations was found wanting in this respect. 
At East Quayside, P&G were nai"ve in their handling of TWDC and the developer and with 
more assertiveness the Company might well have initiated a more collaborative approach. P&G 
could also have been more assertive at Francis A venue in insisting on more involvement with 
the process. Safeway's involvement in the process at Bath was not seen as positive by any of the 
interviewees I met. This was despite Safeway's undoubted experience in the planning process. 
Sadly, even when it attempted to be helpful, the planning officers did not always feel 'helped'. 
In all three cases, contact between members and applicant was non-existent, hence no 
occurrences in the narratives. This is a built-in issue in the planning process and is again a 
negative Collaboration issue. The critical point here is the fact that the applicant cannot sit down 
with the planning committee members, setting out the need for the project, dealing with their 
concerns and providing relevant background information. At most, some councils do allow a 
short presentation by the applicant. Nevertheless this does not permit real interaction, discussion 
and argument. It must be noted the data available to members is essentially that contained in the 
recommendations of the officers together with responses to their questions in committee. 
Conflicts between Local Authority Departments and intra Local Authority disputes are 
Collaboration issues because as we have seen in the narratives, each case involved more than 
one authority and certainly more than one department. Also, in each case, the private 
organisation was caught in the middle, e.g. TWDC and City Council 'collaboration' on East 
Quayside. In Bath we had Bath and Avon CC on highway and traffic issues. In Francis A venue, 
Bournemouth BC were at loggerheads with both Dorset CC and Poole BC. Here we also had the 
Housing Director in total disagreement with planners, policy and highways over the application. 
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There is also an element of Command because the applicant is really unable to do much to 
influence the process. 
The three cases all demonstrate the absence of true collaboration, poor quality of interface and 
relationships with the consequences outlined in the narratives. What actually occurred in all the 
cases was basic negotiation and on the evidence of the narratives, mostly of a hostile nature. As 
we have also seen, the Command thread was a consistent element in most of the project issues. 
9.5 Cmntrad 
All three cases were good examples of the issues addressed here, uncertainty, resources and 
costs, agreements, job issues & performance of private organizations in the process. The 
planning process can be seen as one in which a Contract is developed between the local 
authority and the applicant. The authority delivers an approval for a specific project and the 
applicant has to deliver that project. Determination of an application is supposed to be made 
within eight weeks of submission but this side of the contract is rarely delivered particularly in 
the case of large, complex and or disputed projects. The project issues arising are of great 
importance even if Exhibit 9.1 PART 11 indicates a relatively low number of occurrences in the 
narratives. This is particularly the case with uncertainty and resource costs, as they were a 
constant source of concern throughout each of the cases. 
Uncertainty is one of the most significant issues in the whole planning process and well 
illustrated by the case studies. As an issue, it could have easily fitted into Command as part of 
the public sector procedures issue. It was included here under Contract because the important 
elements of any contract are agreements over what is to be delivered, when, how and at what 
cost. What is crucial here is the impact of such uncertainty on the applicant. All three case 
studies illustrate this. None of the private organisations expected to find themselves involved in 
such prolonged uncertainty and nor probably, did the public sector organisations. Safeway's 
grim determination to fight on through three Inquiries surprised everyone involved at Bath. 
P&G had no concept of what they were getting into, despite expert advice from those who 
might have been expected to know. Primetower had similar problems of uncertainty at Francis 
Avenue. Inability to influence this uncertainty suggests to the applicants that this may involve 
another thread of Command. 
Private organisation's performance is included to note how the private organisation contributes 
to the process and how it performs in delivering the finally agreed project. Clearly the main 
contribution of the organisation is to co-operate with the local authority to achieve an approval 
and then to deliver the agreed project. This last point is absolutely crucial. The cases show the 
194 
private organisations all left something to be desired in their performance as far as collaboration 
was concerned. TWDC might be forgiven for deeming P&G's contribution to East Quayside as 
being the main cause of years of delay. What all three cases demonstrate is that none of the 
private organisations had an effective strategy in place for the task of dealing with the problems 
they faced. Co-operation may be difficult, as it was in all three case studies but delivery is 
completely under the control of the private organisation and there should be no doubt as to the 
willingness of the organisation to do so. This really is a Contract issue because an approval must 
be met with delivery of what has been approved. In fact, both Safeway and Primetower did 
deliver the agreed project or at least Primetower did until they sold the land part way through 
development. 
Resource costs has a relatively low occurrence rate in the narratives because it was only 
discussed towards the end of the narratives. In the three case studies, we saw good examples of 
the high and unexpected ongoing demand on resources on all sides. This is a Contract issue 
because throughout the negotiations and even through appeals, either side can withdraw from its 
position i.e. the authority can grant the approval or the applicant can withdraw an appeal or 
objection. Thus demand on resources will be reduced. In our cases, all three private 
organisations fought on, committing increasing levels of resource for an indeterminate period 
and forcing the public sector authorities to do likewise. None of the parties wished to be in this 
situation. 
Employment can be looked at a number of different ways in terms of the planning process. 
a) It can be a Contract or even Collaboration issue where the local authority wants to 
bring in jobs or preserve employment land as at Francis Avenue. 
b) It can be a major cause of dispute where the local authority does not want more jobs as 
in a fast growing P&G corporate headquarters site in Surrey. This was because ofthe 
impact on existing schools, housing, roads and the general infrastructure. 
c) It can be a Command issue where the employment is 'of the wrong type' as was 
frequently the case with the UDCs. 3 
Employment is included here under Contract because it normally forms part of the negotiations 
and can be critical, particularly over the number of parking spaces to be provided in a project. 
Planning Gain is a Contract issue with a strong Command thread. As we saw in Bath, the 
highway authority, Avon CC suddenly announced they wanted Safeway to pay £120,000 
towards the costs of a new traffic control system. Although this figure was slightly reduced after 
negotiations, Safcway had no choice but to pay. No pay - no supermarket. This was clearly a 
Command situation but the payment was essentially part of the Contract for approval. This issue 
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is often contentious when the local authority makes a demand, which is seen by the applicant as 
unduly onerous and thus a basis for an appeal. 
Legal agreements are a clear Contract issue with a strong Command overtone. The legal 
agreement is almost always a requirement of the local authority as it was at Bath over the traffic 
signalling and the access to Lower East Hayes and Kensington Place. Clearly the agreement 
forms a Contract between the two parties but again, no legal agreement, no planning approval -
very much Command. Having said that, it is often the case that rather than applying a simple 
condition to the approval, the local authority must have absolute certainty that the applicant will 
deliver whatever has been agreed. 
There is no evidence in these cases that a contractual concept was present in the negotiations 
until, at Bath, the eventual Section 1 06 Agreements were signed for Lower East Ha yes and the 
traffic signalling system. All the applicants have said that it would have been difficult to pursue 
the course of action they actually took if the uncertainties, time and resource costs of the project 
had been clearly understood at the outset. Both sides in all these cases would surely have 
benefited from the establishment of a relationship involving Collaboration and Contract at the 
outset. However, even here in Contract, we can see a strong Command contractual relationship 
running through this dimension of planning. In all three cases, even at East Quayside, the parties 
were, in a sense, forced into a contract. Bath and Bournemouth were effectively forced into 
approval by the decision of the Secretary of State. Even then Bath procrastinated over the final 
approval when they tried to reopen issues already agreed by the Secretary of State. 
9.6 Culture 
This dimension of planning covers the potential conflict of cultures between public & private 
sectors and ethical issues that may arise. Cultural issues may have a relatively low rate of 
occurrence in the narratives as indicated in Exhibit 9.1 PART II but the importance ofthe two 
issues raised here cannot be overestimated. Culture is a critical part of the fabric of any 
organisation and has a crucial impact on the attitudes and behaviour of those working in the 
organisation. It clearly informs an organisation's participation in discussions and negotiations 
because it prescribes 'where the organisation and its people are coming from'. 
All three cases demonstrate, to different extents, various differences in culture. There are clearly 
differences between the public and private sector cultures. At East Quayside, TWDC admitted 
their difficulty in understanding P&G and this sentiment was reciprocated. Both sides were 
always at a loss to understand another culture that seemed to permit conduct that was at least 
questionable if not dishonest. At Bath, the Avon councillor's statement that the planners ought 
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to be instructed to find a means of obstructing the project if there were really no grounds for 
rejection left Safeway wondering just what they were dealing with. At the same time, Safeway 
themselves were being cast as untrustworthy, 'typical supermarket operators' by councillors and 
objectors. Bath and Franc is A venue had similar issues in common in one particular respect 
namely the question of commercial enterprise. Neither Safeway nor Primetower ever came to 
terms with what they both perceived as a total lack of understanding of commerce by the 
planners and the councillors. Another aspect of this issue common to East Quayside and Bath 
was that P&G and Safeway were only involved in the process at all in order to protect their core 
business. 
Cultural differences also occur between different organisations m the private sector as 
exemplified at Francis A venue where there were clear differences between the cultures of P&G 
and Primetower causing many problems inside P&G. 
Ethical issues are a difficult area but there are certainly times when the honesty and integrity of 
the other side is questioned, at least in private. This is particularly true when there is already a 
substantial degree of prejudice on one or both sides. This was clearly seen at East Quayside 
where both sides implied unethical behaviour by the other. TWDC and the Inspector in the 
Inquiry saw P&G's sale of the factory to Landau as having an unethical dimension. Equally, 
TWDC's undisclosed approach to Cincinnati and the leaked Balls' memo to Beecham were seen 
by P&G as virtually immoral behaviour. P&G also saw TWDC as a public sector agency, which 
might have a public service ethic but was actually in the hands of hard-nosed developers, with 
all that implied. P&G and TWDC's developer might both be private organisations but as far as 
P&G was concerned, there the comparison stopped. 
Culture is a vital element in the fabric of any organisation. If, as I believe, it is true that culture 
informs the behaviour and attitudes of the people in the organisation, then it is also true that 
interaction between organisations must take culture into account. As we see in the case studies, 
the topic was never on the agenda. Nor indeed is it a topic given prominence in planning 
guidance from government. 
9.7 Discussion 
Chapter 2 provided an outline of a planning process that appears to be linear, the different steps 
occurring in a logical sequence (see Chapter 2 Figure 2.2). This can be seen as a vertical set of 
interactions where the application, consideration, approval or rejection follow a Command 
process as laid down by law, rejection leads to appeal and if successful an approval which leads 
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in turn to a form of Contract. However, as shown in the Bath case study, this can be a dynamic, 
iterative process, with repeated Command interventions by the Secretary of State, repeated 
Challenges and an iterative process of negotiation over the final approval i.e. Contract. 
Collaboration can be regarded as a horizontal interaction because this can apply at different 
parts of the process and in each of the different aspects of the process. On the other hand, 
Culture is an overall influence, all pervading even if it goes unrecognised. This is too simple a 
reading of the actual process as we can now see. 
The perceived problems in the planning system were defined initially in Chapter 5 in the form 
of project issues giving rise in turn to the development of the 5 Cs. Examination of the empirical 
evidence in this chapter has demonstrated the various levels of impact of each of the 5 Cs on the 
three case studies. The evidence suggests that in all three cases, Command was the major 
governance influence running through almost all the project issues. At the same time, 
Collaboration was minimal and the impact of Culture unrecognised. Challenge was shown as a 
failure of Command, when governance decisions were unacceptable to the aggrieved private 
organisation and appealed. The right to Challenge was a positive benefit for Safeway and 
Primetower, although the costs and uncertainty highlighted under Contract were a real problem 
for all the parties involved. Contract issues were implicit throughout the process although again 
this was largely unrecognised. What has emerged from the empirical evidence is that the 5 Cs 
can be seen as representing different aspects of governance with different dynamics. 
Furthermore, they can be internally differentiated, which can mean variations in impact under 
different circumstances and this we will now examine. 
The empirical evidence in the case studies confirmed a number of strands of Command already 
discussed in Chapter 2 that can be differentiated into policy, law, interpretation and 
implementation. Even so, these strands need to be differentiated further, policy for example at 
government and at local governance levels. Figure 9.1 (below) shows in simple diagrammatic 
form this process from policy to implementation. 
We have already seen how government policy is fundamental to the state of the law and the role 
the Secretary of State can play in initiating that policy. East Quayside illustrated this process 
where the Secretary of State decided to initiate a new regeneration policy that was given effect 
by legislation (the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980), the UDCs e.g. TWDC 
were formed, their mission was interpreted by the UDCs into specific local policies for 
regeneration of their Designated Areas and eventually implemented into concrete plans. Bath 
suffered from repeated intervention by the Secretary of State, albeit acting on advice, over retail, 
environmental and highway policy issues. 
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The law is the tool that gives effect to government policy so it is a critical element of Command. 
However, it can also be differentiated into the fundamental Act i.e. the Town & Country 
Planning Act 1990 and subsequent Orders, Regulations and Guidance which are interpreted, 
correctly or not by local governance into local policy and eventually implemented. This 
differentiation was also evident at Bath and Franc is A venue. In all three cases, it was these 
three, interpretation, local policy and implementation that were at the forefront of the various 
conflicts. 
GOVERNMENT POLICY 
LAW 
ORDERS ~ULl TI~GUIDELINES 
GOVERNMENT 
LOCAL 
GOVERNANCE 
INTERPRETATION 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Figure 9.1 -Differentiation of Elements of Governance 
Local Plans, environmental and highway issues are all subject to policy initiatives emanating 
from government but they are also subject to interpretation, local policy and implementation at 
the local level as demonstrated by the empirical evidence. In all three cases too, the roles, 
attitudes, influence and processes of local governance were problem areas where interpretation, 
local policy and implementation were important concerns. 
All three cases showed Challenge as an essentially adversarial legal procedural mechanism that 
nevertheless must be triggered by a bona fide objector. Even here however, the model of Figure 
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9.1 is at least partially applicable. At East Quayside, the public inquiry was about TWDC's 
interpretation into local policy of the legal powers for Compulsory Purchase and its subsequent 
implementation of this policy. Both Bath and Francis Avenue described public inquiries about 
local policy and implementation that involved, to some degree, the local governance 
interpretation of government policy. This was mainly in the form of Planning Policy Guidance 
Notes where the Inspector considered some of these PPGs to be material considerations. 
It has already been said that in the context of an individual project, it is difficult to see how the 
promoting private organisation would be able to change government policy or the law. Most 
organisations, even large ones, would not have the will, knowledge or resources to consider 
such an attempt. P&G's problems on East Quayside were caused by government policy and the 
legal powers given to TWDC but with all the potential resources it could muster, the company 
was absolutely unable to influence the fate of New Sandgate House. Note that P&G was not 
then a member of the CBI, Chamber of Commerce or like organisations and thus could not 
muster commercial or industrial support. In Bath, protestations were fruitless when the 
Secretary of State called in the retail planning applications for his own policy based decision. 
Industry support was not available to Safeway, indeed the first Inquiry considered competing 
proposals from Tesco as well as Safeway. It would seem therefore that in terms of Figure 9.1, 
while government policy and law might well be the fundamental problem, it is unrealistic to 
assume that these elements can be influenced in a single project by the private organisation. We 
might more profitably then turn our attention to the remaining three elements where there may 
be room for influence. 
The empirical evidence does not provide evidence of government policy or legal influences on 
Collaboration but this leads to another question of differentiation, namely where it may be 
possible to Collaborate. In the context of the planning interface being discussed in this thesis, it 
is not possible to see Collaboration being achieved over government policy or law within a 
single project by the promoting private organisation. It is conceivable that Collaboration may be 
possible at local governance level as all the project issues here are concerned with 
interpretation, local policy and its implementation. Contract presents a similar type of 
differentiation in the sense of where a contractual relationship can exist. The empirical evidence 
in the three cases indicates that the project issues were mainly matters of interpretation, local 
policy and implementation by local governance. All were inflicted with uncertainty, resources 
issues and costs, suspicion and lack of trust. 
With all this in mind, if we turn to the dimensions and dynamics of the 5 Cs, Figure 9.2 (below) 
is an attempt to demonstrate graphically what has just been described. Here we have 
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Government with Command controlling policy and the law. Local Governance is separated 
from government at the planning interface over interpretation, local policy and implementation. 
The private organisation stands outside this envelope of governance. The two dimensions of 
Collaboration and Contract connect local governance and the private organisation over 
interpretation, local policy and implementation with Challenge, if it happens, taking place at the 
same levels of local governance. However, there is also a Command dimension because the 
final approval of an application demands compliance by the applicant. This is clearly a one-way 
connection. 
CULTURE 
GOVERNMENT 
COMMAND 
Government Policy 
Law 
Interpretation CULTURE 
COl\ MAND 
Local policy "' 
Implementation 
.... COLL.A BORATION .... PRIVATE 
..... ... 
ORGANISATION COMMAND CON fRACT .... .... 
..... ... 
-~ ~ LOCAL GOVERNANCE CHALLENGE 
CULTURE 
Figure 9.2 Dynamics of the 5 Cs in the Practice of Planning 
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Challenge is shown as a separate element of the private organisation because once the decision 
is made to challenge, that process is hostile, procedural, legalistic and virtually independent of 
the normal modes of operation of the opposing parties. 
Culture as argued in this thesis may be all pervading but as the present government is finding 
out, it is not easily amenable to influence by government policy, much less the law. Even here, 
however, we have differentiation hence the separation of cultures in Figure 9.2. The East 
Quayside case showed how government policy is influenced by the culture of the governing 
political party i.e. Hesletine's approach to achieving his strategy for regeneration. 
Civil service culture is constantly reported as an ongoing problem for government. Local 
governance culture has a long pedigree of public service ethos, as distinct from the market-
based culture of a private organisation. There is even the local public culture to be considered 
where the Bath case showed the public participation of a highly organised group of local, 
professional people with a culture of involvement, although nothing was seen or heard of the 
public at large. In addition, there is the conservation culture of the City as a World Heritage 
City. Despite all these differences, it would seem possible, at least, to consider Culture in terms 
of interpretation, local policy ands implementation because it is at local level where the different 
cultures are likely to collide. 
Figure 9.3 (below) shows a variation of Figure 9.2, illustrating the arrangements involving a 
UDC i.e. TWDC on East Quayside. Here Government collaborated with the private sector e.g. a 
private developer, through the agency of the UDC, specifically created for the purpose. Local 
government was in effect replaced by this mechanism. This of course resulted in a contract for 
comprehensive regeneration using the government provided Command powers to achieve the 
desired ends. From the standpoint of the outside world, TWDC and developer became as one. 
P&G always negotiated with TWDC, not the developer. Figure 9.3 therefore shows the 
developer inside the same envelope as TWDC and on this project at least, sharing the same 
Culture. Here, Collaboration and Contract come into play albeit within the local governance, or 
TWDC orbit at the level of interpretation, local policy and implementation. Command also has 
a role, as before in relation to the private organisation, P&G, because of the impact of the 
implementation of compulsory purchase powers. 
What Figures 9.2 & 9.3 both demonstrate is the strong Command linkage between government 
and local governance while the private organisation only has effective access at local 
governance level. The dimensions of Collaboration and Contract at this level have been shown 
by the empirical evidence to be very variable from weak to almost non-existent. Culture has its 
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unseen impacts but in reality has resembled the model in its separateness. What all this suggests 
is that in terms of the dimensions of the planning process so far described as the 5 Cs, the 
planning process is far from a vertical or linear process and is in reality a complex system. 
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Figure 9.3 Dynamics of the 5 Cs on East Quayside 
9.8 Conclusions 
In the Introduction to this Chapter the question was posed - what have we learnt empirically 
about the planning system as an interface between government, local government, non-elected 
agencies and private organisations? 
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The first point to make is that the three very different types of case have provided ample 
evidence of a process that at times appears, at least to the private organisations involved, to be 
in disarray. It is difficult to believe that the process as described in Chapter 2 was designed in 
such a way that it would be operated in ways we have seen in the case studies. Nevertheless, the 
evidence has enabled some conclusions to be reached about the interface in this process. 
The first conclusion we can draw is that planning is a complex Command based system and the 
impact of Command is felt throughout the system .. What needs to be emphasised here is that 
most private organisations are totally unaware of this impact of Command when they get 
involved in the process e.g. P&G at East Quayside. Even when the organisation might or 
perhaps should be aware because of previous experience, e.g. Safeway, it may completely 
underestimate the total impact of Command on the project as at Bath. 
What we have also learnt however, is that Command can be differentiated into a number of 
elements i.e. government policy, law, interpretation, local policy and implementation as shown 
in Figure 9.2. The three cases have demonstrated that while government policy and law are 
fundamental to the system and may at times be the fundamental problem, e.g. at East Quayside, 
it is impossible in a single project for a private organisation to influence government policy or 
the law. We have seen that it is interpretation, local policy and implementation that have been 
the crux of the disputes because these three constitute the real interface areas between the 
conflicting parties. It may be possible to influence these three areas of Command, even in a 
single project if a more collaborative approach could be developed. This will be investigated in 
the next two chapters of the thesis. 
The second conclusion is that the three cases also clearly demonstrate the crucial importance to 
the applicant of the right of Challenge even if, in the end, the Secretary of State, acting within 
his or her powers, may still be the final decision maker. The Bath and Francis Avenue cases are 
very good examples of this where exercise of this right bore fruit for Safeway and Primetower. 
There is still a Command influence here because the whole Challenge process is defined within 
a structure laid down by law. This structure does have benefits as the actual process can be 
clearly understood by all the participants even if the outcome is unpredictable. Also as we saw 
at Bath, when the Secretary of State calls in an application, the applicant is actually drawn into 
Challenge by this action. 
The third conclusion is that the case studies did not provide evidence of even adequate levels of 
Collaboration across the project issues covered by that dimension of planning. Indeed, much of 
the conflict that arose was because of the poor quality of the relationships that developed, as the 
204 
various project issues became an increasing problem. Sadly, the studies demonstrate only the 
willingness of the opposing parties to fight on and that at length. Ideally, the level of 
Collaboration in the planning process would be such that each party trusted the other with the 
development of harmonious relationships throughout. As we have seen in our narratives, this is 
often far from the case. This can be because of prejudice such as hostile attitudes to multi 
national corporations as P&G found on East Quayside. There is prejudice against supermarket 
chains as demonstrated by councillors and local opposition in Bath. There are also personal 
suspicions that have a similar negative effect on the process as in all three cases. On the other 
side, there is frequently deep suspicion of the public sector by private sector people as was true 
in all the case studies. This is clearly a very important issue that rarely, if ever, receives the 
focus and attention it deserves. 
Even in Collaboration we can still see the influence of Command. The public information 
process is a statutory requirement. Non-elected agencies are direct agencies of government and 
the key networks between civil service and sub central government are not accessible to the 
private organisation. All three cases demonstrated strategic inconsistencies, arising on the public 
sector side from government and/or local policies. As we have also seen, there is even an 
element of Command in the conflicts between Local Authorities and between departments. At 
the same time, Collaboration actually does have some influence on Command, at least the Local 
Policy element, in the preparation of Local Plans involving the public, site owners and 
developers (See Chapter 2, Figure 2.1 ). All three cases and indeed Alnwick displayed the need 
for significant improvement in this dimension of planning and this will be addressed in the next 
two chapters. 
The fourth conclusion is that when there is major conflict, as in the case studies, the severity of 
the impact of the Contract issues on all the parties is clear, particularly the uncertainty, the 
commitment of resources and the costs. Whether Challenge has taken place or not and whether 
the parties recognise it or not, they enter into a form of contractual status by the granting of a 
planning approval and the acceptance of it. Oddly, this is never formally discussed as 
contractual issue. Even in this aspect of planning however, there is a Command influence in 
some of the issues. Planning gain and legal agreements are usually impositions as we saw at 
Bath with the traffic signalling costs and the Section I 06 Agreement on highway access to 
Lower East Hayes and Kensington Place. If the applicant declines to agree to these impositions, 
there is no planning approval. 
The uncertainty of the process and even some employment issues are all areas outside the 
control ofthe private organisation and yet the outcomes of these issues are essential components 
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of the finally agreed 'Contract.' Other influences can come to bear on this category however. 
Employment can involve Challenge as it did at Francis Avenue and indeed Collaboration or 
lack of it, again as at Francis Avenue. There may be room for more formal contractual 
arrangements throughout the planning process to minimise delays, uncertainty and costs. This 
subject will be developed further in the final chapters of this thesis. 
Fifthly, we have seen that Culture is an aspect of practice that is never formally discussed and 
yet it informs the ethics, behaviour and attitudes of all organisations and the people in them. 
This as we have seen is an all-pervading influence and is truly an overall interaction. None of 
the other Cs or the project issues is immune from the impact of Culture. It affects the ideas, 
methodology and decision making process of Command, similarly Challenge, the potential for 
Collaboration and even the issues in Contract. As an influence in the process, the importance of 
Culture cannot be overestimated yet it is never discussed. 
Finally, we have also seen the complexity of the interactions of the 5 Cs as dimensions of 
planning practice as shown in Figures 9.2 & 9.3. Command has been shown to have a major 
influence in the system and Culture is all pervading. However, the empirical evidence has 
demonstrated only too well, the fact that all these aspects may be at work in the system without 
being formally recognised as such. 
Having considered the empirical findings from the evidence of the case studies in this chapter, 
the next chapter will investigate the theoretical implications from that evidence. 
CHAPTER 9 - NOTES 
1 In his autobiography (Hesletine 2000, pp. 211 -214 ), he describes how this original idea was 
resurrected by seeing the plight of thousands of acres of derelict land formerly the dockland areas east of 
London as well as those of Liverpool. He describes how the plan ran into the opposition of the civil 
servants but eventually was agreed when UDCs for London Docklands and Merseyside were to be 
proposed. He goes on to describe the opposition of Howe (Chancellor) and Keith Joseph and how this 
was overcome when he gained Mrs. Thatcher's support by telling her-
If we don 't act as I propose, nothing will happen. The land is in public ownership, much of it is 
polluted and the whole place is in thrall to extreme /eft-wing councils that Reg Prentice tells me 
are almost certainly controlled by communists. 
He goes on-
/ had lit the blue touch paper. The rocket went up. I had won. " 
In discussing the Merseyside UDC, he remarks on the vociferous local opposition. Plans had been 
developed locally for regeneration and Hesletine remarks -
Who could fail to understand their frustration when the focus of their plans was whisked away, so 
to speak, from under their very noses. My decision was right in that it brought both money and 
executive coherence to the project, but that was not the way it seemed to the Council. 
2 Likewise for P&G on a site at Brooklands in Surrey, purchased for long-term office and R&D 
development. The original owners, Vickers had built aircraft on the site in the War and had severely 
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polluted the site. P&G insisted on a clause in the purchase contract forcing the vendors to continue with 
remedial measures after the sale. This was because pollution of a very good nearby river, the River Wey, 
could have become a major liability for P&G with no possibility of recovering costs from the original 
polluter who had long gone. This is clearly a crucial issue with the development of 'brownfield' sites. 
3 A CPO was frequently used to get rid of the offending business e.g. at East Quayside, Cardiff Bay, 
Sheffield. An offending business was deemed to be one that did not 'fit' the comprehensive regeneration 
concept because perhaps it was dirty, involving engineering or small manufacturing. 
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ANALYSIS SUMMARY EXHIBIT 9.1 
This Exhibit summarises the data contained in the Analytical Logs (Exhibits 6.1, 7.1 & 8.1 ). 
PART I PROJECT ISSUES East Bath Francis 
Quayside Avenue 
No. No. No. 
COMMAND Planning Law 3 9 7 
Compulsory purchase IS 
Compensation I 
Government policies 9 s 4 
Local Plans 4 21 
Public Interest I 2 
Regional Government Offices s 
Secretary of State role s 14 I 
Environmental issues I 2S 4 
Aesthetic issues 7 4 I 
Highway & Traffic issues 20 35 4 
Local politicians - role, attitudes, 8 22 8 
influence 
Officers - roles, attitudes, influence 13 24 16 
Public sector procedures & processes 22 34 17 
TOTALS 105 183 83 
CHALLENGE Appeals, rights, process 3 4 s 
Objections & objectors I 9 
Public Inquiries 9 IS 7 
Judicial review & Courts 2 
TOTALS 15 28 12 
COLLABORATION Public information process 3 I 
Public participation - stakeholders 4 3 3 
Non elected agencies 14 
Networks s 3 
Strategic inconsistencies 16 I 9 
Officer I private organisation interaction 16 11 8 
Private organization involvement IS 3 s 
Members/Applicant- Lack of contact 
Conflicts between LA Depts & Intra LA 11 
TOTALS 73 22 36 
CONTRACT Uncertainty of process 10 13 s 
Private organisation performance 13 6 13 
Resource costs on all sides 4 2 3 
Employment issues 13 
Planning Gain 2 
Legal agreements - Section I 06 I 10 
agreements 
TOTALS 28 33 34 
CULTURE Differences in culture 9 5 3 
Ethical issues 10 3 2 
TOTALS 19 9 5 
PART 11 
COMMAND lOS 183 83 
CHALLENGE IS 28 12 
COLLABORATION 73 22 36 
CONTRACT 28 33 34 
CULTURE 19 9 s 
TOTALS 240 275 170 
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CHAPTER 10- ][MPJLICAT][ON§ FOR PJLANNlNG THEORY 
10.1 Introduction 
As we saw in Chapters 3 and 4, there appears to be a wide range of planning theories available 
almost as if from a shop. The instrumental rationality or procedural approach was for long in the 
post war period acknowledged as the dominant paradigm but has more recently been subject to 
much criticism as we saw in Chapter 4. More recently, in the context of the Institutional 
Approach, claims have been made for a new dominant paradigm, the 'communicative turn' or in 
Healey's terminology, Collaborative planning. As we have also seen, this approach is itself 
suffering criticism, not least the claims that it actually is a paradigm. In the 1980's, New Right, 
market based approaches were introduced by the Conservative government, constituting a break 
with the post war thinking. 
The key question and our starting point is just which theories can the empirical evidence 
support? Do any of them describe what happened? Are they normative or prescriptive theories? 
Do they have explanatory power and/ or do they have predictive power? It is in this context that 
the claims of the Institutional approach will be explored, at least in its modified form as 
explained in Chapters 4 & 5. Here as we saw, a number of elements ofHealey's approach were 
summarised into a Modified Institutional-Collaborative Framework (See Exhibit 4.1 ). However, 
following on from the empirical evidence and its analysis in Chapter 9, this Exhibit has been 
slightly amended to reflect the 5 Cs. Governance has been changed to Command and Resource 
costs and Uncertainty are changed to Contract. This revised Framework (Exhibit 10.1) will be 
the template for our exploration. We saw in Chapter 4 that a problem with Healey's approach is 
the lack of focus on outcomes and this thesis is of course very concerned with project outcomes 
and how they are achieved. Finally, the 5Cs will be examined to see whether the empirical 
evidence offers any support for theoretical powers beyond their usefulness as analytical tools. 
10.2 The evidence and the theoretical approach 
It must be noted that much of the work in planning theory is focused on policy analysis and 
critique of the existing system. Whether the planners and elected members actually do what is 
suggested by theory in the ordinary day-to-day activities of planning is at least debatable. 
Typologies of Theory 
It is useful to define here some of the typologies of theory e.g. what is meant by a normative 
theory, by a prescriptive theory, by explanatory powers and by predictive powers? Normative 
theory focuses on how things ought to be, a set of conditions or a state that is desirable and then 
argues why this should be the case. This type of theory deals with the question - 'what ought to 
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be'. However, Taylor addresses another aspect of this type of theory where he argues that a 
normative set of values underpinned the British planning system in the post war period (Taylor 
1998 p. 20). This must be the case because the politicians at all levels as well as the planners 
were concerned to create an ideal physical environment. Prescriptive theory is concerned with 
the best way of achieving a desired state or set of conditions. It deals with the question of how? 
In discussing explanatory power, it is important here to be clear about what is meant by 
explanation and to avoid confusion between explanation and understanding. Webb argues that 
the function of explanation is to reduce the unfamiliar to the familiar and that explanations are 
always from a point of view (Webb 1995 pp.128 -13 7). He quotes Ester ( 1982) saying that: -
The proper paradigm for the social sciences is a mixed causal-intentional explanation -
intentional understanding of individual actions and causal explanation of their 
interaction. 
Webb goes on to argue that people act for reasons not from causes. Cause and effect implies 
determination and lack of choice while reason and action implies autonomy and choice. Stake 
(1995 pp. 37-39) focuses on the difference between explanation and understanding when he 
quotes V on Wright (1971) saying that: -
Understanding is also connected with intentionality in a way that explanation is not. 
Stake goes on to note the difference between cases focusing on cause and effect relationships 
and those seeking understanding of human relationships. In fact he points out the great 
difficulties in determining causes for many of the happenings shown up in case studies 
generally. Webb makes the point that the same antecedent conditions may give rise to different 
effects and different antecedent conditions may give rise to the same effects (Webb 1995 p. 
133). 
In discussing predictive power in the Social Sciences, Webb makes the point that whether 
prediction is possible depends upon the scale on which the prediction is made (Webb 1995 
p.14 7). He uses the analogy of the path of a river to the sea, its direction is predictable but the 
exact path is not. 
Typologies of planning theories 
Before going on to examine what claims can be made for the theoretical approach adopted in 
this thesis, we need to look at what typologies of planning systems were actually encountered 
by the private organisations in the three cases. 
In Chapters 3 and 4, planning theory was discussed from point of questioning whether there is 
such a thing through to the arguments for an emerging paradigm of communicative theory 
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replacing instrumental rationalism. In Chapter 3, Rydin's discussion of an evolutionary 
approach to theories of planning was summarised (see Exhibit 3.1 ). In that chapter, we also saw 
that many writers had argued that instrumental rationalism was the fundamental post-war 
approach that had been the dominant theoretical paradigm. Taylor (1998 pp. 152-153) quotes 
Faludi (1973 Chapter 1) as distinguishing between two types of planning theory: -
1) Substantive theory - about objects e.g. towns, and this includes theory which aims to 
improve our understanding of the problems planning faces. 
2) Procedural planning theory- about the process of planning itself. 
In the cases investigated here, there would appear to be two main theoretical approaches at 
work, namely procedural and the New Right, although there are normative elements too. Bath 
and Francis Avenue cases can both be seen as following the planning process and the challenge 
process outlined in Chapter 2. This is primarily a 'procedural approach' (Faludi 1973), (Rydin 
1993) or 'regulative' planning (Brindley, Rydin & Stoker 1989). Faludi sees this process as 
procedural planning. Rydin sees this process as rational decision making by professional 
planners with no concern for the market. The regulative approach acknowledges the institutional 
arrangements as the local authorities, the decision making as technical/political and the principal 
beneficiaries as the property owners. Both cases can be seen to fit this process description. 
In both cases, the approach by both the local authorities and the applicants was the rational, 
iterative decision-making process familiar to all the participants. If we refer to my summary of 
Rydin's summaries of theoretical planning approaches (Exhibit 3.1), we see that in the terms of 
procedural planning theory, there is a fit with both Bath and Francis Avenue cases. The planners 
were behaving as rational decision makers and the process was about decision-making on issues 
that are common features of applications. Changes of use of the site, highway and traffic 
matters, environmental concerns were all common features of applications dealt with by local 
authorities. Neither Safeway, nor Primetower were attempting to undermine policy initiatives at 
either central or local government levels. 
The political process set the goals with no focus on outcomes. At Bath, the issues of the need 
for a supermarket and the suitability of the Kensington site to house it were established early in 
the process. The eventual focus on the air pollution issue by Bath City councillors was not even 
based on any existing policy, but on part of a speech by the then Secretary of State, John 
Gummer. At Francis Avenue, Bournemouth Council's policy on employment land was led by 
the councillors and was proved eventually to fly in the face of their own officers' views and 
Dorset County Council's overall regional employment strategy. What we had in both cases was 
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a normal type of application that fell foul of each Council's interpretation of its own and 
government policy. 
There was no relationship to economics in either case. Bournemouth councillors did not 
understand, or did not want to understand, the economics of choosing a manufacturing site. 
They never came to terms with the fact that Francis Avenue site was hopeless from any modern 
manufacturing perspective. 
In the end, the implementation of their policies by each of the Councils led, by the normal 
procedural processes, to a challenge by the applicant, in each case successful, though at a 
significant cost. 
There are two more theoretical points to make. One is that we can also see at least an element 
of a normative approach at Francis Avenue where the Council had a clear idea of 'what ought to 
be'. This is in line with Faludi' s substantive planning theory where the focus is on outcomes. 
Bournemouth Council was focussing on continued manufacturing on the Francis A venue site 
and was determined to go to considerable lengths to get it. The fact that their strategy was 
wrong does not detract from this normative element in their approach. There was a similar 
situation at East Quayside where TWDC was focussed on comprehensive regeneration and had 
a very clear idea just what that meant. In both cases we have a clear understanding of the 
planning problem. 
Secondly, there is a contrast between Bath and Francis Avenue cases in terms of Rhodes' Sub-
central government theories. At Bath the evidence shows there was clearly an established active 
networking process between the two councils at member and officer levels. Mrs. Maxwell 
intimated at interview that both councils, at least at officer level were also networked with the 
Government Office for the South West. This latter was an important element in the case given 
the interventions by the Secretary of State that were based on advice tendered, at least initially 
by the Government Office for the South West. At Francis Avenue, there was no such 
networking; in fact the evidence shows Bournemouth Council completely at odds with its 
neighbours, Dorset and Poole. 
There was a much different theoretical situation at East Quayside where there was initially a 
New Right, market orientated government policy approach resulting in the formation of the 
UDCs and collaboration with the private sector in the form of property developers. This resulted 
in a shift in the normal planning process from the local authority, no local accountability, a 
property based regeneration and the use of widely drawn powers including compulsory 
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purchase. Here, of course, P&G cut right across the TWDC interpretation and implementation 
of government policy. Here we had a prescriptive theoretical approach where government had a 
clear idea about how things must be done differently and implemented that approach through 
UDCs. Even here however, the process moved on to a procedural basis in the sense that P&G 
and others were able to challenge policy implementation of compulsory purchase, albeit 
unsuccessfully. There was also an aspect of Sub-central government here because it was 
obvious from the evidence of the networking between TWDC and the City Council and at the 
same time there was evidence of close interaction between TWDC and the Government Office 
of the North East. Incidentally, despite a number of attempts, P&G were never able to have any 
dialogue with the latter body. 
The foregoing comments argue that what we have actually seen in operation in the empirical 
evidence is a process based overall on a procedural theoretical approach with some overtones of 
normative theory at Bath and Francis A venue. There are also elements of Sub Central 
government approaches in all the cases. The procedural approach is certainly prescriptive as it is 
clearly about how things are actually done. There is also explanatory power in enabling us to 
see at least some cause and effect in the cases. If as noted above, we take Ester's point about 
understanding having to do with intentionality, we have some problems. The clarity ofTWDC's 
intention to achieve the overall regeneration of East Quayside was never in doubt. However, 
their intentions regarding the acquisition of P&G's disused factory and later New Sandgate 
House were in considerable doubt. The predictive power of the procedural approach also seems 
to have shortcomings. No one could have predicted the path eventually taken at Bath, i.e. 
Webb's analogy ofthe river's path to the sea. 
10.3 A Modified Institutional-Collaborative approach and the Empirical Evidence. 
A brief summary of the Institutional Approach may be useful here. Rydin ( 1993 pp. 276 - 281) 
argues that Institutionalists have a normative analysis of the state, which promotes a role for 
public policy in redressing economic and social inequalities, in contrast with the market based 
New Right approach of the Thatcher government. Public policy analysis is a prime focus ofthe 
approach (Healey 1997, Vigar et a! 2000). 
Healey views Institutionalism as a normative approach, particularly as an approach to a 
collaborative model (Healey 1997 p. 204 ), (Healey 1999 p. 1131 ). The approach emphasises the 
complex interactions between the activities of formal government bodies, economic activity and 
social life, inter-linked through social networks and cultural assumptions and practices that cut 
across formal organizations. It has a thrust of policy development and strategy making which is 
inclusive, collaborative and communicative as compared with pluralist, corporatist and New 
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Right approaches. Strategies must be seen to be effective and legitimate in terms of being 
clearly understood. It seeks to involve and hear all stakeholders. It questions governance duties, 
competences and the division of tasks. Subsidiarity is a key question as opposed to the 
increasing centralising tendencies of the governments of recent times. The role of the planner is 
questioned and changes to the power base by the notion of making a difference by moving from 
'power over' to the 'power to'. Cultural issues are also a significant feature of this approach. 
Finally, it stresses that those in governance must be able to justifY their actions and be subject to 
challenge. Critically, resources to effect challenges must be made available. 
As we have seen in Chapters 4 & 5, Habermasian communicative ethics are an important feature 
of this approach and indeed this has led to the development of the communicative turn and 
Healey's collaborative approach. It is this area of the approach that is of concern in the 
narrower focus of this 
What does the evidence tell us about the Institutional-Collaborative approach? 
This section will refer to Exhibit I 0.1 as the framework for discussion. 
There is no evidence in any of the case studies showing any attempt by planners or politicians to 
adopt policies leading to implementation of an Institutional, collaborative or communicative 
approach. We saw in Chapter 9 that the private organisations had no realistic hopes of 
influencing government policy or the law, within a single project. This was also true in the 
critical areas of interpretation by local governance of government policy into local policy and 
then implementation. This would suggest that the Command dimension of the Framework is 
normative because it is about what ought to be and the issues addressed in this dimension of 
planning will be considered and changes made only if governance institutions are willing to 
recognise them as problems to be resolved. Having said this, it is possible to believe that 
confronted with these issues, those in government would argue that these are not problems. For 
example, in all three cases, they would have argued the effectiveness and legitimacy of their 
strategies but this positive view was not shared by the private organisations involved. We have 
seen in Chapter 2 for instance, how there was much criticism of the strategies adopted by the 
UDCs where their effectiveness and legitimacy were called into question. It is also probable that 
they would be likely to have a similarly optimistic view of their performance of their duties and 
competences. However, the three cases all demonstrate aspects of these issues where there were 
shortcomings. In none of the cases could participative governance be seen as an obvious 
priority, nor could the performance of those in governance be said to lead to an economic, 
efficient and effective process. Likewise, competences were an issue. Subsidiarity was an issue 
in all three cases. The regeneration of East Quayside was not seen to be a locally driven process. 
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At Bath, the interventions of the Secretary of State disrupted the process at the local level on a 
number of occasions. Even at Francis Avenue a Bournemouth councillor asked the question 
'who is running the town'. Interaction between government and the wider community was an 
issue in all three cases. The use of expertise was also an important issue in all three cases. 
Highways on East Quayside became a highly controversial technical issue between TWDC, the 
City Engineer and P&G's experts. At Bath, the highways and traffic issues can only be 
described as a shambles with the Bath Council even dismissing its consultants because they 
were not agreeing with the Council's desired outcome. At Francis Avenue, the Housing Director 
alone among the members and officers understood there to be a social housing need. All this 
would suggest that, whilst there is clearly room for considerable improvement in performance 
and execution around these issues, this is a normative dimension of the theory we are 
considering. 
If we move to Challenge, clearly the rights to challenge and dispute resolution are legally 
embedded in the planning process and were well demonstrated in the cases. If, as we have seen 
in Chapter 4, Healey argues for Institutionalism enabling a change from 'power over' to 'power 
to', then what we can say from the empirical evidence is that the only evidence here of the 
'power to' was the power to Challenge. Thus, while Institutionalism may emphasise the 
importance of the right to challenge, this is not specific to Institutionalism. The issue of the 
availability of information is crucially important and this is born out by the evidence. High 
quality information was not available to all parties not least to the Inspectors at the Inquiries. 
TWDC's first Statement of Reasons did not even mention P&G or New Sandgate House 
although this was corrected later. P&G certainly did not share all the information in the 
company's possession. Had we chosen to share all the information about the transaction with 
Landau over the sale of the factory, it would have been difficult for the Inspector to imply a 
P&G-Landau conspiracy to obstruct TWDC's land assembly strategy and the subsequent 
development. At Bath, Mrs. Maxwell's attempt to establish the common ground of 'facts' was 
rejected by the Inspector who allowed the whole case to be re-opened. At Francis Avenue, 
much of the evidence on which the Inspector made his decision was only available to him 
because Primetower funded crucial studies on social housing and employment land. The 
Council had no such data available. Those in governance could well see the criteria for 
challenges as being unexceptionable. However, to take one example, the language and formality 
of an Inquiry are hardly conducive to general understanding. Furthermore, at East Quayside, 
P&G did not believe that the Inspector's decisions were made from sound premises. For 
example, his statements about P&G's accommodation strategy in Newcastle were not well 
received by the company. Whether the company chose to house its staff in one facility in 
Newcastle or ten was none of his business. At Bath, the whole community was not involved in 
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the case so these criteria for challenges did not apply. These last two issues, information 
availability and criteria for challenges are normative but also have the possibility of being 
prescriptive. This will be discussed in a later section in this chapter. 
The three cases provide no evidence of a collaborative process embracing the issues covered by 
the dimension of Collaboration in the Framework. In none of the cases were all the stakeholders 
involved, certainly in terms of public involvement. The process was essentially corporatist 
involving only governance and private organisation. The negotiations in all three cases followed 
normal routines, rituals, use of language, choice of arenas and inclusiveness was not an issue. 
Neither was the issue of rights and knowledgeable participation as the only participants were the 
warring parties. There was clearly no consideration of Habermasian communicative ethics in 
any of the cases. This dimension of planning as outlined in the framework is a normative 
approach. Again though, it is possible to see a potential for a prescriptive approach and at least 
in part, an explanatory power. These points will be dealt with shortly in this chapter. 
In terms of Contract, the only issue that is not normative is the point about the applicant 
delivering the agreed project. This point is legally enforceable under planning law and there is 
little further to be said on the matter. The other three issues were all very well illustrated by the 
cases. There was no evidence of any attempt in any of the cases to employ decision-making 
processes that would avoid undue delay and uncertainty, quite the reverse. Unacceptable delays 
and uncertainty were dominant features of all the cases. Again, undue costs and diversion of 
resources were crucial features of all three cases and not foreseen by the participants. The issue 
of environmental impact was an issue in all three cases to some extent. At Bath it was the key 
issue whilst at East Quayside it was a subsidiary issue to the real issue of land acquisition. At 
Francis Avenue, the Council were prepared to ignore the aesthetic, environmental and traffic 
issues in their determination to secure further employment on the site. Here again, there is the 
potential for a prescriptive approach and again this will be discussed later in the chapter. 
Finally, there is the Culture dimension of planning. This is clearly normative in the context of 
the empirical evidence as there was never any attempt, in any of the cases, to deal with cultural 
differences. This is despite the fact that these cultural differences were playing a part in the 
interfaces. TWDC and their developer, on their own admission, never coming to terms with the 
culture of P&G. The 'hard-nosed' supermarket firm, Safeway, arrived in the World Heritage 
city of Bath, with all that signified for the local residents and city fathers. The 'tricky', profit 
orientated developer, Primetower, was at odds with what he perceived as a local authority living 
in a past world. This is a normative dimension of this approach but also has a potential for a 
prescriptive approach. 
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Does the InstitutionaB-Collaborative approach offer explanatory power? 
If we consider these findings in the context of Webb's definition of reducing the unfamiliar to 
the familiar, it is difficult to see the Approach offering us much assistance in explanatory terms. 
There is one area, however, where some explanatory benefit might be obtained, namely the 
communicative ethics issue. In all three cases, the evidence shows poor interfaces and badly 
strained relationships. I would suggest that a key reason these situations developed was that the 
discussions and the reasoning were faulty by Habermasian standards. The evidence in all the 
cases demonstrates much one - sided argument, talking past the other side. At East Quayside, 
P&G could not understand how TWDC dismissed New Sandgate House as a poor quality 
building that could not be as important to P&G as the company were contending. Equally, P&G 
could not understand how TWDC thought P&G was 'walking away from its responsibilities' in 
Balls' words, because the company did not wish to spend significant sums of shareholders' 
money to further the objectives of TWDC. At Francis Avenue, Bournemouth Council did not 
hear Primetower's arguments about the availability of good employment land in the area and in 
that context, how unattractive the Francis Avenue site was. The Bath case showed how Bath and 
Avon Councils did not believe Safeway's absolutely bloody-minded determination that 
eventually, they would build a supermarket on the Kensington site. 
All three cases were classic examples of 'instrumental reasoning' where technical people of 
various disciplines argued along rational lines towards what they believed would be a successful 
outcome for their case. In all the cases, 'moral reasoning' between the participants around 
values and ethics was not part of the process. Nevertheless there was a good deal of possession 
of moral high ground. At East Quayside, there was P&G's view of Balls' undisclosed approach 
directly to P&G's Cincinnati headquarters, the collusion between Balls and Beecham over the 
highway issue and the leaked planning documents. TWDC and the developer on the other hand 
regarded P&G's sale of the factory to Landau as almost immoral and likely to destroy their 
project. At Bath, Safeway and Dolsett were scandalised by the Avon councillor who suggested 
that the officers go away and find ways to frustrate the scheme even though she acknowledged 
they did not have a strong case. This did not appear to be a rational, moral, objective process. 
There were emotional elements of reasoning in all three cases. At times on East Quayside, Balls 
was quite emotional in his attacks on P&G particularly over the sale of the factory to Landau. 
He and his organisation saw this as a major impediment to their scheme. The developer 
certainly did get emotional when he said to P&G that his scheme was just as important as 
P&G's presence on the Quayside. At Bath, there were moments when emotion played its part 
e.g. Dunlop's arguments had much emotional content and this came across very clearly in the 
interview. He rubbished the Shopping Survey, denounced the planners, and rubbished the 
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'experts' i.e. the consultants. He admitted that anything would go to stop the scheme. There 
was plenty of emotion but not much sign of moral reasoning here. At Francis Avenue the 
attitude of councillors to the loss of Max Factor and around 700 jobs, their determination to 
'hold the line', their reaction to the lack of support from Dorset CC and its plans for more 
housing in Bournemouth all had a strong emotional content. On the other hand, there was strong 
emotion on the other side from Primetower and P&G over the presentation to the Council. 
An important factor in this consideration of different types of reasoning is that in all the cases, 
these different types of reasoning were mixed up in the process. This is of course directly 
contradictory to Habermas's perspectives on ideal communications. The problem was that 
nobody recognised this as an issue. 
Does the Institutional-Collaborative approach offer predictive power? 
We have seen already how a development of the Institutional Approach Is Healey's 
collaborative approach or the communicative turn. If we accept the arguments of Allmendinger 
and Tewdyr-Jones (2002) outlined in Chapter 4 of this thesis, one of the weaknesses of the 
communicative turn is the absence of focus on outcomes. Taylor (1998 p.l23) suggests that the 
planning theorists who developed this approach were just not interested in implementation or 
'how to get things done'. He goes on to argue that their real focus was on action and 
achievement through the ideals of democratic participation in the process. As has been said in 
this thesis more than once already, a private organisation is primarily interested in a timely 
approval of its project and any approach that is not focused on that success is hardly likely to 
enjoy much support. All this would suggest that if we mean by 'predictive power' the ability to 
forecast outcomes, the Institutional Approach has little predictive power but there is an area 
where even in a negative sense, it might be helpful. This is in relation to Habermasian 
communicative ethics. 
We have seen in Chapter 4 that Habermas talks of three different modes of reasoning and the 
issue ofmarginalisation in a one-sided discussion. However, Habermas also helpfully speaks of 
four critical conditions for an effective communication between two or more people (Taylor 
1998 p. 123 ). First that what is being communicated is comprehensible to all participants. 
Secondly, that something must be communicated which is factually true. Thirdly, that the 
communicator must be sincere. Finally, an understanding is being sought so the communication 
must be legitimate within certain moral norms and conventions shared by all parties to the 
communication. By these criteria, much of the discussion in all three cases studies was 
'ineffective' thus likely to lead to misunderstanding and erosion of trust as indeed did happen. 
East Quayside showed failure on all four counts. If comprehensibility was an issue, it took a 
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long time for P&G to really understand the full implications of 'comprehensive regeneration'. 
Factual truth was at times at a premium, particularly over the importance of highway matters. 
Sincerity likewise was not an obvious value in the process as was the cases with moral norms 
and conventions. Bath and Francis Avenue showed similar failures in the process to meet these 
conditions, more particularly in these two cases, the issues of factual truth and sincerity. From 
all this, it could be deduced that failure to comply with these conditions for effective 
communication, seen as part of the Institutional-Collaborative Approach, would at least seem 
likely to allow a prediction of likely failure of the process to achieve desired outcomes. 
In the light of the cases we have examined in this thesis, it is difficult to see any useful 
predictive power emanating from the Institutional Approach in terms of the issues raised in the 
modified Institutional-Collaborative Framework (Exhibit 10.1 ). However, as we have just seen, 
there may be some predictive use available in terms of the communicative element as argued by 
Habermas. 
A prescriptive approach- or Modified Collaborative action 
We now come to the question of whether this approach offers any assistance from a prescriptive 
standpoint. From points made earlier in this Section I 0.3, I believe the answer is yes, at least in 
part. 
The Command issues we have already discussed as being outside the possibility of prescription 
in the context of a single project. Challenge, on the other hand, offers a prescriptive approach 
through the issues of information availability and quality together with the issues of criteria for 
challenges. It is conceivable that agreement could be reached between public and private 
organisations on the availability, quality and cost of information. We saw belated if frustrated 
attempts to share improved quality information at both Bath and Francis Avenue. Appropriately 
shared 'factual' information on traffic and air quality at Bath may have saved much time, cost 
and aggravation. An ethical issue arises here about openness in terms of the quality of 
information. If information is withheld as it was on East Quayside, its utility is at least suspect. 
The issue of the criteria for Challenge is again susceptible to prescription because again it is 
conceivable that these issues can all be agreed upon at the outset of a Challenge. All the issues 
raised here are important, not only to the participants but to the community at large. It is 
therefore incumbent on those in governance to ensure that the criteria against which decisions 
are made are clearly stated at the outset followed by clearly stated reasons and justification 
against these criteria and an the impact statement related to the community at large. The only 
case in the empirical evidence that got close to achieving this state of affairs was at Francis 
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Avenue where the Inspector clearly stated at the outset of the Inquiry, exactly what he would 
consider, against what criteria and the impact on the whole community. None of the parties 
disagreed with this position. At Bath, the situation was entirely reversed with the Inspector at 
the Final Inquiry opening up the whole case, even on issues already decided by the Secretary of 
State, when all the participants thought the focus was a single issue of air pollution. At East 
Quayside, the Inspector used criteria, some of which were contentious in that they allowed such 
a degree of subjective judgement. The history of the land and the need for regeneration were 
non-contentious. Consideration of alternative proposals, the comprehensiveness of the 
proposals, their quality & programming and finally the balance of advantage were all seen as 
contentious by the private organisations involved. Bath and East Quayside would have benefited 
from up front clarity on the criteria for challenge as laid out in the Framework. 
In terms of Collaboration, this dimension of planning can offer a prescriptive approach because 
all the issues are susceptible to initial agreement that they be actively considered with the 
intention of incorporating them into the process. None ofthe issues ofstakeholder identification 
and involvement, and inclusionary process, arenas of discussion, who is included, the routines 
of discussion and the right to be heard should all be non-contentious and therefore be clearly 
identified and implemented elements of the process. The empirical evidence would offer most 
support from the Bath case in terms of these issues because the major stakeholders in Bath, the 
potential customers of a Safeway store, were just not involved. Had they been included, the 
story might well have been very different. The communicative elements are in my view 
particularly important because a focus in this area of collaboration has real potential benefit. 
All three cases would have benefited from the avoidance of one-sided discussions and the 
consequent misunderstandings. Likewise, a recognition of and separation of instrumental, moral 
and emotive reasoning could have played a similarly important part in achieving clarity and 
avoidance of misunderstanding. 
All the other issues of Contract are susceptible to a prescriptive approach. If a contractual 
relationship can be established at the outset of a project, a framework and schedule for efficient 
and effective deliverance of the project is also possible. 1 In all three cases, such a contractual 
relationship may well have been instrumental in saving months if not years in time and 
consequent resource costs. It is an intriguing insight into the planning system that neither the 
public sector nor a private organisation would enter into an open ended commercial 
commitment to the expenditure of time, money and diversion of resources without a formal 
contract. 
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Culture again lends itself to a prescriptive approach. As we have seen in Chapter 9, this is an all 
embracing dimension of planning and a crucial element in the behaviour of people and 
organisations. These issues are so important that it is astonishing that they can go unrecognised 
at least in any formal way. 
The Framework adopted so far would appear to indicate some useful prescriptive elements 
among the issues we have explored. This takes us to a consideration of the 5Cs and their utility 
in theoretical terms. 
10.4 The 5 Cs- have they any use in theory? 
In this thesis, the 5Cs have been used only in an analytical function where they have proved to 
be useful diagnostic tools. However, they also have their uses from a theoretical standpoint. 
Firstly, there is some explanatory power. The use of the Analytical Framework based on the 
5Cs, has enabled explanation of cause and effect in many of the project issues considered in 
these dimensions of planning. In addition, it has enabled some understanding of intention. 
We have seen in both Chapter 2 and Chapter 9 that the facility of the Secretary of State to 
generate and change government policy, to legislate if necessary and then to direct that it be 
implemented, can best be described as Command. What we are considering here is that 
dimension of planning where the private organisation is ineffective in influencing policy, 
processes, procedures or attitudes and behaviour at the point of decision. In other words, it is the 
public sector rock on which a private organisations aspirations and business strategy can 
founder, as happened with P&G at East Quayside where P&G's challenge was effective but the 
law was against it. In the other two cases, the same thing would have happened to the business 
strategies of both Safeway and Primetower, had not these two organisations been so recalcitrant 
and resorted to effective challenge. In Chapter 9, exploration of the Command dimension of 
planning has also provided explanation of the differentiation between government and local 
governance aspects of planning and where in the process external influence may be brought to 
bear. 
As we have seen in Chapter 9, Challenge is a crucial dimension of planning as far as the private 
organisation is concerned. However, the exploration of Challenge in the case studies has 
explained Challenge as a reflection of failure of Command or the democratic reciprocal of it. As 
we have already seen, government policy and the law cannot be challenged in the context of a 
single project but all three cases illustrated failure of Command in some aspect or other of the 
local interpretation of government policy, development of local policies and their 
221 
implementation. All three public sector organisations used their Command weaponry and all 
three suffered as a result when the relevant private organisation determined to Challenge. 
If Command and Challenge are the two bastions of the planning system, Collaboration, Contract 
and Culture may appear to be bolt on options but this is not the case. As none of these Cs 
appeared to be dominant or pervasive features of the three cases, it could be questioned whether 
they have any theoretical use. Here again, the use of the Analytical Framework in the analysis of 
the narratives enabled explanation of cause and effect in considering the project issues and their 
interaction. Furthermore, the discussion in Chapter 9 illustrated the interaction of the 5Cs and 
how Collaboration, Contract and Culture were key dimensions of the process even in the 
Command based planning system (Figure 9.2). 
Four of the Cs have normative implications for planning theory. The impact of Command is 
largely felt at the local level through project issues such as the influence and actions of Regional 
Government Offices, local authority members and officers. Bath, Francis Avenue and Alnwick 
all provided ample evidence of this local impact. Likewise, public sector procedures and 
processes were an issue in all the cases. How different the planning process in these cases might 
have been if civil servants, members and officers had acted differently and procedures had been 
more transparent. 
Collaboration also has normative implications. As we have seen in the cases, much ought to 
have been different about this dimension of planning. More pubic participation at Bath and East 
Quayside, more collaborative officer-private organisation interaction in all the cases, 
improvement in private organization involvement, formal contacts between members and 
applicant and minimising the sorts of conflicts between local authority departments and between 
local authorities we saw at Bath and Franc is A venue. 
Likewise, in the end, the parties do reach a form of Contract whether it is compensation for the 
loss of the facility as at East Quayside, or the conditions attaching to an approval as at Bath and 
Francis Avenue. What might have happened in all three cases if the participants had recognised 
a Contract relationship at the outset, placing limits on time, cost and use of resources as well as 
any final Contract for implementation? As we have seen earlier in this chapter, Habermas has 
some helpful criteria for effective communication. 
Culture again has normative implications for planning theory. The impact of culture on 
organisations has been emphasised numerous times in this thesis. The differences in Culture 
between participants in all three cases were at least partly responsible for participants 'talking 
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past each other' as we have seen in Chapter 9. A greater awareness of cultural differences and 
their effects, together with some attempts to manage these differences may have produced 
marked improvement in the process in all the cases. Habermas and his communicative ethics 
may be able to provide some assistance with this problem, as we shall see later. 
There is also the question of the predictive power of the 5 Cs. The cases studies offer a contrast 
in terms of prediction. Even the long history of procedural planning would hardly have allowed 
an accurate prediction of the events and outcomes of either Bath or Francis Avenue by any of 
the participants. At East Quayside, it could be argued that the Government's New Right 
approach to regeneration was a good example of Command where TWDC were provided with 
such wide legal powers, financial, political and moral support that a successful outcome for 
TWDC was entirely predictable. What could not be predicted was the strength of the reaction by 
P&G and the subsequent impact on TWDC's operations. This also illustrates that key to the 
outcome of any case is the situation regarding government policy. If the local interpretation of 
government policy is correct, than the outcome is predictable e.g. if government policy had been 
unequivocally against building new supermarkets in city centres, Bath City Council's case 
would have been unassailable. Even at Francis Avenue where the Inspector demolished 
Bournemouth's case at the Inquiry, he would not award costs to Primetower because 
Bournemouth had implemented the adopted Local Plan as they saw it. Another key issue is the 
role of the elected members. Both Bath and Franc is A venue cases showed that this body is the 
decision making body no matter what might be said about the planners' role. 2 Even at East 
Quayside, we saw evidence of the City Planners' initial report on the TWDC's scheme being 
severely amended through political interference. 
In terms of predictive power, Collaboration and Culture do not appear to have much to offer. 
This may not be entirely true if we regard these dimensions as constituent elements of 
collaborative efforts to arrive at a Contract for the process as well as the eventual outcome. 
Even ifthere may be uncertainty over the final decision of the elected members, much certainty 
in the process may well be predictable. In the dimension of Collaboration, strategic 
inconsistencies have been shown to be a real issue between the authority and the private 
organisation. Nevertheless, all the other issues are amenable to control and influence by the 
officers with support from the applicant (See Endnote 1 ). Likewise, Culture must play a 
significant part if both sides are determined to behave ethically. The obverse of this particular 
coin is illustrated at Bath by the behaviour of the Avon County councillor, who was determined 
to stop Safeway even when she was told the Council did not have a case. If a culture of 
openness and collaboration is engendered on a project, predictability is more likely than when 
there is suspicion and lack of trust. 
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10.5 Condusions 
This chapter has considered the findings from the empirical evidence in terms of implications 
for planning theory. The first point to make is that, in terms of typologies of planning, the 
evidence shows a procedural process working along traditional lines at both Bath and Francis 
Avenue, as was outlined in Chapter 2. Even at East Quayside, once the compulsory purchase 
order had been initiated, the process was essentially procedural. However, that case did start 
from the basis of a prescriptive New Right approach by government in the context of the use of 
UDCs to achieve urban regeneration. Secondly, there was a normative element, in Faludi's 
terms a substantive element, at both East Quayside and Francis A venue where the TWDC and 
Bournemouth Council respectively, had a clear vision of 'what ought to be' in terms of land use. 
Thirdly, there were elements of Rhodes' Sub-central government in all three cases in terms of 
networking. From this evidence and in the narrow context of this thesis where we are focussing 
on the planning process, procedural theory still appears to be the dominant approach In 
particular, the evidence supports procedural theory as a descriptive theory in terms of what was 
happening. However, we have seen here that it is over simplistic to suggest that only one 
theoretical approach applies in a particular case. The procedural approach is prescriptive 
focussing on how things are actually done. There is also explanatory power in enabling us to see 
at least some cause and effect in the cases. The predictive power of the procedural approach 
seems to have shortcomings in terms of Webb's analogy of the river's path to the sea e.g. at 
Bath. 
If we turn to the Institutional-Collaborative Approach, there was no evidence to show any 
attempt by planners or politicians to adopt this approach to planning in these cases. The 
evidence has shown the Command dimension of the Framework was almost wholly at odds with 
the Approach. This appears to conform to Healey's normative view of the Approach. The right 
to Challenge is a key dimension of the Approach and was an important element in each of the 
cases. This is hardly surprising as the right to challenge is in any case a key statutory element of 
the planning process. The issues in the Framework covered by Collaboration were not addressed 
in the cases which again are normative. In terms of Contract, only the issue of the applicant 
delivering the agreed project was a consideration in the three cases. Finally, Culture was never 
raised as an issue. What all this suggests is that the Approach as outlined in the Framework 
represents a normative view of the planning process particularly within the confines of the 
interface considered in this thesis. 
The Approach is a normative approach but it has some limited explanatory power. This is where 
the various types of reasoning identified by H.abermasian communicative ethics issues can be 
helpful. All three cases demonstrated the failings of communication leading to the poor quality 
224 
interfaces and strained relationships. Similar conclusions can be reached about the predictive 
power of the Approach. Here again, Habermasian communicative ethics might have something 
to offer predictively even if only from a negative point of view. All three cases were very good 
illustrations of inadequate communications as measured against Habermas's criteria. 
Lastly, the Institutional-Collaborative Approach at least in part, has prescriptive utility. This is 
not true of the Command dimension of the Approach or indeed of the rights and dispute 
resolution elements of Challenge. However, the evidence supports the prescriptive potential for 
the issues of information availability and the criteria for Challenge. 
What I am arguing is that it is in the dimension of Collaboration that scope for prescription 
mainly exists. All the issues raised there are susceptible to influence by the private organisation 
and particularly the area of communicative action. This is also true of Contract where some 
attempt at formal contractual arrangements could be possible in the confines of a single project. 
Likewise, Culture and the issues covered therein could be amenable to discussion and therefore 
potential influence across the project. 
Up to this point I have used the term 'Institutional-Collaborative Approach' as the name of the 
approach I have been exploring. This was to retain some continuity with the Institutional 
antecedents of the approach in line with Healey's work. In the next chapter where I shall 
explore its prescriptive implications for practice, I shaii use the term 'Modified Collaborative 
Approach'. This is because I see the prescriptive approach as heavily focused on the 
Collaboration dimension of the theory, even in consideration of the dimensions of Challenge, 
Contract and Culture. 
Finally we come to the 5 Cs. As well as their analytical use, these dimensions of planning have 
been shown to have some theoretical use. They have some explanatory power as they have 
enabled explanation of cause and effect in many of the project issues considered in these 
dimensions of planning. In addition, they have enabled some understanding of intention. 
Command and Challenge both have the facility for offering predictive power but this depends 
on the strength of the Command case and the implementation of policy. At East Quayside, 
TWDC was always going to win given the power it possessed. At Alnwick, if the Council had 
abided by the Structure Plan and PPG6, the outcome was a foregone conclusion, even if it had 
gone to appeal - no supermarket. Collaboration and Culture do not appear to have any predictive 
power except insofar as they could contribute to an arrangement for a formal Contract. 
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Collaboration, Contract and Culture are normative dimensions of the planning process. 
However, they are critical dimensions and are the key areas of potential influence on Command 
and Challenge project issues. It has already been shown that they are also dimensions of the 
Modified Collaborative Approach and in that Approach have a prescriptive theoretical use. 
In the next chapter, the potential for practical application of the Modified Collaborative 
Approach and the 5 Cs will be explored following an assessment of the policy and management 
implications of the research. 
CHAPTER 10- NOTES 
1 The writer had such success with the P&G project to build a new Headquarters at Brooklands in Surrey. 
The site already enjoyed outline consent for offices but the actual sizes of each building and all the other 
details of design, finishes, parking, landscaping etc. were to be determined by Elmbridge Council - a 
'difficult council'. At the first meeting with the Chief Planning Officer in August, I asked what was the 
date of the first meeting of the Planning Committee at which our application could be considered. He said 
theoretically mid November but from a practical standpoint it was impossible. My rejoinder was that it 
would be submitted for consideration on that date, the issue was simply what could P&G do to help the 
planners make it happen. A lot of collaborative effort ensued and the application was submitted to 
Committee on the mid November date and approved. The following morning, the Chief Planning Officer 
telephoned to say that in his view, the impossible had been achieved. 
2 At East Quayside, when P&G realised that New Sandgate House was likely to be lost, plans were 
submitted to the City Council for outline planning consent for a new, replacement building on their 
headquarters site in the city. The Leader of the Conservative Opposition on the City Council voted against 
P&G's plans in the Planning Committee, despite the fact that he had supported the battle against TWDC 
over the CPO on New Sandgate House. The application was approved by only a couple of votes. 
At P&G's Egham headquarters in Surrey, a Master Plan for the long-term future of the site only scraped 
through the Planning Committee despite a strong officer recommendation to approve. As the Project 
Manager, I was asked on the morning of the meeting whether we would get our approval. To the 
consternation of the American manager concerned I answered- "I don't know and nor do the officers". 
He was not pleased and could not understand the uncertainty. The Planning meeting that evening started 
with a twenty minute denunciation of multi-national corporations by the local Lib Dem councillor 
followed by silence from the Labour group who eventually said they would vote against, as the 
aforementioned Lib Dem member clearly knew all about the situation. The application for a scheme that 
was vital to the business was approved by a couple of votes. 
On their own admission, in neither of these cases were the officers able to predict these events. 
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EXHIBIT 10.1 
A MODIFIED INSTITUTIONAL/COLLABORATIVE FRAMEWORK 
ISSUES 
I) COMMAND a) Strategies are selected that are 
(i) EFFECTIVE - with regard to resource allocation and regulatory power. 
(ii) LEGITIMATE - In terms of general understanding.-
b) Duties of those in governance roles to be 
i) Democratic - promote participative governance - respect for concerns 
ii) Effective -to deliver (performance criteria?) 
iii) Accountable - operating and reporting within openly agreed principles 
c) Governance competences 
i) Who performs governance tasks and where? Subsidiarity - regional & local levels 
ii) Each level of governance can be a stakeholder at another level 
iii) Interaction between formal government and wider society 
iv) Use of administrative and technical expertise 
2) CHALLENGE a) Right to Challenge - to allow formal challenge to governance decisions 
b) Dispute resolution- Apg_eals, Inquiries, Courts, Mediation 
c) Information of high qual in'_ to be available to all parties at accessible cost. 
d) Criteria for challenges 
i) Those in governance required to give good reasons for decisions 
ii) Decisions should be justified in terms of impacts on the whole community 
iii) Decisions should be justified by reference to agreed strategies and argumentation 
iv) Process to acknowledge the diverse ways of thinking of the whole community, 
the diversity of ways in which views and claims and forms of argument (technical, 
moral etc.) may be expressed, the agreed strategies of other areas of governance 
3) COLLABORATION a) Stakeholders- Who, where, why are they involved- involvement of majority- new 
membership? 
b) Collaborative process to be inclusionary v corporatist 
c) What and where are the arenas of discussion? Different arenas at different times? 
d) Ethical considerations? Who is included, when and how? 
e) Routines, rituals and styles of discussion - topics, language, how and by whom? 
f) Rights -voices must be heard and taken into account and given adequate information 
to allow knowledgeable participation 
g) Use ofHabermasian communicative ethics in which the following three forms of 
reasoning are to be included in the discourse and given equal weight:-
i) Instrumental-technical reasoning (ends to means, evidence to conclusions) 
ii) Moral reasoning (focused around values and ethics) 
iii) Emotive -aesthetic reasoning (derived from emotive experiences) 
Important to avoid one-sided discussions where the hearer is marginalised. 
4)CONTRACT a) Decision making process to avoid undue delays and uncertainties 
b) Undue costs and diversion of resources to be avoided on all sides 
c) Impact of the project to be minimised e.g. traffic, environmental issues 
d) Applicant must deliver the agreed project 
5) CULTURE Cultural issues? Are they addressed? Differences identified? How? Moral duties? 
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CHAPTER 11 -FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 
11.1 Introduction 
This research project arose initially from personal dissatisfaction with the decision-making 
mechanisms in the planning system. What I considered to be bad personal experiences on a 
number of commercial projects were confirmed by anecdotal evidence of similar types of 
experiences suffered by others, e.g. Alnwick. Thus my curiosity was aroused about the wider 
issues surrounding the interface between public and private organisations in the planning 
process. The big question followed on from this interest, namely: -
In the interface between the planning system and private organisations, can a practical 
approach be developed that can improve the management of that interface to the benefit 
of both sides? 
This thesis is the outcome of research into the planning system in an attempt to answer this 
question. Furthermore, as a contribution to public management research, the thesis must address 
the management implications for both public sector and private organisations. In order to deal 
with these implications, it is clearly important to focus on the 'real' problems in the system 
from the standpoint of both sectors. It is easy to dismiss problems as being 'just part of the 
system' but what does that really mean? Problem definition is crucial to recognition of the real 
problem and to the possibility of generating potential solutions. 
In order to reach an improved understanding of the planning system, this thesis has provided a 
detailed examination of the context of planning, its legal and political framework and an outline 
of the process. The investigation of planning theory in Chapter 4, led to the view that the 
Institutional Approach, or at least a modified version of it, may have something to offer in 
dealing with the problems encountered in the system. Chapter 5 then goes on to deal with the 
empirical methodology. 
Empirical evidence from three disparate types of case study has been presented and analysed 
using the 5 Cs with the Analytical Framework of project issues as an analytical tool. An 
overview of the empirical evidence in Chapter 9 shows that the 5 Cs are dimensions of planning 
that have dynamic qualities as discussed in that chapter (Exhibit 9 .I). This led, in Chapter 9 to a 
perspective, (see Figure 9.2), showing Command as comprising a number of components 
relating to policy namely, government policy itself, the law, interpretation, local policy and 
implementation. In Chapter I 0, we explored what the empirical evidence said about planning 
theory and in particular abut a modified form of Institutional theory. 
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In this final chapter, following a summary of the analytical conclusions, an assessment of the 
implications for policy and management leads to my proposals for a model approach that can, I 
believe, alleviate the problems of the management of the interface for both sides. 
Having reached the final chapter of this thesis, we can now ask the question- what do we know 
now? This question needs to be addressed from both empirical and theoretical positions as we 
saw in Chapters 9 and 10. 
11.2 Analytical Conclusions 
Has the empirical evidence allowed definition of the real problems? 
The answer to this question must be yes. From the review in Chapter 9, we can say that it has 
been a sound basis for analytical and theoretical exploration. We can say at once that all three 
case studies illustrated an undesirable quality of interface with strained relationships between 
public and private participants arousing high levels of suspicion and lack of trust. It must also be 
said that the empirical evidence rests upon one individual's narrative accounts of the three 
cases. Although every effort has been made to maintain objectivity, these accounts cannot 
contain all the available evidence and to that extent are selective. Despite this need for 
selectivity, the missing information was deemed to be of secondary importance and therefore, 
not critical to the accuracy of the narrative accounts. 
The first point that can be made is that in each case, the participants were completely at odds 
over purpose. In starting off on any project, this is the big question - why do it? For nearly 
thirty years of involvement in project management, the writer has used a most useful framework 
(See Exhibit 11.1 ). This document identifies a number of key issues that must be addressed 
before starting the project. As we can see, Purpose is seen as the crucially important first issue 
to be addressed. I do not propose to work through the paper, only to show up the vital 
importance of purpose as seen in a private organisation. 1 From the evidence, all these cases 
started with a 'built in' problem, namely, the participants were at cross-purposes in each case 
over the future use of a site. These cross-purposes provided the seed bed for the ensuing 
conflicts. 
Secondly, the 5 Cs were instrumental in exploring the interface showing up the different 
dimensions of the relationships at work between public and private organisations. The empirical 
evidence confirmed the importance of the 5 Cs as dimensions of planning. Initially, they were 
seen a potentially useful analytical tools and so they proved to be. However, their importance 
229 
as dimensions of planning was clearly demonstrated by the evidence. For example, all the cases 
underlined the impact of Command even on the other four Cs and as we have seen, much of this 
power of Command in the system was not always obvious. 
Bolan (Mandelbaum, Mazza & Burchell 1996 p. 504-505) quotes Giddens: -
Power may be at its most alarming and quite often its most horrifying when applied as a 
sanction or force. It is typically at its most intense and durable when running silently 
through the repetition of institutionalised practices (Giddens). 
This second sentence certainly has resonances in these three cases, particularly on East 
Quayside. These findings reinforced the view that the planning system is a Command system 
conceptually and in its operation. In Chapter 9 we saw the important possibility of 
differentiation of Command into five components and this allowed some insight into the real 
interface between the public and the private organisation (Figure 9.1 ). One needs to recognise 
that a problem for one party becomes, in some way or other, a problem for both parties e.g. the 
commitment of resources and uncertainty. The real interface and relationships are established 
around the interpretation of government policy into local policy and implementation at local 
governance level (Figure 9.2). This is the case whether local governance is the local authority 
or an agency such as TWDC (See Figure 9.3). The importance of Challenge and its value to the 
private organisation is clear from the evidence but it can itself be a problem when the process 
takes the tortuous path we saw at Bath. The prolonged, confusing process described here speaks 
to a range of problems for both public and private organisations, not least uncertainty, resource 
costs and impact on the business. The lack of any meaningful Collaboration has been clearly 
identified as a problem and the evidence shed light on the crucial difference between the 
negotiations that did take place and true collaboration that did not. The absence of any Contract 
relationships was shown up in all three cases. The outcomes were important to all the 
participants but only the three private organisations appeared to have any concern about timing 
and the demand on resources required to achieve the outcome. Uncertainty was a key factor in 
all three projects leading to expenditures of time and resources that were both unexpected and 
unwelcome for all parties. They were hardly models of good practice in process terms. Lastly, 
in terms of Culture, we have seen evidence of different cultures at work with no explicit 
recognition of the important influences culture can have on the interface. As these cases 
showed, planning cases are unique in every respect save the legally laid down process through 
which they must pass. Nevertheless, the patterns emerging from the evidence showed 
consistency across the cases. 
The third point to make is that the Analytical Framework proved to be a useful tool for analysis. 
The key question here is - has the method of analysis and interpretation worked? My response 
230 
is yes. The Analytical Framework (Exhibit 11.2) provided two things. First the concept of the 5 
Cs and that has proved to be an especially useful concept throughout the thesis. Secondly, a 
solid platform of project issues as a basis for analysis. This is hardly surprising given that these 
issues were culled from personal experience over many projects. The empirical evidence has 
vindicated the choice of these issues as we can see in Exhibit 9 .I. The exercise of annotation of 
the narratives to determine the occurrences of the project issues was effective. This did not 
pretend to be a quantitative exercise but an attempt to assess the relative impact of the 5 Cs in 
each of the cases. In the event, the 5 Cs also proved to be a descriptor of planning and have 
some theoretical perspective. The Analytical Framework was the basis of the analysis and 
interpretation of the empirical evidence in Chapter 9. This analysis provided a perspective on 
what have we learnt empirically about the interface we have been considering and in particular, 
the impact of Command throughout the planning process. This in turn led to the development of 
the very useful differentiated model of Command (Exhibit 11.3). The Institutional Framework 
provided some reference back to the 5 Cs but also what appeared to be the more relevant issues 
arising from the collaborative approach of Healey. It has to be reiterated that Healey deals with 
a much wider canvas than the scope of this thesis so these issues are selected because of their 
relevance. 
In all, I believe the analysis and interpretation of the empirical evidence has enabled useful 
conclusions to be reached in this thesis. At the same time, I would make three points about the 
method. First, the qualitative method has worked well for my purpose as it has been supported 
by the wide variety and strength of the cases. At the same time, it must be said that the 
annotation of the narratives is one person's assessment of the occurrences of the project issues. 
Another person carrying out the same exercise would be likely to produce somewhat different 
results. However, the three narratives are at least on a common framework because all the 
annotation is the work of one person. Secondly, the variety of the cases and the analytical 
method has allowed data source triangulation and some methodological triangulation. Lastly, 
the Commentary Notes complementing the annotation exercises have been primarily of use in 
highlighting and clarifying the annotations. 
A political dimension of the problems 
Something also needs to be said about the politics influencing the interface and the 
relationships. As we have seen in Chapters 2, 3 and 9, the process chosen for the regeneration of 
East Quayside was the direct outcome of a policy initiative of a Secretary of State who 
eschewed the orthodox post war political consensus. Regarding local government as the 
problem rather than part of the solution he simply removed them from the equation. Thus, the 
East Quayside case had a conceptual framework in planning terms based on a political 
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foundation that was absent from the other two cases. All three cases were however, subject to 
local political influences. At East Quayside, P&G were caught between factional conflicts in a 
massively Labour dominated Council. All the local Labour councillors in the East end of the 
city supported the P&G position but as it turned out, they were in conflict with the leadership 
and the majority. Initially, the Council had been antagonistic towards the Tory government 
strategy that removed their powers and gave them to a non-elected agency of government. It 
appeared from P&G' s experiences, that an accommodation had been reached, at least at senior 
levels in TWDC and the City, because the Council came to see TWDC as their best hope for 
regeneration of the run down East Quayside. This appeared to be pragmatic politics. 
At Bath, the case was not party political, but the local councillors at Bath and Avon Councils 
were the driving force in the local authority side of the case. An important factor in Bath is the 
presence of influential pressure groups largely arising from the city's heritage status. Mrs. 
Maxwell (at interview) talked of members and officers being subject to intense lobbying about 
planning decisions, even after the decision had been made. Having visited the site, it is 
understandable that the traffic and environmental impact of any development on the London 
Road would be a major concern in Bath. However, we saw here that at times, emotional 
reasoning displaced instrumental reasoning in the negotiations over these technical matters. 
The Franc is A venue case involved only local politicians but the councillors at Bournemouth 
were the driving force in the Council's intransigence over the use of the site. This did not appear 
to be a part political issue. As we saw in Chapter 8, one councillor saw the Local Plan as the 
'bible'; another demanded to know 'who is running the town, us or Dorset County Council'? 
This referred to the housing provisions in the Dorset Structure Plan. After the abortive 
presentation to the full Council, P&G, Primetower and Primetower's consultants all took the 
view that the elected members were not reflecting the views of the electorate but did reflect their 
own prejudices. Another point here is that Bournemouth were not able to enlist any support for 
their position on Francis Avenue site from the Dorset County councillors or Poole Borough 
councillors. 
The theoretical findings 
The theoretical findings m Chapter 10 have helped to answer the first of the Research 
Questions, namely that there is a theoretical basis on which the participants in the planning 
process operate. Bath and Francis Avenue cases followed procedural theory although the open 
consideration of planning theory was not apparent from the evidence. East Quayside on the 
other hand started off with a New Right approach albeit following procedural theory once 
challenge reared its head. It is important to recognise once again that much planning theory is 
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concerned with policy analysis and critique of spatial planning and indeed this is true of New 
Right theory. It is hardly surprising then, that procedural theory was the most obvious influence 
in the cases we have considered. Chapter 10 also showed, however, that there were indications 
of Rhodes' Sub-central government theory, if we consider the networking arrangements in each 
of the cases 
Whilst procedural theory might provide the theoretical underpinning for practice, the findings 
have shown up the potential for further theoretical approaches. First, the findings confirmed the 
normative nature of the [nstitutionai-Collaborative Approach. We also saw that the Command 
issues were realistically outside the influence of a private organisation. Challenge is non 
contentious as it is already a dimension of the planning process. However, we saw that, from the 
standpoint of Habermasian communicative ethics, this area of Collaboration offers some 
explanatory and predictive power. All three cases provided very good evidence of inadequate 
communications as measured against Habermas's communicative criteria. The findings also 
showed that the Modified Collaborative Approach does also have potential use as a prescriptive 
theory, at least in part. The dimensions of Collaboration, Contract and Culture appear to be the 
main area for a prescriptive use of the Approach. The issues of information availability and 
challenge criteria are elements of Challenge were seen to be important areas of potential 
collaboration in the interface. A model for the prescriptive use of the Approach will be proposed 
later in this chapter. 
We have also seen in Chapter 10 that the 5 Cs can have some theoretical as well as analytical 
use. The analytical utility of the 5 Cs has been demonstrated in Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9. The 
Analytical Framework enabled textual analysis of the narrative accounts of the cases. From this 
exercise, it became apparent that the 5 Cs are dimensions of planning and consequently 
provided an important conceptual framework for further analysis of the empirical evidence. 
Command has been shown to have an explanatory as well as a predictive element whilst 
Collaboration, Contract and Culture are normative dimensions of the process. However, it was 
shown in Chapter 1 0 that they are also dimensions of the Modified Collaborative Approach and 
in that Approach have a prescriptive theoretical use. 
The overall analytical conclusion is that the empirical evidence is strong and varied yet 
demonstrates consistent patterns in the poor quality of the interface and relationships in all the 
cases. Furthermore, the evidence has provided a firm foundation for analysis using the design of 
the Analytical Framework in which the development of the 5 Cs has been an important 
contribution. The evidence had also provided a good basis for exploration of theory, the 
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development of the Modified Collaborative Approach and the use of the 5 Cs. We now turn to 
the implications ofthe research, in terms of policy and management. 
1 1.3 Implications of the research 
Policy implications 
The first point we can make is that the evidence has shown that we can only deal effectively at 
the micro level of policy. Normatively, we can argue for changes at government policy levels 
and consequently in the law. From the evidence, we can say that possession of weaker powers 
by the Secretary of State could be a good start. Hesletine probably had no concept of the true 
eventual costs to all parties when he implemented his regeneration strategy. At Bath, the story 
could have been very different if the Secretary of State had not intervened to the extent he did. 
We also have the issues of Planning Guidance from the Secretary of State. Clarity about the 
status of these Guidance Notes as to whether they are only guidance or form key material 
considerations would be a helpful policy initiative. Improvements in decision-making in the 
planning system could result if more good quality training was made available for members and 
potential members of planning committees. These sorts of policy changes are of wide 
significance across planning and are effectively outside the narrow context of this thesis. 
However, Chapter 9 showed that we were able to differentiate the Command dimension of 
planning. The evidence showed that from the point of view of local policy, we have seen the 
key issues are interpretation of government policy into local policy, local policy itself and 
subsequent implementation of that policy. Arising from this point are the questions, will the 
local policies be implemented and if so how. Thus, while many of the project issues have policy 
implications as we have seen in the evidence and subsequent analysis, these will invariably 
come back to the fundamental local policy issues stated above (See Exhibit 9.1 ). The issue of 
strategic differences between the public and private organisations is one example of this point in 
each of the three cases. Given the relationships in the three cases, local authority policy on how 
applicants are handled is another example e.g. Bournemouth Council's handling of the 
applicant's formal presentation. The overall point here is that in the context of a single 
application, awareness of potential policy issues and how they are to be resolved is critical. 
Management implications 
This thesis is the outcome of research into the planning system viewed as a difficult interface 
between the public sector and private organisations. The empirical evidence has shown that it 
can be a very difficult interface and underlines the 'big question' - is there a better way in 
which the interface can be managed by both sides to their mutual benefit? 
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A number of points need to be made. First, the case studies demonstrated that each planning 
application, or planning strategy in the case of a UDC, is a project in its own right. This is 
because it must lead to a successful approval in order that the applicant can execute the desired 
scheme and that the scheme is acceptable to the Local Authority on behalf of the people. Any 
project must be capable of withstanding scrutiny on a variety of grounds. Whether it has 
achieved its purpose, at what cost, the timescale for outcomes, the risks involved, the demand 
on resources and generally the effectiveness of the process. The empirical evidence suggests 
that against these criteria, all these cases were failures. As has been demonstrated many times 
already, even the local authority may not be fully in control of policies it is compelled to 
implement. What it is able to control is its management of its responsibilities. This is equally 
true of the private organisation. It could be argued that this is the real crux of the process 
because this is the one aspect that both sides have to implement. Furthermore, a well-managed 
process can be a positive influence on the resolution of difficulties, even those involving policy. 
Something must be said here about the private organisations and their contribution to the 
problems. In all three cases the evidence may have tended to focus so far on the failings of the 
public sector organisations or their processes but the private sector organisations had their own 
shortcomings. From the evidence presented in the East Quayside and Francis Avenue cases, 
P&G's performance was found wanting. The analysis of the East Quayside case in this thesis 
has nicely illustrated the naivety of a private organisation operating outside its normal business 
environment and having no established relationship with the public sector. P&G never 
understood how TWDC operated, were far too willing to accept the original understandings 
from Balls and were nai've about the possibility of avoiding the Compulsory Purchase Order. 
The company only wanted to keep its building and really believed it could win when in fact the 
powers of the TWDC were so widely drawn that they could not be thwarted. Even the 
company's interface with the City Council was hopeless. The company had been located on at 
least one site in the city for around one hundred and fifty years, yet there were no established 
relationships with either councillors or officers in the City Council. It was no wonder that the 
company's appeal to the Leader of the Council for support was to fall on deaf ears. Another 
issue here was that P&G were managing the interface and relationship with TWDC through an 
internal committee and not through strong project management leadership. 
At Francis Avenue, the project was so arranged that P&G had no influence over the planning 
negotiations, when, as owners of the site, the company was clearly a vital stakeholder. Most of 
the time, P&G did not know what was being said to the planners, when, how and to whom. 
Only P&G were likely to have resolved the employment issue with Bournemouth Council more 
effectively and that by direct discussion. As we have seen, as long as this was an unresolved 
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problem, a planning approval was to say the least unlikely. There was a case in these 
circumstances for P&G seeking the planning approval and then selling the site. The developer, 
Primetower disagrees with this view, believing that P&G would have failed, because the 
Bournemouth councillors saw the company as the villain anyway for closing down a 
manufacturing site. Another point here is that P&G would have pushed much harder than did 
Primetower for involvement of the senior officers. If the change of use of the site was of such 
concern to the council, continuing face-to-face discussion with the senior officers was an 
imperative. This type of involvement did not take place until late in the process. 
At Bath, traffic and site access onto London Road were still unresolved issues until six months 
before the Final Inquiry. As these were the key problems for both Bath and Avon Councils from 
the beginning of negotiations on the project, it is difficult to see why Safeway did not manage 
this situation more effectively. Five years seems a long time for resolution of technical issues 
of such importance. Mrs. Maxwell said (at interview) that as the Principal Planning Officer 
involved in the Bath case, she did not get the support from Safeway and their consultants that 
she needed in terms of the right kind of documents and other presentation materials. This 
complicated matters for her in her dealings with the elected members who believed that 
Safeway were withholding information. This is an interesting point because Webster, the 
Safeway architect complained in strong terms about the inadequate use of presentational 
materials he had prepared for the officers. To say the least, this may have been the result of a 
misunderstanding but it was Safeway's responsibility to ensure that these things do not happen. 
Even after my detailed investigation of this case, I am still not clear about the role Safeway 
personnel played in the negotiations with Bath. There was no evidence of strong project 
management leadership. 
In all three cases, the inability of the private organisation to influence interpretation or resulting 
local policy led to implementation of the relevant policies and the consequent challenge. It is 
clear that there are management problems on both sides of the interface. 
In consideration of the management implications of the research, I return to my Project 
Management Model (Exhibit 11.1 ). If we regard the planning application on a particular project 
as a project in its own right, this model has considerable use for both sides of the planning 
interface. 
Purpose and its vital importance and priority have already been established in this chapter. This 
dimension of project management enables early consideration of policy and legal implications 
for the application, particularly their implementation. 2 Expectations, criteria and measurement 
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of success, unique features of the application are all important considerations for both sides. A 
key question is how do the members and the planners 'see' a particular kind of project. Clearly, 
the Council would have warmly welcomed a scheme for a new factory located on the Francis 
A venue site. Likewise, a modest amount of executive housing with large gardens may have 
been welcomed at Bath. Here we come back to purpose or possibly cross-purposes. It is in the 
interests of both sides to get real clarity on this environmental issue. Suspicions, fears and 
prejudices can be addressed and allayed but only if they are out in the open. 
Consideration of Structure enables establishment of goals and the appropriate types and levels 
of resources to be allocated to the application. Goals on each side may be very different as they 
were in the three cases. 
Process enables consideration of the decision-making process, meetings, information, critique 
and accountability. This has clear connections to the Collaborative aspects of the Analytical 
Framework and the Modified collaborative Approach. The environment in which collaboration 
might take place is of crucial importance. For example a key question is how do the planners 
and elected members 'see' planning? If the answer is that it is seen as a purely procedural, 
technical exercise with the applicant held at arms length, then attempts to collaborate are likely 
to be difficult. The same may be true of the way the planners and elected members 'see' private 
organisations. If there is already a suspicious attitude, perhaps because of a previous bad 
experience with a large company or an ingoing prejudice against certain types of organisation, 
there may well be a barrier to possible collaboration. This was the case at Bath (supermarket 
chains) and Francis Avenue (developers). This brings us to the issue of communication. All 
three cases illustrated inadequate communication that was itself a basic cause of problems. It is 
incumbent on management to ensure that misunderstandings are minimised and, at the very 
least, are not due to bad communications. In this context, I believe Habermas has something to 
offer with his communicative ethics and this will be addressed later in this chapter. 
Roles are vitally important. Who does what is a question that can have important implications 
for an effective process if responsibilities can be shared. The planners may be only too pleased 
to be offered help but they must decide on the nature of the help, where that help is legitimate 
and how it is likely to be most effective. The last thing the planners need is a private 
organisation stumbling around causing even more problems. 3 Who speaks for the project was 
highlighted by all the cases. A P&G 'committee' dealing with TWDC, Safeway's leadership of 
the project at Bath and absence of senior Council officer hierarchy involved at Francis Avenue. 
Another question is that of stakeholder involvement. This was an issue to one extent or another 
in each of the case studies and warrants a positive response. A series of issues arise from this 
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question. Who should be involved, how, to what level, where and by whom? These are 
important questions because they imply going further than the statutory information and 
consultation processes. The three cases demonstrated the weakness of this normal process. This 
stakeholder question might be taken further in the sense of the reaction of the wider public to 
the scheme. At East Quayside and Bath no one knew the opinion of the wider public about a 
project that was of real importance to the community. 
In the public sector there is a critical issue in the relationship between the elected members and 
the planners. The management of this relationship is vital to the appropriate operation of the 
system. Conflict here can spell trouble and is outside the influence of the private organisation. 
Likewise, inter-department collaboration and relationships with other authorities may play an 
important role in the process as we saw in all three case studies. Certain councils, members and 
or planners are known to be 'difficult'. This may have been true in only one particular case but 
the label is still there. Very often in the writer's experience, this is an unfair assessment but it 
must be addressed. 4 However, if it is actually true that one or more councillors is likely to 
attempt to 'sabotage' the scheme i.e. Bath and the Avon councillor, it is as well to be really 
clear about this issue. For the private organisation there are a number of points to be made about 
managing the interface. First, that there will only be one contact between the planners and the 
company. Other management, at whatever level, will only be involved as needed. This is 
critically important if confusion is to be avoided. Likewise, contact between planners and agents 
acting for the organisation e.g. surveyors, architects, must be carefully managed. Another point 
is that the company may have to be more open and transparent than normal commercial 
considerations would allow. This may be a risk but my experience has been that planners 
welcome such openness and it may provide crucial background data for them. It can help to 
explain where the applicant is coming from in ways not readily apparent from the details of the 
scheme. The organisation must be ready to help the planners in every possible way. 
Whilst the overall objective for both sides is to get a determination of an application, it is also in 
the interests of the parties to achieve this effectively. This brings together the three project 
dimensions of Schedule, Cost and Quality. Resources and time are at a premium for everyone. 
This again suggests a collaborative approach so that potential barriers to effective action are 
recognised and dealt with at the earliest possible time. This approach clearly has to start at the 
outset of the project in areas such as policy. A Draft PPG might be relevant but debatable in its 
potential impact. The question then arises, how is it to be handled and by whom? The overall 
question is what is the schedule for getting the determination of the application? As noted in 
Endnote 3 in this chapter, nothing is impossible but every attempt must be made to avoid the 
situations we saw at Bath and Francis Avenue. The final point here is that what is agreed and 
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finally approved MUST be delivered and this applies to both sides. Many challenges have 
resulted from onerous conditions applied to an approval, particularly when they were applied at 
the last minute and unexpectedly. This comes back to the issue of community capital -
credibility disappears when devious behaviour appears. 
I have argued throughout this thesis that Culture is an all-pervading dimension of planning. This 
is because it is a crucial determinant in the way all organisations operate thus how their people 
operate. This raises numerous questions about the organisations at the interface we are 
considering but also in the environment in which they are operating. The question of the 
political climate in a particular council can be important. This can clearly have implications for 
policy and management but also importantly for the culture of the organisation. There is almost 
certainly a very different culture in an inner city Labour controlled council compared with a 
Tory controlled council in the shires. At the local level there is also the culture of the place to 
consider e.g. Bath's World Heritage City status. This culture has a very heavy influence on all 
planning activities in Bath as Mrs. Maxwell ruefully explained at interview. On the private side, 
there are also cultural issues to be addressed. The strength of P&G's culture was a key factor at 
East Quayside and Francis Avenue. Furthermore, a multi-national organisation may well be 
British managed but still subject to considerable influence from its parent. This is an issue in 
P&G because much of the introspective 'need to know' culture of the company emanates from 
the US. 
Finally, we come to the issue of risk. All three cases demonstrated a timescale and demand on 
resources well beyond anything that the participants envisaged at the outset. If each side at the 
outset of the project had understood these risks, would they have been pursued to the bitter end? 
I can offer a piece of anecdotal comment- in the two P&G cases the answer would have been 
no. 
11.4 The strengths and weaknesses of the Modified Collaborative Approach 
What are the strengths and weaknesses of the theoretical approach? Following examination of 
this approach in Chapter 10, we saw the strengths of the approach to lie primarily in its focus on 
collaborative issues as shown in the Framework (Exhibit 10.1 ). Thus, it is possible to address 
issues of inclusion of stakeholders, information availability, modes of discussion, forms of 
reasoning and effective communication, all issues that arose in the three cases. There was no 
evidence of such focus in the examination of other planning theories in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, 
critiques of the 'communicative turn', in other words, Healey's collaborative approach, were 
discussed, albeit in a much wider context than covered by this thesis. On the evidence available 
in this thesis it must be argued that too much is claimed for the approach. It certainly does not 
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appear to be a paradigm shift in planning as we have no evidence here of its implementation in 
practice in any of the three cases. This suggests the considerable width of the gap between 
theory and practice. 
A major weakness in the approach is the lack of focus on outcomes. This is not surprising given 
its normative thrust and, as suggested by Taylor (1998 p. 123), the theoreticians' lack of interest 
in implementation. Practically, Phelps and Tewdyr-Jones (2000 pp.111-130) deal with the 
failure of the approach to achieve satisfactory outcomes in a particular case of development of a 
Local Plan. Of course, in the context of a single project, the outcome is critical and the process 
is only a means to that end. This weakness does not prevent the use of the approach, at least in 
limited form, as we shall see later. 
Another weakness is the lack of focus on the role of elected members, where as we have seen, 
the final local decision-making powers rest. The approach addresses politics in the way it 
considers strategies adopted by and the duties and competences of governance. This follows 
from the critiques of the assumptions generally made about governance and how it works 
(Healey 1997 Chapters 7, 8 & 9). 
The issue of power is another concern with this approach. Issues such as the government's wide 
use of Statutory Instruments with mostly little interference from parliament, compulsory 
purchase and its impact are not addressed. As we have seen in Chapter 4, despite criticisms by 
Tewdyr-Jones and Allmendinger (1998 p. 1980) among others, Healey (1999 pp. 1132-1133) 
argues about the nature of power where she sees it: -
Not as a question of power 'over' or 'power 'to' but as the power to 'make a difference', 
where public argumentation will have the potential to effect change. 
The evidence suggests that this power to effect change is overestimated because as I have 
argued, the Command influence throughout the system is so strong. The evidence has 
demonstrated that this 'power to' may only be relevant in the dimension of Challenge and that, 
in any case, is almost the antithesis of the collaborative approach (Tewdyr-Jones and 
Allmendinger 1998 p. 1987). 
As we have already noted in Chapter 4, there has been significant critique of Habermas's work, 
notably by Tewdyr-Jones & Allmendinger (1998 pp. 1975-1989). They have a specific focus on 
how stakeholders and other actors my act teleologically, normatively or dramaturgically and the 
lack of any guarantee that actors may act openly and honestly. These points are clearly valid but 
I would have to say that within the confines of the interface we are considering, such actions are 
normally hardly likely to be profitable. I say this because any private organisation e.g. Safeway 
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or P&G that is trying to put down roots in a particular location needs to build 'community 
capital'. By this I mean the need to be seen and accepted as a good citizen in the community. 
This clearly includes establishing a good relationship with the local authority, including the 
planners. This sort of long-term relationship is hardly possible if the evidence proves at some 
point that the first interactions have been less than open and honest. It will be noted that I am 
using a very limited area of Habermas's communicative work here as being germane to my 
thesis and from this standpoint, Habermas has some potential use as we shall see later. 
11.5 What am I proposing? 
The last two sections have discussed the policy and management implications of this research. 
These two sets of implications can be used as a basis for making prescriptive proposals for 
dealing with the interface between public and private organisations in the context of the 
planning system. 
Summary of the argument 
At the beginning of this chapter the big question was asked - is there a better way in which the 
interface can be managed by both sides to their mutual benefit? I believe the answer is yes. 
There cannot be an argument in favour of the kind of process described in the three case studies 
nor can there be any desire to work with such inadequate quality of interface and relationships. 
These views were confirmed in interviews carried out with participants at Bath and Francis 
A venue and TWDC representatives did not demur when P&G made similar statements after the 
East Quayside Public Inquiry. A point here is that it is conceivable that a council may wish to 
have the decision taken out of their hands from a local political standpoint. This could have 
been an influence at Bath and at Francis Avenue. If the applicant is eventually forced to appeal, 
the final decision is than taken over the councillors' heads and they may thus avoid the 'blame' 
for the decision. 
What then is the better way? First, I firmly believe in the avoidance of problems. Very often, 
this is possible through early recognition of potential problems in a project, not only what they 
are but also why they are problems and where they reside. In this thesis, I have already 
established two frameworks that I believe will help in this problem area. The overall framework, 
based on the differentiated dimension of Command (Exhibit 11.3) can enable discussion of 
purpose, policy and law and specifically the difference between government and local policy. 
The Analytical Framework (Exhibit 11.2) has proved to be a useful analytical tool and will 
bring detailed focus on specific problems together with the Project Management framework in 
Exhibit 11.1. 
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The second point is the importance of collaboration. I shall propose a framework that I see as a 
'collaborative' model based on the modified version of Healey's approach with an emphasis on 
the utility of Habermasian communicative ethics. As we have seen in Chapter 10, there was 
little congruence between what actually happened in the cases and the Institutional Framework 
(Exhibit 10.1 ). Having said that, Healey's collaborative approach does cross connect with the 5 
Cs and the Analytical Framework. Collaboration is a key dimension of both frameworks as are 
the Contract issues. The attraction of this modified collaborative approach is that it addresses a 
number of these issues that are not the focus of earlier approaches and by its very nature, is 
heavily focused on collaboration. In this context there is also consideration of the type and 
quality of communication, another problem area in the case studies. Here the Habermas model 
can help. Habermas' s description of the different types of communication showed up, only too 
clearly, the imperfections in this area in our three cases. 
The importance of Culture is also emphasised in this approach and we have seen the 
consequences of lack of understanding of this dimension of planning in the case studies. 
Lastly, Challenge IS recognised for its potential importance, particularly to the private 
organisation. 
How to use the model 
I would treat this model as I would treat a Master Plan. I have produced many Master Plans for 
manufacturing and commercial sites over the years and found them invaluable. Having said that, 
they can also be a cause of concern because people can assume that the plan is 'cast in stone'. 
This, of course, is far from the truth. It is no more than a snapshot in time of what might be 
possible but possibly will not happen. It is only as good as the current project and its effect on 
the plan. This is true of this model. As we have seen earlier, every project is different and 
different issues will arise and can be accommodated. 
The important point is that both sides are made to think at the outset of their interface. The 
planners might very well use the model at an initial meeting to start this thinking process, 
particularly with an applicant having a large project and no experience of the planning system. 
It might be argued that such an applicant would have expert guidance from a consultant 
surveyor so why would any thing more be necessary. I have seen such an expert cause problems 
for the client when the expert did not know the area and brought 'London' thinking to a 
provincial council that was very unwilling to accept his input. 
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Neither side should have any fear of the issues shown up in the model. Ethics might be seen as 
a delicate topic but that is no reason for avoiding it. Indeed willingness to discuss topics of this 
nature may well be keys to a collaborative approach and the use of this model. 
The Model 
The model I am proposing brings together nine dimensions of planning that have been the 
subject of much of the work in these last three chapters of this thesis. These are combined with 
issues discussed in the Institutional-Collaborative Framework (Exhibit 10.1) and the project 
issues discussed in the Analytical Framework (Exhibit 11.2). This has all been summarised in a 
new document, Exhibit 11.4, which brings together all the strands outlined above in one 
summary document. In addition, two vitally important complementary parts of the model are the 
Project Management Framework (Exhibit 11.1) and the Dynamics of the Interaction Framework 
(Exhibit 11.2). Exhibit 11.4 brings together nine dimensions of planning That are familiar from 
the previous work in the thesis but nevertheless require some discussion. 
1) Purpose 
As I have already argued in this chapter, this is a fundamental issue that must be addressed at 
the outset. Disagreement over purpose is the first sign of impending troubles in the process. 
2) Government policy 
This fundamental dimension of planning has been discussed at length; suffice it to say here that 
in this model, I am specifically addressing issues from the Institutional-Collaborative 
Framework where government policy is a major determinant. Governance duties and 
competences are not only areas of government's own direct responsibility but government can 
and does determine these duties and competences at local level as a matter of policy. This may 
also be true of public sector procedures and processes. Phelps and Tewdyr-Jones (2000 pp.111-
130) deal with this point in discussing reasons for the failure of the collaborative approach to 
achieve satisfactory outcomes in a particular case of development of a local plan. Despite deep 
involvement of the community, their expectations were not met in part because the language in 
which the Local Plan had to be written was not compatible with the views expressed by the 
members of the community. 
3)Law 
This is the crucial underpinning of government policy and the foundation of the planning 
process but there may be a specific legal issue that impacts the project e.g. a CPO. 
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4) Local Govemment 
As we have already noted, a key point is the location of the issue as a matter of interpretation, 
local policy or implementation. From the standpoint of the private organisation, the location of 
this issue may be a critical factor in their ability to exert influence. The issues addressed in this 
model are an amalgam and re-arrangement of those already discussed in the Analytical and 
Institutional-Collaborative Frameworks. Consistency of strategies has been relocated here from 
Collaboration, as choice of strategies is clearly a matter of policy. Likewise, Public interest, 
Environmental, Aesthetic, Highway and Traffic and Employment issues, Local plans and 
Policies and internal conflicts in the public sector are all included here. This is because these 
issues are all matters of policy concern at local government level even though there may also be 
heavy government policy influence in these critical areas. This list of issues is not necessarily 
comprehensive and other issues may well arise in a specific project. As discussed in government 
policy above, governance competences and duties, together with public sector procedures and 
processes as also included here because these are all issues that can be subject to policy 
decisions. The same is true of the availability and use of expertise and this is of course an 
important consideration in the Institutional model. 
5) Collaboration 
This is really the dimension of planning I would wish to promote as an envelope containing all 
the other dimensions. A truly collaborative model might also show collaboration as the 
lubricating oil that gets into every crevice of the process. Another aspect is the ownership of the 
project. By this I mean that the officers can become almost eo-owners of the project if of course 
they are completely convinced of the 'rightness' of the proposal in every sense. I have twice 
been in the fortunate position of seeing this occur. At Egham, the lady chairing the Planning 
Committee and the officers fought for acceptance of P&G's Master Plan for the site because 
they firmly believed that it was good for the community. They did this because the officers had 
been so involved in the development of the scheme, it was almost as if they had designed it 
themselves. 
The issues included here are mostly those similarly covered in the Analytical and Institutional -
Collaborative Frameworks. The involvement of the public and other stakeholders is amplified 
by inclusion of the issue of good understanding of policies. This speaks to Healey's point about 
the legitimacy of strategies in terms of their general understanding. Although networking does 
not appear to have been a major issue in the three cases, it did exist and at Bath it had some 
influence mostly between the City Council and GOSW. It may be important, therefore, to 
attempt to identifY potential networks and how and why they are influential. The other issues 
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are obvious as they cover interaction between the private organisation and the politicians, 
officers and just how the private organisation is involved in the process. 
6) Communication 
This has been separated out from Collaboration as shown in the Institutional-Collaborative 
Framework (Exhibit 10.1 ). The reason for this separation is the importance I attach to the 
quality of communication and how the case studies illustrated consistently inadequate quality of 
communication. This is bad enough when it is occurring between the planners and private 
organisation but if other stakeholders become involved i.e. the public, objectors et a!, the 
situation becomes much worse. This can be seen very well at a Public Inquiry when the 
proceedings can reach a level of technical/legal obfuscation leaving supposed 'experts' 
confounded. I believe we can benefit from some assistance from Habermas in this matter 
because he offers a rather simple framework that addresses the difficulties in communication. 
Habermas argues that there are four critical conditions for an effective communication between 
two or more people: -
1) What is being communicated is comprehensible; 
2) Something must be communicated which is factually true; 
3) The communicator must be sincere; 
4) An understanding is being sought so the communication must be legitimate within 
certain moral norms and conventions shared by all parties to the communication. 
These simple conditions are important considerations in the validity of communications 
between participants in the interface we are considering. It would be interesting to see the 
results of the adoption of this framework at a Public Inquiry or in the Courts. 5 Taylor (1998 p. 
124) draws attention to an investigation by Kemp into the Windscale public inquiry held in 
1977, which found in favour of a nuclear reprocessing plant being built. Using Habermas's 
conditions outlined above, Kemp found the final report contained inconsistencies, omissions 
and misrepresentations of evidence, so failing the tests of factual truth and sincerity. Kemp went 
on to conclude that the final decision was made on the basis of distorted communication and not 
on the 'force of the better argument'. 
Habermas continues with his three forms of reasoning. Instrumental - technical reasoning 
linking ends to means and evidence to conclusions. Moral reasoning, focused around values and 
ethics. Emotive - aesthetic reasoning, derived from emotive experiences. He argues that the 
second and third forms have been crowded out by the first, the scientific, rational type of 
reasoning because it is more associated with economic and political life. All three should be 
given equal weight and the language of all three types of reasoning must be included in 
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discourse. Practical reasoning frequently does not separate facts from values or emotions from 
our deployment of material resources, as there is often a total mix up of data, issues, priorities 
etc. Like the four conditions for effective communication, these three forms of reasoning all 
have resonances with the quality of communication in the three case studies. 
I find these seven points are extremely helpful and potentially useful tools, particularly in a 
situation where communications are deteriorating. They are essential components of the 
Communication dimension of the model I am proposing if this model is to be effectively 
collaborative. 
7) Contract 
The importance of this dimension of planning cannot be overestimated. Both Analytical and 
Institutional-Collaborative Frameworks addressed this in similar ways and are so addressed in 
this model. Previously, I have suggested there are two contracts. One is the delivery of a 
determination of the application and there is an implicit contract for this 'project' to deliver this 
contract avoiding undue strain on resources, minimising uncertainty and meeting a specific date. 
There is nothing magical about this but it tends to be something that just happens eventually 
unless both parties are determined to have an effective process. This contract must be discussed 
at the outset if an effective process is to be put in place (See Endnote 4). The other contract is of 
course for the delivery of the project itself. It is an imperative that the private organisation 
delivers the scope of the project as agreed. This is also where strict compliance with the 
conditions attached to an approval, including planning gain and legal agreements, is absolutely 
vital. Given that unexpected and or onerous conditions are often the source of challenge, it must 
be said here that it is possible to influence the conditions. This is only a realistic possibility if 
there has been at least something resembling a collaborative approach. Handled properly, these 
matters can be crucial to the building of community capital. 
8) Culture 
The importance of this dimension of planning has been emphasised throughout this thesis but 
cannot be overemphasised. Sadly, as we saw at East Quayside, the ethical and moral issues 
raised by the behaviour of both sides, was only loosely addressed. If the private organisation 
really does not understand what makes the public sector organisation tick, why not say so? 
Why not say this is uncharted territory for us? If the councillors and officers said to a multi-
national company they really wanted to know what made it tick. I believe much 
misunderstanding could be avoided if discussion of culture was on the agenda. It is galling, to 
say the least, to sit through an attack on your own company when you know that the views 
being expressed can be wholly refuted by reference to the facts. 
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9) Challenge 
Again, both the Analytical and Institutional-Collaborative Frameworks address this important 
dimension of the system. The issues addressed here combine both frameworks. Challenge has 
been placed at the bottom of the nine dimensions because it is an indication of failure of the 
process if resort has to be made to it. Whatever else, it ought not to be one of the topmost 
agenda items at the start of discussions with the planners. 
Th issue of suspicion and lack of trust has been left out of the model deliberately. It was 
originally included under Collaboration in the Analytical Framework. Whilst it was a feature of 
all three cases, it was the result of many other problems and thus a secondary issue. I would 
argue that if suspicion and lack of trust become apparent, they are sure indicators of a faltering 
process. They ought to have no place in a collaborative approach. 
11.6 The Research Questions 
The research questions have been answered and the answers are summarised here using the 
same numbering as in Chapter 1. 
I) Chapter 10 has explored and explained the theoretical underpinning of the operation of the 
process as experienced in the cases. This confirmed the mainly procedural nature of planning as 
it operates in the context we are considering. At the same time, New Right and Sub Central 
Government influences were identified as well as normative elements at least in Faludi's 
concept of substantive planning theory dealing with outcomes. The 5 Cs have also been shown 
to have explanatory power as well as their utility in this thesis as analytical tools. 
2) Critical factors built into the system are the powerful influence of Command, the negotiating 
process rather than a collaborative process, the regularly dysfunctional nature of the 
'communicative process', the lack of a contractual relationship between the parties and the 
unrecognised cultural differences. 
3) Much uncertainty existed in the three cases, with many different causes e.g. the interventions 
of the Secretary of State's at Bath, but much of the problem arose out of manageable issues e.g. 
technical issues. A successful application essentially completes the process with a contract 
between the local authority and the applicant but there is no contract dealing with how the 
process will be managed. Thus, while a contractual relationship may not resolve all uncertainty, 
it can be helpful in resolving many of the underlying problems. 
4) There are methodologies for managing the planning process and they have been discussed at 
length in Chapter 10. The key factors are an approach involving Collaboration and the three 
cases demonstrated the need for a form of contractual relationship to avoid the uncertainty and 
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resource implications that existed. There were strong influence of Culture s at work in all the 
cases but there was no recognition of these influences and this critical dimension of planning. 
5) The causes of the problems due to policy and implementation have been successfully 
investigated and analysed. Consequently, in this chapter, the implications for policy and 
management have been determined. 
6) In all three cases and indeed at Alnwick, the delays, uncertainties and resource costs thus the 
ensuing conflicts seemed to be assessed differently. In each case, the private organisation 
wanted to get the problem resolved and get on with their business. This did not appear to be the 
case with the public sector organisations 
7) The thesis has presented a prescriptive model that can offer improvements in the process for a 
better quality interface and improved relations for both sides. 
11.7 Implications for future work 
The model I am proposing needs first to be tested in a working situation. If I were still working, 
I would do this on my next project. Second, more work needs to be done on Healey's 
collaborative model. Whilst I subscribe to many of the points of critique made by Allmendinger 
and Tewdyr-Jones among others, I do believe this approach has something to offer but it has to 
be in a form that is useable by the planners. Thirdly, the question arises, can we generalise from 
these cases? It is not possible to generalise across the broad sweep of spatial planning given the 
narrow context of this thesis. However, we can suggest that if the cases were representative of 
the typical processes in the planning system, it would be possible to generalise in terms of 
p!:0jects. It has also been argued that the empirical evidence has supported the range of project 
issues summarised in Exhibit 9.1. Indeed, when shown an early copy of this Framework, the 
Property Director of Safeway said they were familiar to him across his projects. What these 
cases demonstrate is there are aspects of planning that are common features of all planning 
practice. Likewise, as we see in Exhibit 11.3, government policy, law, interpretation, local 
policy and implementation are all features likely to arise widely across practice. Within these 
limitations, it will be possible to generalise from these three cases. 
11.8 Conclusions 
This thesis has covered a wide range of territory in attempting to answer the big question -
In the interface between the planning system and private organisations, can a practical 
approach be developed that can improve the management of that interface to the benefit 
of both sides? 
I believe this thesis reflects a research project that has fulfilled its aim of answering that 
question positively. 
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My experiences with the planning system have frequently been less than successful in terms of 
the conflicts that have arisen and far from ideal in terms of the quality of the interface. I 
believed there must be a better way. This conviction has been supported by anecdotal evidence 
from others and reinforced by the Property Director of Safeway plc, who immediately 
recognised the relevance of my Analytical Framework. Of course I had no idea what this better 
way might be but I began to realise that I had used a very elementary version of the 
collaborative approach in my last two projects. This was before I had discovered 
Institutionalism or Collaborative approaches. Neither of these projects was free of problems but 
at least I was able to establish with the officers, something of what I now recognise as a mild 
level of collaboration. 
This thesis has provided a new conceptual framework together with a strong body of widely 
varied empirical evidence. The development of the Analytical Framework followed by the 
development of the concept of the 5 Cs as dynamic dimensions of planning has enabled a 
particular method of analysis of the case study narratives to be used. This methodology has 
shown up consistent patterns across these disparate cases and in particular, the overarching 
influence of Command in the planning process. 
The literature search not only led to the outline of the development of the planning system in the 
post war period (Chapter 3) but also to the discovery of Healey's work. This work had 
attractions because of its attempts to deal with aspects of planning that complemented the issues 
I had already uncovered in the Analytical framework and the 5 Cs. The focus on collaboration, 
communication and culture appeared to be specifically applicable to the development of a 
'better way'. This led in turn to the development of the Institutional-Collaborative - Approach 
and Framework. 
The empirical evidence has illustrated the gap between theory and practice in the sense that 
what actually happened was far removed from the supposed new paradigm of the 
communicative turn. In practice, what we found was instrumental rationality or procedural 
planning apart from the New Right approach of East Quayside. Speaking as an engineer I 
would have to argue that theory is fine but the question is - can it be applied usefully? 
Institutionalism, the communicative turn, the collaborative approach or whatever version is 
under consideration is fine as an approach to policy analysis but has it been used effectively at 
the coalface? From my reading the answer is no but that does not prevent application of parts of 
the theory in an appropriate context. 
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The 5 Cs have been an important concept because as we can see in Exhibit 11.3, it enables an 
analysis of where there are areas of Command amenable to influence by Collaboration and-or 
Contract. What I have argued is that even within the law as it stands, it is possible to allow the 
dimensions of Collaboration and Contract to influence some aspects of Command and 
Challenge. 
All this work has allowed the development of the final Collaborative Framework (Exhibit 11.4). 
This Framework is effectively a summary of my research and is, I believe, based on sound 
theoretical foundations supported by the strong empirical evidence. It has the added utility of 
practical use. 
The approach to planning from public and private sectors is different, partly because of the 
power relationship but also because of the business orientation of the private organisation. As 
we have discussed earlier in this chapter, successfully obtaining a planning approval is critically 
important to the private organisation, hence the application itself can be seen as a project in its 
own right. This situation calls for effective management of the planning interface by the private 
organisation if they are not to find themselves potentially suffering a fate comparable with those 
described in the three cases. I believe it is in the interests of both sides to adopt a collaborative 
approach and my proposed model offers a framework for achieving an effective process. Thus 
my Project Management model (Exhibit 11.1) is an approach that has proved its effectiveness in 
over thirty years experience managing projects. As we have seen in this chapter, it raises issues 
and questions that cannot and must not be dodged if a project is to have a chance of success. 
Much of planning theory focuses on 'the planners' giving the impression of faceless 
bureaucrats, where motives are at least suspect. Indeed within the concept of the communicative 
turn, planning might well be de-professionalised (Allmendinger & Tewdyr-Jones 2002 p. 17). 
This I find unacceptable. This thesis has demonstrated the complexity of the planning system 
and it is difficult to see how non-professionals could manage this crucially important public 
sector responsibility effectively. Another point is that they are people doing a difficult job where 
they are not even the final decision makers. This all brings me back to the big question. I 
believe the planners are critical actors in a process that, with their cooperation and goodwill 
would indeed lead to a better way. 
This research has dealt with a complex subject covering many facets of what is a complex 
interface. Out of this complexity, I have developed a model approach that can be used in 
practice. The policy implications of the research have already been addressed earlier in this 
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chapter, as have been the management implications. The model addresses policy, project and 
management issues and is capable of reflecting additional issues specific to a particular case. 
My fundamental conclusion is that a collaborative approach on the lines of this model is likely 
to ensure a smoother and more effective process. This means a process in which the delays, 
uncertainties and costs reflected by the empirical evidence can at the very least be minimised for 
both sectors, public and private. Have I found a better way? I believe I have shown the answer 
to be yes. 
CHAPTER 11- NOTES 
1 In P&G, Engineering led an activity to produce a 'Business Needs Statement' or purpose. This activity 
involved all the key actors form Manufacturing, R&D, Business management, Engineering etc. with a 
sheet of flip chart paper. The group attempted to write a statement of need that could withstand all 
attempts by that group to demolish it. Many favourite projects did not see the light of day after this 
exercise, much less submission to management, thus much useless effort was saved. 
2 The author succeeded in exercising influence in a major new factory in Germany. The policy called for 
warehouses of a maximum size of 5,000 sq. ft. and non-contiguous with the production area that was 
itself 120,000 sq. ft. By producing detailed technical arguments about the choice of fire-resistant materials 
of construction (concrete), heavy sprinkler densities, bigger than normal above ground dedicated fire 
water storage, the company's fire record in similar plants in the US and the company's insistence on safe 
practice, we were able to build three 100,000 sq. ft. warehouses for raw materials and finished product 
contiguous with the production area. This made a crucial difference to the efficient operation of the plant 
without compromising safety. Four years later, three more warehouses of the same individual size plus a 
further 80,000 sq.ft. of production area were added, all of the existing and new space being contiguous. 
It must be understood that this was achieved with the full co-operation of the City and Fire authorities. 
Their support in persuading the permit granting authority was crucial. The company also understood that 
it would only be possible as long as the position of all the relevant authorities was not compromised in 
terms to their statutory duties and responsibilities to the public. 
3 In two projects where the author was project manager, at Egham and Brooklands, P&G agreed to take 
responsibility for informing all possible local stakeholders about P&G, the site and the project. The 
Council officially informed the statutory authorities in accordance with practice. This was a highly 
successful initiative in both cases because it assisted the planners with their workload and it enabled the 
stakeholders to satisfY their concerns. 
4 The author had such success with the P&G project to build a new Headquarters at Brooklands in Surrey. 
The site already enjoyed outline consent for offices but the actual sizes of each building and all the other 
details of design, finishes, parking, landscaping etc. were to be determined by Elmbridge Council - a 
'difficult council'. At the first meeting with the Chief Planning Officer in August, I asked what was the 
date of the first meeting of the Planning Committee at which our application could be considered. He 
said theoretically mid November but from a practical standpoint it was impossible. My rejoinder was that 
it would be submitted on that date, the issue was simply what could P&G do to help the planners make it 
happen. A lot of collaborative effort ensued and the application was submitted to Committee on the mid 
November date and approved. The following morning, the Chief Planning Officer telephoned to say that 
in his view, the impossible had been achieved. 
5 An illustration of this point occurred in a different context in a case in the Court of Appeal in which the 
author was involved. This involved a complex disagreement over a commercial lease for a building P&G 
had acquired through a takeover. The two QC's appearing for the owner and for P&G were two of the 
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top four silks at the commercial property bar. P&G's barrister opened the case when, after some minutes, 
the presiding Appeal Court judge, Lord Justice Staughton intervened saying:-
Mr. Neuburgher, I know nothing about commercial property law and if we continue in your 
present vein, we will be here for a long time because I shall be asking many questions. If 
however, we proceed in a language I understand, then things will be much improved. 
Both QC's got the message and the process of the case was improved enormously, particularly for the 
layman. 
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lEXHmnr ILl 
lPROJJEC'f MANAGEMENT 
NOTE - The impact of topics I to IV, outlined below, are set out in order of importance, i.e. 
Purpose must be clearly established first. 
1) PURPOSE Why? 
What is the task as seen by the hierarchy, the doers, the clients? (Business Need Statement?) 
What, if anything, is unique about the task? If unique, how is this issue to be addressed? 
What are the expectations of others who are involved, even those peripheral to the project? 
What are the measurements of success/failure? Who decides on these measures? 
Are there differing notions of success criteria between participants? How will these be 
handled? 
11) STRUCTURE 
Reporting lines- are they clear- solid/dotted/fuzzy- who reports to whom? 
Are goals clear - well understood? 
Resources - people of the right type and quality - enough people - right equipment? 
Ill) PROCESS How? 
What are the decision making mechanisms? 
Is accountability clearly defined and agreed? 
Feedback mechanisms - frequency - effectiveness - influence on process? 
Meetings- Type- Working, information only? Frequency? Agenda setting? Freedom to 
initiate meetings? 
Critique- How is critique to be handled and when- ongoing, mid task, on completion of task? 
IV) ROLES Who? 
Who speaks for the whole team to the outside world? 
Who does what? 
Is there a responsibility chart? 
Who manages key decisions? 
OTHER ISSUES 
A) CULTURE 
Is there recognition of the different organisational, professional cultures of participants? 
Are such differences addressed? How? 
B) COST 
Is there a clearly understood and properly underwritten cost estimate? 
Are uncertainties in cost projections covered e.g. unlisted items, contingencies etc.? 
How is cost to be monitored? How will potential overruns be foreseen and corrected? 
C) SCHEDULE 
Is there a clearly understood schedule for the project? 
Is this schedule agreed at the outset by all participants? 
Monitoring of progress - when, how? 
How are potential delays foreseen and then resolved? 
D) QUALITY 
Has the issue of quality of outcomes both organisational and physical been addressed? 
How will this be measured? 
E) RISK 
What risks are involved? What levels of risk? Who can influence the risks? 
Is the level of risk justified? 
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JEXJH[liJ!Ul' 11.2 
ANAl!.... YTICAL lFRAMlEWORK- :U:V 
AN AlL YTJICAJL lFRAMJEWORK 
PROJEC1' li§§UE§ NOTES 
I) COMMAND a) Planning & associated Law- foundation of the process 
b) Compulsory Purchase Law - resistance to Orders 
c) Compensation- Limits- value of property 
d) Govt. Policies - Planning, Regeneration, Environmental 
e) Local Plans & Policies- land use, influence, timing 
f) Public Interest - what is it? who defines it? 
g) Regional Government Office role 
h) Role of the Secretary of State for the Environment 
j) Environmental issues e.g. Air Pollution 
k) Aesthetic Issues - who decides? how? Real impact? 
I) Highway & Traffic issues - impact on the community 
m) Local politicians - role, attitudes and influence 
n) Officers- role, attitudes and influence 
o) Public Sector Procedures & processes 
2) CHALLENGE a) Appeals - rights - process - resources 
b) Objections - rights -quality of objections - strength of 
case - impact 
c) Public Inquiries- the adversarial process-
Inspectorate - appeals - decisions 
d) Judicial Review (permission required & limited scope 
for review) & adversarial_Qrocess of the Courts 
3) COLLABORATION a) Public information _process- how and by whom? 
b) Public participation- stakeholders 
c) Non-elected agencies- difficulties in negotiations 
d) Networks- which ones, who is involved, how & why? 
e) Strategic inconsistencies between governance and the 
private sector 
f) Officer I private organisation interaction 
g) Private organisation involvement 
h) Lack of contact between Members & applicant 
i) Conflict between LA depts and Intra LA disputes 
j) Suspicion -lack of trust on both sides 
4)CONTRACT a) Uncertainty_ of process- outcomes & timing 
b) Private org_anisation _IJ_erformance 
c) Resource costs of _l)focess and decisions to all sides 
d) Effi21()yment issues- local or external to area? 
e) Planning Gain- new community facilities, road 
improvements etc. 
f) Legal agreements - Section 106 Agreements 
5)CULTURE a) Cultural differences between Public & Private 
org_anisations 
b) Ethical issues- Public and Private sectors 
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lEXJHili!Uf 11.3 
CULTURE 
GOV1ERNMJEN1r 
COMMAND 
Government Policy 
Law 
-
~ ~ 
~ , 
I 
Interpretation A p JRPOSJE I'>.. 
CULTURE 
""'!. 11" 
Local Policy 
COLL lBORATION 
...... Do... 
Implementation "''Il Ill"' PRIVATE 
.... cor TRACT ... ORGANISA l'ION 
..... 
"" 
COMMAND 
..... CHA !LLENGE 
..... 
LOCAL 
GOVERNANCE 
CULTURE 
Dynamics of the Interaction 
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A MODl!FlED COLLABORATIVE FRAMEWORJK JEXI!f][]IU'][' HA 
:U:§§lJlE§ 
1) Purpose The congruence or lack of it between purposes of public sector & private organisations 
2) Government Policy a) Policies are Effective (Resource Allocation & Regulatory Power) 
b) Governance duties (Role, attitudes & influence)- Democratic, Effective, Accountable 
c) Governance competences Secretary of State 
Regional Govt. Offices 
d) Public Sector Procedures, processes & expertise 
3) Law a) Planning & associated Law 
b) Compulsory Purchase Law I Compensation Law 
4) Local Government a) Consistency of strategies with private organisation 
b) Public Interest- what is it? who defines it? 
c) Environmental issues e.g. Air Pollution 
d) Aesthetic Issues - who decides? how? Real impact? 
Location of the issue: - e) Highway & Traffic issues- impact on the community 
a) Interpretation OR f) Employment issues 
b) Local policies OR g) Local Plans & Policies - land use, influence, timing, 
c) Implementation h) Governance competences Local politicians and Officers 
i) Governance duties (Role, attitudes & influence)- Democratic, Effective, Accountable 
j) Public Sector Procedures, processes & expertise 
k) Conflict between LA Depts and Intra LA disputes 
5) Collaboration a) Public information process- how and by whom? Public participation- How? 
b) Stakeholder involvement- Who? Why? When? Where? How? 
c) Policies are well understood 
d) Networks - which ones, who is involved, how & why? 
e) Officer I private organisation interaction 
f) Private organisation involvement 
g) Lack of contact between Members & applicant 
6) Communication a) Instrumental- technical reasoning (linking ends to means & evidence to conclusions) 
b) Moral reasoning (focused around values and ethics) 
c) Emotive - aesthetic reasoning (derived from emotive experiences 
d) What is being communicated is comprehensible. 
e) Something must be communicated which is factually true. 
f) The communicator must be sincere. 
g) An understanding is being sought so the communication must 
be legitimate within shared moral norms and conventions 
7) Contract a) Uncertainty of process - outcomes and timing 
b) Private organisation performance 
c) Resource costs to all sides of process and decisions 
d) Planning Gain - new community facilities, road 
improvements etc. 
e) Legal agreements - Section I 06 Agreements 
8) Culture a) Conflict of cultures - Public & Private organisations 
b) Ethical issues- Public v Private sectors 
9) Challenge a) Appeals- rights, process, resources- accessibility of information 
b) Objections - rights -quality & strength of case - impact 
c) Public Inquiries- the adversarial process- decisions 
-
-----
d) Courts - the adversarial process - Appeals 
-~-J~dicial Review- permission- limited scope 
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